

A sepia-toned portrait of I. A. Richards, a man with glasses, wearing a suit and tie, looking slightly to the right. The portrait is positioned in the upper left quadrant of the cover.

I. A. Richards and Indian Theory of Rasa

Gupteshwar Prasad

Introduction: The Theory of Rasa
An Outline of the Literary Principles
of I. A. Richards.
Emotional States and Bhavas.
Poetic Experience and Rasanubhuti.
Communication and Sadharanikarana.
Emotive Meaning and Rasa-Dhvani.
Imagination and Pratibha.
Appetency and Aversion: Maitri and Satruta
of Rasa.
Rhythm and Metre: Laya and Chanda
Conclusion: I. A. Richards as a
Tatvabhinivesi Critic.
Sanskrit Reference.
Bibliography.

This One



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Gupteshwar Prasad

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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The present doctoral dissertation is the fruit of my study of the literary criticism of I.A. Richards in the light of the *Rasa* theory. Indeed, on the face of it, such an idea entails the comparison and contrast of the altogether different cultural and metaphysical and aesthetic tradition. I am fully conscious of the difficulties and dangers involved in such a research project. Richards is a rather forbidding, if not quite a frightening, critic for this means a careful and diligent study of aesthetics, literature, semantics, psychology and philosophy. Another challenge is basic insecurity of comparative aesthetics. To judge Richards by the rules of *Rasa*, in the words of Dryden, is just like judging Shakespeare by Aristotelian standard. At least to judge Shakespeare by Aristotle is in conformity with the European tradition to which both belong. But to judge Richards by *Rasa* theory might appear a bit odd. We may note how Eliot was dazzled by Indian metaphysics or W.B. Yeats by Tagore's mysticism. Nevertheless, this study has a value of its own and it might prove rewarding in many ways. It is likely to stimulate a new awakening so greatly needed at this hour. It may also give a new incentive for further explorative studies of this kind. It may also help us understand Richards' literary criticism better and in a new light.

Richards is by far the most important and influential critic of our time. Blackmur describes Richards as an "admirable critic"¹ and Watson describes him as "the most influential theorist of the century".² Fowler looks upon him as the "father of modern critical theory".³ Hyman pays the highest tribute to him when he observes: "no treatment of modern criticism is possible without discussing Richards, since in the most literal sense he created it."⁴ With the only exception of Eliot, Richards' influence has been the most fructifying of all the critics of our time.⁵ Of the three

1 Blackmur, R.P. : "A critic's Job of Work", *Five Approaches of Literary criticism*, ed. Scott, W.S. (New York, 1968), p. 331.

2 Watson, George : *The Literary Critics* (London, 1964), p. 177.

3 Fowler, Roger : *The Languages of Literature* (London, 1971) p. 109.

4 Hyman, Stanley Edgar : *The Armed Vision : A Study in the Method of Modern Literary Criticism* (New York, 1952), p. 1971)

5 Manly, John M and Fickert, Edith : ed. *Contemporary English Literature*

able logicians and psychologists listed by Henry M. Peyre, Richards occupies the foremost position, the other two being John Crowe Ransom and Kenneth Burke.⁶ In the words of F.R. Leavis; "Mr Richards has immensely improved the instrument of analysis and has consolidated and made generally accessible the contributions of Coleridge."⁷ This commendation of Richards' critical achievements goes with Eliot's tribute "whether we agree or not with any or all of his conclusions, whether we admit or deny that his method is adequate, we must admit that the work of Mr. I.A. Richards will have been of cardinal importance in the history of literary criticism."⁸ Richards' long and stormy career as critic and teacher was dedicated to the proper scientific interpretation of literature, the vindication of the psychological theory of poetic value, and the demonstration of the value and significance of practical criticism. The close relationship he establishes between the poet and the sympathetic reader is consistent with Eliot's concept of unified sensibility. His literary criticism has been studied from various angles - linguistic, logical, psychological and pedagogical. It has not, however, been studied so far from the point of view of Indian poetics, much less from the point of view of the Indian theory of *Rasa*. He is, in many ways, a typical representative of modern spirit. There is no figure in the whole range of contemporary literary criticism who combines such a high standard of scholarship, freshness of approach and extraordinary discerning taste. He has the credit to raise and confront, in the most seminal way, most of the major problems of art and literature. And it seems reasonable to suppose that the challenge of this comprehensiveness has considerably helped to stimulate the interest of many English and American critics to look at literature from an entirely new angle. Whereas Eliot's criticism is a kind of 'Workshop criticism' and a great part of Leavis's criticism is vitiated by his personal prejudices, Richards' approach to literature as a psychologist

(London, 1935), p. 102.

6 Henry, M. Peyre, : "The Criticism of Contemporary Writing : A French view", *Lectures in Criticism* (Panthen Books, The John Hopkins University, 1949), p. 121.

7 Leavis, F.R. : "What is wrong with criticism?" *Scrutiny*, vol I, No.2, Sept; 1932, p. 133.

8 Eliot, T. S. : *The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism* (London, 1955), p. 123.

(iii)

and a semanticist has given prime importance to the study of language even in such emotive fields as poetry. He refused to regard poetic activity as essentially different from other kinds of human activity. Moreover, he gives a detailed account of the creative process of art.

"The taste of the twenties", as M.C. Bradbrook observes, "was for the analytic-as distinct from the complex - and the idiosyncratic in literature."⁹ The literary criticism of the twentieth century is qualitatively different from any previous criticisms and it is by its very nature "eclectic, relativistic and learned."¹⁰ It would be no exaggeration to say that we live in an age of critical anarchy. The recent proliferation of critical schools, concepts, models, methodologies and metalanguages has left us baffled and unable to choose between conflicting approaches and points of view. As Hyman puts it, "one of the principal implications of modern criticism is its development towards science."¹¹ Richards has been fed up with the "superficial estimates of the professional critics"¹² and "close-capped starting points of certain quite opposite lines of poetic theory."¹³ His literary criticism keeps pace with the taste of the time. In his adolescence, Richards grew up to be a rationalist to the core of his being. His nature revolted against the idea of accepting anything uncritically just on the basis of faith. His reason had to be satisfied by convincing and incontrovertible evidence before he could accept the validity of any theory or principle. The critical theories of many critical stalwarts - Greek, Italian, German and British, were set at naught by him. Unlike Eliot who speaks with the authority of a major poet and also unlike Leavis who is primarily a practical and descriptive critic, Richards is an aesthetic theorist who tries to solve the problems of art and beauty with the detachment of a scientist. Orwell is a moralist critic and not an aesthete. He is interested in attitudes to life rather than in Beauty. His criticism is inextricably blended with

9 Bradbrook, M.C. : "Eliot's Critical Method", T.S> Eliot : A Study of his Writings by Several Hands, ed. B. Rajan (London : 1971), p. 120.

10 Hornes, Charles, S. Russell, Edwin & Frazer : ed. The Major Critics : The Development of Literary Criticism (New York, 1952), p. 10

11 Hyman: The Armed Vision, p. 9.

12 Worsford, W. Basil : Judgement in Literature (Delhi, 1968), p. 58.

13 Criticism Today : A Report from America, Essays in Criticism, Vol. VI, Jan 1956, No. 1 pp. 1.2.0

politics. Virginia Woolf is not a systematic critic and her aim is only to communicate a certain insight about a work, an impression of a writer or of an age, a suggestive or stimulating idea that is adumbrated but never fully developed. Her criticism has neither Dr. Johnson's assurance nor Coleridge's profundity. Richards asks questions which lie at the very core of aesthetics. While the majority of critics of his time merely parroted the opinions of the last master critics, Richards came to introduce a new critical approach. His scientific bent of mind did not allow him to acquiesce in long standing conclusions. He tried to understand - not so much the concrete production as the experiences connected with it, the manner of its effect, the mental, emotional, technical labour of its production, the expression of the artist's ideal embodied in it. Hence, his literary criticism is completely free from all personal, biographical and historical digressions. In fact, he has endeavoured to replace historical or biographical criticisms by more current and practical and semantic criticisms. He has an unfailing dislike for dogmatism. He is often blamed for his undue predilection for the psychological at the expense of the aesthetic side of poetry. But the fact is forgotten that he takes recourse to psychology to save criticism from degenerating to "arbitrary critical principles."¹⁴ "Criticism", as he takes it, "is the endeavour to discriminate between experiences and to evaluate them."¹⁵ And this cannot be done "without some understanding of the nature of experience, or without theories of valuation and communication."¹⁶ However, the difference between the theory of aesthetics and that of science is obvious. Aesthetics is reckoned as the 'study of beauty' whereas pure science is concerned with verifiable truth regarding matter in the world of nature around us. Science can prove experimentally its conclusions by arranging controlled conditions. But aesthetics cannot create objects of artistic beauty; it can only explain the norms of beauty in art-works already created by a poet or an artist. Richards is a true aesthete because he has real love for the understanding of what is beautiful in literature. His criticism is always illuminating, always fresh, always honest. He has a highly

14 Richards : Principles of Literary Criticism (London, 1955), p.2.

15 Ibid., p. 2.

16 Ibid.

cultivated critical faculty and he displays real gusto in the appraisal of literature and formulation of critical principles. Richards started writing soon after the first world war and wrote for over half a century.

In his first published book *The Foundation of Aesthetics*, written in collaboration with C.K.Ogden and James Wood, Richards tried to define beauty and thus laid the foundation of effective criticism. In his extremely influential books *Principles of Literary Criticism* and *Practical Criticism*, he founded his system of poetic values on the concept of the psychologic-physiological 'impulses', largely of the reader. In the reading of poetry, he argued, a greater number of impulses than are usual can be aroused and so harmonised that no suppression is necessary. And the effect on the reader is a sense of ordered life. In his *Coleridge on Imagination*, he tried to bring out Coleridge's theory of Imagination from a new standpoint considering Coleridge as a 'semasiologist'. In his *Speculative Instruments* he modified some of his earlier views on the twin-functions of language. His other works like *Why So Socrates*, *Good Earth and other Poems*, *The Screens and Other Poems* and *Tomorrow Morning*, *Faustus*, have no direct bearing on literary criticism. As a critic Richards is acute, intellectual, analytical and provocative. He is esteemed high for his critical independence, and boldness of his conclusions. The entire corpus of his literary criticism is concerned with some basic problems of literature like emotional appeal, poetic experience, communication, imagination, poetic value, poetic language, rhyme and metre, etc. These are precisely the questions that have been considered in Indian *Rasa* theory. It is to be noted that the critical credo of I.A. Richards has close correspondence with the *Rasa* theory. The Indian *Rasa* theory, in its broad compass, provides close analysis of poetry, poet, reader, poetic experience, communication, imagination, and such other subjects as are related to literature. Richards' literary criticism invites us to study these problems of literature from a psychological angle. It is a fruitful line of investigation to trace out some parallelisms between Richards' critical formulations and the Indian theory of *Rasa*, more so, because the questions raised by Richards and the solutions suggested are not very different from those of the classical

Sanskrit critics. It is a fact that Indian critics evinced great ingenuity while going into the details of almost all the important issues of literature and they divided their problems into segments too subtle and minute to be observed by a non-serious reader. But their broad critical principles are comprehensible enough and remind us again and again of the critical theories put forward by Richards and other modern critics.

In the beginning, I had an idea to study Richards' literary criticism in the light of Indian poetics in general. But later, I had to drop this idea for a more specific study and had to take up only the Indian *Rasa* doctrine for parallelism. This afterthought was the result of my changed view that what was within my scheme could be easily done by taking up *Rasa* doctrine alone. Research projects on such abstruse subjects as aesthetics or psychology-oriented or science-oriented literary criticism are ordinarily dull and difficult. But if one has to take up an explorative research work like this, one has to accept it with all its edges and limitations.

Comparison and contrast have ever remained the two chief tools of the critic. The importance of comparative aesthetics is self-evident. "We study foreign literature to enrich our own, to participate more fully in the true life of the thinking world, and to strengthen the ties of common understanding."¹⁷ The paucity of research work in the area of comparative aesthetics shows that it has not yet received the attention due to it. In masterpieces like *The History of Sanskrit Poetics* in two volumes by Dr. S.K.De, *History of Sanskrit Poetics* by P.V.Kane, *Sanskrit Poetics* by Krishna Chaitanya, *Some Aspects of the Theories of Rasa and Dhvani* by A.Shankaran, *Studies in Sanskrit Aesthetics* by A.C. Sastri, *The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta* by Raniero Gnoli, *Literary Criticism in Ancient India* by Ramranjan Mukherjee, *Philosophy of Aesthetic Pleasure* by P.Panchpagesh Sastri, *A Study in Language and Meaning* by Bhupendra Bhattacharya, *The Problem of Meaning in Ancient Philosophy* by R.C.Pandeya, *The Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus* by P.C. Chakravarty and *Indian Aesthetics and Western Aesthetics* by Dr. K.C.Pandeya are unquestionably invaluable additions to the critical repertory of Sanskrit. But what these outstanding books

17 Gifford, Henry : "English in the University : IV, The use of Comparative Literature", *Essays in Criticism*, Vol. 12, 1962, p. 74.

lack is a comparative view point. A.B. Keith in his *A History of Sanskrit Literature* tried to give a critical and comparative appraisal of Bharata's and Aristotle's dramatic theories in a short compass. Ganganath Jha, in his excellent translation of Mammata's *Kavya Prakasa*, pointed out some western parallelisms here and there in foot notes. Dr. V. Raghavan, for the first time, created our interest in comparative poetics by writing *Bhoja's Sringara Prakasa, Some Concepts of Alankara Sastra and The Number of Rasas* wherein eastern and western writers were placed on common platform. But even in these works, there is no attempt at a full-length comparative study of eastern and western thoughts. D.S. Sharma's brochure *Literary Criticism in Sanskrit and English* and kuppuswami Sastri's *Highways and Byways of Sanskrit Literary Criticism* make an interesting reading and at places suggest parallel eastern and western points of view. The anthology of critical essays entitled *Asian Response to American Literature* edited by C.D. Narasimhalah, which includes a brilliant article entitled "New Criticism and Indian poetics" by P.S. Sastri, is a step forward in this direction. What we need most is not an apology for additional books on Sanskrit poetics but studies on comparative poetics which alone can widen the range of our thought and strengthen mutual contact.

In recent years, the Indian scholars are becoming more and more conscious of their rich heritage in critical theory as a result of which some fruitful attempts have been made to enrich the treasure of comparative aesthetics by the research scholars of different Indian Universities. Dr Harihar Jha's *Kuntaka's Theory of Poetic Structure : A Comparative Study in the Light of its Modern Western Analogues* (Lalit Narain Mithila University, Darbhanga, 1975), Dr. Vishwanath Jha's *A Comparative Study of the Greek concept of Catharsis and the Indian Concept of Guna* (Lalit Narain Mithila University, Darbhanga, 1975), Dr. Vishnu Chandra's *An Examination of the last plays of Shakespeare in the light of Sanskrit dramatic theory* (Udaipur University, 1979), and Dr Madan Gopal's *Drama : Classical Sanskrit and Elizabethan*, Dr Srikrishna Mishra's *Coleridge Abhinavagupta and Comparative Study from the Standpoint of Rasa Theory* (Patna University, 1979), are such new ventures. My own Ph.D. dissertation *The Literary criticism of William Empson and its Indian analogues* (Magadh University, 1969) in which I had studied Empsonian critical technique in the light of the particular affinity which

Empson's theory of ambiguity has with some comparable theories of Indian poetics like *Dhvani* and *Vakrokti* was an humble attempt in this direction. K. Viswanathan's *Essays in Criticism and Comparative Poetics* is also an attempt to compare some eastern and western critical concepts like character and *Patra*, plot and *Vastu*, Tragedy and Sanskrit drama, *Sringara* and Platonism, Imagination and *Pratibha* and Emotional effect : catharsis and *Rasa*.

The crying need and usefulness of comparative aesthetics are now widely felt. This might serve as a corrective to the parochial attitude of the Westerners. Matthew Arnold was fully justified when he observed : "no single event, no single literature is adequately comprehended except in its relation to other events, to other literatures."¹⁸ This goes with Winternitz's saying : "Though the Indians are not flesh of our flesh or bone of our bone, we may yet discover mind of our mind in the world of Indian thought."¹⁹

Richards came to India twice, once in the early twenties for his honeymoon, making the mistake of visiting India in the hot season and again in the fifties, when he made an extensive tour of different Indian Universities. He is also said to have some encounter with Dr. K.C.Pandey of Lucknow University who was a renowned scholar and an authority on Indian aesthetics. Although this came quite late in Richards' life when he had already written all his major books, the very fact that he read Dr. Pandey's books on Indian aesthetics with great interest shows that he must have found community of ideas with his own in Indian aesthetics.

We, however, cannot say it for certain that Richards was influenced by Indian system of thought or Indian aesthetics. His critical technique basically differs from that of the *Acaryas* of *Rasa* school. My problem, therefore, is not to explore oriental influences on Richards' aesthetics but to study and interpret his literary criticism in the light of the Indian theory of *Rasa*. Assuming that the underlying premises of the two literary and related critical traditions are fundamentally different, there still

18 Arnold, Matthew : Inaugural Address, cited, Viswanathan, K. : *Essays in Criticism and Comparative Poetics* (Andhra University Press, 1977), p. 484.

19 Winternitz : *A History of Indian Literature*, Vol. I, tr. Subhadra Jha (Varanasi, 1963), p. 10.

seems ample scope for examining and analysing Richards' critical formulations against the background of the Indian theory of *Rasa*.

It is worth mentioning that Richards' views on Indian literature and grammar are scattered over his critical writings. He refers to *Mimamsa-Nyaya* controversy, the *Prabhakara Mimansakas*, the sacred word AUM, the verbal ecstasies of the *Sufi* mystics, the Buddhist notion of *Satta* (being) *Atta* (self), *Jiva* (living principle) or *puggala* (person) in *The Meaning of Meaning*.²⁰ He quotes the *Upnisad's* mystic utterance *Neti, Neti* (not that, Not that) in *Speculative Instruments*.²¹ This is not to suppose that Richards believes in the Indian *Rasa* theory. If there is any affinity between his critical assumptions and those of the *Acaryas* of *Rasa* school, it is purely accidental.

A study of Richards' literary criticism in the light of the *Rasa* theory, I am confident, will foster a new vision and open a new vista in comparative aesthetics. I am afraid most of the works done on Richards as a literary critic are either shallow or mere doctrinaire. Though there is no dearth of critical literature on other contemporary critics, scant attention has been paid to the literary criticism of Richards and it has not been considered at all from the Indian standpoint. This study is a humble attempt to re-assess the literary criticism of Richards from a comparative standpoint.

I have been often impatient with what may be called pure study of English literature. Similarly, I humbly differ from those purists who plead for pure study of Indian poetics and ask us to be on guard against any western analogue. This is doing injustice to Indian poetics because it is now high time when we should think in terms of world literature and widen our horizon. My conviction is that the broad principles of all the literatures of the world are alike though their outward features may vary on account of differences in culture and civilisation. Comparative aesthetics enables us to discover affinities and resemblances underlying the critical theories of different countries. An attempt to interpret western literary criticism in the light of Indian literary criticism will be consequently of great help in understanding the

20 Ogden, D.K. and Richards, I. A. : *The Meaning of Meaning* (London, 1953), pp. 38-39.

21 Richards, I. A. : *Speculative Instruments* (London, 1955), p. 174.

attitudes of the two countries towards life and literature. It is sometimes argued that it is difficult to correlate Sanskrit critical concepts to western critical concepts or the different definitions of poetry given by Sanskrit Acaryas to those suggested by the western critics. In fact, no two critical concepts or definitions can be the same and so they cannot be rigidly compared. Comparative aesthetics being a treacherous field for study, it is no wonder if one tumbles here and there for right path. As Gifford puts it, "The comparist works under all kinds of difficulty. He has to take many risks, and is more obviously prone to delusions than other critics. But when the study of any single literature today comes to resembles the nations' high-roads - a welter of traffic increasingly caught up in its own fumes - he can feel exhilaration in the open spaces before him, the large and generous vistas where so much is yet to be tried."²²

I have not presumed to write a full-length study of the literary criticism of Richards but have tried to present a detailed study of his literary criticism with particular reference to the Indian theory of *Rasa*. This is the central theme of this thesis, and from this it derives whatever unity it may have - though I have at times elaborated the study of certain critical principles and concepts to cover a wide field.

It may well be that these pages will appeal only to those who are prepared to force their way through a subtle metaphysic to a subtler truth about Indian concept of literature. Narrow, prejudiced and intolerant minds can never comprehend the double interpretative nature of the task undertaken here. "The Oriental", as C.D. Narasimhaiah puts it, "is credited with a subtlety of intellect which had not yet received sufficient critical recognition."²³ This thesis proves this statement.

It may be observed that the echoes of the Indian theory of *Rasa* are evident in the writings of such critics as Eliot, Richards, Leavis and Empson. Some new critics evolved terminology of criticism like 'irony', 'paradox', 'ambiguity', 'texture', 'structure', 'tension', etc. It would seem that the classical Sanskrit rhetoricians also evolved a vocabulary of criticism like *Dhvani*,

22 Gifford, Henry : *Comparative Literature* (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), p. XI.

23 Narasimhaiah, C.D. : *Introduction, Asian Response to American Literature* (Vikas Publications, New Delhi, 1972), p. xix.

Vyanjan, Vakrokti, Rasa, Anumana, Alankara, Aucitya, etc. I have examined the problem in hand from my own angle and have taken the liberty of simply expressing my views with certain emphasis. But this study contains much that needs saying.

After Independence, our social, cultural and linguistic ties with England and other European countries have become stronger than before, with the result that we have become one at least on the level of literature. It has been the misfortune of much English literary criticism written in India in the post-Independence period that it frequently takes up a British author and tries to judge his output in isolation as well as solely by British standards. It is high time now that we should rise above the narrow barriers and learn to understand and appreciate the literature of other countries with an open and un-biased mind. In any case, culture is becoming cosmopolitan. The essential motive behind this thesis, being of a piece of the religion of humanity, as I have done my own bit to bring about a cultural i.e., emotional and imaginative understanding between the East and the West through this kind of comparative critical aesthetic venture, research project, is something which need not be misunderstood. To view the history of India against wider background and point to her contacts with her neighbours is by no means to distract from the Independence and originality of her culture, but only to lay stress on the magnanimity and catholicity of its outlook and taste and its genius for drawing substance and strength from diverse sources. For in no single instance did borrowing result in mere imitation, but led to a thoughtful and harmonious integration of the borrowed feature with the indigenous setting in which it was placed. "East and West", as Radhakrishnan observes, "are both moving out of their historical past towards a way of thinking which shall eventually be shared in common by all mankind even as the material appliances are ...East and West are fertilising each other..."²⁴ The feasibility of the comparison of one literary theory with the other may also be examined without any presupposition or predilection. "This common pool of literature", as K.M.Munshi says, "will enable the reader, Eastern and Western, to understand and appreciate currents of world thought, as also the movements of mind in

24 Radhakrishnan, S. . *Eastern Religions and Western Thought* (O. U. P., 1940), pp. 258-59.

India, which, though they flow through different linguistic channels, have a common urge and aspiration."²⁵ Again, the only way by which we can contribute something to our understanding of British literature is by comparing it with our own and dispassionately judging their relative merits. This will also enrich our critical repertory to a large extent. As Winchester remarks : "there are always such essential differences between great writers that it is idle to attempt to determine their comparative value."²⁶ But nobody would deny that a comparative study of two critics or two critical theories would bring fruitful results.

India produced a galaxy of first rate critics. Critics like Bharata, Anandavardhana, Rajasekhara, Abhinavagupta, Kuntaka, Bhoja, Mammata and in recent years S. Kuppuswami Sastri, V.A. Ramaswami Sastri, P.V.Kane, V. Raghavan, S.K.De, Krishna Chaitanya, etc. are the gems of world literature. Their critical techniques might differ and this is but natural, but the basic questions posed by them and the solutions arrived at by them may have a good deal in common. It is a fact that peculiarities of sensibility and outlook separate the East from the West. But this gulf can be bridged and the twain may meet. The new consciousness which has now started growing is almost compelling several Indians to look at British literature through Indian eyes. This augurs well for the future of both India and England. It is not true that whatever is old is always correct. Nor is it true that whatever is new is always false. Unless we avoid these extremes and prepare ourselves for a new reconciliation, we cannot judge either our own literature or the Western literature impartially. And an intimate knowledge of the two literatures alone can produce an awakening and enrichment of what may be called world-consciousness. The Indian method of treatment is aphoristic i.e., *Sutra-saṁī* or *Samasa-saṁī* as contrasted with the Western method of treatment which is elucidatory i.e., *Vyasa-saṁī* or *Vyakhyatnaka-saṁī*. Thus, it is not surprising that what is said by Richards in several pages has been said by Indian critics in a few words only.

It has been now universally acknowledged that in India there has been a pretty rich and long tradition of literary criticism. The

25 Munishi, K. M. : Preface, Surendra Nath Gupta in *Foundations of Indian Arts* (Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1954), p. 6.

26 Winchester, C. T. : *Some Principles of Literary Criticism* (London : 1929), p. 81.

depth and variety of Sanskrit literature have been widely recognised. In view of this, it is a pity that we should turn to Western literature only in order to appraise the worth of our own literary output. Sanskrit critics were endowed with great talent and there is hardly any literary problem which is left untouched by them. It is thus proper that we should feel grateful to those ancient classical critics for bequeathing to us such an abundant variety of critical literature which can stand us in good stead even now. Again, it would be in the fitness of things if we look at them for solving literary or critical problems which either remain unsolved in Western literary criticism or have been but partially solved and require further elucidation and elaboration.

I have divided my thesis into ten chapters. The Introduction, which is the first chapter of this thesis, is intended to give a general exposition of the Indian theory of *Rasa*. A suggestion is also given here why it is possible to interpret Richards' critical formulations in the light of the Indian theory of *Rasa* and why an understanding of the *Rasa* theory helps us understand Richards better. The second chapter is designed to give a critical survey of the literary criticism of I.A. Richards. Chapters three to nine are purported to analyse Richards' critical formulations on some specific literary problems from Indian standpoint. The study has been rounded off in the tenth chapter which is the conclusion of this thesis. The appendix, provides the Sanskrit texts of the passages quoted in the conclusion. What binds and coordinates the different chapters of this thesis is the emphasis on comparison of the two literary methods - Eastern and Western. I must admit, in all frankness, that I have mostly depended upon the English translations of the Sanskrit texts. Where such a translation was not available or could not be made available, I ventured to give my own translation. It has been my aim to make the translation as close as possible to the text and I have done so in order to embody in some measure the literal sense of the original. But in either case, proper mention has been made in the foot-note. As linguistics is not my field of research, I have as far as possible, avoided the consideration of Richards' theory of meaning from linguistic standpoint. The linguists seldom give any credence to Richards.

I have not been able to persuade myself to treat the subject as a mere speculative theory. No critical excursion can dare do

so. Indian aesthetics is firmly rooted in philosophy and it not only gives us critical principles but a vision of life. My aim has, therefore, been not only to study some critical principles but also to analyse the elements that go to the making of the aesthetics consciousness, which is determined by conditions that lie deep in our lives. I have quoted a fairly large number of writers and critics - Indian as well as Western - in this study. But I admit that the interpretations given here are entirely my own and do not necessarily represent those of the writers and critics quoted.

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Gaya ,
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Gupteshwar Prasad

INTRODUCTION : THE THEORY OF RASA

The Indian theory of *Rasa*, in the light of which, I propose to study I.A. Richards' literary criticism forms the very core of Indian aesthetics. The aesthetic theory of *Rasa* dominates more than hundred years of aesthetic and literary criticism in Sanskrit and encompasses in its ambit all the leading Sanskrit critics of ancient times, we know of. Indeed, this theory of *Rasa* is the fruit of nearly two thousand years of Indian contemplation on Art, Drama and Poetry. But what is more, it is not only a theory of aesthetics or literature, but a living principle governing the whole of our life.

"*Rasa*, like *Dharma*, is one of the key-words of Indian culture characterising its aesthetic aspect. In the words of V.K. Gokak "*Rasa* is one of those quintessential words in Sanskrit which sum up a whole philosophy or even a civilization."¹ Also, *Rasa* theory is not only the backbone of the *Dhvani* theory, but the unifying element synthesizing the beginning, the middle and the end of the whole of Indian poetics. It is the greatest achievement of Sanskrit literary criticism which presents a unique crystallization of art, philosophy and psychology. And with the advancement of modern psychology, its importance is being reaffirmed as a consequence of which a big body of critical literature on this subject is now available.

However, the history of *Rasa* theory is replete with controversial speculations and diverse interpretations. In classical Sanskrit literary criticism itself, we find a bewildering variety of critical theories. What is more, some of them are found, though with a different emphasis in view of different literary and critical situations, in contemporary literary criticism of the West. For example, the echoes of Anandavardhana's theory of *Dhvani*, Kuntaka's theory of *Vakrokti* and Mahimbhatta's theory of *Anumiti* may be easily heard in the critical theories of I.A. Richards, William Empson, John Crowe Ransom, R.P. Blackmur and Cleanth Brooks. While this is a matter of great pride for us, it is really unfortunate that we contemporary Indians, who are in literature, literary criticism and general aesthetics, appear to be more interested in and influenced by Western literary theories

1 Gokak, V. K. : Sri Aurobindo Circle, 5th number (Pondicherry, Bombay, 1949), p. 210.

and criticisms than in our own which are as old as Bharata himself.

While most of the educated Indian readers and writers are, by and large, familiar with Aristotle and Aristophanes, they are lamentably ignorant of the works of Bharata, Kuntaka, Anandavardhana, Kalidasa and Bana Bhatta. Being increasingly aware of such a tragic situation in course of my experience as a teacher of English for twenty years, I have chosen, in this research project of mine, to do what is even patriotically needful as far as it lies within my limited capacities.

This study is designed to examine Richards' literary criticism against the background of some comparable theories of *Rasa-Sastra*. As such, it is worthwhile, at first, to spell out the meaning and scope of the word *Rasa* and discuss, at some length, what the theory of *Rasa* is and why it occupies such an important place in Indian poetics.

The word *Rasa* is composed of two letters *Ra* and *Sa*. Etymologically, *Ra* means "to give"², and *Sa* means "Motion".³ *Ra* and *Sa* put together i.e., *Rasa* has several meanings according to Panini's grammar, all of which are not related to one another. V.B. Apte lists several meanings of the word *Rasa*, "to flow", "to make wet all over", "to soak or saturate in liquid", "to taste or relish", "water", "potion", "flavour", "fluid", "liquid", "sauce", "condiment", "pleasure", "delight", "happiness", "charm", "interest", "elegance", "beauty", etc.⁴

The dictionary of Monier Williams also lists several meanings of the word *Rasa* - both used as a verb and as a noun. Used as a verb, it means "to roar", "yell", "cry", "sound", "reverberate", "scream". And used as a noun, it means "juice of plants", "juice of fruit", "any liquid or fluid", "the best or finest or prime part of any thing".⁵ The milk of cow is called *Gorasa*. It is held in our mythological culture that beneath this vast earth, a legendary river called *Rasa* flows. Therefore, that particular region is called *Rasatala* (*Rasa* = river + *tala* = floor).⁶ Like the word *Sarasvati*, the word *Rasa*, has, came to denote a "river". However, in Yaska's

2 Radana-Bhattoji Deekshit : Siddhabta Kumudi (Khem Raja Sri Krishna Das, Bombay, 1926), p. 465.

3 Sr gatau : Ibid., p. 470.

4 Apte, V.S. : Sanskrit-English Dictionary (Motilal Banarsi Das, Delhi, 1973), p. 465.

5 Monier Williams : Sanskrit English Dictionary (O.U.P., 1956), p. 864.

6 Mahabharata : Banaparva, 188/69-70.

Nirukta, *Rasa* is used in the sense of "essence". The sun is called *Aditya* because it takes essence from the morning rays.⁷ The sun is called the calf of morning because it sucks its rays.⁸

The word *Rasa* occurs several times in various contexts in the *Rg-Veda* like water, juice of plant, liquor, drink, sap, etc.⁹ In the *Yajur-Veda*, it is used in the sense of "joy".¹⁰ In the *Sama-Veda*, it is used in the sense of "liquor".¹¹ In the *Atharva-Veda*, its sense of "juice of plant" is retained. But its usage is extended to "sap of herbs" and "sap of grain".¹² It has been

7 Adata *Rasan-Nirukta*, 2/4.

8 *Suryamasya Vatsamaha*, *Ibid.*, 2/6/20.

9 (i) The waters I this day have sought, and to their moisture have we come. Griffith, Ralph T. H. : *The Hymns of the Rgveda* 1/23/23 - Vol.1 (Benaras, 1920), p. 29. All quotations from the *Rg-a* that follow are from this book unless otherwise indicated.

(ii) Thou are the Bull of earth, the Bull of heaven, the Bull of the rivers, the Bull of standing water. For thee, the strong, O Bull, hath Indu swollen, juice pleasant mellifluous, *Ibid.*, 6/44/21. p. 603.

(iii) The stalk hath poured, faith with its spreading branches, the mead's bright glittering juice that dwells on mountains. *Ibid.*, 5/43/4, p. 503.

(iv) The juices which, O Food, are thine throughout the regions are diffused. *Ibid.*, 1/187/4, p. 508.

(v) The milch cow brought sweet flavoured milk was dealt around. *Ibid.*, 5/44/13, p. 512.

(vi) When man poured himself from close embarrassment. *Ibid.*, 1/71/5, p. 502.

(vii) Pouring the juice within the jar. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, 9/63/13, p. 312.

(viii) Bright were the flaming fires, the sun gave forth his shine, and Some, Indra's shone clear. *Ibid.*, 8/3/20, p. 113.

(ix) The kine with milk dress him who makes the milk increase, Soma, amid the songs, who finds the light of heaven. Winner of wealth, the effectual juice is flowering on, singer and sage by wisdom, dear as heaven itself *Ibid.*, 9/84/5, p. 340.

(x) The speckled sap runs like a food. *Ibid.*, 9/16/1, p. 281.

10 I offer my salutation to thee, O' dead souls, in the name of spring season. *Yajur-Veda*, 2/32.

11 (i) O' Indra, take I liquor made fragrant by me. *Sama-Veda* 315/7.

(ii) The Liquor made sucred by gold leads one to God. *Ibid.*, 6/4/4.

12 (i) She that hath cursed with cursing, that hath taken me lightly as hey root, that hath seized on (our) young to take its sap at her eat (her own) off spring. Whiney, William Wight : tr. *Atharva-Veda* 1/28/3, 4/17/3 (Harward Oriental Series, Harward University, 1905), p. 28, p. 179.

(ii) Up with life-time; together with the sap of the herbs. *Ibid.*, 3/32/10, p. 141.

(iii) I bring the milk of kine; I have brought the sap of grain. *Ibid.*, Vol. 7, 2/26/5, p. 66.

rightly acclaimed by Dr. A. Sankaran that "the history of the meaning of *Rasa* during the Vedic period, affords an explanation and prepares the ground for its use by writers on literary criticism from Bharata downwards to signify aesthetic pleasure or the thrill of joy invariably accompanying a skilful enactment of a play, rendered highly appealing through excellent poetry, music and action."¹³ In the *Satapatha Brahmana*, the word *Rasa* was used in the senses of "honey", "syrup", "elixir", "mixture or juice".¹⁴

The age of *Upanisads* brought about a remarkable change in the use of the word *Rasa*. By the time the *Upanisads* came to be written, its sense of juice of plants or grain lost its particular character. Its use was restricted to "essential element" or 'essence' alone. Its use in the sense of "water" was, however, retained. *Brhadaranyakopanisad* used *Rasa* in the sense of "water" and remarked "almost in a Thalesian fashion that water is the source of all things whatsoever."¹⁵ In the *Brhadaranyaka* and other *Upanisads* *Rasa* is used in the sense of "vital part" or "essential element".¹⁶ It is also to be noted that the word *Rasa* is

(iv) May the strong satisfactory savour (*Rasa*) of the honey mixed, come to me along with breath and splendor, *Ibid.*, 3/13/5, p. 108.

(v) Whoever, O' Agni, tried to harm our taste of drink... *Ibid.*, Vol. VIII, 6/124/1, pp. 371-72.

13 Sankaran, Dr. A. : *Some Aspects of the Theories of Rasa and Dhvani* (Madras, 1928), p. 1.

14 (i) The gods took honey-sweet water, when he says, 'the gods took water full of essence'. Max Muller : ed. *The Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. XII. *Satapatha Brahmana*, 5/3/4/3 (Moti Lal Banarsai Das, 1966), p. 77.

(ii) Water meaning sap. *Ibid.*, Vol. XIV 3/3/3/18, p. 74.

(iii) The juice is honey sweet. *Ibid.*, 6/4/3/2, p. 74.

15 Ranada, R. D. : *A Constructive Survey of Upanisad Philosophy* (Poona, 1936), p. 76.

16 (i) He is the essence of the limbs.

Radhakrishnan, S. : *The Principal Upanisads, Brhadaranyaka Upanisad* 1/3/19 (London, 1963), p. 215.

(ii) ...by tongue one knows tastes. *Ibid.*, 3/2/4, p. 215.

(iii) He (the vital breath) is called *Angirasa* for he is the essence of the limbs (*Anga*, members of the body). *Ibid.*, 1/3/8, p. 158.

(iv) One might taste the other. *Ibid.*, 4/3/31, p. 265.

(v) The essence of these things is the earth; the essence of the earth is water. The essence of water is plant; the essence of plants is person. The essence of a person is speech. The essence of speech is the *R.K.* (Hymn). The essence of the *R.K.* is the *saman* (chant). The essence of *saman* (Chant) the *Udgitha*. *Ibid.*, *Chandogya* 1/1/2, pp. 33-38.

(vi) *Aggirasa* meditated on this as the *Udgitha*, people think that it is indeed,

used in the masculine gender by *Taittiriya Upanisad*, while the word *Brahma* is in the neuter gender. The *Upanisadic* sense of *Rasa* is only 'supreme reality'. All the three genders in Sanskrit are permitted to apply to it. The word has nothing to do with its other meanings in poetics. Thus, beginning with 'essence', 'juice', 'semen', 'potion', etc., the meaning of the word *Rasa* was extended and carried further to denote "highest taste" or "divine experience accompanied by a sense of supreme delight". It, thus, naturally follows that the earliest thinkers in literary criticism should have derived this meaning of *Rasa* while trying to equate the pleasure of poetry with divine bliss. As applied to drama, it may mean the aesthetic pleasure which the connoisseur enjoys when he loses himself completely in the characters, situations, the incidents and poetry and music of the play as represented by highly gifted and accomplished actors. It would, however, be preposterous to think that the literary critics of *Rasa* school, except just a few of them, used the word *Rasa* in the sense in which it was used in the Indian scriptures. But then it would be equally wrong to hold that the literary critics of this school were not influenced by the Vedic and *Upanisadic* philosophy.

In the *Ramayana*, *Rasa* came to mean any mixture, elixir or potion. This epic mentions the names of all important *Rasas*, namely *Srngara*, *Karuna*, *Hasya*, *Vira*, *Bhayanaka*, and *Raudra*.¹⁷ In the *Mahabharata*, the word *Rasa* was used to mean liquor, drink, melted butter and milk.¹⁸ The *Mahabharata* describes the pathos (*Karuna*) of Uttara¹⁹ and also refers to the furious (*raudra*) and the terrible (*bhayanaka*) in the description of the funeral ground.²⁰ In the *Caraka-Samhita*, *Rasa* gives a different shade of meaning. It stands for taste or flavour which is six in number; bitter (*tikta*), pungent (*katu*), salt (*lavana*), sour (*amla*), sweet (*madhura*) and stringent (*kasaya*).²¹ Dr. S.N. Dasgupta refers to

Angirasa because it is the essence of the limbs.

(vii) These brooded on the *Rd-Veda*; from it, thus brooded upon, insure forth as its essence, fame, splendor, (vigour of the senses, food and health. (Ibid., 3/2/3, p. 379.

(viii) For truly, on getting the essence, one becomes blissful. Ibid., *Taittiriya*, 2/7/1, p. 549.

17 *Ramayana* : *Yuddha Kanda*, 1/4/8/9.

18 Gokaka, V.K. : op. cit., p. 211.

19 *Mahabharata* : *Asvamedhic Parva*, 60/1.

20 *Mahabharata* : *Bana Parva*, 153/11.

21 *Carakasamhita*. 1/64.

some other masters of *Ayur-Veda* who also contributed to the study of *Rasa* and demonstrated its role in the selection of medicines and in diagnosing diseases and finding out their cure. He says that Nimi added the seventh *Rasa* i.e., Alkaline (*ksariya*) to the old list and Badisa Dhamargava increased the number of *Rasas* to eight, adding the unmanifested, (*avyakta*), in particular. It is difficult to recognize *Avyakta* as *Rasa*, since *Vyakta* and *Avyakta* are the states of *Rasa*. *Rasa* lies in water in a dormant or *Avyakta* form. So *Avyakta* cannot be taken as a separate *Rasa*. Kankayana holds that the *Rasas* are infinite in number and cannot be counted on account of the diversity of substances in which they are located (*asrava*). Their specific properties (*gunas*) as light or heavy, their action in developing or reducing the limbs of the body and their diversity are apparent to the palate. Susruta enumerates semen (*virya*) also as a *Rasa*.²² Our study is, however, confined to the word *Rasa*, as it is used in literary criticism and aesthetics. For our purpose, it is sufficient to remember that the aesthetic meaning of *Rasa* i.e., 'flavour' to be tasted by mental palate is an extension of its original meaning i.e., flavour to be tested with the tongue. It can be easily seen that the basic meaning of the word *Rasa* i.e., enjoyment has never been lost sight of at any stage. The enjoyment may be through any agent, either through the tongue or through the mind as it happens in aesthetic enjoyment. The literary critics who associated the word with *Brahmasvada* were indisputably guided by Indian philosophy. Even in the ordinary sense, *Rasa* refers to an object which is mellifluous and tasty. So literary critics were fully justified in taking a broad view of *Rasa* and conceiving it as a superb element worth tasting (*parama asvadaniya tattva*) in all imaginative literature. Thus, in the ultimate analysis, Indian poetics equates the pleasure of *Rasa* with that divine bliss which the seer gets when he is face-to-face with God or realizes Him in the depths of his being.

Now, *Rasa* has been variously translated into English such as sentiment²³, flavour²⁴, delectability or art-emotion²⁵ by the

22 Dasgupta, S.N. : A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II (Cambridge, 1932), p. 357 and p. 362.

23 Ghosh, M.N. : tr. Bharata's *Natyasastra*, Vol. I, Chapter 1 to XXVII (Calcutta, 1950), p. 102.

24 Raja, Kunhan, C. : Survey of Sanskrit Literature (Bombay, 1962), p. 253, and A. K. Coomaraswamy : The Mirror of Gesture (New York, 1936), p. 17.

critics. But none of these translations conveys the actual spirit of the word. While the word sentiment "never suggests the impersonal, the universal and the transcendent aspect of *Rasa*"²⁶, the word flavour and delectability have the overtone of the quality of a substance which is a blending of its characteristic taste and smell. But *Rasa* is more than an amalgam of taste and smell. It is a self-revelation, a realization of truth, a coming closer to the Divine Light. The word art-emotion likewise is not an appropriate translation of the word *Rasa*, because it smacks of cheapness and also because it does not adequately convey the pleasure evoked by the excellence of a piece of art. *Rasa* is also etymologically translated as 'aesthetic experience' by Gnoli, as 'savour' by Ballantyne; as *stimmung*²⁷ by Jacobi, 'mood', by S.K. De and 'relish' by Rakesh Gupta.²⁸ All these renderings are misleading because they narrow down the scope of *Rasa*. In fact, the word *Rasa* is eclectic and, therefore, it cannot be mechanically defined or translated into English. Indian poetics does not attempt so much to define a term as to indicate all its possible meanings and interpret its inner contents. It is not easy to say why beauty pleases, and ugliness displeases or repels. So any approximation to the definition of *Rasa* is endangered either by under-statement or over-statement.

Rasa is realized when an emotion is awakened in such a manner that "it has none of its conative tendencies and it is experienced in an impersonal contemplative mood."²⁹ *Rasa* is superb bliss (*ananda*), for the soul aspires for nothing but bliss. God is truth (*sat*), consciousness (*cit*) and bliss (*ananda*). He is

25 Raghavan, V. : The Number of Rasas (Adyar, 1940), p. VII.

26 Sharma, D. S. : Literary Criticism in Sanskrit and English (Madras, 1950), p. 22.

27 *Stimmung* is a German word meaning mood or atmosphere see Schonott, T. C., Nico J., Ute and Terrell, Peter : ed. Collins Gem German English and English German Dictionary (London, 1978), p. 276.

28 Viswanatham, K. : Essays in Criticism and Comparative Poetics, p. 407. Also see Gnoli, Raniero : The Aesthetic Experience according to Abhinavagupta (Roma, 1956); Ballantyne, J.R. and P.D. Mitra : tr. Visvanatha's *Sahityadarpana* (Bibliotheca Indica series of Sanskrit Publication, 1875); Jacobi, Hermann : tr. of Anandavardhana's *Dhvanyaloka* into German (Leipzig, 1903); De, S.K. : Some Problems of Sanskrit Poetics (Cal, 1959); Gupta Rakesh : Psychological Studies in *Rasa* (Aligarh, 1950)

29 Chaudhary, Pravas Jiwan : Studies in Comparative Aesthetics (Visva Bharti, 1953), p. 78.

the fountain of unalloyed joy or beatitude. The Upanisadic seers were, therefore, right in identifying Rasa with God.³⁰

The *Rasa* school holds that the life breath (atma)³¹ of poetry is *Rasa*. Chandogya Upanisad observes : "the infinite is happiness. There is no happiness in any thing which is small or finite."³² Whenever an Indian thinks of poetry, he cannot possibly alienate it from philosophy or moral science. In India, knowledge has always been considered as an integral whole and not as something which can be treated in isolation. The most perfect work of art is like the immense universe, the creation of harmonising potency of the limitless omnipotent self-effulgent God. Poetry, by purifying our soul, takes us to the realm of the spiritual world where bliss alone reigns supreme. *Rasa Sastra* is the typical Indian view of studying poetry taking it as a source of infinite pleasure. It defines everything which is good, noble, pleasurable and worth appreciating. It is considered as the soul (atma) of poetry. Of all the critical doctrines propounded by the Indian Acaryas, the one which bears authenticity and universal recognition is the theory of *Rasa*. It is a landmark in the development of the history of Sanskrit literary criticism. The three main pillars of Sanskrit literary criticism are style (*riti*), figures of speech, (*alankara*) and *Rasa*. Among these, the theory of *Rasa* is distinguished from other theories by its universal acceptance.

The main function of *Rasa* is to create a state of perfect beatitude where mind becomes serene and tranquil and susceptible to perpetual bliss (*akhanda ananda*). This is the reason why the pleasure of poetry is said to be on par with *Brahmananda*. It is a mental state unique in itself because in this state, the mind is completely purged of the properties of darkness (*Tamoguna*) and of passion (*rajoguna*), when individuality (*vyasti*) dissolves into aggregate (*samasti*) and the sympathetic reader (*sahrdava*) realizes the eternal truth and enjoys the ever lasting pleasure because of the supremacy of the properties of goodness (*sattvaguna*). Madhusudana Sarasvati observes that it is a state in which *sattva* begins to flicker and dominate as the sole *vrtti* of the innermost content of heart (*antahkarna*), which enables the reader to enjoy unbounded

30 Taittiriya, 2/7/1.

31 Rg-Veda, 7/67/2.

32 Chandogya, 7/23/1.

pleasure.³³ This theory gets its inspiration from the Sankhya scheme of three *gunas*. Acarya Visvanatha, while describing the nature of *Rasa*, says : "it is pure, selfmanifested, Incessant, indivisible, supreme pleasure, full of life, rare, like the pleasure one derives in communion with God, amazing, harmonized and highly flavoured."³⁴ For such a pleasure, Lord Buddha, used the word *pamojjabahulam* meaning the acme of bliss.³⁵ Thus, *Rasa* presupposes Divine delight which is realized when the self gets disentangled from the egoistic moorings and rises to the height of complete detachment characteristic of higher mode of living.

Rasa is "unity in diversity".³⁶ It is more than the western concept of beauty.³⁷ It is a realization of the ultimate truth, the fruition of aesthetic experience. The ultimate realization comes only "after the limitations of the egocentric attitude are transcended and all separate existence is merged in the unity of harmony realized."³⁸

The chief exponents of *Rasa* school are Bharata, Anandavardhana, Rajasekhara, Dhananjaya, Abhinavagupta, Kuntaka, Bhoja, Mahimbhatta, Kshemendra, Mammata, Saradatanaya, Visvanatha and Jagannatha. The list is not exhaustive. Some other critics also contributed to the theory of *Rasa*. But the critics mentioned above are the chief exponents of this theory. These critics try to solve the problem of beauty in poetry. The main problem with which they are concerned is : wherein lies the beauty of poetry? Does it lie in figures of speech (*alankaras*), in suggestion (*dhvani*), in strikingness of expression (*vakrokti*) or style (*riti*), or sentiment (*rasa*) ? Each of these authors advances his arguments in his own typical way in order to support his theory. But the argument advanced by the supporters of *Rasa* school are by far the most convincing and appealing.

33 Sarasvati, Madhusudana . Bhaktirasayana, 3/12/13.

34 Visvanatha, Acarya : Sahitya Darpana, 3/2-3 (Chowkhamba, Varanasi, 1957), p. 105.

35 Dutta H. N. : Indian Culture : Its Strands and Trends (Calcutta, University, 1941), p. 71

36 Pandaya, K.C. Comparative Aesthetics, Vol. I (Chowkhamba, Varanasi, 1959), p. 22.

37 Sastri, Prof. A. C. : Studies in Sanskrit Aesthetics (Calcutta, 1952), p. 2.

38 De, S. K. : Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics, Vol. II (London, 1925) p. II.

The theory of *Rasa*, which is applied equally to poetry and drama was, first, discussed not in a book on poetry, but in a book on dramaturgy and histrionics i.e., in *Natyasastra* by sage Bharata. He flourished between the first and the second centuries B.C. It is the earliest and fullest surviving treatise on dramatic theory. In this book, the doctrine of *Rasa* has been formulated in a forceful and comprehensive manner. And, as P.V. Kane observes : "this work contains the first exposition of *Rasa* theory".³⁹ "Being at the head of the *Rasa* school, Bharata may justly claim the title of the father of Sanskrit literary criticism."⁴⁰

Bharata's *Natyasastra* deals with all important problems of drama and includes topics on poetics, language, figures of speech, literary blemishes, meter, stylistic devices and above all *Rasa* without which, as Bharata says, "no meaning proceeds".⁴¹ Bharata further says : "*Rasa*, is so-called because it is capable of being tasted (*asvadate*)."⁴² A particular state of mind, says Bharata, gives rise to what is called *Rasa*. In his words : "just as well-disposed persons while eating food, cooked with many kinds of spices, enjoy (*asvadayanti*) the tastes, and attain pleasure and satisfaction, so the cultured people taste the Dominant States (*sthayi bhava*) while they see them represented by an expression of the various States with words, Gestures and the Temperament and derive pleasure and satisfaction."⁴³

Critics who came after Bharata were devoted to exploring and examining the niceties of the problem and found that the realization of *Rasa* involved more psychic than physical consideration. They naturally tried to interpret the *Rasa* theory of Bharata in their own manner and also endeavored to add something from their own side. Bharata's *Natyasastra* bears the famous aphorism (*rasa-sutra*) "the sentiment is produced from a combination of Determinants (*vibhava*) consequents (*anubhava*) and Transitory states (*vyabhicari bhava*)".⁴⁴ It may be observed that the aphorism of Bharata did not elaborately explain the revelation of *Rasa* (*rasa-nispatti*) as a consequence of which it came to be interpreted variously by Bhatta Lollata, Sankuka,

39 Kane, P.V. : History of Sanskrit Poetic (Bombay).

40 Sankaran, A. : Some Aspects of the Theories of *Rasa* and *Dhvani*, p. 17.

41 Ghosh : tr. Bharata's *Natyasastra*, Vol. I, p. 105.

42 Ibid

43 Ibid., pp. 105-106.

44 Ghosh : tr. Bharata's *Natyasastra*, p. 105.

Bhatta Nayaka and Abhinava-gupta from the stand points of *Purva Mimamsa*, *Nyaya*, *Yoga*, and *Pratyabhijna* systems respectively.

At this point, it is necessary to discuss the various interpretations of *Rasa-sutra* in some detail. Bhatta Lollata puts forward a generation theory of *Rasa* (*utpattivada*). According to Lollata, *Rasa* exists in the hero and heroine. The existence of *Rasa* is in the original characters (*anukarya*) themselves. But the masterly imitation and exploration (*anusandhana*) of the original characters, Rama and Sita, by the actors brings *Rasa* in the spectators also. The use of the word *Anusandhana* is in conformity with *Isvara Pratyabhijna Darsana* which Utpuldeva developed out of *Vyakarna* and *Vedanta*. This theory is also called projection theory of *Rasa* (*aropa-vada*) because according to it, the spectator projects the original characters on the characters presented on the stage. Lollata used the word *Vasana* in the sense of *Sanskara* or inherited instinct. In his view, although the Transitory States (*vyabhicari bhavas*) do not co-exist with stable States (*sthayibhavas*), they remain in the form of impressions or *Sanskara*. The spectator, as it were, takes the actors playing the roles of Dusyanta and Sakuntala as original ones. This gives pleasure to him. *Rasa* does not exist in the spectator. He relishes it because for the time being he feels that the characters on the stage are no mimics but real figures. There is nothing like imitation on the stage. According to this theory, the criterion of dramatic enjoyment is the projection of real characters on the unreal ones. The obvious limitation of this theory is that it presupposes the revelation of *Rasa* in the spectator by a process of projection. Again, it is difficult to relish *Rasa* which resides in another's heart. *Rasa* is not to be seen but to be felt.

The second inferential theory of *Rasa* (*anumiti vada*) was propounded by Sankuka. According to this theory, the spectator does not project but infer from certain signs like dress, make-up and deft imitation the *Rasa* residing in the heart of character. Although he knows that a particular character playing the role of Dusyanta is not Dusyanta, yet he, for so long as he is witnessing the show, infers that the actor is Dusyanta. This inference creates pleasure in him. Sankuka, on the analogy of *Citra-turaga-nyaya*, concludes that although the man playing the role of Dusyanta is a different person and cannot be Dusyanta he can be taken as

Dusyanta for the sake of pleasure. As a horse painted in the picture is not actually a horse, still it is taken to be so for the sake of pleasure, so the spectator or *Samajika* feels pleasure in drawing such an inference. The greatest limitation of this theory is that *Rasa* cannot be made an object of inference. Inferring something is entirely different from experiencing something. In emotional intensity, we assume that a particular character is in love or in a state of disappointment. But this inference is not the experience of love or disappointment.

Bhattanayaka enunciates a more convincing theory of *Rasa*. His theory is called the theory of enjoyment (*bhukti-vada* or *bhoga-vada*). The previous theory was intended to explain the realization of *Rasa* through the medium of actor. Bhattanayaka takes a different stand. He uses phrases like *Satvodreka* and *Bhoga*. At the time of realization of *Rasa*, the spectator is lifted from all worldly barriers and enters the domain of universal knowledge. The meaning of a word is derived from three sources—literal or direct (*abhidha*), effecting or promoting (*bhavakatva*) and enjoying (*bhojakatva*). *Abhidha* gives us only the flat or the literal meaning of the word. But it is not enough. In poetry, there is something more than that. *Bhavakatva* is generalization or *Sadharanikarana*. It makes general what is specific and particular. Dusyanta ceases to be a historical or mythological figure. He becomes an ordinary lover within our reach. In a way, he becomes a symbol of love. At the third stage, i.e., *Bhojakatva*, we enjoy *Rasa* and feel pleasure. An objection has been raised against this theory that there is no evidence of *Bhavakatva* and *Bhojakatva* processes. The purpose which they are supposed to serve is served even by *Dhvani* or *Vyanjana*.

Abhinavagupta was the fourth interpreter of *Rasa-Sutra*. His object was to make Bharata's work completely based on the principles of *Rasa*. He was a Kashmirian philosopher and one of the pioneers of *Rasa* and *Dhvani* schools of Sanskrit literary criticism. In his two books *Abhinava-Bharati* and *Locana* Commentary, the former being an exposition of the underlying meaning of Bharata's *Natyasastra* and the latter being a commentary on Anandvardhana's *Dhvanvaloka*, he tried to bring home the principle of *Rasa* at the centre of all creative writing. It was to his credit to consider *Natya-Sastra* as *Rasa-Sastra*. In his *Abhinava-Bharati*, he tried to meet the objections raised by his

predecessors in conceiving *Rasa-Sutra* in its right perspective. He interprets *Rasa-theory* in his own manner and puts forward his revelation theory of *Rasa*. Reflation means the unfolding of something which is hidden or latent. There are certain *Bhavas* which are hidden in the spectator right from his very birth. These *Bhavas* are impressions or inherited instincts (*vasanas* or *sanskaras*) formed in consequence of worldly experiences, former birth, practice, education and so on. The difference between *Sthayi bhava* and *Vasana* is, however, clear. *Vasanas* are innate instincts or propensities rooted in man's personality; *sanskaras* are acquired impressions. Sometimes they are used indiscriminately as synonyms also. But *Sthayibhava* is a technical term in dramaturgy. It relates only to emotions of man as represented by actors in drama by their fourfold *Abhinaya*. When spectators see these represented emotions, they become 'tasteful' or *Rasa*. The reason is that they too have in their own personality, their counterpart in germinal form as they are also human. Thus *Vasanas* or *Sanskaras* relate to life; while *Sthayibhavas* relate only to emotions represented on the one and enjoyed on the other in drama. *Abhinava gupta* assumes the existence of *Rasa* in the *Darsaka* or the theatre-goer from the very beginning. The witnessing of drama or the recitation of poetry simply facilitates its revelation. This theory is near perfection and has the sanction of most Sanskrit critics and scholars. *Abhinavagupta* was an ardent follower of *Saiva* philosophy which is a monistic (*Advitavadi*) philosophy. According to it, the ultimate reality is called absolute *Siva* or *Parama Siva* who is described as subtle, infinite and formless. In unrevealed *Siva*, *Siva* and *Sakti*, co-exist and there is no distinction between the two. *Siva* takes the shape of *Ardhanarisvara*. He embraces both *Siva* and *Sakti* and, yet he transcends both and is indivisible and free. The influence of *Saiva* philosophy on the thoughts of *Abhinavagupta* can be easily seen because he takes stable States (*Sthayibhavas*) as pre-existing in the heart of the spectator which get revealed when proper conditions prevail. *Sthayi-Bhava* is Stable State (*Bhava sthirani*) according to eastern as well as western psychology.

The Indian theory of *Rasa* as explained by *Dhanika* in the *Avaloka* commentary on his elder brother *Dhanajaya's Dasarupaka* is surely an extension of *Bhattanayaka's* explanation

of Bharata's *Rasa-sutra*. It seeks to Synthesize the three rival claims of Lollata, Bhattanayaka and Sankuka.

It is surprising that the legacy of Bharata was carried over not by the supporters of *Rasa* but by the exponents of the theory of figures of speech who demonstrated the fusion of *Rasa* in the figure of speech called *Rasavad-Alankara*. They, no doubt, relegated *Rasa* to a subordinate position. But they were fully conscious of the paramount importance of *Rasa* and its application in poetry which is evident from their occasional reflections on the factors responsible for the excellence of poetry.

Bhamaha did not give an elaborate account of *Rasa* though he considered the various applications of *Rasa* in epic as indispensable.⁴⁵ He defined poetry as "a co-existence of word and meaning."⁴⁶ Instead of making a probe into the soul of poetry, he insisted on its body or form (*kavya-sarira*). Hence he showed the role of *Rasavad Alankara* in the triumph of poetry.⁴⁷ He dwelt upon the external embellishments of poetry and did not consider them separate from *Rasa*. This view is logically erroneous but it, at least, shows that Bhamaha did not overlook the importance of *Rasa*. He observes : "an intelligent treatise written in poetry and enlivened by *Rasa* becomes as palatable as a bitter medicine when sweetened with honey."⁴⁸ Dandin and Vamana gave utmost importance to expression in poetry. They start with the basic assumption that the perfection of style implies the perfection of *Rasa*. They lay emphasis on poetic effort (*kavi-prayatna*) and confine themselves to only those factors which are helpful in making the style perfect and consummate.

After the supporters of the school of figures of speech came the supporters of the theory of suggestion (*vyanjana* or *dhvani*). These critics recognized *Rasa* as an integral part of *Dhvani* and called it *Rasa-Dhvani*. It was suggested that *Rasa* invariably takes the shape of suggestion (*vyangya*). Though Anandavardhana is credited with the theory of suggestion, he could not ignore the importance of *Rasa*. Suggestion does not go counter to *Rasa*-such was the hypothesis of Anandavardhana. *Rasa* cannot manifest itself except in the form of suggestion. This theory was

45 Bhamaha : *Kavyalankara*, 1/21.

46 Ibid., 1/16.

47 Ibid . 3/6.

48 Bhamaha : *Kavyalankara*, 5/3.

"too strong to be displaced or suppressed by any other theory of aesthetic enjoyment."⁴⁹ Anandavardhana, in his elucidation and exposition of *Rasa-Dhvani*, takes *Rasa* as the sole aesthetic foundation of poetry. In this way, from drama and dramatic theory, the notion of *Rasa* is taken over to poetry and poetic theory and its prime importance as an indispensable ingredient of poetry is accepted. "This importance was probably for the first time ably set forth by the Kashmirian Anandavardhana in the ninth century, and subsequently elaborated with such mastery by his commentator Abhinavagupta that it became thenceforth an accepted fact in Sanskrit Poetics, never to be set aside by rival systems and improved only in detail by later speculations."⁵⁰ The general framework, as determined by Bharata, however, remains intact.

Dhvani Kavya is great precisely because it makes a *Sahridaya* a poet for the time being. It is implied in Coleridge's great remark that Shakespeare is great because he makes us a poet while reading him, that is the psychological secret behind the appeal of *Dhvani*. Further, poetry makes us emotionally involved and unless one is emotionally involved one is not interested in anything, and if one is not interested, one does not learn anything. And what we learn from poetry is going out of one's self as Shelley put it ; that is how we become better after a study of great literature. We become many; we exact a kind of emotional fancy dress. We acquire experience and experience is poise. Sanskrit poetics like Greek poetics in a secular : *Ramavat, na Ravanavat* Morality in Poetry cannot be tied to the apron strings of any country or race. It leads to rival claims. But the psychological explanation given above should serve everyone .

Agni_Purana does not bring the *Rasa* process in detail. But in the various contexts and references it supports the role of *Rasa* in poetry. It gives great importance to the erotic sentiment (*srngara rasa*).⁵¹ *Rasa* is called the life (*prana*) of poetry.⁵²

While describing *kavyapurusotpatti*, Rajasekhara regarded *Rasa* as the very kernel of poetry.⁵³ According to him, poetry is a

49 Raja. C. Kunan : Survey of Sanskrit Literature, p. 258.

50 De, S. K. : Some Problems of Sanskrit Poetics, p. 177.

51 Agni-Purana, 9. 11.

52 Ibid., 337, 338.

53 Rajasekhara : Kavya Mimansa, 3/15 (Rastabhasa Parisa, 1965), p. 15.

specific kind of expression the beauty of which depends upon *Rasa*.

Though Kuntaka could not ignore the importance of *Rasa*⁵⁴ in poetry, he took striking or deviating expression (*vakrokti*) to be the distinguishing feature of poetry, denying the name of poetry to the poetry of commonplace statement (*svabhavokti*). *Vakrokti* is a generic name for peculiarity of expression (*bhangi-bhaniti* or *bhaniti-vaicitrya*).⁵⁵ It is departure from established uses (*prasadhaprasthana-vyatireka*). For him, as for Anandavardhana, it is plurality of meaning that is of capital importance in poetry. Poetry is an expression which deviates from the normal one. It is a unique manner of expression differing from the non-poetic manner.

Like Anandavardhana, Mahimabhatta also looked upon *Rasa* as the soul of poetry. But where Anandavardhana took *Vastu* or *Alankara* or *Rasa* as *Vyanjana*, Mahimabhatta took them as inference (*anumana*) and conceived *Rasa* as inferential meaning.

It is said that Bhoja wrote eighty four books out of which two, *Sarasvati-Kanthabharana* and *Srngara-Prakasa* are concerned with poetics. In these two books, he elaborately outlined the theory of *Rasa*. He attached great importance to "Ego" (*abhimana* or *ahankara*) in *Srngara Rasa* and made all other *Rasas* derivatory. We shall discuss his views in detail while considering the number of *Rasas* and *Mula Rasa*.

While Ksemendra tried to apply the theory of *Rasa* to meter, Mammata showed the inter-relationship between *Rasa* and *Dhvani* and through forceful arguments brought out the significance of *Rasa* in poetry. Saradatanaya dealt with *Rasas* and *Bhavas* in detail and used *Srngara Rasa* in the sense of love (*rati*) which is another name of God's will. The will of God to create this universe is inherited by man and he gets interested in creating something. Poetry is the best creation of man. Saradatanaya tried to synthesize the ideas of Bhoja and Mammata. Acarya Visvanatha took the extreme view when he took poetry as constituted of only those utterances which are steeped in *Rasa*.⁵⁶ Jagannatha who was greatly influenced by *Advaita* system of Indian philosophy tried to resolve the

54 Kuntaka : *Vakrokti-Jivita*, 4/11.

55 Ibid., 1/10

56 Visvanath : *Sahitya Darpana*, 1/2, p. 23.

contradiction among the theorists of *Rasa*, *Alankara* and *Vakrokti* schools. He defined poetry as beautiful words conveying beautiful meaning.⁵⁷

As to the number of *Rasa*, Bharata acknowledged only eight kinds of *Rasa* (*astau natya rasah smrtah*). His list of *Rasas* as translated into English by M.M. Ghose is as follows : 1. Erotic (*sringara*) 2. Comic (*hasya*) 3. Pathetic (*karuna*) 4. Furious (*raudra*) 5. Heroic (*vira*) 6. Terrible (*Bhayanaka*) 7. Odious (*Bibhatsa*) and 8. Marvellous (*adbhuta*).⁵⁸ If, however, *Adbhuta* is the marvellous which is a very minor form of sublimity, what about sublimity itself which is almost as important as Beauty. Similarly, every discerning reader would realise that *Raudra* is terror, one of the twin attitudes in tragedy associated with pity or *Bhayanaka* which refers to horror. In view of this, it seems reasonable to translate *Adbhuta* as Sublimity, *Raudra* as Terrible and *Bhayanaka* as Horrible. These eight *Rasas* arise out of four original ones. 'The Comic' arises from 'the Erotic', 'the Pathetic' from 'the Terrible', 'the Sublime' from 'the Heroic' and 'the Horrible' from 'the Odious'.⁵⁹ Bharata also described the colours and the presiding deities of these *Rasas*. 'The erotic' is light green (*syama*), 'the Comic' white, 'the Pathetic' ash-coloured (*kapota*), 'the Terrible' red, 'the Heroic' light orange (*paura*), 'the Horrible' black, 'the Odious' Blue and 'the Sublime' yellow.⁶⁰ Visnu is the god of 'the Erotic', *pramathas* (the *ganas* of *Mahaveva*) of 'the Comic', *Rudra* of 'the Terrible', *Yama* of 'the Pathetic', *Siva* (*mahakala*) of 'the Odious', *Kaladeva* of 'the Horrible', *Indra* of 'the Heroic' and *Brahman* of 'the Sublime'.⁶¹

Now, we may illustrate each of them from British drama thus :

Erotic (*sringara*) : Orlando's writing love verses dedicated to his beloved Rosalind and pinning them on trees in the woods and carving them deep in the bark as described in Shakespeare's *As You Like It* or Ferdinand's playing chess with Miranda in a cave as described in Shakespeare's *The Tempest*.

57 Jagannatha : *Rasa Gangadhara* (Chowkhamba Vidya Bhawan, Banaras, 1970), p. 10.

58 Ghosh : tr. Bharata's *Natyasastra*, p. 119.

59 Ibid., p. 107.

60 Ibid., pp. 107-108

61 Ibid., p. 108.

Comic (*hasya*) : the role of Launcelot Gobbo, Shylock's servant, in Shakespeare's *The Merchant of Venice* provides sufficient material for *Hasya Rasa*. In Hardy's novel *The Mayor of Casterbridge*, Micheal Henchard calls on Abel Whittle, who was a late riser, to ask him to go to Durnover to fetch hay and shouts out his name at his doors when Abel Whittle comes out in semi-nakedness. The description provokes our laughter. It is an example of *Hasya Rasa*.

Pathetic (*karuna*) : King Lear's suffering in Shakespeare's *King Lear*.

Terrible (*raudra*) : Catherine's anger in Shakespeare's *The Taming of the Shrew*.

Heroic (*vira*) : the scene of wrestling match between the Duke's Champion Charles and Orlando in Shakespeare's *As You Like It*.

Horrible (*bhayanaka*) : the ghost scene in Shakespeare's *Hamlet* or the scene in *Othello* where Othello strangulates Desdemona to death.

Odious (*bibhatsa*) : the scene in *Julius Caesar* where Cina, the poet, is torn to pieces.

Sublime (*adbhuta*) : the Ring-episode in Shakespeare's *The Merchant of Venice*.

It has to be noted here that the episodes shown against the names of *Rasas* are not *Rasas* themselves. They can assume the proportion of *Rasas* only when they fulfil the ingredients necessary for the manifestation of *Rasas*.

According to Bharatas, each *Rasa* is developed from a Stable State (*sthayi-bhava*), which dwells in all human hearts as an innate idea or tendency and is fed by a number of minor feelings like longing, despondency, envy, detestation, etc., common to more than one mood. Not only Bharata but some other critics and poets also like Kalidasa, Bhamaha and Dandin recognized only eight *Rasas*, not taking into account the existence of 'the serene' (*santa-rasa*). Udbhata for the first time mentioned *Santa-rasa* and his views were later corroborated by Abhinavagupta though Dhananjaya repudiated his views on the ground that it was unfit for the stage.

Rudrata added 'the agreeable' (*preyas*) to the number of *Rasas*. Bhoja in his *Sarasvati-Kanthabharana* admitted the

existence of twelve Rasas. He admitted the eight Rasas of Bharata and added four Rasas from his own side : 'the Magnanimous' (*udatta*), 'the Arrogant' (*uddhata*), 'the Serene' (*Santa*) and 'the agreeable' (*preyas*) - the last two being already recognized by Udbhata and Rudrata. He gave utmost importance to 'the Erotic' (*sringara-rasa*). In *Sringara-Prakasa*, he connected the four Rasas - 'the Serene' (*santa*), 'the Agreeable' (*preyas*), 'the Sublime' (*udatta*) and 'the Arrogant' (*udhata*) with four types of characters. V. Raghavan says : "When Bhoja wanted to relate a type of man to Rasa and to define character of Rasa one hopes that, if pursued, this line would have resulted in a lot of literary criticism of the nature of character study so common in western critical literature."⁶²

The four additional kinds of Rasas as hinted at by Bhoja may be easily connected with four kinds of heroes. These four kinds of heroes are Serene (*dhirsanta*), Romantic (*dhiralalita*), Vain-glorious (*dhiroddhata*) and Noble-minded or Magnanimous (*dhiroddatta*). Becket of T.S. Eliot's *Murder in the Cathedral* is a serene hero. Romeo is a romantic hero. Coriolanus is a vain-glorious hero. Prospero is a magnanimous hero. If we borrow examples from Sanskrit literature, we can say that Carudatta of Sudraka's *Mriksa Katika* is a serene hero, Udayana of Bhasa's *Svapna-Vasva-Datta* is a romantic hero, Bhima of Bhatta Narain's *Beni-Senhara* is a vain-glorious hero and Dusyanta of Kalidasa's *Abhijnana Sakuntala* is a magnanimous hero. Strictly speaking, Romeo is not like Udayana and hence he is not fit to be a romantic hero. The romantic hero must be interested in art and music.⁶³ Udayana has this quality whereas it is wanting in Romeo.

Still later, Ramchandra Gunchandra in his *Natya Darpana* introduced 'the sorrow' (*dukha*) as Rasa. Visvanatha introduced filial affection (*vatsalya*) as a Rasa. Other critics like Bhanu Datta added allurement (*maya*) to the old list of Rasas.⁶⁴

It has to be noted that Bhoja's exaltation of 'the Erotic' was attractive enough to engage the attention of the contemporary critics. Bhoja advanced forceful arguments to establish 'the Erotic' as the basic Rasa. He held that the Erotic is at the centre

62 V. Raghavan, V : Bhoja's *SringaraPrakasa*, Vol II (Madras, 1963), p. 444.

63 Dhananjaya : *Dasarupaka*.

64 Bhanudatta : *Rasatarangini* (Varanasi, Vikrama, 2025), p. 477.

of all *Rasas*. Other *Rasas* are mere extensions of 'the Erotic'. Bhoja thought that "poetry is beautiful because of 'the Erotic'. It is the germ from which other qualities sprout. It is the inner *Tatva* of Ego, the ideal in man of the "I" *Ahankara*. It is man's love for his own self, it is that which makes him take even pain as pleasure."⁶⁵ Bhoja further observed : "*Rasika* means who has *Rasa* in him ... this cannot be due to any known cause, it is due to past dharma and it is *Srngara*, *Ahankara*, *Abhimana*. According to *Satkarya-vada* of the Sankhya philosophy, if the *Rasika* enjoys *Rasa*, *Rasa* must be present in him as a *guna* of his *atman*."⁶⁶ The *Srngara-Rasa* or *Ahankara-Rasa* "becomes *sthayin* and attains nourishment when attended by the ancillary *Bhavas*, and attaining that climax each such *sthayin* again dissolves into *Ahankara*, or by its own heightening, heightens only the ever glowing light of that *Ahankara*."⁶⁷

Bhoja referred to three stages of 'the Erotic' : the first stage is its extreme (*parakoti*) where it is called *Ahankara*. The second stage is its middle (*madhyamavastha*) in which *Ahankara* having come in contact with the various objects of the world, gets manifested in various forms. The third stage is its best (*uttama*), in which all *Bhavas* mature and assimilate and give expression to fondness (*preman*), which is another name of Ego (*aham*). Bhoja's theory of narcissism or self-love sounds true. In everything we do, there is the question of satisfaction of our Ego.

Abhinavagupta made an attempt to synthesize and crystallise all the *Rasas* into one *Rasa* called 'the serene' (*santa*).⁶⁸ Dr. V.Raghavan supports the view of Abhinavagupta and observes : "the primordial state of mind is 'serene'. What we call relish (*svada*) is one undefined state of the form of a repose of the mind, (*visranti*)."⁶⁹ Ksemendra admitted 'the serene' as the fundamental *Rasa* (*angi-rasa*) of the *Mahabharata* and the *Ramayana*. But the *Ramayana* may also be said to contain 'the pathetic' (*karuna-rasa*) as its narrative originates from the killing of a crow by the hunter leaving its mate in utter grief and anguish, the appeal of which is profoundly evocative.

65 Raghavan, V. : Bhoja's *Srngara-Prakasa*, Vol. II, p. 356.

66 Ibid.

67 Raghavan : Bhoja's *Srngara-Prakasa*.

68 Ramkrishna, Kavi, M. : ed. *Natyasastra* of Bharat Muni with the Commentary of Abhinavagupta (Baroda, 1956), p. 339

69 Raghavan, V. : *The Number of Rasas*, Vol. I p. 177.

Bhavabhuti, the famous Sanskrit dramatist, took 'the pathetic (*karuna-rasa*) as the basic *Rasa*.'⁷⁰

And in some of the lines of Shakespeare, we find that the element of pathos has been much emphasized. The following lines from *Othello* are worth quoting.⁷¹

Othello : She loved me for the dangers I had passed,
And I loved her that she did pity them

The English poet Shelley gave importance to the pathetic when he said : "Our sweetest songs are those that tell of saddest thought."⁷² Young Celia's suffering and dying while serving plague - stricken people in Ellor's so-called comedy *The Cocktail Party* is another example of *Karuna-rasa*.

The *Vaisnava* saints of the medieval period, particularly the *gaudiya* saints and the followers of Chaitanya cult of Bengal, like Rupa Gosvamin and Jiva Gosvamin whose name is often confused with that of Sanatana Gosvamin reacted against the Vedantic monism of Sankaracarya and introduced the devotion (*bhakti-rasa*) as a *Rasa*.⁷³ Rupa Gosvamin's *Bhakti-rasamrta-sindhu* and *Ujjvala-nilamani* expounded the theory of *Bhakti-rasa* on the analogy of the well recognized *Rasas* particularly the Erotic. Jiva Gosvamin's commentary of his uncle's *Ujjvala-nilamani* entitled *Locana-rocani* also deserves special mention here. *Ujjvala-nilamani* deals with *Rasa* in terms of the *vaisnava* concept of *Ujjvala* or *Madhura Rasa* meaning *Srngara Rasa*, *Ujjvala* being the colour assigned to that *Rasa* by Bharata himself. *Bhakti* was considered simply as a state of mind (*bhava*) by Mammata. He observed that the attachment to God is *bhava* while the attachment to the beloved is *Rasa*.⁷⁴ Madhusudana Sarasvati controverted this view and argued that the attachment to the beloved is incapable of giving that pleasure which is to be had from the attachment to God. Hence the devotion (*bhakti*) ought to be given a place in *Rasa*.

70 Bhavabhuti : *Uttara Ramacarita*, II, 47.

71 Shakespeare : *Othello*, Act I, Sc. III, 167-168.

72 Shelley, P. B. : 'To a Skylark', line 90. *The Complete works of Whelley* (O.U.P., 1909), p. 598.

73 De, S.K. : *The Vaisnava Faith and Movement in Bengal* (Calcutta, 1942), pp. 126, 153. Also see, *Bhaktirasasastra in Bengal Vaisnavism*, *Indian Historical Quarterly*, Vol.VII, pp. 643-688.

74 Mammata : *Kavya Prakasa* (Banaras, 1960), IV, 35.

It is at this point that the question how pathetic sentiment (*karuna-rasa*) is realized needs to be considered in some detail. This question, in the words of V. Raghavan, takes us straight into the greater one, "why do we see and how do we enjoy a tragedy?"⁷⁵ It is a problem which has not yet been satisfactorily solved by Western literary criticism. The Western critics grappled with this problem in manifold ways. Aristotle offered a theory of Catharsis to explain the function of tragedy. Many others like John Denis, Rousseau, Adison and Shopenhauer, formulated their theories to explain the apparent contradiction of the unpleasant turning out pleasant in aesthetic enjoyment. The Indian way of thinking is that *Visada* or sorrow is the Stable State (*sthayi-bhava*) of pathetic sentiment (*karuna-rasa*). It is the love for the person that is at the bottom of pleasure. The death of a person whom one does not love does not excite one's sorrow. Madhusudan Sarasvati, Rudrabhatta and Bharata tried to explain the tragic pleasure in their own ways. But all of them agree on the point that when we see a tragic hero, we do not take him as a separate entity but a part and parcel of our own self. We become one with him. Our identity is merged with his identity. In other words, at the time of seeking a pathetic scene, all egotism of the connoisseur is washed away and his mind becomes calm and tranquil. It rises above all physical barriers. Uppermost in his mind remains nothing but "perfect calm" (*visranti*) which is the root of all pleasure. Abhinavagupta holds that sorrow becomes pleasurable because it is universalized (*sadharanikrta*). It is realized by the man who shakes off his subjectivity and acquires a state of calm contemplation, in which sorrow no more remains painful. Visvanatha holds that tears trickling down our cheeks are no proof of our grief. They may come out of our sympathy (*ardrata*). In his words : "as in the lover's pinch, in tragedy the pain is desired."⁷⁶ It sounds like the utterance of Cleopatra :⁷⁷

The stroke of death is as a lover's pinch.

That hurts, and is desire'd.

Jagannatha argues that the devotee's shedding of tears at the description of a deity shows that tears may not always be caused by grief. This argument is, however, not tenable because

75 Raghavan : The Number of Rasa, p. 155.

76 Visvanatha : Sahitya Darpana, 3/7, p. 116.

77 Shakespeare : Antony and Cleopatra, Act V, Sc. II, 334-35.

the devotee does not suffer from any pain and so there is no question of tragic pleasure in it. The Indian notion of purification of heart is analogous to Aristotle's concept of catharsis. But it would be wrong to consider catharsis, as a substitute for *Rasa*.⁷⁸ The mental state offered by catharsis, in which emphasis is laid on the purification of heart through pity and terror, is basically different from the mental state offered by *Rasa*, in which pleasure alone reigns supreme. Moreover, catharsis refers to the psychological effect of tragedy on the audience. And, as Aristotle argued, the audience is not influenced or depressed by the spectacle of suffering but in some way feels released because his subjective, potentially morbid emotions, are extended outward through pity for the tragic hero. The ultimate result is 'psychic harmony' which the audience gets as a reward. On the other hand, pleasure particular to 'pathetic sentiment' (*karuna rasa*), is obtained because of the enlargement of Ego. Whereas Catharsis is a process, not an end in itself, *Rasa* is an end in itself. Similarly, any easy equation like the idea of *vasana* in *Yogadarsana* and Aristotle's *Catharsis* is bound to be wrong. Yoga psychology aims at the annihilation of all *chittavrttis*; and not elimination of the same as in Aristotle.

It is a matter of common observation that sorrow is the most sensitive of all created things. Aesthetically, tragedy does not end in catastrophe. The protagonists like the suffering that befall them. Claudius says⁷⁹:

If I must die, I will encounter darkness as a bride,

And hug it in mine arms.

And Antonio also says :⁸⁰

...but I will be

A bridegroom in my death, and run into it

As to a lover's bed.

From the foregoing discussion, it follows that Indian aesthetics holds that poetry is the finite form of the infinite experience. It is the expression of the poet's vision, the projection of his soul, which ever remains in a blissful state. Of late, under

78 Bhargava, Dr. P.L. : 'A Comparative study of the Sanskrit and the Greek Dramatic Theory' Dwivedi, Dr. R.D. : ed. Principles of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit (Motilal Banarasidas, Delhi, 1968), p. 23.

79 Shakespeare : Measure for Measure, Act III, Sc. I, 84-86.

80 Shakespeare : Antony and Cleopatra, Act IV, Sc. 12, 99-101.

the influence of western literary criticism, a tendency has grown up in India "to encourage aesthetic appeal of art at the expense of the spiritual."⁸¹ The new critical movement gaining ground in England and America outright rejects the philosophical claims of criticism and confines the scope of literature, particularly of poetry to the study of sounds, figures, symbols, images and other linguistic devices. By laying too much emphasis on facts and realities, the western critics have, to a certain extent, missed the realization of the force that motivates art and makes us feel the existence of beauty, goodness and truth.

Connected with the question of the number of Rasas is the question of one archetypal or primordial (*mula*) Rasa. Rasa is perfect joy or *Ananda*. Although it is futile to make divisions of *Ananda*, it may be safely presumed that *Ananda* can be obtained through various means. The root of *Ananda*, is concentration of mind. At the time Rasa is relished as *Ananda*, there seems no need to make categories among the different kinds of *Ananda*. Those rhetoricians who stand by only one Rasa proclaim that division of Rasa is impossible. In the strict sense, 'the pathetic' (*karuna-rasa*) cannot be regarded as the basic Rasa because of the simple reason that there are Rasas which are quite contradictory to it. But if we extend the meaning of the pathetic to embrace all human feelings and emotions which move and rend human heart, it may be taken as the basic or archetypal Rasa. To be affected by others' emotions is the primary condition of Kavya-Rasa. It is named *Samvedana* or compassion (*sahridayata*). This is the extension of the meaning of the word *Karuna*. *Samvedana* is, however, not 'sympathy' but 'awareness'. *Samvedana* is literally what the Germans call *Empfindung* or empathy or 'oneness of feeling' and *tanmayibhavana* and *hrdaya-samvada* are its synonyms. It is an insightful response involving an impersonal identification of one's feelings with the feelings described in the drama or poem. It is an unconscious state of 'aesthetic experience', which is something distinct from worldly 'sympathy' as well as 'awareness'. It is to be noted here that before Bhavabhuti, no Sanskrit critic accepted Santa-Rasa as the basic Rasa. It was Bhavabhuti alone who, because of his extremely contemplative nature, took Santa as the basic Rasa and supported it taking other Rasas as its off-shoots. About four

81 Roy, D. R. : "Music : Aesthetic Versus Spiritual", The Cultural Heritage of India, Vol. III (Ram Krishna Mission, Belurmath, 1936), p. 589.

centuries after Bhavabhuti, Abhinavagupta established 'the serene (*santa*) as the basic *Rasa*. He stated that *Santa* is the basic character or nature.⁸² According to him the Dominant Sentiment (*sthayi-bhava*) of *Santa-Rasa* is self-enlightenment (*atma-jnana*). This state is completely free from wordly passions and desires and is a state of perfect bliss (*suddha-ananda*). Love and grief also attain this state of self-consciousness and are then transformed into 'the Erotic' (*srngara*) and the pathetic (*karuna-rasa*). Self-enlightenment, which is the *Sthayin* or *Santa-Rasa* is the basis of all *Sthayi-bhavas*. It is in fact, the *Sthayin* of all the *Sthavi-bhavas*. All *Sthavi-bhavas* incline towards the *Santa*. 'The Erotic' (*srngara*) and 'the Comic' (*hasya*) are configurations of *Santa-Rasa*.

About this time, Bhoja, in equally forceful words, advocated that it is actually *Srngara* which is the basis of all *Rasas*. His views on *Srngara-Rasa* have been given in the appropriate place. His argument is that it is our Ego which is the main attribute of our soul. We feel distracted when our Ego is not satisfied. It is this Ego or pride (*ahankara* or *abhimana*) which blinds us to the world. We only love those who love us and in this way ultimately we come to love ourselves most.⁸³ Obviously, Bhoja uses the words *Ahankara* and *Abhimana* rather loosely because they are not synonymous words. *Ahankara* is egotism, self-conceit, a sense of self-love. *Abhimana* is usually used in a good sense, in the sense of self-respect, honorable or worthy feeling. In Bhoja's theory, these words only denote the feeling of self-worship, an excessive interest in one's own perfections. The word 'soul' is used here not in its metaphysical sense but to suggest the heart or the seat of thought and feeling (*antah karana*).

The theory of *Srngara* put forward in *Agnipurana* is the translation of Bhoja's argument and the author of *Agnipurana*, like Bhoja, admits that the main attribute of soul is Ego or *Ahankara*, *Srngara* being the king of all *Rasas* (*rasa-raja*).

The theorist who took wonder (*adbhuta*) as the basic *Rasa* was Narayana Pandita, the great grandfather of Kaviraja Visvanatha whose name is referred to by Visvanatha himself.⁸⁴ The foundation of this theory is *Camat-kara* which is one of the

82 Abhinavagupta : Abhinava Bharati, p. 339.

83 Raghavan, V. : Bhoja's *Srngara Prakasa*, p. 453.

84 Visvanatha : *Sahitya Darpana*, 3/3 vrtti, p. 106.

original phrases of Indian aesthetics. The universally acknowledged meaning of the word *Camat-kara* is 'unhindered self-realization' (*nirvighna-atmapratiti*) or bliss (*ananda*). As the pleasure of poetry is distinct from ordinary pleasure, the adjective *alaukika* is used with it to denote its superior quality.

And finally, the theorists who conceived devotion (*bhakti*) as the basic *Rasa* were chiefly the *Vaisnava-acaryas* of the medieval period. They propounded the theory that in reality the only *Rasa*, worth the name, is *Bhakti-Rasa* because it is the perfect bliss. *Rasas*, like *vira*, *karuna*, etc., are quite insignificant in comparison to *Bhakti-Rasa*. Rupa Gosvamin took devotion to God as the basic *Rati* and renamed *Hasa* and *Vismaya* as *Hasarati* and *Vismayarati* and considered them as branches of *Bhakti-Rasa* which is the basic *Rati*. Madhusudana Sarasvati also propounded a similar theory and took *Bhakti-Rasa* at the centre of all *Rasas*.

The basis of *Rasa* is emotional state (*bhava*) or feeling and the seat of emotion or feeling is mind or psyche. It is a subject to be properly treated in psychology. It is not easy to understand the function of mind. Indian poetics has done a great service by classifying and anatomizing the different layers of mind. It gives a detailed account of emotional state (*bhava*), Dominant state (*sthayi-bhava*), Determinants (*vibhava*), Consequents (*anubhava*) and Transitory state (*sancari bhava*). They are ultimately to be crystallized into one final *Rasa*. The whole discussion has a physiological bearing. Since the great poet is he who has complete command over *Rasa*, the problems connected with *Rasa* have always engaged the attention of the critics.

Bhavas are the mental states caused by a particular circumstance of happening. Determinants (*vibhavas*) are used for clear knowledge. The words, gestures and the representation of the temperament are determined (*vibhavayate*) by them and so they are called *Vibhavas*. *Vibhavas* are of two kinds : *Alambana* and *Uddipana*. *Alambana* is that object or thing with reference to which *Rasa* arises. *Uddipana* is the excitement determinant. It is used with reference to the hero and the heroine and not with the perceiver or spectator. The dramatic representations are made to be felt by consequents (*anubhavas*). The words used by the characters and their gestures play an important role in bringing home the histrionic representation (*abhinaya*). Consequents are of three kinds : bodily (*kayika*), mental (*manasika*) and decorative

(*aharya*). Physical movements are placed in the first category. The outer expression of pleasure (*harsa*), pain (*visada*) and other mental states are placed in the second category. And the act of dressing and decorating one-self according to the suitability of the situation is placed in the third category. Transitory States (*sancari* or *vyavicari bhavas*) are attached to Dominant states (*sthayi bhavas*). Modern psychology accepts the existence of *sancari bhavas* in one way or the other. Several auxiliary mental affections are associated with one dominant state. For example, humility (*dainata*), pity (*dava*) self-reproach (*glani*), dissatisfaction (*asantosa*), etc., are associated with compassion (*karuna*). Similarly, feelings like self-assertion (*atmabhimana*), fortitude (*dhirata*) and many other *Bhavas* are associated with perseverance (*utsaha*). No emotional state exists in isolation or works alone. A chain of several small emotional states, like the ripples of a wave, are inextricably attached to a dominant state. The dominant state not only mingles with other transitory states but it also tends to mingle with other dominant states in which case one dominant state becomes primary and the other secondary. This is why the rhetoricians of *Rasa* school speak of the friendliness (*mitrata*) and the enmity (*satruta*) of *Rasas*. It is difficult to yoke the comic (*hasya*) with the Pathetic (*karuna*) or the erotic (*sringara*) with the odious (*bibhatsa*).

Bharata enumerated only eight Dominant States (*sthayi bhavas*) and thirty three Transitory States (*sancari bhavas* or *vyabhicari bhavas*). Over and above, he listed eight Temperamental States (*sattvika bhavas*). Thus roughly calculated, there are forty-nine *Bhavas* capable of drawing out the sentiment from the play. *Rasa* arises from them when they are imbued with the quality of universality. The thirty three Transitory States are as follows :

(1) Discouragement (*nirveda*) (2) Weakness (*glani*) (3) Apprehension (*sanka*) (4) Weariness (*srama*) (5) Contentment (*dhrti*) (6) Stupor (*jadata*) (7) Joy (*harsa*) (8) Depression (*dainya*) (9) Cruelty (*ugrata*) (10) Anxiety (*cinta*) (11) Fright (*trasa*) (12) Envy (*asuya*) (13) Indignation (*amarsa*) (14) Arrogance (*garva*) (15) Recollection (*smrti*) (16) Death (*marana*) (17) Intoxication (*mada*) (18) Dreaming (*supta*) (19) Sleeping (*nidra*) (20) Awakening (*vivodha*) (21) Shame (*vrida*) (22) Epilepsy (*apasmara*) (23) Distraction (*moha*) (24) Assurance (*mati*) (25)

Indolence (*alasya*) (26) Agitation (*avega*) (27) Deliberation (*vitarka*) (28) Dissimulation (*avahittha*) (29) Sickness (*vyadhi*) (30) Insanity (*unmada*) (31) Despair (*visada*) (32) Impatience (*atsukya*) and (33) Inconstancy (*capalata*).

The eight Temperamental States (*sattvika Bhavas*) are as follows : (1) Perspiration (*sveda*) (2) Paralysis (*stambha*) (3) Trembling (*Kampa*) (4) Weeping (*asru*) (5) Change of Colour (*vai-varnya*) (6) Horripilation (*romance*) (7) Change of voice (*svara-sada*) and (8) Fainting (*pralaya*).

The Temperamental States (*sattvikabhavas*) cannot be reckoned under *Bhavas* because they are certain sensations. Similarly, all *Sancari bhavas* are not *Manovikaras*. *Sancari bhavas* like *Marana*, *Alasya*, *Nidra*, *Apasmara*, *Vyadhi*, etc., are the nature of physical body and a few like *Matl*, *Vitarka*, etc., are characteristics of intellect.

All the *R-sas* are related to one or the other human emotions which in turn are related to some basic instincts. Mc Dougall, the exponent of Hormic psychology, in his book *Outline of Psychology* defines instinct as an inherited, or innate psycho-physical disposition which determines its possessor to perceive, and to pay attention to objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or, at least, to experience an impulse to such action. He enumerates human instincts in the following manner and also points out the emotions associated therewith.⁸⁵ According to him, for each primary instinct, there is a corresponding primary emotion.

Names of instincts	Names of emotional qualities
1. Instinct of Escape	Fear.
2. Instinct of Pugnacity	Anger.
3. Instinct of Repulsion	Disgust.
4. Instinct of Parent	Tender emotion.
5. Instinct of Appeal	Distress.
6. Instinct of Sex	Lust.
7. Instinct of Curiosity	Wonder.
8. Instinct of Submission or self-abasement	Feeling of subjection.

⁸⁵ McDougall, William : *An Introduction to Social Psychology* (London, 1950), pp. 43-76

9. Instinct of Assertion	Elation
10. Instinct of Social or gregarious instinct. Feeling of loneliness.	
11. Instinct of Food seeking	Appetite or craving.
12. Instinct of Acquisition	Feeling of ownership.
13. Instinct of Construction	Feeling of creativeness
14. Instinct of Laughter	Amusement.

Obviously, McDougall here used the word "emotion" in the sense of innate or inherited tendencies which are the motive power behind all thought and action. There are other instincts like self-abnegation, reproduction, and so on. The list is not exhaustive. Later, this theory fell into scientific disrepute when psychologists discovered that any one can make up his own list of instincts in the manner McDougall did and there is no way to prove that one list is more authentic than the other. Psychology is a fast developing science and the theory of McDougall has outlived its importance. The recent psychologists even hesitate to accept the existence of instincts. McDougall, however, gave us a clue to appreciate the infinite number of mental States and their sub-divisions.

It is to be noted here that all the instincts and emotions pointed out by McDougall can be conveniently fused with the *Rasas* and their Transitory States (*sancari bhavas*) thus :

Erotic (*srngara*)-It included instincts No. 6, 4 and 10.

Comic (*hasya*)-It included instincts No. 14.

Pathetic (*karuna*)-It included instincts No. 5 and 8.

Furious (*raudra*)-It included instincts No. 2.

Heroic (*vira*)-It included instincts No. 1,9 and 12.

Terrible (*bhayanaka*) -It included instincts No. 1.

Marvellous (*adbhuta*) -It included instincts No. 7 and 13.

Odious (*vibhatsa*)-It included instincts No. 3.

Serene (*santa*)-It is resignation from worldly activities (*nivrtti*) and hence there is no room for inclination of mind (*pravrtti*) in it.

Although all the instincts and emotions can be incorporated in one or the other *Rasas*, human life is so wide and complex that *Bhavas* cannot be counted statistically. In fact, *Bhavas* are infinite and are of varying degrees. Those critics who conceived of more

The old question of the poet as an inspired bard to whom nature unhesitatingly unfolds its beauty and the *Rasika* or *Sahridaya* being a man endowed with enough of literary sensibility was revived by the Sanskrit rhetoricians. They discussed in detail the question of aesthetic experience. There is a surprising unanimity of opinion among the critics of different groups and schools on the point of acknowledging aesthetic experience by an exaltation of the *Sattva*. They hold that aesthetic experience is possible only when all effective and mental barriers are resolved (*avarana bhanga*) and the object in view is perceived with an exemplary single-minded-ness. The two chief obstacles to be overcome are sensual attachment or affections and mental hinderances or biases. Ideal beauty transcends sensual perception. The mental image of the contemplated object is the natural outcome of attention or *Avadhana*. Aesthetic experience means enlarging of the soul whereupon the perceiver sees the world in all its beauty, glory and horror and nothing is seen outside the Divine scheme. This vision may be likened to God's vision because at this stage the poet becomes a *Rsi*, i.e., a man of vision and a prophet.

It is, thus, proved that philosophically speaking, aesthetic experience is transcendental or suprasensuous. According to the theory of *Rasa*, it is in essence different from worldly experience because it is unique in character. But it does not mean that it is beyond human comprehension. Abhinavagupta states that it is not *Nirvikalpa* or unrelated knowledge like the perception of the Absolute for *Rasa-Pratiti* involves the knowledge of the *Vibhavas*, etc., in their generalized form. But at the same time it would be wrong to suppose that it is *Savikalpa* or related knowledge, for it is not related to any particular class, *Jati*, etc., During the moment of realization *Rasa* is an inexplicable, indefinable, blissful state. The bliss of *Rasa* is compatible with an awareness of differences. And, therefore, it is sandwiched between the worldly and the unworldly states. *Rasa* is realized by a *Sahridaya* whose mirror of heart (*mana-mukura*) is neat and clean.

The theorists of *Rasa* school attach great importance to imagination which they technically call *Pratibha*. Like *Bhava*, the word *Pratibha* is highly evocative and includes a fairly wide variety of concepts in its compass such as intuition, imagination, genius, etc. The poet is in possession of a novel insight (*kavinam nava drastu*). Abhinavagupta defines *Pratibha* as the poet's

faculty which enables him to create novel things (*apurva vastu nirmanaksama prajna*).⁸⁶ According to Rajasekhara, *Pratibha* helps the poet to see even those things which are actually not before him and thus even invisible things are made visible before his eye sight. Rajasekhara lays emphasis on imagination because it is one of the causes (*hetus*) of poetry, other causes being practice (*abhyasa*) and inborn qualities (*vyutpatti*).⁸⁷

Rasa has inextricable relationship with *Gunas* which add to its beauty and appeal. *Gunas* are proofs of its essence and excellence. Whatever pleasure we derive from *Rasa* is due to *Gunas*. In a way, they are instrumental to the manifestation of *Rasa*. As a muscular body stands testimony to the soul's energy, so *Gunas* like *Madhurya*, *Oja*, etc., exhibit poetry's energy and spirit, this spirit being *Rasa*. In fact, *Gunas* are concerned with meaning as well as with poetic composition i.e., versification. For lofty and sublime thought, a graceful and flawless language is essential. *Gunas* are three in number : *Madhurya*, *Oja* and *Prasada*. What moves the heart is called *Madhurya*. It gradually progresses in *Sambhoga*, *Virpralambha*, *Karuna* and *Santa Rasas*. What enlarges the consciousness is called *Oja*. It gradually gets accelerated in *Vira*, *Vibhatsa* and *Raudra Rasas*. In *Oja*, the heart has a forward motion. In *Madhurya*, the heart moves in one single direction. In *Prasada*, it moves in all the possible directions, horizontally, elliptically and spirally. What immediately absorbs our mind is *Prasada* Guna. As fuel catches fire in no time, so a good literary composition saturated with *Rasa* soon casts its spell on the readers.⁸⁸

As *Rasa* is the soul of poetry, its relation with all the *Gunas* cannot be ruled out. Its natural corollary is that the ingredients which embellish poetry and add to its flavour must necessarily advance the cause of *Rasa*. Meter (*chanda*) and figures of speech (*alankaras*) serve this end. Figures of speech are detrimental to *Rasa* only when they are redundant or unnatural.

The discussion of *Rasabhasa* and *Bhavabhasa* is not outside the scope of this study. *Abhasa* literally means the distinct perception or apprehension of distorted or unreal form in place of the real or genuine one. As the reflection of something is only

86 Abhinavagupta : *Dhvanyaloka Locana* (Chowkhamba, 1965), p. 93.

87 Rajasekhara : *Kavya Mimansa*, p. 37.

88 Mammata : *Kavya Prakasa*, 8/70.

the *Abhasa* of that thing, so *Rasabhasa* does not give us pure or real *Rasa* but only an apprehension of *Rasa*. It happens because of insufficient *Vibhavas* or when there is some blemish in the characters themselves. *Rasabhasa*, *Bhavabhasa*, *Bhavasanti*, *Bhavodaya*, *Bhavasandhi* and *Bhavasabalata* - all these are reckoned under the caption *Rasa* because they all are felt and experienced.

Bhava is the first stage of *Rasa*. It is *Rasa* in the making. It is *Bhava* which under certain conditions untrammelled by adverse circumstances is transformed into *Rasa*. Where a circumstance is created wherein *Rasa* is realized but inappropriately and haphazardly, it is called *Rasabhasa*. Infatuation for another's wife or husband, a woman's love for many lovers at a time, one-sided love, love of a high born person with a woman of menial class, etc., will come under this category. In Goldsmith's *She Stoops to Conquer*, Marlow's love with Miss Hrdcastle who appears before him in the guise of a barmaid is an example of *Rasabhasa*. Similarly, in Congreve's *The Way of the World*, Lady Wishfort's desire for marriage and her pathetic flirting with Mirabell which presents the old lady's depressed sex hunger is an example of *Rasabhasa*. In Donne's poem "Twickenham Garden", the poet loves a countess who is faithful to her husband and hence she will not allow the poet to love her. The poet says that her faithfulness towards her husband will kill him. The poet's love is one-sided and hence this is also an example of *Rasabhasa*.

Bhavabhasa occurs where there is insufficient or inadequate cause to produce *Bhava*. In *Bhavabhasa*, the Impropriety of the expression of *Bhava* is easily felt. Prince Hamlet's wrath against his uncle Claudius is not supported by sufficient reason and, therefore, his indignation presents an example of *Bhavabhasa*. This is why T.S. Eliot presented the formula of the 'particular emotion'. An artistic success shows an 'exact equivalence' of Situation and the emotion it is supposed to evoke. Eliot's theory of 'Objective Correlative' states that emotion ought to be related to the object or event.⁸⁹

In *Bhavasanti*, one *Bhava* is suppressed or subdued because of the sudden emergence of another contradictory *Bhava*. Yet the *Bhava* which is suppressed or subdued does not die out and it helps the manifestation of *Rasa*. In Milton's *Paradise Lost*, Satan

89 Eliot, T. S. - *Selected Essays* (London, 1951), p. 145.

is shown groaning in the lake of fire which moves us to pity. But soon he is shown to jump up like a pyramid of fire which evokes our heroic sentiment. With the emergence of the heroic sentiment, the subdued sentiments of submission and humility do not evaporate and we muse for long on the depressed condition of the archangel which leaves a trail of sad feelings behind.

In *Bhavodaya*, one *Bhava* comes up when another *Bhava* is subdued and the *Bhava* that comes up on the forefront evokes our pleasure. In the Ring-episode in Shakespeare's *The Merchant of Venice*, fun and humour succeed a scene which is so much overcast with gloom, tension, suspense and anxiety. The introduction of fun and humour here produces a soothing effect on our mind. In Shakespeare's *Macbeth*, Lady Macbeth's 'force of will' is followed by her terrible feeling to do away with the life of the babe that sucks her with its boneless gums. This is an example of *Bhavodaya* because here the filial affection is overdominated by the terrible feeling.

Where two *Bhavas*, which are equally forceful and exhilarating, are placed side by side, it is called *Bhavasandhi*. The word *Sandhi* suggests the togetherness of two things. In Keats' *The Eve of St. Agnes*, poem " " we come across many such combinations and contrasts. For example, the hostility outside the castle is contrasted with the calm and quiet atmosphere of Madeline's chamber. In Matthew Arnold's poem 'Dover Beech', we get an example of *Bhavasandhi*. The poet is reminded of the past ages when life flowed on peacefully and humanity possessed deep religious faith. As contrasted with this, the modern age is said to be full of doubts, confusions and distractions and the whole world is said to be full of chaos and disorder. The juxtaposition of the comic with the heroic in Dryden's *Mac Flecknoe* presents a good example of *Bhavasandhi*.

Where several *Bhavas* are arranged in close succession and all are equally important and thought - provoking and equally contribute to the liveliness of the description, there is *Bhava-Sabalata*. In the concluding lines of Marlowe's *Dr. Faustus*, there is a queer mixture of diverse emotions in *Dr. Faustus's* cry like fear, terror, anxiety, pity and submission to God which is a specimen of *Bhava-Sabalata*.

What is distracting to *Rasa* or what adversely affects or diminishes its beauty and efficacy is called poetic-blemish or *Rasa-Dosa*. Poetic blemishes are, in fact, the blemishes of *Rasa*. *Rasa-Dosa* may be of three types : (1) When *Rasa* is not easily and conveniently relished and a hurdle appears in the process (2) When something suddenly appears in the way which is repugnant to *Rasa* like the emission of light hindered by some object coming or intruding in between and (3) When something delays the realization of *Rasa*. An example will make the point clear. If while describing the beauty of a woman, the word 'beauty' is repeated several times, it is done much to the detriment of *Rasa*. The pleasure of *Rasa* lies in understanding and in contemplation i.e., *Carvana* and *Rasana*.⁹⁰ If the chewed food is poured into one's mouth, it will not give one pleasure. Similarly, a repeated hint at the 'beauty' of the girl cannot enable us to feel her beauty. We can appreciate her beauty and derive pleasure only when we are left to explore her beauty. Like-wise, the description of an old man kissing a young will lead to *Rasadosa*.

The experience of beauty is not to be equated with God - intoxication or spiritual realization. In spiritual realization, the mind transcends the aesthetic experience. It realizes the Universal Beauty and passes beyond *Rasa* and *Bhoga* to *Visuddha Ananda*. On the other hand, the experience of poetry is definable in terms of language and idiom. In great poets, the syntax becomes the syntax of thought rather than of language and grammatical links are often dropped and the meaning of many sentences are compressed to facilitate concentration of feeling. But in each case, the poet always uses language to express his feeling and emotions. It is sometimes maintained that *Vibhava* is the only *Rasa*. The critics who support this view usually take recourse to the faulty argument that reality resides in the object and the seeing eye is only a passive witness or a silent spectator. But experience shows that reality is expanded both in the subject and the object. It is, therefore, proper to assume the seat of *Rasa* both in the subject as well as in the object. *Vibhava*, according to Bharata, is the *Karana*, *Nimitta* or *Hatu* of *Bhava*.⁹¹ *Bhava* is called forth by *Vibhava*.

90 Abhinavagupta : *Dvarivaloka Locana*, p. 154.

91 Bharata : *Natyasastra*, 7/3.

In so far as the question of poetic value is concerned, *Rasa* theory has to contribute a lot towards its formation and appreciation. *Rasa* is essentially concerned with moral and ethical standards. It uplifts the soul and elevates the consciousness so as to feel the ultimate truth and see the Divine beauty permeated in the universe. It does not support the view that poetry should be composed for its own sake or figures of speech should be used only to decorate the body of poetry. It invariably aims at the higher values of life. In recent years, I.A. Richards, comes closer to the Indian attitude when he declares that the ultimate aim of poetry is to form an attitude to life and the value of poetry depends upon the synthesis of worthwhile impulses. The theory of *Rasa* holds that poetry is not written for self-pleasure or self-satisfaction but for the well being of humanity at large. In epic poetry, there is one dominant or principal *Rasa* called *Angi-Rasa* in terms of which the whole epic can be defined. This view is analogous to the concept of key-word upheld by William Empson in his *The Structure of Complex words*.

The study of poetic meaning has been one of the chief concerns of the critics of *Rasa* school. They have suggested that poetry aims at *Rasa-Dhdani* or emotive meaning which passes beyond literal or metaphorical meaning. The theorists of *Rasa* school maintain that word has three main functions. Its first function is to convey its literal meaning. This is called *Abhidha*. When we say "he is Ram", we say nothing more than the fact that somebody is named Ram. Its second function is metaphorical or *Laksanika*. For example, when we address a stupid boy as an ass, we do not mean that he is actually as ass. What we mean is that he is as dull and lethargic as an ass. Here, the meaning is derived not on the basis of bald fact but on the basis of the metaphorical use of the word. Similar is the position when we call some body as 'pure gold'. And finally, the function of a word may be suggestive and its meaning may be *Vyangyārtha*. When we say "The sun is set", it calls forth many meanings and interpretations. It may mean to a school boy that the time of dispersing of classes is ripe. To a prostitute, it may mean that the time of business is come. There may be other meanings also of this utterance which may be appreciated according to one's mood, mental make-up, situation, habit and environment. This suggested meaning is called *Dvani* in *Rasa-Sastra*. The word *Dvani* is very significant here. It has been used by the

grammarians also. It is said that as the sound of a metal pot, when struck, vibrates for some time, so when we use a word, its meaning vibrates for some time taking us aloof from its literal meaning. This meaning is the suggestive meaning or *Dhvanyartha*. The Indian rhetoricians got the clue of this assumption from the Indian semanticists and grammarians who propounded the theory of *Sphota*, meaning the eternal sound.

The critics of *Rasa* school believe that the suggestive meaning (*vyangya*) is the crown and capital of poetry and comes to our help when the literal meaning (*vacyartha*) or the metaphorical meaning (*lakshyartha*) become inoperative.⁹² But at the same time it has to be noted that the literal meaning is the real foundation on which the superstructure of the suggestive meaning is laid. Anandavardhana, the chief exponent of *Dhvani* theory, observed : "as a man ambitious of light should not discard the candle which is its basis, so a man aspiring for suggestive meaning should not discard literal meaning".⁹³ Anandavardhana puts *Dhvani* in three broad categories : *Vastu-Dhvani*, *Alankara-Dhvani* and *Rasa-Dhvani*. In real poetry, it is *Rasa-Dhvani* which is dominant. In poetry, *Rasa* is always *Vyangya*. The meaning of the word, which is suggestive is appreciated immediately. This is the maturest type of *vyanjana*. This is called *Asanlakshyakrama-Vyangya* meaning the *Vyangyarth* which is appreciated incessantly. Of the four types of meaning suggested by I.A.Richards in his *Practical Criticism* i.e., Sense, Feeling, Tone and Intention, at least the last two i.e., Tone and Intention fairly resemble the Indian concept of *Dhvani* or *Vyanjana*. The word-meaning relationship is perennial. In India, 'letter' is called *Aksara* because it is immutable and imperishable. There is also the concept of *Sabda-Brahma* which signifies that word power is enormous like that of God.

The critics of *Rasa* and *Dhvani* schools have left us a large corpus of literature which throws sufficient light on linguistic possibilities. In India, unlike in the Western countries, the intrusion of linguistics in literary criticism has been generally avoided. They are considered as two distinct branches of enquiry. But the hankering after this purity of literary criticism has not precluded the literary critics from borrowing materials from

⁹² Visvanatha : *Sahitya Darpana*, 2/12, p. 75.

⁹³ Anandavardhana : *Dhvanyaloka*, -1/9.

grammar, linguistics and semantics. Anandavardhana, Kuntaka, Mammata, Visvanatha, Jagannatha and a host of other Sanskrit literary critics who deal with poetic meaning frequently refer to the linguistic and semantic principles laid down by Panini, Patanjali, Nagesabhatta, and Bhartrihari.

Rasa is intermingled with love for the entire human being including the lower species. Love becoming increasingly purer also increases in its intensity. Only the purest love is capable of being most intense and, therefore, of the greatest creation because from the standpoint of impure love of utilitarian and hedonistic calculations, such a great creation is impossible. *Rasa* means love and compassion for the entire humanity. Artificial love is always fragile, weak and short-lived and hence it is of low intensity. Pure love means the complete merging of the whole human ego with that of the loved one; a complete identification of the intensely loving persons. Such an identification goes beyond any utilitarian-hedonistic motivations. Such love is a disinterested love which is the root of artistic creation and which is aimed at by the poet who wants to compose *Rasatmaka-Kavya*. Poetry cannot obtain the quality of *Rasa Vatta* or it cannot make the reader *Rasardra* unless the poet knows how to rise above his personality.

The Indian theory of *Rasa*, as we have seen above, is the product of Indian culture and defines a typically Indian attitude to life. The word '*Sanskrit*' and its equivalent 'culture' are synonymous. The standard devised by the supporters of *Rasa* school for the judgement of literature is astonishingly novel and original.

India is a land of mystics and prophets, saints and ascetics. Indian culture, which is of the greatest antiquity among all the known cultures of the globe, attaches great importance to 'higher things', things relating to the soul.⁹⁴ Hence, it is in keeping with our culture that our rhetoricians should conceive of the idea of the soul of poetry (*kavyatma*). Here, no enquiry is ever considered to be complete, unless it takes into account higher truth. As Radhakrishnan observed : "For Indians the physical world is not a futile play of senseless atoms engaged in a deadly conflict. The reality of God experienced by the mystics is found to be quite compatible with scientific facts and logical reasoning

94 Srinivasan, R. : *Facts of Indian Culture* (Bharitya Vidya Bhavan, 1970), p. XI.

based on them."⁹⁵ And, therefore, "in India, no enquiry was ever made, that did not directly or indirectly, aim at a higher realization of truth and a greater fulfilment of life."⁹⁶ So a stress on higher truth, far beyond what is evanescent, is what defines the real feature of Indian culture. In the words of Sri Aurobindo, "that which is to the western mind myth and imagination is here an actuality and a strand of life of our innerbeing. What is there beautiful poetic idea and philosophic speculation is here a thing realized and present to the experience."⁹⁷ The western mind initially trained in crude scientific thinking is not in a position to understand and appreciate the real import of Indian literature or Sanskrit literary criticism, as a result whereof our theories of poetry and drama are either underrated or dismissed on the ground that they contain more philosophy than the real experiences of life. The votaries of Western culture, quite naturally, feel confounded when they come across phrases like *Kvyatma*, *Brahmanandasahodara*, *Madhumati-Bhumika*, *Dhvanī*, *Rasa*, etc., scattered over the pages of Sanskrit literary criticism. Whereas most of the energy of the western literary critics is exhausted in making experiments with critical tools, the Sanskrit literary critics always endeavored to find out the ultimate truth and in doing so displayed exemplary depth, subtlety and variety.

It need not be emphasized that the foundation of *Rasa* theory is laid on such diverse disciplines as aesthetics, psychology, moral science, ethnology, sociology and philosophy. The critics of *Rasa* school march from the real to the ideal, from the poetic beauty to the Divine beauty. When the mirror of heart is cleansed of all impurities, it becomes capable of reflecting the supersensuous light. When Divine light shines, the vision manifests the formless and the Infinite, the unique and the harmonious, the basis and support of all existence. Here, there is neither rising nor setting, neither right nor left, neither up nor down, neither night nor day, neither heaven nor earth, neither beauty nor ugliness. When *Rasa* flickers spontaneously, the tongue falters, intellect sinks into nothingness. Intelligence and cognition miss the way in the wilderness of amazement. The

95 Radhakrishnan, S. . *An Idealist View of Life* (George Allen & Unwin, London, 1951), p. 331.

96 Chakravarty, P.C. : 'The Spiritual Outlook of Sanskrit Grammar' *The Culture Heritage of India*, Vol. III (Belur, 1936), p. 670.

97 Sri Aurobindo : *The Foundations of Indian Culture* (New York, 1953), p. 303.

perceiver is stripped naked of everything in order to gaze at the supreme beauty. He is bound to the naught and estranged from all save God. He overcomes all dangers and precipices.

In Indian life and thought, philosophy has ever remained an important stimulant. Hence, philosophy has always been one of the greatest driving forces of Indian aesthetics. The ancient Indian sages realized that every human being is potentially Divine and entitled to eternal bliss or perpetual happiness. They aimed at spiritual knowledge for full consummation of human life. In every walk of life, including critical activity, they sought eternal bliss or beatitude. The term *Rasa*, meaning *Ananda*, points to this ultimate goal of literature. Indian poetics has both gained and lost by the overpowering influence of philosophy. The *Saiva* and *Advaita* philosophies exerted great influence on Indian poetics with the result that its form was changed to some extent. On the other hand, philosophy also enriched its content and made it more congenial to the Indian mind. In fact, the exponents of *Rasa* school made literary criticism a philosophy and philosophy a literary criticism. Despite this obvious phenomenon, the Sanskrit critics were always on the alert regarding the meaning and applicability of the word *Rasa*. It was in the principal sense of 'relish' or 'experience' that the word *Rasa* was applied by most of the critics of *Rasa* school though, as has been mentioned above, the later critics of this school like Jagannatha,⁹⁸ attempted to mystify poetic experience by quoting the authority of the *Upanisads*. Dr A. Shankaran calls Jagannatha's view "wholly unhistorical".⁹⁹ Bharata, the earliest exponent of *Rasa* theory, however, held that the theatre is designed for amusement.¹⁰⁰ This is an emotivist interpretation of art as opposed to those writers who regard the creative process as being the rendering of a vision. *Rasa* theory regards that the work of art cannot be separated, in the experience either of the creator or the contemplator, from the social context, cultural milieu and the practical experiences of life. In practical life, we do not read poetry or any other emotional literature or witness a dramatic performance to get Divine pleasure. Our enjoyment of poetry or drama is concrete, and definable and so within the reach of our senses. Hence, it is highly misleading to brand *Rasa*

98 Jagannatha : *Rasa Ganadhara*, p. 99.

99 Shankaran, A. : *Some Aspects of the Theories of Rasa and Dhvani* p. 3.

100 Bharata : *Natyasastra*, 1/120.

theory an idle philosophy. As drama (*natya*) cannot be called abstract because it is performed on the stage, so *Rasa* cannot be called abstract because it is experienced by the reader and enjoyed by the theatre-goers. *Rasa*, as it is taken in Sanskrit literary criticism, is always an objective phenomenon. This is why the question of the propriety (*auchitya*) of its use has been discussed in detail by the critics of this school.

The method of Indian aesthetics has been compilatory (*sankalanatmaka* or *sangrahatmaka*). It adumbrates the truth wherever it is available. The resultant effect of this procedure is that the bringing out of truth outweighs practical criticism which is the main concern of the western critics. Sanskrit talent, like the Western one, has never been self-obsessed. . It cares more for beauty revealed in a particular piece of art. It cares more for collecting and collating the essential ingredients of literature and criticism in general. Every thing that the Indian rhetoricians have written glows with the light of their rich genius and that spiritual fervour which is the heritage of the Hindu. It contains much food for reflection and stimulus to action.

Rasa theory is vast and varied enough to be accurately interpreted and understood in terms of modern psychology in spite of the latter's claim to know the human psyche in its entirety. Psychology is confined to laboratory experiment as against the theory of *Rasa* which borders on the spiritual and the metaphysical.

There are striking similarities between the *Rasa* theory as enunciated by the Indian aestheticians and . Richards' critical credo. This common pool of thought, it is hoped, if adequately brought out, will enable the readers, eastern as well as western, to understand and appreciate currents of world thought as also the movements of the mind though they flow in different linguistic channels, have a common urge and aspiration.

2. AN OUTLINE OF THE LITERARY PRINCIPLES OF I.A.RICHARDS

Our main endeavour in this chapter would be to trace an outline of Richards' aesthetics with a view to interpreting and comparing its various aspects with the Indian theory of *Rasa*. Richards' criticism proved to be seminal and most influential in many ways. In his best criticism, his energy went into analysing and defining the theoretical problems which had haunted the mind of the literary critics for long. He put into currency ideas seldom fully explored, concerning the integrity of poetry, the process of poetic composition, communication, poetic value, the relation of the poet with the reader, the language of poetry and the importance of verbal nuances and poetic ambiguity. The terms which frequently recur in his literary criticism are 'instinct', 'emotion', 'impulse', 'attitude', 'synaesthesia' and such other terms as have direct bearing on psychology and neurology. A few expressions used by Richards such as 'balancing of impulses', *twarting of impulses* 'tenor-vehicle compatibility' 'emotive meaning', 'pseudo-statement', 'stock responses', 'chaos', 'value', 'belief', etc., have, like Eliot's 'objective correlative', 'emotional equivalent of thought,' 'dissociation of sensibility', 'music of poetry', 'unified sensibility' and so on, Love become an indispensable part of the critical vocabulary of our time. In an interview with Brower, Richards points out, "I went back to Cambridge" get a medical qualification...physiology and much more; in psychological reading and reflexion beyond any I'd tried to do as an undergraduate. And what was in those days the theory of linguistics and communication."¹ He admits that he owes much to the eminent psychologists like James Ward, Williams James and C.F.Stout and also to the world-renowned, nobel-prize winner, neuro-physiologist Sir Charles Sherrington.² The process of poetic creation generally thought to be obtruse and mysterious is presented by him with scientific exactitude and clarity.

Reading Richards means a close, laborious, pedagogic study of such ponderous aesthetic, philosophical, psychological

1 Brower, R. Vender, H. and Hollander, J. : eds. I.A. Richards: Essays in His Honour (New York, O.U.P., 1973), pp. 17-41.

2 *Ibid.*

literary and philological tonnes as *The Foundations of Aesthetics*, *Science and Poetry*, *The Meaning of Meaning*, *Principles of Literary Criticism*, *Practical Criticism*, *Meclius on Mind*, *Colaridge on Imagination*, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, *Interpretation in Teaching*, *Speculative Instruments* and *How to Read a Page*. And then the numerous critics on the aesthetic and philosophical theory of *Rasa* of the classical period of Sanskrit literature beginning with the very father of Sanskrit literary criticism, poetry and drama, namely Bharata, have to be studied and tackled in all their hair-splitting and concentrated as well as amply expanded and truly executed arguments.

The field of aesthetics is broad and incorporates at least two major modes of approach, the philosophical and the psychological. Philosophers since Plato have been vitally interested in the problems of art and beauty. Broadly speaking, the systematic study of art and beauty with particular emphasis on questions concerning the creation, experience, and criticism of works of art is termed aesthetics. Its chief object is to examine one's ideas on beauty which have prevailed in all ages and to find out the fundamental principles on which such ideas rest. The aesthetic attitude may be said to consist in confronting life as a whole in a way that is akin to the religious attitude. Each of these attitudes i.e., the aesthetic and the religious tends to transform existence either by taking it up into a world of imagination or by constructively altering it in terms of a vision of things possible. The credit to use the word 'aesthetic' in its modern sense for the first time goes to Alexander Baumgarten.³

Richards' aesthetics has a broad canvas. His knowledge is encyclopaedic and his critical formulations are psychology-oriented. Tate remarks that Richards takes poetry as "a kind of applied psychology".⁴ For Richards, critical remarks are a "branch of psychological remarks".⁵ In fact, as Hyman puts it, "Richards has taken all knowledge as his province and his field is the entire mind of man."⁶ His range is so wide that he has often been found a victim of the expansiveness of the mind. Blackmur, for instance, observes that his "apparatus is so vast, so

3 Shipley, Joseph T. : *Dictionary of world Literature* (Little Field, Admus & Co., U.S.A. 1977), p. 3.

4 Tate, Allen : *Essays in Four Decades* (O.U.P., 1970), p. 203.

5 Richards : *Principles*, p. 23.

6 Hyman : *The Armed Vision*, p. 315.

labyrinthine, so inclusive and the amount of literary criticism is so small that it seems to be a by-product instead of being a central target."⁷ The fact has, however, been forgotten that by extending the scope of literary criticism, Richards wants to keep abreast with the time.

Some basic questions relating to aesthetics have been tackled by Richards much in the same manner as the theorists of *Rasa* school have done. And, as the present enquiry will reveal, Richards' aesthetics and *Rasa* theory bear certain striking resemblances in so far as general questions of aesthetics are concerned. Nevertheless, as Richards' aesthetics and *Rasa* theory emerge from two different sources and are the products of two different cultures and traditions, each has its own specialities, and, at places, they naturally also differ.

A critical survey of the principal theories of poetry and literary criticism by Richards would show how broad based is his programme and how comprehensive and all-embracing is his range of treatment. He has discussed almost all the important problems of poetry and literary criticism.

Let us, first of all, take up his theory of beauty. This problem was first discussed in detail by Richards in his book *The Foundations of Aesthetics* which is his earliest work in literary criticism written in collaboration with C.K.Ogden and James Wood. In this book he propounds the theory the theory of 'synaesthesia', meaning a calm and harmonious state of mind in which beauty is perceived. He looks at beauty in terms of its emotional effects and, thus, he may be credited with laying the foundation of effective criticism. He defines beauty as that essence of object which causes a synaesthesia⁸. He dwells upon the perceiver's state of mind while appreciating beauty.

Beauty has the amazing capacity to inspire the perceiver and harmonize his mental nerves. The state of mental equilibrium is distinguished from the state of passivity, inertia, over-stimulation or conflict, *nirvana*, ecstasy and sublimation.⁹ The state of mental equilibrium is said to be an active state of mind. On the contrary, the state of inertia or passivity is said to be a state of

7 Blackmur : 'A critics Job of Work', *Five Approaches of Literary Criticism*, p. 331.

8 Richards, I.A. Ogden, C.K. and Wood, James : *The Foundations of Aesthetics* (London, 1925, 1st published 1921), p. 152.

9 *Ibid.*, p. 76.

inactivity, indolence or dullness. Richards puts forward the theory of "synaesthesia" which covers both equilibrium and harmony.¹⁰ In a synaesthetic state, the mind leaves off its individuality and is lifted to a level where it is capable of entering the consciousness of the artist which enables him to perceive beauty.

Richards argues that in every equilibrium of mind, however momentary, we are experiencing beauty.¹¹ While, for Plato, beauty depends upon its being perceived by mind; and for Kant beauty is purposeless; and for Hume beauty depends upon the attitude of the perceiver; and for Hegel beauty is the reflection of the Absolute beauty; and for Croce beauty cannot be expressed in words because it is experienced intuitively, for Richards beauty is conducive to synaesthetic equilibrium. This synaesthetic state is in the perceiver rather than something in the work of art as a consequence of which the same piece of art is likely to induce different states of emotional equilibrium in different readers according to their capability and sense of beauty. Emphasis here is laid on a tranquil, yet an active state of mind which, according to Richards, is the *sine qua non* of the perception of beauty.

In *The Meaning of Meaning*, written in collaboration with C.K.Ogden, Richards once again goes back to the term 'synaesthesia' to define beauty. He lists sixteen meanings of the word beauty of which the last seven are said to belong to the realm of Psychology.¹² He observes: "Anything is beautiful, which induces synaestheses."¹³ In *Principles of Literary Criticism*, he uses the term 'Coenesthesia' in place of 'Synaesthesia' meaning common sensibility.¹⁴ In *Practical Criticism*, he takes beauty as an objective phenomenon. He takes it "as a property in virtue of which the beautiful thing does arouse these tendencies."¹⁵ The abstract property of being such as to arouse, under certain conditions, tendencies to self-completion in mind is sufficient to define its nature. In Richards' view, whether beauty is regarded as an inherent quality in things or a projected quality, it necessarily "stands for such an

10 Ibid.

11 Richards . *The Foundations of Aesthetics*, p. 75.

12 Ogden and Richards : *Meaning*, pp. 142-43.

13 Ibid., p. 143.

14 Richards : *Principles*, p. 98.

15 Richards : *Practical Criticism* (London, 1954), p. 359.

objective quality."¹⁶ Richards' concepts of 'synaesthesia' and 'coenesthesia' have much to do with Theodor Lipps' concept of 'Empathy' (*Einfühlung*) which states that a perceiving subject projects himself into the object of perception and that almost unnoticed muscular responses, he makes in doing so, form the basis of the perception of beauty.

Lipps' theory of static feeling is based on 'Empathy'. For him, 'Empathy' is an act. Lipps was basically a logician and not an experimentalist. Lipps' theory of 'Empathy', however, is not restricted to aesthetic experience alone. Richards endeavours to limit the scope of poetic experience or the experience of the beautiful by giving a precise, suggestive and accessible definition of beauty. The organisation of impulses, which according to Richards, constitutes synaesthesia and is at the root of coenesthesia is of paramount importance. Caudwell argues that everything that gives pleasure cannot be considered beautiful. "A pork chop, well done, may arouse strong feeling of coenesthesia, but it is not beautiful or hideous. As an aesthetic object, it is neutral."¹⁷ It is easy to appreciate the fallacy involved in Caudwell's argument. When Richards says that beauty is pleasurable and it induces a synesthetic state, he aims at the beauty of art and poetry and not that of a trifling object like pork chop. Caudwell oversimplifies the problem by misinterpreting and misconstruing Richards' statement to suit his Marxist approach. Even such a concrete, practical book as *Practical Criticism* is ultimately a study of literary judgment and the book in its bulk and content, has been written in the typical colourless, humourless abstruse and prosaic Richardsonian style.

There are two dominant trends of the modern critical movement. First, there is the tendency to relate the author to the ideas of his time of which he is a spokesman, and, second, there is the tendency to look at poetry as giving a poetical symbol for these ideas. Richards and his ardent follower William Empson have exercised deep influence on the second tendency which is closely related to the first but with the historical or biographical school they have little to do. Richards' literary criticism is partly axiological - touching the problem of value and partly semantic-touching the problem of meaning. His psychological

16 Ibid., p. 360.

17 Caudwell, Christopher : *Further Studies in a Dying Culture* (London, 1959), p. 80.

theory of value has been most cogently and forcefully put forward in *Principles*. The popular belief is that poetic value depends upon loftiness and sublimity of thought, vividness of images, impassioned expression architectonic beauty of language, perfect versification and apt use of words. Richards thinks that the list leaves out one important ingredient of poetry. This is the mental poise or harmony which results from the reading of a poetic masterpiece. Richards holds that everything turns futile if poetry fails to bring about a synthesis or intermingling in our discordant impulses. Poetic value depends upon its strength to satisfy our interests and bring about balance in our impulses. Ordinarily, our impulses lie in a disordered and chaotic condition. The stimulus creates a stir in our impulses. There are two kinds of impulses - appetency and aversion. The first attracts us while the other distracts or repels us.¹⁸ When there is a stir in our impulses, there occurs a conflict between the two sets of divergent impulses and each tries to win over or outweigh the other. This process continues until there is a compromise between the two sets of impulses. At the final stage, a harmony is established among the fighting impulses and the feebler impulses are suppressed. Poetry is valuable in proportion to its capacity to bring about harmony, order, coherence and co-ordination in our impulses. In Richards' words the importance of an impulse depends on "the extent of the disturbance of other impulses in the individual's activities, which the thwarting of the impulse involves."¹⁹ This argument is again reiterated in his *Science and Poetry*.²⁰ In *Science and Poetry*, Richards says : "If the mind is a system of interests, and if an experience is their movement, the worth of any experience is a matter of the degree to which the mind, through this movement, proceeds towards a wider equilibrium."²¹ This is a restatement of his previous stand taken in *Principles* : "Anything is valuable which will satisfy an appetency without involving the frustration of some equal or more important appetency."²² "The most valuable states of mind then are those which involve the widest and most comprehensive co-ordination of activities and the least curtailment, conflict, starvation and restriction."²³ This theory "embraces ethics, too,

18 Richards : *Principles*, p. 47

19 Ibid., p. 51

20 Richards : *Science and Poetry* (London 1935), p. 33 ff.

21 Ibid. p. 34

22 Richards : *Principles*, p. 48.

23 Ibid. p. 59

but ethics redefined with the help of behaviourist's psychology. What is good is what produces value, and a conception is arrived at through the harmonising of function within the organism.²⁴

Richards' theory of value has led to a good deal of controversy in the field of literary criticism. T.S. Eliot, for example, finds obvious discrepancy in it because it is "erected upon purely individual-psychological foundations."²⁵ Such a balance of impulses has not yet been spoken of or demonstrated by any psychologist. Richards himself also does not fully explain the process how the balance of impulses takes place and what are the factors responsible for it. Richards doubtless takes interest in demonstrating the tension between desirable and undesirable impulses. For this reason Wimsatt and Cleanth Brooks describe Richards' critical tenet as a 'poetics of tension'.²⁶ Richards himself admits that "it is permissible to contrast experiences which win stability and order through a narrowing of the response with those which widen it."²⁷ In stead of drawing a demarcating line between the valuable and the sublime, Richards distinguishes between poetry which produces an effect of delicious relaxation on the mind and poetry which has enduring and healthy effect.

Richards' psychological theory of poetic value or balancing of impulses is reminiscent of *Maitri* and *Saturuta* or *Rasas*.

The critics of *Rasa* school hold that there are certain *Rasas* which can be easily brought together while there are some other *Rasas* which defy such a coordination by reason of their incompatibility. *Srngara* and *Hasya*, for instance, are *Mitra Rasas* and can be assimilated. But *Srngara* and *Karuna* which are *Satru Rasas* cannot be assimilated. Richards' notion of appetency and aversion may be related to *Maitri* and *Satruta* of *Rasas*. In Richards' scheme, poetic value depends upon the systematization of opposed and discordant impulses not by defeat but by reconciliation. This systematization usually takes place amongst impulses which otherwise remain in a chaotic and disordered state. While working out such a poetics of tension, Richards has in mind the complexity of modern life which gave

24 David Daiches : *Critical Approaches to Literature* (London, 1961), p. 133.

25 Eliot : *The Use of Poetry*, p. 17.

26 Wimsatt, Jr. William K, and Cleanth Brooks : *Literary Criticism, A Short History* (London, 1964), p. 610.

27 Richards : *Principles*, p. 249.

birth to such poems as Eliot's "The Waste Land" and "The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock". On the contrary, the theorists of *Rasa* school hold that coordination amongst *Mitra* and *Satru Rasas*, except in a few exceptional cases, cannot be effected. In view of the changed circumstances, Richards' arguments are difficult to be controverted.

Richards' literary criticism draws on psychology. The words which frequently occur in his literary criticism are feeling, emotion, impulse, interest, attitude, stimulus, cognition, enjoyment, intuition, pleasure, volition, etc. The word 'emotion' in its scientific sense occurs for the first time in the critical vocabulary of Richards. Though Richards nowhere clearly mentions how attitude is aroused, his interpretation of poetry in terms of attitude it evokes deserves serious consideration.

The account of *Bhava*, *Vibhava*, *Anubhava* and *Sancaribhava* given by Bharata and his successors is pretty exhaustive and can be studied from psychological standpoint. Richards' stimulus is neighboured by *Vibhava* and his emotion and impulse by *Bhava* and *Sancaribhava*. Truly speaking, Richards' description of the psychological terminologies is not even half as thorough as one in Indian *Rasa* theory.

Richards' theory of meaning is an integral part of his theory of literature. It is central to all his critical writings. For his theory of meaning, we may chiefly turn to his five books, *The Meaning of Meaning* (with Ogden), *Principles of Literary Criticism*, *Practical Criticism*, *Science and Poetry* and *Speculative Instruments*. In respect of giving prime importance to language in the study of poetry, Richards comes in the direct succession of Coleridge whom he looks upon as a 'semasiologist'²⁸ and "with whom", as he states, "we step across the threshold of a general theoretical study of language capable of opening to us new powers over our minds."²⁹ In his opinion, the "linguistic sciences and language Teaching contain statements which are often valuable, sometimes trenchant, and occasionally seminal."³⁰ He affirms that the study of the modes of language becomes, as it attempts to be thorough, the most fundamental and extensive of all enquiries.³¹ He regrets that the study of meaning has been

28 Richards : Coleridge on Imagination, p.

29 Ibid., p. 232.

30 Richards So Much Nearer (New York, 1968), p. 67.

"abandoned in despair by so many enterprising but isolated enquiries."³² He admits that he got "instruction and occasionally amusement"³³ from the methods of different linguists, philosophers through the ages. The credit to introduce linguistic scholarship in the field of literary criticism in the strict sense goes to Richards. Thus, those critics who have decried Richards for having transformed "literary criticism into the science of linguistics"³⁴ or have said that "Richards provides a ramshackle aesthetic to build upon"³⁵ have not taken into consideration the present trend of literary criticism the principal implication of which is "its development towards science."³⁶ In Richards' literary criticism, the stress everywhere falls upon the phrase 'emotive meaning'. What is salutary in his best criticism is the purity of interest in poetry as poetry. The *Meaning* provides an up-to-date information concerning the varied uses of language. Many related observations of linguists and anthropologists have been carefully jotted down, analysed and examined here. Richards introduces semantic scholarship in criticism because he believes that it is only the linguistic approach to criticism which can improve the reading and enjoyment of poetry. A basic triangle has been used to show the relationship between symbol and reference, reference and referent and symbol and referent. Here symbol stands for word, reference for thought and referent for object. Ullmann observes that the basic triangle is "the best known modern attempt at the analytical approach to the problem of meaning"³⁷ Richards suggests that there are direct connections between symbol and reference i.e., word and thought and reference and referent i.e., thought and object while the connection between symbol and referent i.e., word and object is indirect or imputed. In Richards' own words, "between the symbol and the referent, there is no relevant relation other than the indirect one, which consists in its being used by some one to stand for a referent ... there is no direct connection

31 Richards : *Coleridge on Imagination*, p. 231.

32 Ogden & Richards : *Meaning*, p. VIII.

33 Ibid., p. IX.

34 Blackmur, R.P. . 'A Critic's Job of Work' *Five Approaches of Literary Criticism*, ed. Scott, W.S. (New York, 1958), p. 334.

35 Watson, George : *The Literary Critics* (Penguin, 1962), p. 202.

36 Hyman : *The Armed Vision*, p. 9.

37 Ullmann, S. . *Language and Style* (Oxford, 1964), p. 17.

between say 'dog' the word, and certain common objects in our streets, and that the only connection which holds is that which consists in our using the word when we refer to the animal."³⁸ Richards points out an exception to the general rule of indirect relationship between symbol and referent. This is found when "symbol used is more or less directly like the referent for which it is used, as for instance, it may when it is an onomatopoeic word or an image, or a gesture or a drawing. In this case, the triangle is completed, its base supplied, and a great simplification of the problem involved appears to result."³⁹ In Richards' words, the "meaning of A is that to which the mental process interpreting A is adopted."⁴⁰ In *Principles*, he observes "the mere sight of any familiar word is normally followed by a thought of whatever the word may stand for."⁴¹ In *Science and Poetry*, he observes: "our thoughts are pointers and it is the other, the active, stream which deals with the things which thoughts point to."⁴² The *Meaning* is sub-titled "a study of the influence of language upon thought and of the science of symbolism". The phrase 'science of symbolism' is very significant here because it stands for semantics or the science of meaning. At the end of the book, comments on the subject by two famous anthropologists, B. Malinowski and F.G. Crookshank, and bi-linguists like Husserl, Bertrand Russell, Ferge, Baldwin and C.S. Pierce have been appended to emphasise the solutions arrived at by him. In the beginning of *Meaning*, Richards severely criticises F. De Saussure, for obeying "blindly the primitive impulse to infer from a word some object for which it stands"⁴³ Though he is full of praise for Saussure for having "placed linguistic upon a scientific basis"⁴⁴, he objects to his theory of signs which "by neglecting entirely the things for which signs stand, was from the very beginning cut off from any contact with scientific methods of verification."⁴⁵

In Richards' scheme, semantics and poetics are interrelated. His theory of basic triangle which shows indirect connection

38 Ogden & Richards : *Meaning*, pp. 11-12.

39 Ibid., F.N. 1 at p. 12.

40 Ogden & Richards : *Meaning*, p. 200.

41 Richards : *Principles*, p. 125.

42 Richards : *Science and Poetry*, p. 19.

43 Ogden & Richards : *Meaning*, p. 4.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid., p. 32.

between word and object is quite in consonance with the principles laid down in Indian semantics. It is actually a wonder that without being aware of modern semantic principles, the ancient Indian grammarians and semanticists arrived at almost the same conclusions as are got by the western linguists after a good deal of endeavour and long research. Nagesa Bhatta, for instance, states that word-power means the meaning of word which dwells in mind. *Sabda* is *Manasika* or *Bauddhika*. *Buddhi* and *Sabda* dwell in one and the same place and so they are inseparable. They are closely associated with each other. If words were directly connected with objects, the very utterance of the word *Agni* would have burnt one's mouth. In Sanskrit semantics, *Buddhi* has been identified with *Mana*. This is what Richards calls 'reference' or 'thought'. Nagesa Bhatta takes *Buddhi* as mediating between *Sabda* and *Padartha*. When word is uttered, it directly pierces into our thought. Then by *Smarana* and *Anukarana*, its meaning is understood and appreciated. *Sabda* is related to *Manasika Artha* only. It is not related to *Vastavika Artha*. *Sabda* pre-exists in *Buddhi*. *Artha*, too, pre-exists in *Buddhi*. The twin propellers of *Buddhi* i.e., *Sabda* and *Artha* work simultaneously. When mind becomes active at a certain moment, word and meaning come in close proximity. It is in this sense that word and meaning are closely related to each other. This *Vagartha* ultimately forms one unit in the mind.

In *Meaning*, Richards provides us with the basic dichotomy of language between symbolic and emotive. In his words : "the symbolic use of words is statement; the recording, the support, the organisation and the communication of reference. The emotive use of words is a more simple matter, it is the use of words to expose or excite feeling and attitudes."⁴⁶ Richards holds that the emotions of a word in poetry are independent of their sense. This flat separation between emotive and cognitive uses of language leads him to the assumption that Keats' "Beauty is truth" need not be apprehended analytically in order to appreciate the poem fully and that although Shakespeare's masterpiece *King Lear* evokes the finest attitudes, not a single fact relevant to the truth involved is verifiable by scientific procedure.⁴⁷ In Richards' words poetry is the "supreme form of emotive language".⁴⁸ The relation between symbol and referent

46 Odgen & Richards : *Meaning*, p. 149.

47 Ibid., p. 140.

is unreal or informal. A reference is logical statement. Referent is the object which the statement is about. When language points to the relationship between reference and referent 'symbolically', it assumes the character of symbolic or scientific language. When the position is just the reverse i.e., when language is employed not to point to any logical relationship between the reference and referent, but only to evoke an 'emotion' or arouse an 'attitude', then this specific use of language is called its emotive use. Richards calls it the canons of symbolism. He gives sixteen definitions of the word 'meaning' which "reputable students of meaning have favoured."⁴⁹ Here "the investigation is made in accordance with the methods of special sciences whose contributions have enabled the new studies to be differentiated from vulgar speculation with which it might appear to be associated."⁵⁰ Since meaning is the most deceptive part of language and "its associations are dangerous," Richards thinks that "great care is required in the use of the term "meaning".⁵¹ According to Richards, words are themselves meaningless. They become meaningful only when they are used in a particular context. Meaning is invariably contextual. The object and the symbol that stands for the object are independent of each other. "It is only when a thinker makes use of them (symbols) that they stand for anything, or, in one sense, have 'meaning'".⁵² Signs may fairly be used as symbols in purely scientific writing. It can be charged with 'emotive' or 'evocative meaning' taking the shape of poetry. In *Meaning*, Richards also gives great weight to uncertain grammar.⁵³ He forces the readers to invent meaning and explore various interpretastades of poetic meaning. He observes : "words may come between us and our objects in countless subtle ways."⁵⁴ In *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, he deals with the criterion of words. His conclusion is : "To realise that it is idle to ask of a word, "Is it beautiful?" - , unless we are ready to ask thoroughly, "what will it do in its varied incidents?" - is the first step and a long step in the aesthetics of language."⁵⁵

48 Ibid., p. 159.

49 Ibid , p. 166.

50 Ogden & Richards : *Meaning*, pp. V-VI.

51 Ibid , F.N : at p. 22.

52 Ibid., p. 10.

53 Ibid., F. N. at p. 47.

54 Ibid., p. 45.

55 Richards . *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* (O.U P., 1965), p. 86.

In *Principles*, he is more interested in giving to poetic language a local habitation and a name. In the words of Eastman, reading *Principles* was like "wading through a vastly important jungle of ideas."⁵⁶ He observes: "a statement may be used for the sake of the reference, true or false, which it causes. This is the scientific use of language. But it may also be used for the sake of the effects in emotion and attitude produced by the reference it occasions. This is the emotive use of the language. The distinction once clearly grasped is simple. We may either use words for the sake of the reference they promote, or we may use them for the sake of the attitudes and emotions which ensue."⁵⁷ His achievement is laudable in such fields as emotive use of language. Richards' identification of the twin functions of language need not be taken rigidly. It is, in fact, a recognition of the truth that the use of language varies from subject to subject. The scientific and emotive uses of language mark this variation in style. He is convinced that "Words have no intrinsic literary character. None are either ugly or beautiful, intrinsically displeasing or delightful. Every word has instead a range of possible effects."⁵⁸

In *Science and Poetry*, which is a short sequel, Richards tries to summarise some of his arguments advanced in *Principles*. He observes: "It will be admitted - by those who distinguish between scientific statement, where 'truth' is ultimately a matter of verification as this is understood in the laboratory, and emotive utterance, where 'truth' is primarily acceptability of this attitude itself - that is it not the poet's business to make scientific statements."⁵⁹ "A pseudo-statement", Richards states, "which fits into this system of assumptions would be regarded as 'poetically true'; one which does not, as 'poetically false'. This attempt to treat 'poetic truth' on the model of general 'coherence theories' is very natural for certain schools of logicians but is inadequate, on the wrong lines from the outset."⁶⁰ "A pseudostatement is 'true' if it suits and serves some attitude or links together attitudes which on the other ground are desirable.

This kind of 'truth' is so opposed to scientific 'truth' that it is

⁵⁶ Eastman, Max : *Enjoyment of poetry* (New York, 1954), p. 253.

⁵⁷ Richards : *Principles*, p. 267.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 136.

⁵⁹ Richards : *Science and Poetry* (London, 1925), pp. 62-65.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

a pity to use so similar a word, but at present it is difficult to avoid the malpractice."⁶¹ "A pseudo-statement is a form of words, which is justified entirely by its effect in releasing our impulses and attitudes : a statement, on the other hand, is justified by the truth i.e., its correspondence, in a highly technical sense, with the fact to which it points."⁶² I.A. Richards is more influenced by modern psychology rather than by modern science in his idea of "pseudo-statement".

In *Practical Criticism*, Richards postulates a theory that meaning is the most elusive of all subjects. "The all important fact for the study of literature - or any mode of communication - is that there are several kinds of meaning."⁶³ He lists four kinds of meaning : Sense, Feeling, Tone and Intention.⁶⁴ Sense is the plain meaning of the word. Feeling is the sum total of the writer's attitudes, biases, or accentuation of interest towards a word. Tone indicates the writer's awareness towards those he is addressing. Intention is the writer's aim, conscious or unconscious, the effect he is endeavouring to produce. Whatever might be the nature of writing, any of these four kinds of meaning is bound to be predominant. In a scientific treatise, the Sense will have the Upperhand and Feeling about the subject will be subordinated to Sense. His Tone will be settled for him by academic conversation and his Intention will be confined to the clearest and most adequate statement of what he has to say. In conversation, Intention usually subjugates the other functions. At times, Feeling and Tone may express themselves through Sense. In Richards' words, "A poet destroys his statements; he may make statements which have logically nothing to do with the subject under treatment' he may, by metaphor and otherwise, present subjects for thought which he logically quite irrelevant; he may perpetrate logical nonsense, be as trivial or as silly, logically, as it is possible to be; all in the interests of the other functions of language to express feeling or adjust tone or further his other intentions."⁶⁵ Richards' theory of four-fold meaning has added a new dimension to the concept of poetic meaning.

In *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, which is a continuation of the

61 Ibid , pp. 64-65.

62 Ibid., p. 65.

63 Richards : *Practical Criticism*, p. 180.

64 Ibid . pp. 181-188.

65 Richards : *Practical Criticism*, pp. 187-188.

studies Richards began with C.K. Ogden in *Meaning*, he rejects a doctrine of 'usage' and instead suggests a theory of 'context' and 'interanimation of words.'⁶⁶ He considers meaning as the "missing part of the contexts from which it draws its delegated efficacy."⁶⁷ A word in poetry cannot be judged in isolation nor its meaning can be determined by detaching it from the context. Richards defines 'context' as "a set of entities (things or events) related in a certain way; these entities have each a common character so that other sets of entities occur having the same character and related by the same relation; and these occur 'nearly uniformly'.⁶⁸ Since meaning rests on context and the context is not always clear, ambivalence, complexity or ambiguity in poetic expression is probable. The diversity of meaning gives density to poetic language.

In *Speculative Instruments*, Richards defends himself against the charge levelled by Max Black that he had taken refuge in scienticism. Max Black was a member of the symposium organised to consider the feasibility of emotive language. Richards recalls his statement made in *Principles* : "I would like to defend my early writings from the charge of scienticism, but there are more important things to do. That they have been read as supporting scienticism I admit. But in sum their burden is sufficiently against the vain attempt to orient the mind by belief of the scientific kind alone."⁶⁹ Richards partially agrees with Black and says : "I am heartily in accord with Black that the banding about of 'emotive' has done more harm than good."⁷⁰ Here Richards' compromising tone is indicative of his development as a critic. By this time, he comes to realise that no rigid demarcating line can be drawn between the emotive and the scientific or cognitive functions of language. He admits that mind is essentially a unit and every act of thought is the off-spring of reason no less than that of imagination or emotion. Literature is the product of one's whole mind, not merely of a part of it. We cannot ignore the place of thought in life. Thoughts and emotions, culled from great thinkers and philosophers, abound in the pages of many creative writers. One can feel and appreciate

66 Richards *Rhetoric*, p. 47.

67 Richards : *Rhetoric*, p. 35.

68 Richards : *Meaning*, p. 58.

69 Richards : *Principles*, p. 30.

70 Richards : *Speculative Instruments*, p. 40.

the impact of writer's thought without necessarily taking up his doctrinal position. But this does not mean that the language of poetry should not be distinguished from the language of science. It is true that emotion and cognition work together. But the language of poetry is always emotive and evocative. Richards' theory of meaning alluded to in his principal works lays emphasis on the fact that the ingredients of poetry differ in character from those of science - that one is the product of emotion while another is the product of intellect. Though emotion and intellect are inseparable, it is emotion which is dominant in poetry.

For Richards, the verbal structure of the poem is associated with the poet's intensity of feeling. That a word or an image signifies something other than what it represents and carries enlarging connotations and multiple meanings is suggestive of the poet's emotional depth and wide experience. In poetry, complexity of meaning and the feeling associated with meaning point to something that cannot be precisely defined. Hence, the use of symbol. Words acts as sings. But unlike other sings, they point in several directions and function in various ways. The intensity of emphasis is often marked by stress or accent in a metrical composition. Where plain language becomes inoperative, figurative language comes to help. In figurative language, literal meaning of words is disregarded in order to show or imply a relationship between diverse objects. As Richards puts it : "These twin dangers - careless, 'intuitive' reading and prosaic, 'over-literal' reading - are the symplegades, the 'jutting rocks', between which too many ventures into poetry are wrecked."⁷¹ Richards argues for emotional perfection in a poem which largely depends upon its formal perfection. The poem is 'a fabric of meaning'. This is what Cleanth Brooks in his own way, calls 'structural perfection' which according to him depends upon 'coherent and powerful' organisation of 'attitudes by poetic strategies'. According to Brooks, form as the semantic structure, is the very essence of poetry, while content is its paraphrastic statement. "The structure of poetry", Brooks states, "is a structure of meanings, evaluations, and interpretations, and the principle of unity which informs it seems to be one of balancing and harmonising connotations, attitudes and meanings."⁷² This structural unity is the result of ironic

⁷¹ Richards : *Practical Criticism*, p. 191.

relationships.

For Richards, imagery may make an appeal to the senses and also be open to symbolic interpretation. He admires Eliot's "The Waste Land" because in it the apparently simple sensuous images suggest deeper meanings. Though this poem marks a complete breakdown of traditional form in English poetry, it has a form and rhythm of its own, its own 'music of ideas'.⁷³ He shows the relationship between rhythm and meaning.⁷⁴ In rhythm the experience is tinged with emotion and often affords a sense of balance. The idea that rhythm affects meaning and is guided by emotion rather than by musical beat is opposed to the traditional view of rhythm that it depends partly on the poet's use of pauses and partly on the extent of his vocabulary. His view on rhythm is as broad as Eliot's who gives a very high position to rhythm in his concept of 'auditory imagination'.⁷⁵

Richards evinces great semantic interest which has encouraged many new critics to carry his critical formulations to their logical conclusions. Ransom's 'texture', Tate's 'tension', Brooks 'irony' and 'paradox', Warren's 'symbol' and such other devices employed by the new critics have much to do with Richards' theory of meaning. In *Rhetoric*, he himself admits that "stability in a word's meaning is not something to be assumed, but always something to be explained."⁷⁶ The new attitude to language relocates diction at the centre of critical attention. For if meaning is the result of the total activity of all the words in a context, and not something pre-existing in expression, then statement about the meaning and form of poems are implicitly statements about organisations of words and diction, the choice of words, is a fundamental element of meaning.

Richards' concern with meaning is so deep that he makes emotive meaning almost reserved for literature. Although the new critics are uncertain on the question of different uses of language and find this distinction as a whole too severe and superficial and part company with Richards by recognising the continuity of linguistic processes within and outside literature, Richards' argument in support of emotive meaning is difficult to be

72 Brooks Cleanth : *The Well Wrought Urn* (London, 1968, 1968), p. 159.

73 Richards : *Principles*, p. 293.

74 Richards : *Practical Criticism*, p. 227.

75 Eliot *Selected Prose* (Penguin, 1963), p. 89.

76 Richards : *Rhetoric*, p. 11.

challenged. His interest in semantic exploration has given impetus even to the new Aristotelian poetics which goes beyond the Aristotelian base to the extent that it draws on a vastly larger and more various literary corpus than Aristotle knew. In the words of Empson : "Richards has done so much work on meaning superstition that this hypothesis only needs to be clarified and worked out in detail before it can be found useful on a serious scale."⁷⁷

Richards is thoroughly convinced that in no literary form meaning is so carefully looked at and explored as in poetry. It uses words that are suggestive, symbolical and metaphorical. Words in poetry gain meaning by implication, association and interanimation.⁷⁸ Quoting Lafcadio Hearn, Richards says "words have colour, form, character. They have faces, ports, manners, gesticulations; they have moods, humours, eccentricities : they have tints, tones, personalities."⁷⁹

The linguistic criterion provided by Richards is fully in accord with the discoveries of professional linguists and semanticists. It is he who has the credit to divert the attention of the critics from the poet to the poem and from the literal, monotonous and drab meaning to the metaphorical and the subtle suggestive meaning of words usually employed in poetry.

The science of meaning is relatively of modern origin in the West though it occupied a place of paramount importance in the linguistic speculations of the ancient Indian grammarians and critics like Panini, Patanjali, Jaimini, Nagesa Bhatta, Bharthari, Anandavardhana and Kuntaka. Therefore, it is no wonder if a large part of what Richards says about meaning was apprehended by them. Patanjali shows how a word in its essential aspect differs from substance (*dravya*), action (*kriya*), quality (*guna*) and class (*jati*). A *Sabda* is the same as the sound (*tasmad dhvanih sabdah*). Richards says that words are meaningless by themselves and they assume meaning when they stand for anything. The Indian grammarians hold that every word has meaning but its meaning is determined by its use. The sense in which a word is used is its meaning.

Richards' theory of emotive meaning is analogous to

⁷⁷ Empson, William : *The Structure of complex Words* (London, 1962), p. 1.

⁷⁸ Richards : *Rhetoric*, p. 47.

⁷⁹ Ogden & Richards : *Meaning*, pp. 235-36.

Rasa-Dhvani of Indian poetics. Anandavandhana and Abhinavagupta describe at large the structure of poetry and lay emphasis on its emotive meaning.

Richards' theory of poetic ambiguity is the natural corollary of his theory of poetic meaning. There is a surprising consistency in his arguments about poetic ambiguity. Ambiguity is desirable in poetry because it makes its meaning multi-coloured and multi-dimensional. In *Principles*, Richards observes : "The truth is that very much of the best poetry is necessarily ambiguous in its immediate effect."⁸⁰ In almost the same tone, he says in *Science and Poetry*, "Most words are ambiguous as regards their plain sense, specially in poetry."⁸¹ By way of suggesting the four-fold meanings in *Practical Criticism*, Richards brings out the importance of ambiguity in poetry.

This new experience he gets when he gives protocols to his undergraduate students for examination and analysis. They suggest different meanings of the same words. This forces Richards to come to the conclusion that words used in poetry are essentially evocative in character and they are capable of various interpretations. In *Practical Criticism*, Richards argues : "every interesting abstract word (apart from those that have been nailed down to phenomena by the experimental sciences) is inevitably ambiguous - yet we use them with the pathetic confidence of children."⁸² There are other statements also which evince his faith in poetic ambiguity. "Certain conjunctions of words - through their history partly and through the collocations of emotional influences that by their very ambiguity they effect - have a power over our minds that nothing else can exert or perpetuate."⁸³ "Our opinions about poetry, do not much differ in type from our opinions about many other topics; and all such opinions are very liable to ambiguity."⁸⁴ And in *Interpretation in Teaching*, Richards further argues : "A word, like any other sign, gets whatever meaning it has through belonging to a recurring group of events, which may be called its context."⁸⁵ But as the context is not always clear, ambiguity is possible. Ambiguity may be contrasted

80 Richards : *Principles*, p. 291.

81 Richards : *Science and Poetry*, p. 28.

82 Richards : *Practical Criticism*, p. 340.

83 *Ibid.*, p. 364.

84 *Ibid.*, p. 341.

85 Richards : *Interpretation in Teaching* (London, 1949), p. VII.

with indefiniteness in which "we do not know which one of several different meanings we are to take - mere multiplicity, when the sentence means many things at once, all which are to be taken as, collectively, its meaning."⁸⁶ In *Rhetoric*, he considers ambiguity, "as an inevitable consequence of the powers of language and as the indispensable means of most of our most important utterances."⁸⁷ The clear assumption behind these lines is that there can be no single interpretation of a poem and every reader will understand it according to his sensibility, intelligence and capability.

Referring to the traditional use of ambiguity, Richards invites us to examine the question of ambiguity afresh. He observes that "Where the old Rhetoric treated ambiguity as a fault in language, and hoped to confine or eliminate it, the new Rhetoric sees it as an inevitable consequence of the powers of language."

Looking back at old Rhetoric, we find that Aristotle, the greatest of the Rhetoricians, used the term 'ambiguity' in the sense of 'vagueness' or 'obscurity'.⁸⁸ He does not go into the subtleties of diction. In his *Poetics*, he treats the subject very cursorily and in *Rhetoric* he has little to say beyond this that words should be clear and appropriate. Quintilian⁸⁹, Cicero⁹⁰, Demetrius⁹¹, Horace⁹², and Longinus⁹³ were advocates of clarity in language and asked us to be on the alert against ambiguous language as far as possible. Modern linguists, however, believe

86 *Ibid.*, 154.

87 Richards : *Rhetoric*, p. 40.

88 In his *Poetics*, Aristotle stood for 'perspicuity' in language. Twining, Thomas, tr. Aristotle's *Poetics* (Everyman's Library, London, 1953), Part II, Chapter XXVI, p. 43. In *Rhetoric*, he says : "We must avoid ambiguous language i.e., unless we deliberately wish to be obscure, as writer's wish, who have nothing to say, but pretend that they mean something. Jebb, R.C. : tr. The *Rhetoric* of Aristotle (Cambridge, 1909), pp. 156-57.

89 Butler, H.E. : tr. Quintilian's *The Institutio Oratoria* (New York, 1921-22), Book VII, p. ■■■■

90 Sutton, E. W. : tr. Marcus Tullius Cicero's *De Oratoria* (London, 1942), III, XIV, 53, p. 43.

91 Maxon, T. A. : tr. Demetrius on *Style* (Everyman's Library, (London, 1953), p. 209.

92 Maxon, T. A. : tr. Horace's *The Art of Poetry* (Everyman's Library (London, 1953), p. 75.

93 Havell, H.L. : tr. Longinus' on the *Sublime* (Everyman's Library, London, 1953), p. 333.

that "ambiguity, like redundancy, is a characteristic of language. It is easy to show that it is usual feature but more easy to show that it is pervasive."⁹⁴

The word 'ambiguity' used by Richards provoked a good deal of hostility when his disciple William Empson, taking a cue from Richards' theory, carried it to a funny excess in his *Seven Types of Ambiguity*. Even a discerning critic like F.R. Leavis accused Richards of having encouraged "Empsonian kind of irresponsibility."⁹⁵ It would, however, seem that if Empson carried Richards' theory to a ridiculous excess, Richards is not to blame.

Dr. B. Rajan discards Richards' idea of poetic ambiguity and shifts his interest to Milton's ideal that poetry should be simple, sensuous and passionate.⁹⁶ His opinion is of suggestive value to those who wish to understand Milton's theory and practice of poetry. But it is least helpful in understanding the resources of meaning. Richards, who has been watching these reactions from the very beginning, felt the desirability of finding a suitable substitute for the word in his later writings. In *Speculative Instruments* he observes : "As such it is better, more politic and wiser, not to call this versatility of words by any such evil sounding name as 'ambiguity'. Let us call it 'resourcefulness' instead."⁹⁷ This re-fashioning of the phrase does not in any way alter the position.

Richards' theory of poetic ambiguity is something different from the semanticist's theory of syntactical ambiguity which chiefly depends upon structure and syntax. Richards' ambiguity is directly concerned with poetic beauty which in turn depends upon interaction of meaning.

The theory of metaphorical language is another important contribution of Richards as a literary critic. In *Rhetoric*, he argues : "throughout the history of Rhetoric, metaphor has been treated as a sort of happy trick with words, an opportunity to exploit the accidents of their versatility, something in place occasionally but

94 Gleason, H.A. : *Linguistics and English Grammar* (New York, 1965), p. 461
Also see Ullmann, Stephen : *The Principles of Semantics* (London, 1957), p. 107.

95 Leavis, F. R. : 'Education at the University' (III), *Literary Studies, Scrutiny*, Vol. IX, No. 4, March 1941, p. 310.

96 Rajan, B. : 'Simple, Sensuous and Passionate', *Review of English Studies*, Oct., 1945, p. 41.

97 Richards : *Speculative Instruments*, p. 75.

requiring unequal skill and caution."⁹⁸ As compared with other critics, his treatment of metaphor is more comprehensive. While commenting on metaphor, Aristotle observes in his *Poetics* "a metaphorical word is transferred from its proper sense : either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from one species to another, or in the way of analogy."⁹⁹ Aristotle considers metaphor as the greatest gift of the poet because through it he discovers a resemblance between apparently dissimilar objects. Middleton Murry points out that "the function of metaphor is the precision of language."¹⁰⁰ Murry, however, like Richards, does not define either the nature or the function of metaphor.

Richards takes an extended view of metaphor. According to him "metaphor is the omnipresent principle of language."¹⁰¹ In his words, "even in the rigid language of the settled sciences, we do not eliminate or prevent it without great difficulty."¹⁰² While analysing the structure of metaphor, Richards uses two catch words, 'tenor' and 'vehicle',¹⁰³ meaning the thing to be discussed and the thing to which an object is compared. Critics have found Richards' view on metaphor inadequate and unsatisfactory. Max Eastman, for example, takes a more puritanic view when he says, "he cannot explain metaphor and his failure to do so grows more and more distressing with each new book he writes."¹⁰⁴ S.C. Sengupta is with Eastman in finding fault with Richards' theorizing.¹⁰⁵ Empson, brands Richards' view on metaphor as 'lordly'¹⁰⁶ in which the whole range of language is treated. Richards' argument that metaphor covers "all cases where a word gives two ideas for one, where we compound different ideas of word into one, and speak of one thing as though it were another,"¹⁰⁷ virtually obliterates the demarcating line between

98 Richards : *Rhetoric*, p. 80.

99 Aristotle : *Poetics*, tr. Thomas Twining, Part II, XIV, p. 48.

100 Murry, Middleton : *The Problems of Style* (London, 1952), p. 83.

101 Richards : *Rhetoric*, p. 92.

102 *Ibid.*, p. 99.

103 *Ibid.*, p. 90.

104 Eastman, Max : *Enjoyment of Poetry* 253.

105 Sengupta, S.C. : *Towards a Theory of the Imagination* (O.U.P., 1956), p. 146.

106 Empson : *Review of Richards' The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, *Criterion*, Vol. XVII, No. 66, Oct., 1937, p. 127.

ordinary and metaphorical language. Richards adequately meets the objections raised by his detractors. If metaphor is not a twining of visions, what else can it be? Richards is fully alive to the specific use of metaphor in poetry. By the word 'omnipresent', he simply wants to suggest that metaphor has enormous strength. He holds that "however stone dead such metaphors seem, we can easily wake them up."¹⁰⁸

Referring to Lord Kames' book *Elements in Criticism*, Richards says: "How about this suggested rule that we should carefully avoid mounting metaphor upon metaphor? What would be the effect of taking it seriously? It would, if we accepted and observed it, make havoc of most writing and speech. It would make, I think, Shakespeare, the faultiest writer who ever held a pen."¹⁰⁹ Richards points out the danger involved in unnecessary assemblage of metaphor. He guards against the improper application of metaphor and suggests that metaphor should be used carefully and with due discrimination. He seems to share the views of Dr. Johnson who severely criticises the metaphysical poets of the seventeenth century in which there is a conscious attempt to jumble up metaphors.

In *Principles* Richards states: "metaphor is a semisurreptitious method by which a greater variety of elements can be wrought into the fabric of the experience."¹¹⁰ In *Rhetoric*, his concept of metaphor becomes more wide and accurate. He brings out the significance of meaning by way of explaining metaphor. He does not take metaphor as an ordinary figure of speech. He takes it as an evidence of the resources of language. His preoccupation with metaphor can be seen in his other critical writings as well.¹¹¹ The subtler states of mind can only express themselves through metaphor because the poet usually works by analogy.

According to Richards, there may be two forms of metaphor - one simple and another complex or recondite. 'The legs of chair' is an example of simple metaphor. Here metaphor depends upon

¹⁰⁷ Richards : *Rhetoric*, p. 126.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

¹⁰⁹ Richards : *Rhetoric*, p. 101.

¹¹⁰ Richards : *Principles*, p. 240.

¹¹¹ Richards & Ogden : *Meaning*, pp. 102, 103, 213, 214; *Practical Criticism*, pp. 221-23; *Coleridge on Imagination*, pp. 134-35; *Interpretation in Teaching*, pp. 121-24; *Speculative Instruments*, pp. 40-41, 46-48.

the correspondence of two things. "But a metaphor may word admirably without our being able with any confidence to say how it works or what is the ground of the shift."¹¹² Words relating to abuse and endearment will fall within this category. "When we address somebody as 'swine' or 'duck', we do not strictly seek any correspondence between two things. We do not call anybody 'duck' because he has wings or he is tasteful to eat. The basis on which these comparisons are made is subtle and recondite. Juxtaposition of two things does not mean that there is any justification for comparison between them. When I like tobacco and logic, there is no very obvious character that they have in common."¹¹³ Richards quotes from Shakespeare's *Hamlet* "what should such fellows as I do crawling between earth and heaven."¹¹⁴ And then he also quotes from Jonathan Swift's *Gulliver's Travels* when the Brobdingnagian King tells Gulliver : "the bulk of your natives appear to me to be the most pernicious race of little odious vermin that nature ever suffered to crawl upon the face of the earth."¹¹⁵ In these illustrations, metaphor has not been used on the basis of any obvious correspondence. Hence, as Richards states, "talk about the identification or fusion that a metaphor effects is nearly always misleading and pernicious."¹¹⁶ Often metaphor is founded more on 'unlikeness' than on 'likeness'. If at all there is any 'likeness', it is so subtle and secret that a good deal of labour is required to trace it out. It is easy to understand simile. But a metaphor is difficult to be discovered. Metaphor is a meeting point of a cluster of images. Richards' views on ambiguity and metaphor are, to a large extent, akin to the Indian concepts of *Dhvani*, *Vakrokti*, *Rasa-Sabalata*, *Laksana*, etc.

Richards' singular contribution to the concept of poetic experience needs special mention. He has to say something strikingly original about it. His theory of poetic experience, which Scott James prefers to call his 'pathology of poetic experience'¹¹⁷ heralds the coming of a new type of criticism based on science and psychology.

For Richards, poetry is a concrete experience. Poetry is not

112 Richards : *Rhetoric*, p. 117.

113 Ibid., p. 118.

114 Ibid., 119.

115 Ibid

116 Ibid., p. 127

117 Scott James, R.A. : *The Making of Literature* (London, 1970), p. 6

something airy, but it is muscular and vertebrate. He outright dismisses the idea that poetic pleasure is a pleasure of distinct category based on aesthetic instinct.¹¹⁸ For him, every experience has a physical, psychological and neurological explanation. The very word 'experience', presupposes the significance of sensory and motor nerves. It is difficult to conceive of any experience if the channels through which it is received are disbelieved. Poetic experience is neither 'otherworldly' nor 'grossly worldly'.¹¹⁹ It is not 'otherworldly', because it is not unique in its constituents. It is not 'grossly worldly' because it is made up of a different stuff. While ordinary objects of the world conform to the natural principles and give us 'scientific beliefs', poetry is far above and superior to ordinary worldly objects and gives us 'emotional beliefs'. Richards states : 'The difference between emotive beliefs and scientific beliefs is not one of degree but of kind.'¹²⁰ This is so because the empire of poetry differs in its stuff from that of the material world. The world of poetry is neither abstract nor mythical. Richards argues : 'The world of poetry has in no sense any different reality from the rest of the world and it has no special laws and no other-worldly peculiarities.'¹²¹ Thus, in Richards' view, poetry grows out of experience which is concrete and analysable.

On the opposite extreme of Richards stands the great Italian critic Croce who has been very influential in promoting the view that artistic experience is intuitive knowledge.¹²² The tendency to regard the artist as concerned only with individual qualities of things has given rise to the 'formal' and 'abstractionist' conceptions of art. These emphasise formal values, the values that lie in design and pattern, in rhythm and contrast, in unity and balance, quite apart from any subject matter which the art work may represent. The treatment of art as separated from life provoked strong reaction on the part of critics like Richards and Elliot who are unable to look at literature as divorced from life. Richards comes with the contention that the work of art cannot be separated, in the experience of either the creator or the contemplator, from the social context, cultural milieu and the real

118 Richards : Principles, p. 15.

119 Ibid., p. 28.

120 Richards : Principles, p. 278.

121 Ibid., p. 78.

122 Croce : Aesthetics, tr. Douglas Ainslie (London, 1920), p. 12.

experience of everyday life. There is no essential difference between the approach of Richards and that of the critics of *Rasa* school on the point of poetic experience. Both deny the mysterious nature of poetic experience and stress on concrete realisation. Both consider the experience of poetry as different in stuff from ordinary worldly pleasure. But where Richards' analysis of poetic experience is limited to sensory realisation, the critics of *Rasa* school carry it to the realm of spiritualism and call it on a par with *Brahmananda*.

In the state of poetic experience, the reader ceases to be "oriented in one definite direction."¹²³ He gets disinterested in one particular thing and his heart is enlarged. While defining the meaning of the word 'disinterested', Richard states "To respond, not through one narrow channel of interest, but simultaneously and coherently through many, is to be disinterested."¹²⁴ It is possible only when there will be equilibrium of opposed impulses. In Richards' words : "There are two ways in which impulses may be organised; by exclusion and by inclusion , by synthesis and by elimination. Although every coherent state of mind depends upon both, it is permissible to contrast experience which win stability and order through a narrowing of the response with those which widen it."¹²⁵ This means that experience is the natural consequence of the balance of opposites.

Another problem with which Richards is concerned is the problem of communication. He dwells upon the devices of communication and brings out the poem - reader relationship rather than the poem - poet relationship. Since the discussion of a poem must not go beyond the devices of communication, a study of poetic form becomes inevitable.

Richards thinks that communicative efficacy depends upon the perfection of art. If the art is perfect, the feeling of the artist is bound to be communicated. Communication is inherent in the perfection of art. Therefore, he suggests the artist not to bother for communication but to concentrate on the perfection of art. "That the artist", Richards states, "is not as a rule consciously concerned with communication, but with getting the work, the poem or play or statue or painting or whatever it is 'right'."¹²⁶ In

¹²³ Richards : Principles, p. 251.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 249.

his view of poetry, as in that of Eliot, there is a firm recognition of the limits of a poet's work. The poet is free to concentrate on the task of making poetry, without being deflected by an urge to serve any extra-literary ends. He shares Eliot's view that poetry or art has a life of its own and so should not lead itself to any extraneous purposes. A poem has no preconceived purpose. Its purpose is discovered and realised in the process of composition. It is, in fact, nothing but aesthetic experience.

The value of poetry is closely related to the problem of communication. In *Practical Criticism*, he observes : "value cannot be demonstrated except through communication of what is valuable."¹²⁷ He further says : "That the one and the only goal of all critical endeavours, of all interpretation, appreciations, exhortation, praise or abuse, is improvement in communication may seem an exaggeration. But in practice it is so."¹²⁸ Richards' theory of communication does not isolate the artist from his production. In *Principles*., he says : "the mere fact that the artist should not, as a rule, fasten himself to communication does not imply that communication is not his pre-occupation and is not actually his principal object."¹²⁹ The first and foremost condition of communication is that the poet and the reader must be bound by the tie of common sensibility. Richards argues, "unless 'A' has remarkable gift of description and 'B' has extraordinary sensitive discriminating ability, their two experiences will tally at best but hardly."¹³⁰ In another place, he expresses the same view in other words : "for successful communication a number of impulses with their effective stimuli must be common to the communicators, and further the general ways in which impulses; modify one another must be shared."¹³¹ So the contradiction between the two statements, first that the artist should not be mindful about communication and second, that the artist should not ignore communication is resolved here.

The theory of communication is based on the broad principle that art has a social function. It is meant for society. Therefore, it is necessary that the artist must take into consideration the

126 Richards : *Principles*, p. 26.

127 Richards : *Practical Criticism*, 12.

128 *Ibid.*, p. 11.

129 Richards : *Principles*, p. 27.

130 *Ibid.*, p. 178.

131 *Ibid.*, p. 191.

social aspect of his art. In other words, the success of art depends upon its being properly communicated to the mass provided it also, at the same time, keeps the conscience of the artist.

A large part of Richards' theory of communication is derived from the literary criticism of Coleridge and Eliot though he exercises his independence of judgment everywhere. Coleridge, who was Kant's poetic counterpart, diverted the attention of the readers from sordid intellectual unbelief to supreme truth when he put forward the theory of the 'sense of musical delight' and the 'willing suspension of disbelief'. When Richards deals with the artist's concern with getting the work 'right', he has definitely Coleridge's 'synthesizing imagination' and Eliot's 'unified sensibility' at the back of his mind. Eliot, it appears, derives the concept of 'unified sensibility', a remedy that can bridge the gulf between 'thinking' and 'feeling', from Remy de Courmont and he sees in Baudelaire, Laforgue, Corbiere and Donne a similar unification. Richards tries to unite the opposite extremes of Coleridge and Eliot by laying emphasis on the fidelity and singlemindedness of the artist.

While Richards believes that the feeling of the poet always requires to be communicated, there is nothing in poetry which can be said to be secret or recondite. He partially agrees to Tolstoy's "Infection theory of art" which lays down that art has the infectious quality to affect the reader or the receiver. But he refutes Tolstoy's opinion that certain sensations are peculiar or strange.¹³² He stands for the completeness and clearness of the experience which develops in the mind of the communicator at the time of expression.

The word in *Rasa* doctrine which is nearest in approach to Richards' communication is *Sadharanikarana*. Though this word does not occur in Bharata's *Natyaśāstra*, it is mentioned by Bhattanayaka who was one of the interpreters of Bharata's *Rasa-sūtra Vibhavanubhava Sancariniḍṣah Nispattiḥ*. Thus, the theory of *Sadharanikarana* may be treated as an off-shoot of Bharata's aphorism on *Rasa*. The terminology used by Richards and the theorists of *Rasa* school, no doubt, differs. But there is hardly any difference between them in the treatment of subject-matter. Richards, however, seems to lean towards the artist or communicator as contrasted with the theorists of *Rasa*

¹³² Richards, *Principle*, P.P. 186-189.

school who endeavour to give an almost exhaustive account of the mind of the *Sahrdaya* at the time of receiving poetic experience. Again, the word *Sadharanikarana* has a philosophical overtone which is lacking in a too technical word like communication.

An uncompromising foe of the aesthetic movement called 'Art for Art's sake' or 'poetry for poetry's sake' which stemmed from Keats and the pre-Raphaelite artists and the theories of Pater, Whistler Oscar Wolde, Clive Bell and A.C Bradley, Richards formulates his theory of literature like a thoroughgoing scientist. He is fully conscious of the fact that almost "from the beginning of scientific aesthetics. the insistence upon the aesthetic experience as an experience, peculiar, complete and capable of being studied in isolation, has received prominence."¹³³ This school, unfortunately, believes in the intrinsic worth of art and holds that the experience of art is an end in itself and any consideration of its ulterior ends tends to lower poetic value. Richards protests : "The separation of poetic-experience from its place in life and its ulterior worths, involves a definite lop-sidedness, narrowness, and incompleteness in those who preach it sincerely."¹³⁴ No one can hope to enjoy Shelley's "Prometheus Unbound" while holding at the same time that the views expressed in it are nothing but moonshine or that the perfectibility of man is an undesirable ideal or that hangmen are excellent things.¹³⁵ Likewise, to consider Sermon on the mount deprived of any intention or ulterior end will be a mark of mental timidity.¹³⁶ Richards has been widely influential because of his brilliant specific insight. His criticism like that of Dr. Johnson and Eliot is valuable not because of the subject, but because one can experience in his writing a master-mind in action and can discern one possible response to life and literature. But unlike Eliot, who repudiates system-building and rests the value of his criticism on his own theory about poetry calling it a kind of 'workshop criticism', Richards works out a systematic theory of literature.

Richards suggests his individual point of view with regard to

¹³³ Richards : Principles, p. 73.

¹³⁴ Ibid., p. 79.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

the connection of life and literature. "There is no gulf", Richards states, "between poetry and life as over-literary persons sometimes suppose. There is no gap between our everyday emotional life and the material of poetry."¹³⁷ Richards admits that poetry is "a secret discipline to which some initiation is needed."¹³⁸ But it can be accepted for ever that it "translates into its special sensory language a great deal that is given in the ordinary daily intercourse between minds by gesture, tones of voice, and expression."¹³⁹ It is not possible for everybody to grasp the ideas embodied in poetry. For that, some special training is required. Poetry uses symbols, images, cadence and such other devices which cannot be appreciated by a commoner. But "those who have naturally a fine imagination and discrimination, who have a developed sensibility to the values of life, do seem to find the password to poetry with great ease."¹⁴⁰ Richards emphatically says that "it is the verbal expression of this life, at its finest", which is "forced to use the technique of poetry."¹⁴¹

Richards' belief in utility theory and inextricable relation that exists between life and literature does not permit him to accept the legacy of the critics associated with pure aestheticism. He rejects Bradley's 'Poetry for Poetry's sake' and replaces it by his theory of 'Poetry for life's sake'. He boldly accepts the purpose and meaning behind artistic creation. The Kantian doctrine of 'disinterested pleasures' which looks upon art not as means but an end in itself; not as a useful product of man but as an ornament, not as an instrument but as an achievement is disapproved by him. In fact, Kant's idealist stance in philosophy cannot bear any equation with that of Richards. Kant made a distinction between sublimity and beauty. While beauty depends upon form and proportion, sublimity is associated with infinity which overwhelms our senses and gives us a sense of our own inferiority. It makes us realise how great is the contrast between our own infinitesimal status and the vastness of the external world. Further, there are two forms of sublimity the mathematical and the dynamic, the former involving quality and the latter involving active generative forces. In both cases, we experience

137 Richards: *Practical Criticism*, p. 319.

138 *ibid.*

139 *ibid.*

140 *Practical Criticism*

141 *ibid.*

our reason stirs our moral sense . Richards breaks away from Kantian position. He thinks that no art can live without life. Life and literature are closely related to each other. The notion that the best literature is that which produces the best moral results is sometimes said to condemn itself by the absurd conclusion it leads to. It is argued that if utility alone be the aim of artistic creation, there will be no difference between art and other useful articles. The Platonic-Kantian-Tolstoyan attitude, therefore, requires to be reconsidered in the light of what Richards has to say on this point. The idea that art divorced from life can endure suffers from obvious limitations. Richards, therefore, justly disapproves any literary product which is created for its own sake. He has unbounded admiration for the creative artist who does not isolate art from life. The reader also should always be prepared to receive inspiration from a work of art. In Richards' word "The reader must be required to wear no blinkers, to overlook nothing which is relevant, to shut off no part of himself from participation."¹⁴² In his admission of the value of art, Richards may be singled out as a critic of man and society. It is a fact that artist is in need of a patronage. But to say that he solely creates to please his patron would be a mistake. No art is possible unless the artist is actuated by the desire of self-fulfilment. So a compromise between the two extreme views is possible. It can be accomplished without detriment to the artist's pride. Richards is not unaware of the difficulties inherent in morality theory in its extreme sense. This is why he again and again reminds the artist to be loyal to his duties. The artist's loyalty to the work he undertakes implies both his concern with society and his concern with communication.

The old controversy regarding the standard by which to measure the worth of literature, i.e., whether the writer should take upon himself the task of instructing the readers to provide what may be called 'moral uplift' and to leave the world morally elevated or to judge art by its own standards is revived by Richards. He asserts, "of all the great critical doctrines, the moral theory of art (it would be better to call it the 'ordinary value' theory) has the most great minds behind it."¹⁴³ In order to solve this problem he looks back upon Plato who discarded the poets as good-for-nothing creatures except in so far they enthused citizens in warfare or made them revere the gods. He also brings

142 Richards : Principles, p. 71.

143 Richards : Principles, p.71.

In the name of Tolstoy who dismissed useful art and said that all art is intended to serve and not to state. Between these two theorists, he finds several critics and philosophers having similar attitude to aesthetic appreciation.

Mathew Arnold was an advocate of moral theory of art. His moral preoccupation extended the purport and the functions of criticism in the widest possible way. Richards, who develops a sort of instinctive abhorrence for the movement which believes in the absolute autonomy and intrinsic worth of art and shirks from acknowledging its ulterior ethical purpose, may be reckoned in the succession of Horace and Marthew Arnold. As T.S. Eliot puts it, "Mr. Richards, like every serious critic of poetry is a serious moralist."¹⁴⁴ Here, the distinction from Eliot, or for that matter from Leavis, should be immediately clear. Eliot is also a moralist but he believes in the complete autonomy of poetry. Leavis too treats poetry as an instrument of intelligence and culture. For Richards, poetry is directly concerned with morality because it is only in poetry that our best impulses are reconciled and satisfied.

Richards thinks that morality should be treated as a side-issue, for criticism and the critic are concerned with it in its extreme sense. The "unfortunate opinion that the arts have no concern with morality leads to the 'ignoble blasphemy' which compels us to look at *Esther Walters* as an "impure book" or *Madame Bovary* as "an apology for adulterous wrong."¹⁴⁵ In the wider sense, it is the poet and not the priest or the moralist who is the real moral teacher. Hence, it is futile to seek value in the "general rules of conduct". Value resides in 'minute particulars' in which the artist is an expert.¹⁴⁶ This is one reason why the moralist has always been antagonistic to the poet. Richards believes in "the fine conduct of life" which springs from "fine ordering of responses far too subtle to be touched by any general ethical maxims."¹⁴⁷ A closer reflection on the history of literature shows that the moral principles enunciated by the poets were more readily accepted by the public than those upheld by the moralists and the religious teachers. So, as Richards says, Shelley was fully justified when he said that 'the basis of morality

¹⁴⁴ Eliot : The Use of Poetry, p. 17.

¹⁴⁵ Richards : Principles, p. 35.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 61.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 62.

is laid not by preachers but by poets."¹⁴⁸ A good work always satisfies our impulses whereby we feel morally elevated. Goodness of a work of art is an exercise of impulses and the satisfaction of their appetencies.

The purpose of poetry and its place in an age of science have been elaborately discussed in *Science and Poetry*. On the front page of this book, Richards quotes the following lines of Matthew Arnold, which embody the high purpose of poetry and its significant role in an age of science:

"The future of poetry is immense, because in poetry, where it is worthy of the high destinies, our race, as time goes on, will find an ever surer stay. There is not a creed, which is not shaken, not an accredited dogma which is not shown to be questionable, not a received tradition, which does not threaten to dissolve. Our religion has materialised itself in the fact, in the supposed fact : it has attached its emotion to the fact, and now the fact is failing it. But for poetry the idea is everything."

In the beginning, as in *Principles*, he points out the hollowness of the magical view of poetry, which holds that poetry grows out of mystical experience of unanalysable inspiration.¹⁴⁹ Therefore, as he says, "both a passionate knowledge of poetry and capacity for dispassionate psychological analysis are required if it is to be satisfactorily prosecuted."¹⁵⁰ In the processes of *Science and Poetry*, he finds an obvious difference. He finds in poetry some elements, which can save man from tension and war.¹⁵¹ Richards insists on the alleviatory power of poetry. That poetry alone can salvage this war-torn world from total annihilation is the main theme of this book. This fact alone distinguishes him from most of the critical practitioners of our time who hardly see such a force in poetry and art. Like Arnold, Richard takes poetry as the last solace of a degenerating civilisation. There are many statements to healing and health in Arnold's theory and practice. It is valuable because it can have a therapeutic effect upon the readers. Poetry, for Richards, is a medium to overcome chaos and conflict which disrupt the normal tenure of our lives. The main function of poetry is to bring

148 Richards : *Principles*, p 62.

149 Richards : *Science and Poetry*, p. 33.

150 Ibid , p. 15.

151 Richards : *Science and Poetry*, p. 90.

balance and reconciliation in our discordant impulses.

From the very beginning, Richards lays emphasis on imagination in creative activity. In *Principles*, he enumerates six distinct senses of the word 'imagination'.¹⁵²

1. It refers to the production of vivid images, unusually visual images.

2. It means the use of figurative language.

3. In a narrower sense, it means sympathetic reproduction of other people's states of mind, particularly their emotional states.

4. Inventiveness, the bringing together of elements which are not ordinarily connected.

5. Relevant connection of things ordinarily thought of as disparate which is exemplified in scientific imagination.

6. The synthetic and magical power on which Coleridge laid emphasis.

Of all the six meanings mentioned above, the last one is considered by Richards as the most important. Compared with the poet, an ordinary man "suppresses nine-tenth of his impulses."¹⁵³ As he says, an ordinary man "goes about in blinkers because what he would otherwise see would upset him."¹⁵⁴ The poet has the superior power of ordering experience where by the "impulses which commonly interfere with one another and are conflicting, independent and mutually destructive, in him combine into a stable poise."¹⁵⁵ Tragedy is the best example of the synthesis of opposite and discordant qualities. "Pity, the impulse to approach and Terror, the impulse to retreat, are brought in Tragedy to a reconciliation which they find nowhere else."¹⁵⁶ According to Richards, "The Projection of meaning into words is itself an imaginative process."¹⁵⁷ In ordinary life, the working of the mind is not as appreciable as when an artist starts creating something. "The range and complexity of the impulse-systems involved is less; the need for action, the comparative uncertainty and vagueness of the situation, the intrusion of accidental irrelevancies inconvenient temporal

¹⁵² Richards : *Principles*, pp. 239-42.

¹⁵³ Richards : *Principles*, p. 243.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁶ Richards : *Principles*, p. 245.

¹⁵⁷ Richards : *Coleridge on Imagination*, p.121.

spacing - the action being too slow or too fast - all these obscure the issue and prevent the full development of the experience. We have to jump to some rough and ready solution. But in the imaginative experience these obstacles are resolved."¹⁵⁸ He brings an analogy from Chemistry to give edge to his argument. He observes : "As a chemist's balance to the grocer's scales, so is the mind in the imaginative moment to the mind engaged in ordinary intercourse or practical affairs."¹⁵⁹ It is because in them "the development and systematisation of our impulses goes to the furthest lengths."¹⁶⁰

In *Coleridge on Imagination*, Richards offers his comments on Coleridge's theories of 'Imagination' and 'Fancy' and 'Sense of Musical Delight'. He finds him to be a seminal mind and sees a peg to his pet doctrine in the lines of Coleridge. He reads behaviourist psychology into Coleridge. He tells us that though outwardly 'Fancy' and 'Imagination' seem poles asunder, they are not quite different entities, nor are they independent of each other. In many cases, they are complementary to each other. He fixes his attention on the imaginative faculty of the poet. He also calls Coleridge a semaseologist¹⁶¹ and a psychologist.¹⁶² Much of what he says about Coleridge's theory of imagination is his own theory of imagination. But it is worth mentioning here that Coleridge's account of imagination is not merely epistemology oriented, but it also refers to the theory of values epistemology-oriented. As his theory is derived from German Philosophy, its concern with the theory of value is obvious. Richards' definition of imagination basically refers to the psychological aspect of imagination. It is clear from his observation: "It is in such resolution of a welter of disconnected impulses into a single ordered response that in all the arts imagination is most shown."¹⁶³

The word in *Rasa* theory which corresponds to 'imagination' of western literary criticism is *Pratibha*. *Pratibha*, *Sakti* and *Prajna* are synonymous in the theory of *Rasa*. The word *Pratibha*, however, has broader meaning than that of imagination. It

158 Richards : Principles, p. 237.

159 Ibid., p. 238.

160 Ibid., p. 237.

161 Richards : Coleridge on Imagination, p. XI.

162 Ibid., p. 2.

163 Richards : Principles, p. 245.

includes such western concepts as intuition, inspiration, rapture, ecstasy, etc. Richards believes in Coleridgean imagination. According to him, imagination by its very nature, is synthetic. *Rasa-doctrine* deals at large with *Sanvojaka* character of *Pratibha*. It not only creates and recreates but synthesises, intermingles, assimilates and imbues. Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta, Mammata, Visvanatha and Jagannatha deal with the different aspects of *Pratibha*. Some Sanskrit critics believe in *Utpadya Pratibha*, i.e., *Pratibha* obtained through constant Practice. But most of the critics, like Richards, believe in *Sahaja Pratibha*, i.e., imagination as an inborn quality. Richards believes in both creative and critical imagination. Rajasekhara, in his book *Kavya-Mimansa* touches upon the two forms of *Pratibha* - *karyitri* or creative and *Bhavayitri* or critical.

The originality of Richards' tragic vision is difficult to overstate. He deals with it by way of bringing out the synthetic power of imagination. In Richards' view, tragedy has a fairly wide compass. Generally the tragic dramatist repudiates the bright aspect of life or ignores or explains away what is good or worth having in life. In the human world he insists on man's tragic lot and parodies the ideals of religion and morality. Richards' emphasis on man's fortune expresses a tension very deep within romanticism. Richards states that human destiny is the sum total of a good many possibilities. Thus, Richards' definition of tragedy is compatible with the Greek concept of tragedy which describes that sorrow is the real test of life and is the main staple of art.

In his *Principles*, he says that tragedy is a proof against irony and irrelevance.¹⁶⁴ This means that tragedy can absorb anything into itself and still remain tragedy. Tragedy has great absorbing and assimilating capacity. It can absorb the untragic and anti-tragic elements. If this view is accepted, most Greek, French and Elizabethan tragedies might be found deficient for nowhere one can find this type of catholicity on the part of the tragic playwright. Only the best of Shakespeare can stand this test. In Shakespeare's *Othello*, or *Measure for Measure*, the tragedy is embedded in the plots themselves, but the characters have been delineated against such a vast canvas that they remain something more than merely tragic figures. These tragedies

¹⁶⁴ Richards : *Principles*, p. 282.

describe, by inklings, insinuations and implications, that life is a meeting point of diverse motives, a cross-current of conflicting desires and a whirlpool of opposite impulses which constitute life.

Richards' views on rhythm and metre are strikingly original. Rhythm is something more than the handling of sound. It is concerned with emotion. Likewise, metre is something more than the arrangement of accented and unaccented syllables in a special pattern. It is concerned with meaning. In the opinion of Richards, metre involves movement of meanings, not merely of sounds.

It is interesting to note that *Rasa* has also inextricable relationship with *Laya* and *Chanda*. The only Indian theorist to take up the problem of application of *Rasa* to *Laya* and *Chanda* is Ksemendra who in his famous treatise *Suvrta Tilakam* demonstrates how the verbal arrangement, the sound-effect, the specific metre and above all the slow and fast rhythmical movement contribute to the evocation of a particular *Rasa*. Richards' notion of rhythm and metre is not very different from the Indian view since Richards too, like ksemendra, finds a relationship between metre and meaning.

The foregoing account gives a general outline of the critical formulations of I.A. Richards. In the subsequent chapters, an attempt would be made to study Richards' critical theories in the light of the Indian *Rasa* theory.

3. EMOTIONAL STATES AND BHAVAS

In the spectrum of meanings of the word *Rasa*, 'relish', 'bliss', 'sensual delight', etc., are all very much present. But the context decides what exactly is meant by a person in a given usage. Any generalisation is unwarranted. It has been pointed out earlier that the theory that the mode of aesthetic pleasure which is evoked by a work of art was first formulated by Bharata and was later elaborated and elucidated by different Indian aestheticians including Abhinavagupta who tried to render clearer the conception of *Rasa* from both the aesthetic and the philosophical sides. It was also said that *Bhava*, exists at the centre of *Rasa*. In western literary criticism, attempts have been made to define poetry in terms of 'emotion'. Richards also tries to define poetry and explain the creative process of art in terms of 'emotion' and other innate tendencies of man. So, in this chapter, an attempt would be made to see how far the words 'emotion' and *Bhava*, are relevant to poetry and whether we can bring 'emotion' on a para with *Bhava* as used in *Rasa*-doctrine.

As it is difficult to find an exact equivalent of the word *Rasa* in English, so it is hard to translate the word *Bhava* into English. The translation of the word *Bhava* as 'feeling' or 'emotion'¹ or 'mood'² is only workable and does not properly convey the mental state suggested by *Bhava*. 'Feeling', 'emotion', and 'mood' do not bring out the rudiments of *Rasa* that lie dormant in *Bhava* the full maturing of which can be found when *Bhava*, *Anubhava* and *Sancaribhava* combine. Moreover, the visceral changes suggested by the word 'emotion' is not present in all the *Bhavas*.

Before we proceed to study *Bhavas* or make any advance in the understanding of the complex emotions and impulses that are the forces underlying the thoughts and actions of man, we must pursue the way in which the word 'emotion' entered Richards' critical vocabulary signifying the principal human drive and conative tendency characteristic of the nature of man. Emotion is the essential spring or motive power behind all

1 / A.B. Keith translates *Bhava* as 'feeling' or 'emotion'. See *sanskrit Drama* (O.U.P., 1952), p. 319.

2 > P.V. Kane translates *Bhava* as "mood" See *History of sanskrit Poetics*, p. 108.

thought and action. But till recently, the word 'emotion' could not be properly understood and often it was confused with 'feeling' or 'instinct' or 'impulse' or 'sentiment' or any mental disposition to feel or act in a specific way.

'Emotion' is a word contrived to introduce as many equivocations as it can into all the theories - psychological, philosophical, aesthetic and literary. In the pre-Richardsonian period the word 'emotion' was rather loosely used and abstractly conceived. Recent researches in the field of psychology, however, give us a clue to define this word in its scientific sense. How this word came to be defined in modern psychology will be considered later. It is sufficient to indicate here that the word 'emotion' has been used in contemporary literary criticism, particularly in the literary criticism of I.A. Richards, in its scientific sense for the first time.

The question how the word 'emotion' entered into critical vocabulary and ultimately into literary theory is an interesting one. It is useful at this stage to give a cursory glance over the changing notion about emotion through the centuries. This would enable us to see what advances have been made by Richardsonian aesthetics during the last few decades. It is to be noted here that the word 'emotion' was quite otherwise conceived in Greek literary theories. Plato used this word to denote the stirring up of the mind or more usually the excited state of mind or feelings. Plato's disciple Aristotle was more accurate and conscientious in the treatment of the word 'emotion'³. On the one hand Aristotle spoke of rational enjoyment and on the other, he refuted Plato's doctrine replacing it by his own theory of *Katharsis*. The Roman poet-critic Horace, gave much importance to emotional appeal and said that the secret of this appeal might be traced in the poet's capacity to move the reader's heart and soul.⁴ Longinus insists on emotion as an integral feature of sublimity because, as he said "nothing contributes so decisively to the grand style as a noble emotion in the right setting when it forces its way to the surface in a gust of frenzy, and breathes a kind of divine inspiration into the speaker's words."⁵

3 Butcher : *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Arts* (Dover, 1951), p.215.

4 Horace : "On the art of Poetry", *Classical Literary Criticism*, tr. T.S. Dorech (Penguin, 1965), p. 81.

5 Longinus : "On the Sublime", *Ibid.* p. 109.

Sydney, who followed the foot-prints of Aristotle in many ways, found emotion important for two reasons. First, because poetry can amuse and second, because it can moralise. Obviously, the first may be said to be related to emotional appeal. Ben Jonson wanted the poets to practise their art with painful toil to improve upon their craft. Hume comments : "Whatever emotion the poetical enthusiasm may give to the spirits, 'tis still the mere phantom of belief of persuasion."⁶ Other philosophers of this period like Locke, Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz felt tempted to use the word 'emotion', sometimes for 'feeling' sometimes for 'sentiment', sometimes for 'anger' and such other violent emotions.

Dr. Johnson went a step ahead of his contemporaries and defined poetry as "the art of uniting pleasure with truth by calling imagination to the help of reason."⁷ Obviously, in his definition he tried to shift the emphasis from 'emotion' to 'reason'. The Romantic criticism replaced the mimetic and didactic theories of art with expressive and autotelic theories. Romantic criticism, in a way, enhanced the ambiguity of the word 'emotion' insofar as it concentrated more on the poet's psyche than on the objective reality of things. Wordsworth defined poetry as "the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings". "It takes", he goes further, "its origin from emotion recollected in tranquillity."⁸ Wordsworth alone, among all the romantic poets and theorists, thought that only those objects can serve the poet with material for art which can appeal his emotion i.e., provided he is able to apprehend the subject with a certain emotion.

In his Platonic defence of poetry, Shelley found out that no subject can be transformed into poetry unless it is conceived emotionally. As against the eighteenth century drift of laying emphasis on 'reason', Shelley associated poets with emotional life. The increasing value attributed to emotion, impulse, feeling and spontaneity of expression and the decreasing importance attached to reason and intellect differentiated the romantic theorists from their predecessors. The Victorian poets, critics and philosophers once again seem to take recourse to scientific

6 Hume Treatise on Human Nature, Book I, Part III, Section 10.

7 Johnson, Dr. Samuel 'Life of Milton'; Dr. Johnson's Prose and Poetry, Selected by Mona Wilson (London, 1971), p. 834.

8 Wordsworth, William : "Preface to Lyrical Ballads". English Critical Essays, Nineteenth Century, ed. Jones, Edmund (New York, 1940), p. 26.

accuracy. The reason of this change in attitude and temper may be attributed to the unexpected success of science during this period. John Stuard Mill, who had unflinching faith in Wordsworthian doctrine of poetry, interpreted poetry as "the expression or uttering forth of feeling."⁹ Mill agreed that a man's emotional susceptibility is innate but his skill and craftsmanship are acquired. From the conviction of the scientists that natural phenomena should be subjected to dispassionate observation, stemmed Matthew sArnold's concept of poetry as 'criticism of life'.¹⁰ Some people commit the mistake of imagining that Matthew Arnold defines poetry as criticism of life only. Arnold, it is to be noted, never cared for definition in the abstract though he had an extraordinary gift to crystallize his ideas in telling and memorable phrases. By 'criticism of life', he meant that poetry must deal with life and deal with it powerfully and in that mood of high seriousness which comes from absolute sincerity so that poetry is a voice from the inmost depths of the soul and not mere preaching or sermoning conceived and composed in the mind or the head or the brain.

The idea that emotion and reason are two quite distinct faculties separate from each other has been falsified and contradicted by twentieth century poetics. T.S.Eliot's description of the creative process which requires a 'union of thought and sense' resulting in 'the sensuous apprehension of thought'¹¹ and uses an 'objective correlative'¹² states that in his scheme emotion and reason, heart and mind are closely related to each other. Again, Eliot's theory of 'impersonality' which demands emotional surrender or escape from emotion¹³ shows how he makes a departure from nineteenth century poetics particularly wordsworthian doctrine of poetry. The Arnoldian prediction that in course of time poetry will more and more occupy the place of religion is dismissed by Eliot on the ground that it is none of the business of the poet to think. In Eliot's words 'the poet who thinks is merely the poet, who can express the emotional equivalent of thought'.¹⁴ The business of the poet according to

9 Gibbs, J.W.M. : ed. *Early Essays of John Stuart Mill* (London, 1897), 208.

10 Arnold Matthew : *Essays in Criticism, Second Series* (London, 1958), p. 3.

11 Eliot : 'The Metaphysical Poets', *Selected Essays*, p. 286.

12 Eliot : *Hamlet, Selected Essays*, p. 145.

13 Eliot : 'Tradition and Individual talent', *Selected Essays*, p. 21.

14 Eliot : 'Shakespeare and the Stoicism of Seneca', *Selected Essays*, p. 135.

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Eliot, is to produce the imaginative illusion of a view of life. In poetry, personal emotion has to be transformed into impersonal experience of art through finding an 'objective correlative' or suitable medium.

The word 'emotion' in its scientific and psychological sense comes for the first time in the literary criticism of Richards. Unlike Eliot who repudiates system-building and lays stress on the value of his criticism on his own thinking about poetry, calling it a kind of 'workshop-criticism',¹⁵ Richards makes a clear distinction between the emotional state produced in the reader and the device used to produce the emotional state.¹⁶ Richards' doctrine of emotive vs. scientific use of language and quantitative theory of value which presupposes comparison of different experiences in terms of their value mark a shift of interest from metaphysics to aesthetic analysis. Richards succeeds in providing a scientific nomenclature to modern literary criticism which well suits the age of science. Richards' aesthetics reduces criticism to science. We cannot but commend his scientific bias which enables him to rescue criticism from the marshy bog of subjectivity and personal enthusiasm. In his later works, Richards tries to dispel the confusion that there is actually a dividing line between emotion and thought. In his book *Speculative Instruments*, he tries to effect a compromise between these two extremes. He makes it clear that literature is chiefly meant to produce emotional appeal though emotion and cognition are inseparable. Richards forcefully argues that much of the criticisms of the past is robbed of its essence because it cannot keep clear of all affectations. Richards and the critics who very much follow the way paved by him try to keep pace with the modern discoveries of psychology, neurology and other allied sciences. Richards' literary criticism justifies again and again that criticism can go hand in hand with science resulting in true scientific criticism.

Blackmur's 'gesture' where he insists on getting at emotional truth even by being illogical and irrelevant and Allen Tate's theory of 'tension' which demands poet's emotional fidelity and figurative development leading to a complex patterning of meaning once again restore the poet's position dislodged by the earlier theorists. The affective processes constitute one of the

15 Eliot . 'Frontiers of Criticism', *On Poets and Poetry*, p. 106.

16 Wimsatt, and Brook, *Literary Criticism : A Short History*, p. 623.

most confused and controversial areas in psychology. The whole structure of the psychic life is made up of three elements; sensation, image and affection.¹⁷ Richards tries to find a suitable scientific terminology for the study of poetry.

So far as the science of psychology is concerned, the word 'emotion' has been variously defined by the psychologists of different theoretical orientations. But there is a surprising unanimity of opinion among them on the point that the emotional state is a complex reaction involving a high degree of activation and visceral changes. It is accompanied by strong feeling of affecting states.

The word 'emotion' is derived from the Latin 'e' (out) and 'movere' (to move). Originally, the word was applied to mean 'a moving out from one place to another', in the sense of a migration. The word came to mean a moving, stirring, agitation, perturbation in the strictly physical sense. Finally, it came to mean any agitation, vehement or excited mental state of the individual.¹⁸

Let us now consider what is *Bhava*, is derived from the root *Bhu* meaning 'to be' or 'to exist'.¹⁹ From this is beaten out an immense chain of derivations like *Bhava*, *Bhavan* (being), *Bhava* (existence), *Bhavana* (causing to be), *Bhuvana* (the world), *Bhu* or *bhumi*, (the earth), *Bhudhara* (earth supporter), *Bhupa* (an earth protector, king), etc.,. Thus, *Bhava*, according to the etymological derivation means 'what is existent'. The *Gita* uses *Bhava* in the sense of "what comes into existence" (*nasato vidyate bhavah*).²⁰

Bharata uses *Bhava* to denote mental affections taking the shape of *Sthayins* and *Sancarins*. As he uses this word, *Bhava* permanently lies in the heart of man and is excited by some external stimulus or *Vibhava*. The effect of the excitement is that the heart of the cultured spectator or cultivated reader is moved to pity or terror or love or admiration or to some other feeling.

17 Heid Breder, Edna : *Seven Psychologists* (Ludhiana, 1971), p. 138.

18 "The Latin word *Movere* means to stir up, agitate, excite or move. To be moved in an emotional sense means to be 'stirred'. In a motivational sense, it means to 'bestir oneself', or 'to be pushed'. Sometimes emotion not only stirs us up but also causes us to bestir ourselves."

Mann, Norman : *Psychology : The Fundamentals of Human Adjustment* (Harper, London, 1961), p. 313.

19 *Bhu Sattayam : Siddhanta Kaumudi*, 7.

20 *Gita*, ii, 16.

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The maturing of *Bhava* gives *Rasa*. Thus, in the final analysis, emotion seems to lie somewhere close to *Bhava*.

This analysis, however, brings us to an altogether different antithesis. If emotion lies close to *Bhava*, is there any other term also used by Richards which approximates *Bhava*? Richards' literary criticism gives us an impression that if there is any term which might appropriately define and explain the creative process of art and which is nearer *Bhava*, it is 'impulse' and if a term used by him comes closer to *Rasa* it is 'attitude'. He explains the worth of poetry in terms of the balance of impulses. In Indian terminology it is only the synthesis of *Bhavas* in a particular order which produces poetic excellence. The value of poetry, according to the Indian rhetoricians, lies in the crystallization of those *Rasas* which are of the same tribe discarding those which belong to the other tribe. This is what they call *Maitri* and *Satruta* of *Rasas*. Richards clearly states that the ultimate aim of poetry is to form attitude. This forming of attitude is nothing but *Rasodreka* which leads the reader to *Rasa Bodha*. In *Rasa* theory, *Bhava* is, thus, taken as the cognizable aspect of the human mind. The instincts may also be incorporated in it. *Rasa* or the aesthetic experience or *Bhava*, is a kind of perception of beauty and truth.

In *Amarakosa* any alteration of mind (*manovikara*) is called *Bhava* (*vikaro manaso bhavah*) though Bharata gives the simplest definition of *Bhava* as the expression of mental states.²¹ According to him, *Bhavas* are the attending conditions of *Rasa*. Some *Bhavas* may, by a definite process, assume the proportion of *Rasa*. It is on this basic assumption that the concepts of Determinants (*vibhava*), consequents (*anubhava*) and Transitory States (*sancaribhava*) have been formed. Bharata takes *Bhava* as the primary condition of *Rasa*. *Bhava* is meaningful provided it enriches and impregnates *Rasa*. In this connection, there are three suppositions made by Bharata; first, *Rasa* causes *Bhava* to come into being, second, *Bhava* causes *Rasa* to come into being, and third, both cause each other to come into being. Among these three mutually corroborative suppositions, the second one i.e., *Bhava* causes *Rasa* into being is relatively strong. It is because these *Bhavas* enrich *Rasa* that they are so called.²² One

21 Ghosh : Bharata's *Natyasastra*, 7/2, p. 100.

22 Bharata : *Natyasastra*, 6/34.

cannot think of *Rasa* without *Bhava*. The mental states which are susceptible and impressionable to feelings are designated as *Bhava*. Both *Rasa* and *Bhava* are complementary to each other.²³ *Bhava* is the cause of the revelation of *Rasa* (*rasanispatti*). All *Bhavas* do not possess the quality or strength to produce *Rasa*. Therefore, in poetry only those *Bhavas* are called *Bhavas* which have the capacity to produce *Rasa*. The *Bhava* of poetry derives its worth from its quality to produce *Rasa*. Instead of being produced, it causes *Rasa* to produce.²⁴ Bharata seems to believe in the three distinct states of *Bhava*. First, the mental states like anger, love, etc., which are to be studied in psychology. Second, *Bhava* which makes poetic meaning pregnant and enables the reader to enjoy its beauty. And third, *Bhava* which has place in the reader's mind and which is evoked by the beauty of poetry. At the third stage *Bhava* acts differently and has immense potentiality. It overwhelms the impassioned and cultivated reader (*rasika*) with genuine pleasure.²⁵

Bharata gives three possible meanings of *Bhava* :

(i) *Bhava* is so-called because it pervades (*bhavayanti*), (ii) because through words, gestures and representation of the temperament, it infuses the meaning of the play into the spectators, and (iii) because with its aid, inner idea of the playwright is made to pervade the mind of the spectators by means of words, gestures, colour of the face and the representation of the temperament. The first two meanings are related to the derivation of the word while the third is related to the realisation and fulfilment of *Rasa*. It is clear from Bharata's definition of *Bhava* that he takes its third meaning in a highly technical sense. To say that what helps the idea of the dramatists to pervade the mind of spectator is *Bhava* is to use the word *Bhava* in an extremely extended and technical sense.²⁶

By *Bhava*, Bharata means the property of *Rasa*. In his words "Just as by many articles of various kinds auxiliary cooked food (*vyanijana*) is brought forth, so the States along with different kinds of Histrionic Representation will cause the Sentiments to

²³ Ibid., 3/36.

²⁴ Ibid., 7/203.

²⁵ Bharata : *Natyasastra*, 7/1.

²⁶ Ghosh : tr. *Bharata's Natyasastra*, 6/35, p. 118.

originate".²⁷ According to him the Stable States (*sthayi-bhava*) when they come together with various other States (*bhavas*), attain the quality of *Rasa*. In the words of Bharata: "The states are so called by experts in drama for they cause to originate (*bhavayanti*) the sentiment (*rasa*) in connection with various moods of dramatic representation."²⁸ *Bhava-Sthayi*, *Sancari* and *Sattvika* are technical terms for mental states not as existing in life but as represented in drama, poetry, etc. If an emotion is developed prominently at length, it is *Sthayi*; if incidentally, it is *Sancari*, if its representation by actors demands great proficiency (*Sattva*) in their art - like the representation of tears, horripilation, perspiration as if natural - it is called *Sattvika*. Also only eight or nine can be represented as stable emotions in a whole work at great length. Hence, according to Bharata, the *Sthayi-Bhavas* are limited in number.

Bharata distinguishes *Bhava* from *Cittavrtti*, by which he means an agitated state of mind. While *Bhava* is a permanent mental state, *Cittavrtti* is a transient mental state. He gives a detailed and minute classification of *Bhava* with all its divisions and sub-divisions and their interrelationship with one another. He enumerates eight Stable States (*sthayi-bhavas*), eight Temperamental States (*sattvika-bhavas*) and thirty three Transitory States (*vyabhicari-bhavas*). This gives us a true picture of our complex mental life.

Here an account of how the word 'emotion' by the western psychologists was taken seems essential because Richards borrows this word direct from psychology. The interest in human emotions has captivated the master minds through the ages and divergent psychological theories have gradually developed. By some, emotion is considered a stirred up state of organism while by other it is defined as energy reactions. But such definitions neglect the difficulty which crops up from the fact that both psychological disturbance and situational crisis are matters of proportion. At what specific point does truly emotional behaviour begin is a question worth investigating. Does all behaviour have an emotional component? Some psychologists have accepted that every experience has an affective aspect. If this is taken for granted, then the above definitions of 'emotion' miss the point.

27 Ibid., pp. 106-107.

28 Ghosh : tr. Bharata's *Natyasastra*, 7/2.

Rene Descartes, who wrote the first treatise on emotion, *The Passions of the Soul*, took 'emotion' in a liberal sense. According to him, there are six primary passions - wonder, love, hate, desire, joy and sadness. Sadness and hatred were conceived as natural consequences of pain while joy and love were considered the off-shoots of pleasure. He thought that continued pleasure generates joy. The six primary emotions are fundamental of which all the rest are species. The primary emotions may be divided into two parts - those which are concerned with mind and those which are concerned with heart. In the first may be placed 'surprise' and in the second the other five emotions. Descartes does not indicate the number of dependent emotions, although he considers that amongst them attraction, detraction, nobility, ego, hope, humility, fear, jealousy, - play dominant role.²⁹ This definition of emotion is not in consonance with its definition given by modern psychologists. The American psychologist William James and the Danish psychologist Lange approached the problem from a different standpoint. James's theory that "the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion."³⁰ marks a departure from the position taken by Descartes. James's emphasis on certain innate or reflex adjustment of the nervous system leads automatically to bodily changes in the visceral and the skeletal muscles.³¹ The most violent attack against the James-Lange position came from the neurological front. It was apprehended by the work of W.B.Cannon, who published a series of research reports in the second and third decades of the twentieth century. Many of these were summarised in his book entitled *Bodily changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear Rage, : An account of recent researches into the function of emotional excitement*. James-Lange theory of emotion and its refutation by Cannon and Bard led to a good deal of controversy in the field and the recent Activation theory of emotion tries to synthesize the rival claims of these theories.

Contemporary psychology has by no means become a mere branch of physiology, although the importance of the psychological approach is universally acknowledged.

29 Thilly, Frank : A History of Psychology (Allahabad, 1958), p. 312.

30 James, W. : Psychology : Briefer Course (New York, 1908), p. 273.

31 Boring, Edwin, G. : A History of Experimental Psychology (Bombay, 1966), p. 516.

McDougall tried to associate the emotions with their corresponding instincts. The way in which he explained instinct was likely to increase the number of instincts without a limit. Modern psychologists break away from the stand taken by McDougall. Moreover, a controversy has recently taken place whether instincts should be recognised as separate mental states. McDougall's definition of emotion is too broad to give us a concrete idea about it. According to him, "emotion in its wide sense includes all mental activities and experiences."³² But as we know, emotion refers to a particular state of mind. The Depth psychologists who interpret emotion as expression of unconscious motives have based their findings upon clinical data.³³ Their major contribution is the psychology of emotional behaviour.

Much recent research in physiology and psychology has confirmed the familiar belief that the automatic nerve-system and ductless glands play important role in emotional responses. As compared with emotion, feeling is simple and elementary, small in range and less violent. Strictly speaking, fear, terror, apprehension, rage, fury, suspicion, contempt, scorn, abhorrence, disgust, loathing, horror, dread, alarm, shame, remorse, awe, pity, gratitude, joy and delight - all will fall within the province of emotional states. Emotion is complex, subtle and variegated. Modern psychologists show great interest in analysing the subtlety of emotional states. In the words of Paul Thomas Young, "emotion is characterised by automatic function rather than by a sympathetic function alone."³⁴ Young defines 'emotion' as "an acute disturbance of the individual as a whole, psychological in origin, involving behaviour, conscious experience and visceral functioning."³⁵ It sounds like Woodworth's definition of emotion as "a moved or stirred up state of feeling."³⁶

The complex nature of 'emotion' renders it difficult to define it precisely and accurately. It comes under the affective mental process and is "one of the most complex phenomenon known to

32 McDougall : *An Outline of Psychology* (London, 1949), pp. 316-17.

33 Stratton, G.N. : "The Function of Emotion shown particularly in Excitement", *Psychological Review*, Vol. 35, 1928. pp.352-66.

34 Young, p.T. : *Emotion in Man and Animal* (London, 1943), p. 51.

35 Ibid

36 Woodworth, R.S. : *Psychology* (London, 1937), p. 308.

psychology."³⁷ From the observer's point of view, 'emotion' is a concrete process having objectively measurable elements and observable overt responses. It is diffused in character and may be conveniently intermingled with other processes. It is a conscious experience - an awareness of a multitude of sensations and hence may be experienced along several dimensions. It manifests itself in a set of observable overt responses, such as change in facial expression, voice, posture. It may also lead to metabolic changes and galvanic skins responses. In emotion, physiological and neural process may be altered, thoughts and actions may be affected and mental disorganisation may take place. What we are doing may be dropped, even forgotten and we may exhibit unusual energy. This view is contrary to the concept of Bhava. In Sama or Nirvada, which forms the *Sthayin* of *Santa-Rasa*, the mind becomes calm and tranquil and shows no observable response at all. All the *Bhavas* do not necessarily lead to bodily changes. Emotion is directly concerned with behaviour and its underlying mechanisms. The recent Hypothalamic theory of emotion, Leper's motivational theory of emotion and the Activation theory of emotion study from different angles the factors responsible for the emotional behaviour of man. In *Santa-Rasa*, man shows no marked behaviour at all. His behaviour, if there be any, cannot be assessed in terms of his physique.

'Feeling' and 'Emotion', being two distinct mental activities, cannot be considered one and the same. They manifest themselves differently. Yet, it cannot be denied that both involve certain degree of cognitive process. "Each emotion", Woodworth claims, "is a feeling, and each is at the same time a motor set."³⁸ From this, it follows that both emotion and feeling depend on brain stems and are closely related to each other. Murphy reiterates this fact when he observes, "feelings follows certain regular orders and these regular orders of feelings are called emotion. Emotions cannot be understood in terms of mere cross-sections or given moments; they are characteristic sequences."³⁹

37 Stevens, S. S. : ed. *Hand Book of Experimental Psychology* (London, 1951), p. 473.

38 Woodworth, H.S. : *Psychology A Study of Mental Life*, p. 308.

39 Murphy, Gardner : *Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology* (London,

The aesthetic emotion or poetic impulse is what is called *Bhava* in Indian poetics. *Bhava* has a variety of roots in human nature. All imaginative literature is the outcome of *Bhava*. But before it attains value, it has to undergo a long and difficult process. This process is concerned with the sincerity of feeling and its expression in emotive language. Of all the western aestheticians, Croce alone was against the view that it is impulse or sentiment that goes to the making of poetry. Croce's aesthetics lays emphasis on intuition, the inner urge, the spirit. Beyond intuition are only impressions, sensations, feelings, impulses, emotions or whatever else one may term. Intuitive knowledge is expressive knowledge and beyond that everything is void and shadowy. Even emotion or impulse cannot operate unless they are energized and vitalised by intuitive knowledge. Richards approaches the problem of emotion from a psychological point of view. By emotion, he means something more than that particular emotion which is essential for the composition of poetry. He lays emphasis on the essentially receptive nature of emotion. In his interpretation of creative process of art, he is greatly influenced by the Gestalt and Behaviourist schools of psychology. The Gestalt's insistence on totality and the Behaviourists's insistence on individual reaction help him form his concept of emotion. His psychological leaning forces him to use the word *emotion* purely in psychological sense and hence his description of emotion is more limited than the description of *Bhava* given by the theorists of *Rasa* school.

In his principal works, Richards tries to define emotion and explain its function. He shows his disgust with those critics who incline to use the word *emotion* rather loosely to denote "any noteworthy 'going on' in the mind almost regardless of nature."⁴⁰ Richards is convinced that the critic's tendency to use the word in its loose and pejorative sense has had an adverse effect on literary appreciation. The word 'emotion' as he says, "suffered quite needlessly in its usefulness."⁴¹ Richards emphasizes the neuro-physiological correlates of emotion and defines it in terms of bodily reactions. According to him, "Two main features characterise every emotional experience. One, there is a diffused reaction in the organs of the body brought

1956), p. 152.

40 Richards : Principles, p. 101

41 Ibid

about through the sympathetic system. The other is a tendency to action of some definite kind or group of kinds."⁴² This definition of emotion suggested by Richards reminds us of Stout's observation that "in all the more intense phases of emotion organic sensations form an important constituent of the total state of consciousness."⁴³ It is to be noted here that Richards was much influenced by the writings of Stout in the formative period of his career as a literary critic. For Richards, experience is "any occurrence in the mind. It is equivalent to mental state or process."⁴⁴ Feeling and emotion are basically different because "emotion can much easily be regarded as built up from organic sensations."⁴⁵ About feeling, Richards says that "it would be convenient if it could be kept for pleasure-unpleasure."⁴⁶ All these definitions are based on psychological experiments. According to Richards, "a feeling does not imply an object. It is a state of mind. It is not necessarily directed to anything."⁴⁷ Richards brings out the distinction between the range of feeling and that of emotion. Feeling has a wide-connotation than 'emotion'. In his words "under feeling, I group for convenience the whole conative-affective aspects of life - emotion, emotional attitude, the will, desire, pleasure-unpleasure and the rest. 'Feeling' is shorthand for any or all of this."⁴⁸ In Indian terminology, it may be said that feeling is not an aesthetic experience or *Rasanubhuti* because it is an all embracing state of mind in which many mental states are fused. In fact, it is not always an active state of mind. It hardly aims at any object. But we know, the imperative need of an object or excitant (*vibhava*) for the realisation and relish of *Rasa* cannot be ignored. Richards considers stimulus essential for the evocation of emotion. This notion of Richards is not very different from the notion of excitant or Determinant (*vibhava*) in *Rasa* theory. When Richards lays emphasis on the inevitability of 'stimulus', he focuses his attention on an important aspect of poetry. Richard's stimulus is the English version of Indian

42 Richards Principles, p. 101.

43 Stout, G.F. : A Manual of Psychology (London, 1949), pp 362-65.

44 Richards : Principles, p. 38.

45 Ibid., p. 98.

46 Ibid., p. 367.

47 Richards : Practical Criticism, p. 330.

48 Richards : Practical Criticism, p. 181.

Vibhava. Richards, however, does not describe the different types of stimuli in detail. He is content with saying that stimulus, if it is suitable, must lead to the fulfilment of emotion and must evoke an attitude in the reader. In the Indian theory of *Rasa*, *Vibhavas* are placed into two broad categories - that which inflames (*uddipana*) and that on which the sentiment hangs (*alambana*). *Alambana* is that with reference to which a sentiment arises. It is the link between a sentiment and the cause which excites it. *Uddipana* is that which excites the emotion in the *Asraya*. In the *Bibhatsa Rasa*, stinking flesh is the *Alambana* of the *Rasa*, and the attendant circumstances which enhance the feeling of loathing the worms etc., in the flesh are its *Uddipana*. Similarly, the presence of Sakuntala in the forest where flowers are blossoming and the trees are bent with luscious fruits acts as *Uddipana* because it evokes *Sringara Rasa* in Dusyanta who is the *Asraya* here. In this case, Sakuntala works as *Alambana*.

Richards tells us something about the quality of stimulus though he is silent on the point of its variety. A stimulus should be befitting to the situation as well as to the thought. Since it is the main hinge of creative writing, it should not be weak or artificial. A stimulus should be eschewed when it comes as an "alien intruder which thrusts itself upon us and, after working a devious way through our organism as though a piece of cheese, emerges at the other end as an act."⁴⁹ How agreeable, lively and indigenous a stimulus should be is further brought out by him in the following words : "Of the possible stimuli, which we might at any moment receive only a few actually take effect."⁵⁰ In order to define the function of stimulus, he shows its relationship with response. He observes : "Stimuli are only received, if they serve some need of the organism and the form which the response to them takes depends only in part upon the nature of the stimulus, and much more upon what the organism wants, i.e., the state of equilibrium of its multifarious activities."⁵¹ Thus, according to Richards, any and every object cannot serve as stimulus nor all stimuli are equally valuable and helpful in leading the emotion to its fulfilment. A stimulus must have the suitability and cogency to rouse emotion. Emotion is the governing factor. Stimulus may vary according to situation, object, person and thought. A single

49 Richards : Principles. p. 87

50 Ibid., p. 87.

51 Ibid p 87



emotion may be stimulated by a fairly large variety of stimuli. This view is quite in confirmity with *Rasa* theory. *Rasa* theory holds that a single *Rasa* may be produced by many *Bhavas*. The only condition is that there should be a coordination in these *Bhavas*. Similarly, there is the concept of *Virodha* and *Avirodha* of *Rasas*. This means that it is impossible to combine and fix *Virodhi Rasas* in one single nucleus. *Virodha* or *Satruta* of *Rasas* cannot fulfil the aim of *Rasa*. Insofar as the literary criticism of Richards is concerned, he puts much emphasis on both 'emotion' and 'stimulus'. He also specifies the propriety of emotion and stimulus. In his critical tenet, much stress has been laid on the homogeneity of stimulus and impulses. This is what we get in *Rasa* theory. In *Rasa* theory, great importance has been attached to the homogeneity of *Bhavas* and *Rasas*. Where such a homogeneity is wanting, one cannot expect much from the poet. Poetry not accompanied by genuine *Bhavas* must deceive us. It must shrivel and die. It is bound to produce what is called *Bhavabhasa* or *Rasabhasa* i.e., a travesty of emotion and sentiment. Again, there is a distinct branch of *Rasa* theory called *Aucityavada* which believes in the propriety (*aucitya*) of the application of poetic devices. Only the proper application of *Bhava*, *Chanda*, *alankara*, *Laya*, and *Sabda Dhvani* can create *Rasa*. For the evocation of *Rasa*, it is necessary that the different devices of poetry should be used with caution and due discrimination though the effort of the poet should be directed towards the evocation of *Rasa*.

Richards shows how it is possible to transform emotion and impulse into attitude. It is the attitude of the poet which matters in poetry and the ultimate aim of both emotion and impulse is to form attitude. Attitude is the witness of the ripening of emotion and impulse. Richards observes : "those imaginal and incipient activities or tendencies to action, I shall call attitudes"⁵² These tendencies to action are formed by emotion and impulse. One cannot think of doing anything unless one is prompted by some emotion or impulse. In the definition of attitude given by Richards, emphasis has been laid on 'tendencies to action'. These tendencies are called incipient because they are noticeable in the early stage of emotion. Richards defines impulse as the 'the process in the course of which a mental event may occur, a process apparently beginning in a stimulus and

52 Richards : Principles, p. 112

ending in an act."⁵³ He brings out the importance of an impulse as "the extent of the individual's activities which the thwarting of the impulse involves."⁵⁴ He admits that in actual experience more than one impulse is operative. In any actual behaviour the number of simultaneous and connected impulse occurring is beyond limitation.⁵⁵ Though simple impulse is the limit but psychology is concerned with complex impulses.⁵⁶ According to Richards, even the simplest impulse like laughter implies intricate activities.⁵⁷ In *Science and Poetry*, Richards points out the mutual relationship between attitudes and impulses. "Attitudes", Richards observes "are the impulses towards one kind of behaviour or another which are set ready by the response."⁵⁸ Our "experience is", as Richards says, "made up of emotions and attitude." Impulse mediates between emotions and attitudes.⁵⁹ In Richards' words, "The experience itself, the tide of impulses sweeping through the mind, is the source and the sanction of the words."⁶⁰ From Richards' account of impulse and attitude, it is manifest that by impulses he means *Bhavas* or *Vrttis* that are the main constituents of *Rasa*. It is the impulse in its complex and intricate form that is transformed into attitude.

The question whether Richards' concept of attitude can be identified with *Rasa* has deep implications. Richards' theory is grounded in modern Psychology - which is primarily psycho-physical or sensuous. He talks of "appetencies", "impulses" etc., springing from the instinctive level of senses. The "Attitudes" are determined by motivations in life in relation to others. The satisfaction of these Attitudes in a unique way is the work of poetry. But Indian aesthetics does not admit either of *Bhava* or *Rasa* in any life experience. These are latent in everyman no doubt. They are aroused by life situations too, when man becomes dynamic and active because of them. But they are never enjoyable or delectable or aesthetic that way. They become aesthetic only when their dross of life-touch is removed by the distancing caused by *Vibhavas*, *Anubhavas* etc., which are

53 Ibid., p. 86.

54 Ibid., p. 51.

55 Ibid. p. 86.

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid.

58 Richards : *Science and Poetry*, pp. 24-25.

59 Ibid. p. 24.

60 Ibid., p. 31

technical terms coined to stand for causes and effects of emotions in life, which cease to drive one to activity. They are detached from life, and presented in art or poetry imaginatively. This evokes aesthetic relish or response which is another name for the reader's roused emotions in an impersonal, disinterested way so that they are rendered aesthetic.

As the critics belonging to *Rasa* school hold that poetry is meant to produce *Rasa*, so Richards emphatically says that poetry must form an attitude. Attitude is, however, not *Rasa* because it is only a way of feeling, thinking or behaviour. Croce falls into the error by identifying 'emotion' with 'thought'. He observes : 'The man who thinks has impressions and emotions, in so far as he thinks. His impression and emotion will be not love or hate, not the passion of the man who is not a philosopher, not hate or love for certain objects and individuals, but the effort of his thought itself.'⁶¹ Richards does not commit such a mistake. His definitions of emotion, impulse and attitude are neat and self-contained.

The distinction between sensation and emotion is often compared with the distinction between pleasure and happiness or pain and misery.⁶² Richards is quite clear on this point. Both being cognitive activities, sensation and emotion cannot be separated and treated as independent of each other. It is a fault to find a correspondence between pleasure or happiness or pain and misery. We may be happy, yet, may be far away from pleasure. Pleasure is more intrinsic than extrinsic. The same principle holds good in respect of pain and misery.

That *Bhava* is born of feeling and, therefore, it is related to mind⁶³ leads us to the fallacy that if mind is the seat of feeling, where is the seat of *Vicara*. Mind is generally associated with *Buddhi*. Heart is connected with feeling. If it is supposed that *Bhava* is born of feeling, it must have some thing to do with heart. Again, modern psychologists hold that mind is something more than an amalgam of nerve-fibres and cone-centres conditioning the responses of man-visual, sensory and otherwise. The knowledge of the structure of mind and its function and factor

61 Croce . Aesthetic, p. 22.

62 Carritt, E.F. An Introduction to Aesthetics (London, 1955), p. 66.

63 Jaitley, Basant 'Bhava' in Sanskrit Poetics . A Historiote, Principles of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit (Delhi, 1959), p. 102.

governing personality traits has unquestionably enriched our understanding of poetry. Still, something is left behind. The probing and dissecting of mind, in which modern experimental, clinical and neuro-psychology are so much interested are not very helpful to us in our exploration of poetic beauty. Poetry cannot be made a hand-maid of science. The neglect of heart by Richards makes his literary criticism top-sided. What makes the theory of *Rasa* great and magnanimous is its emphasis on heart which is the seat of all *Rasas*. In *Rasa* theory, we often come across phrases like *Hradya-samvada*, *Mana-mukura*, etc.

Richards' literary criticism borrows the popular notion of the psychologists that emotion motivates us to action. He studies emotion in terms of sensory and motor nerves. The result is that he reduces poetry to mental secretions and sensory automation only. He also shares the view of the psychologists that for emotional response, strong motivation, thwarting of useless impulses and sudden removal of superfluous motives are necessary. As he wrote most of his major books in the early twenties, it was not possible for him to take into account the researches in the field of motivation which were done much later. He does not study the psychosomatic disorders that take place during emotional states. Modern psychologists hold that the complex nature of emotion sometimes renders it difficult to analyse it. Guilford states "emotions seem such personal things that many people may dislike to see them dissected for the cool, observing eye of science."⁶⁴ While Richards admits that "the mental processes of the poet are not a profitable field for investigation",⁶⁵ he oscillates between emotion and impulse and is in a fix to decide as to which of the two is more important. Nor is this all. He makes two erroneous propositions about emotion which may not be acceptable to the modern psychologists. For example, to say that "emotion is an ingredient of consciousness"⁶⁶ or "emotions are primarily Signs of attitudes"⁶⁷ or "emotions are what the reaction with its reverberation in bodily changes feels like"⁶⁸ is to confuse emotion with feeling or

⁶⁴ Guilford, J.P. : General Psychology (New York, 1956), p. 170.

⁶⁵ Richards : Principles, p. 29.

⁶⁶ Richards : Principles, p. 98.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 132.

⁶⁸ Richards : Science and Poetry, p. 24.

Intuition. The third proposition about emotion i.e., "emotions are what the reaction with its reverberation in bodily changes feels like" is, obviously, confined to the physical aspect of emotion only and gives no hint at the aesthetic experience essential for poetic creation. So, at best, Richards' concept of emotion may be taken in the sense of bodily activity. It does not serve as a material out of which poetry is made. He elevates emotion to such a fantastic height that ultimately it becomes useless.

Richard's concept of emotion, it is clear, is derived from psychology. His emotion, it seems, is not *Bhava* of the *Rasa* theory. *Bhava* has to undergo a long process in order to assume the proportion of *Rasa*. *Bhava* is the rudiment of *Rasa* which is developed and transformed into *Rasa* when it is combined with *Vibhava*, *Anubhava* and *Sancarī-bhava* as Bharata himself suggested. *Bhava* is distinct from emotion because it alone cannot make for poetic relish (*rasasvada*). Every poem has some *Bhava*, but it cannot be enjoyed unless it is proved that the *Bhava* is capable of evoking pleasure. *Bhava* can be poetic emotion only when it is crystallized into *Rasa*.

According to Richards, 'feeling' is broader in concept than emotion because it comprehends the whole conative-affective aspect of life. This notion of emotion is supported by only a few psychologists. The mental disturbance which characterises 'emotion' is altogether different. Again, poetry is not concerned with all feelings and emotions. There are some crude feelings and emotions which cannot be made the subject-matter of poetry. If the various definitions of emotion given by Richards are examined, it becomes amply clear that to some extent they are mutually contradictory. The definition that "emotions are what the reaction with its reverberation in bodily changes feels like" narrows down the scope of emotion. Modern psychologists like Cannon-Bard have propounded a theory that much happens in the brain during the moments of emotion. Again, the definition that "emotion is an ingredient of consciousness" is of doubtful validity because consciousness cannot be studied scientifically. So consciousness as a subject-matter of psychology is dismissed by modern psychologists, particularly by the Behaviourist school. Similarly, the definition that "emotions are primarily signs of attitudes" gives us partial truth. It is true that attitude can be assessed on the basis of emotional reaction. But

it often happens that persons, particularly sophisticated ones, conceal their attitude and they seem to love even though they might be heartily hating the man whom he is dealing with.

The Indian theory of *Rasa* holds that for *Rasa*, *Bhava* is essential. It is said that *Rasa* cannot be enjoyed by a disturbed mind. For the arousal of *Rasa*, harmony of impulses is necessary. This is what Richards calls the balance of impulse. In *Rasa* theory *Bhava* has been used in a broad sense to include such emotional states as 'feeling' (*anubhuti*), mood (*manah-sthiti*), sentiment (*bhavana*), and impulse (*vrtti* or *avega*). In other words *Bhava* in *Rasa* theory is a broad term and it is used in the sense of 'emotional tendencies' (*bhavatmaka pravrtti*). This broadness is lacking in Richards' concept of emotion. In fact, even modern psychology does not go to that length, to which the classical Sanskrit critics go in their venture to analyse and examine *Bhava* in all its shades.

Rasa is the aesthetic counterpart of emotion. The discussion of its relation with the Dominant (*sthayi*) and Transitory (*sancari*) states, their causes and manifestations, the evocation of *Rasa* and its correlation with the values of life is a commendable achievement of the history of Indian aesthetics. Many important findings of modern psychology are anticipated here. The sixth and the seventh chapters of Bharata's *Natyasastra* together with the elucidation and commentary of Abhinavagupta thereon contain a rich treasure of information and invaluable suggestion in this field. No doubt, when Bharata wrote about *Bhava*, he meant the *Bhava* of the actors or the audience of drama. He says : "Just as a tree grows from a seed, and flowers and fruits (including the seeds) from a tree, so the sentiments (*rasa*) are the source (*lit. root*) of all the States (*bhavas*) and likewise the States exist as the source of all the sentiments."⁶⁹ In the words of Bharata, *Rasa* does not exist without *Bhava* nor does *Bhava* exist without *Rasa*.⁷⁰ But by the time of Abhinavagupta, the theory of *Rasa* came to be applied to both drama and poetry.⁷¹ *Bhava* was also taken as the basic element of literature in general. *Rasa* became the apprehension of the intensity of emotions.

69 Ghosh : tr. Bharata's *Natyasastra*, p. 107

70 Bharata : *Natyasastra*, 6/36.

71 Abhinavagupta : *Abhinava-Bharata*, p. 291.

The whole super-structure of the theory of *Rasa* is laid on the foundation of *Bhava*, which is its rock-bottom. *Bhava* has close connection with mind. The study of *Rasa* is the study of the psychology of *Bhava*. Emotion is a stirred up state of mind which is produced either by the external or the internal stimulus and after creating organic and internal changes brings forth reactions. On the other hand, a worthwhile *Bhava*, under certain conditions, straightway leads us to *Rasa*.

The field of psychology is the 'psyche' or the mind of man. There are two principal ways in which something can be known - either by introspection or by observation. Observation, in turn, may act through two channels - by looking into the behaviour of man explicitly or by appraising his behaviour as it is described in books on history and literature. Much commendable work has been done in Indian poetics to analyse and understand the different layers of *Bhava*. Indian poetics does not only deal with *Bhava* and its ramifications but also provides a detailed account of its role in the creative process of art starting from aesthetic experience to communication and realisation of *Rasa*.

It has been said by Bharata that the Determinant (*vibhava*) is the cause or *Karana*, *Nimitta* or *Hetu* of *Rasa*.⁷² The Determinant is very useful in the fulfilment of *Rasa* because it excites the feelings. As against emotion, *Bhava* in *Rasa* theory, denotes a state of calm contemplation. Bharata states how Dominant States (*sthayi-bhavas*), Determinants (*vibhavas*), Consequents (*anubhavas*) and Transitory States (*sancari-bhavas*) form a web. Each Transitory State may be caused by one or more Determinants. A number of Transitory States may be caused by one or more Determinants. A number of Transitory States might co-exist with each emotional State like ripples of wave. For example, there are many emotional States akin to the 'Erotic' (*srangara*) as Anxiety (*cinta*), Apprehension (*sanka*) Recollection (*smrti*), Weariness (*srama*), Apathy (*glani*), Indolence Intoxication (*unmada*) Shame (*vrda*), etc. Thus, by the process of permutation and combination, the number of *Bhavas* may increase to several thousands. No *Bhava* exists in isolation. A chain of Transitory States (*sancari-bhavas*) co-habits with each *Bhava*. It often happens that one *Bhava* lies with another *Bhava* belonging to a definite category. In such a case, either of the two

may play a leading role. When there is harmony in *Bhavas*, *Rasa* is inevitable because *Rasa* depends upon the successful combination of *Bhavas*. Where such a combination is wanting, the result is a void. There are certain practical difficulties in bringing together *Bhavas* like 'the comic' (*hasya*) and 'the pathetic' (*karuna*) or 'the erotic' (*sringara*) and 'the gruesome' (*vibhatsa*). On the other hand, it is convenient and logical to associate 'the pathetic' (*karuna*), 'the comic' (*hasya*), 'the marvellous' (*adbhuta*) with 'the erotic' (*sringara*). Mere experience of *Bhava* is not *Rasa*. *Rasa* is the state that follows such an experience. The recollection (*smarana*) and the relish (*asvada*) of that experience is *Rasa*. *Rasa* emerges when the *Bhavas* are properly combined. *Rasa*, supported by inadequate *Bhavas*, is simply tantalising. This is what is called fugitive *Rasa* (*rasabhasa*). Madhusudan Sarasvati says that all the *Bhavas* cannot be relished in the same manner. As anger (*krodha*) is born of *Rajas* and grief (*soka*) is born of *Tamas*, they cannot arouse the same blissfulness which is aroused by the serene (*santa*) and the *Bhakti Bhavas*.⁷³ It is only *Sattva* which can give an enduring pleasure.

In post-Bharata literary criticism, the scope of *Bhava* was much enlarged. It came to be used in various senses like feeling of 'pain' (*dukh*) and 'pleasure',⁷⁴ hereditary trait (*sanskara*) and feeling in general (*bhavana*).⁷⁵ Dhananjaya used it in the sense of 'urge' (*kamana*).⁷⁶ Abhinavagupta made it synonymous with 'passion' (*chittavrtti*).⁷⁷ Still later, Bhanu Misra, in his *Rasatarangini*, defined *Bhava* as any alteration of mind which suits the manifestation of *Rasa*. He further described its implication that *Bhava* is the knowledge of a thing which is congenial to *Rasa*.⁷⁸ Abhinavagupta's concept of *Bhava* is reminiscent of Aristotle's concept of *catharsis* which lays stress on the purgation of painful feelings and points out the mutual dependence of emotion and feeling.⁷⁹

73 Madhusudan Sarasvati : *Bhakti-Rasayana*, 2/78.

74 Dhananjaya : *Dasarupaka*, 4/4.

75 Madhusudan Sarasvati : *Bhakti-Rasayana*, 1/6.

76 Dhananjaya : *Dasarupaka*, 4/4.

77 Abhinavagupta : *Abhinava-Bharati*, p. 342.

78 Bhanu Misra : *Rasatarangini* (Bombay, 1958), p. 6.

79 Butcher, S. H. : *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Arts*, p. 202.

Abhinavagupta lays stress on the fact that *Bhavas* are countless and are perceptible only by our finer sense. By the time of Anandavardhana, who preceeded Abhinavagupta, the idea began to gain ground that *Bhava* is the kernal of poetry, its main centre of appeal. Anandavardhana applies his theory of *Bhava* to all the forms of literary expression - play, poems, lyric and other verse forms. His main concern is to prove how mere word, image and figure of speech are not sufficient to convey the emotion of the poet and how it is the suggestiveness (*vyanjana* or *dhvani*) which makes poetry real and enduring. Abhinavagupta may, however, be grouped with Richards, particularly the early Richards, the Richards of *The Foundations of Aesthetics and Principles*. In the *Foundations of Aesthetics*, he clearly states that the synaesthetic state is a state of mental equipoise and tranquillity. But it should not be confused with the state of mental passivity or inertia in which mind is dulled and becomes completely inactive. This is a state of perfect calm. Richards' notion of synaesthetic state of mind, in which beauty is perceived, invites a comparison with Abhinavagupta's concept of *Santa Rasa*. The *Sthayin* of *Santa Rasa* is *Sama*.⁸⁰ *Sama* means *Samana* or satisfaction of all desires. This occurs when *Tripti* is attained. *Sama* follows *Nirveda* which means final withdrawal from worldly activities. It is the result of *Tattvajnana*. It is the *Sadhaka* of *Moksa*.⁸¹ *Tattvajnana* leads to strong *Vairagya*.⁸² But *Vairagya* is not *Nirveda*. *Vairagya* cannot be the *Sadhaka* of *Moksa* when it follows *Mithvajnana*. *Vairagya* is the absence of *Raga* or lust whereas *Nirveda* is the outcome of a more pressing circumstance the realisation of suffering i.e., *Soka-Pravaha*.⁸³ It is a fact that *Nirveda* results from *Tattvajnana* and for this reason we feel tempted to identify *Nirveda* with *Sama*. Abhinavagupta finds *Sama* a more appropriate term for the expression of the mental state in *Santa Rasa* than *Nirveda*.⁸⁴ which has the overtone of dispassion and passivity. "The aesthetic experience of *Santa*" as K.C. Pandeya puts it, "consists in the experience of the Self as free from the entire set of painful experiences, which are due to external expectations, and, therefore, is blissful state

80 Abhinavagupta . Abhinava-Bharati, p. 335.

81 Abhinavagupta : Abhinava-Bharati, p. 33.

82 Ibid., p. 334.

83 Ibid , p. 335.

84 Ibid.

of identity with the universe."⁸⁵ A close scrutiny will, however, show that there is no essential contradiction between *Sama* and *Nirveda* because *Nirveda* or the state of final withdrawal from the worldly activities is the necessary outcome of the exhausting of passions. When man is completely tired of his toilsome pilgrimage through the weary way of the world, when his tumult of mind subsides, he finds nothing in this world which can excite his feelings or disturb his ego. We may find an example of *Nirveda* in Duke Frederick as described in Shakespeare's *As You Like It*. Duke Frederick is so completely converted by the hermit at the end that he resolves to take religious orders and straightway sends a messenger to the forest of Arden to restore Senior Duke's lands and those of all his followers. He is now not at all affected by the worldly temptations, yearnings, aspirations and hopes. He rises above lust, and passions and finds nothing in this world which can stir his being to its depths. This is also Macbeth's state of mind after the killing of Duncan when he ruminates over the futility of life. He rejects life as a "tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing". But his apparent solipsism is soon overtaken by material urge and his culpability forces him to commit murder after murder to cover up his original crime. Hamlet's position is basically different from that of Macbeth. The problem before him is "To be or not to be", i.e., whether to assert and take revenge upon his uncle or to be destroyed root and branch. Hamlet is the tragedy of a man completely ruined in the conflict and at last emerging in a victory that is little better than defeat. So, Hamlet's mental state does not have that calm which is needed in *Santa Rasa*. He is, at best, a supreme tragic figure.

According to Indian Poetics, *Sama* is nothing but the aversion to all desires - "all passions spent" as Milton would say. It is a quietude of mind. It is taken to be a great bliss. Abhinavagupta, whose mind was preoccupied with the thoughts of *Pratyabhijna Saivism* propounded the theory of *Santa Rasa* on the same lines. Yogic practices are also said to be the chief sources for attainment of *Santi* or permanent bliss. *Santa Rasa* tantamounts to *Visranti* because in the state of *Sama* or *Nirveda*, mind becomes tranquil and is free from all worldly moorings. *Santi* is the very nature of soul. Our soul must languish when we

⁸⁵ Pandeya, Dr. K.C. . *Comparative Aesthetics : Indian Aesthetics* (Chowkhamba, Varanasi, 1959), p. 246.

give all our thought to the body. In order to attain peace and quietude of mind, we must rise above body. So, Abhinavagupta was not wrong when he considered *Santa Rasa* the centre of all *Rasas* and took it as *Mula Rasa*. Just as the inclusion of *Santa Rasa* in the hierarchy of *Rasa* was hotly debated, the topic of Christian *Sama* was in for debate in the West too. Eliot's *Four Quartets* is a good example of *Santa Rasa*. Eliot, ever inclined towards *Santa Rasa* says that the *Gita*, next to *Divine Comedy*, is the greatest philosophical poem. Graham Green has some pertinent remark to make about Christian literature. Moreover, if tragedy is all passions spent the position is not different from *Santa Rasa*.

There is, thus, some difference between Richards' view of synaesthetic state of mind and Abhinavagupta's concept of *Santa Rasa*. Richards takes synaesthesia as the only condition for the perception of beauty. In *Principles*, he propounds a psychological theory of value very much on the same lines. He states that the value of poetry depends upon the co-ordination and systematization of impulses. The balance of impulses leads to what is called the synaesthetic state of mind. Abhinavagupta's concept of *Santa Rasa* implies philosophical speculations about mind and soul. *Santa* is a state that "consists in the continuous flow of the current of pure *Satva*, perfectly free from the tinge of impurities of *Rajas* and *Tamas*."⁸⁶ Richards' theory of synaesthesia is strictly limited to psychological researches concerning nervous tension whereas philosophy has ever remained the breath of the life of literary criticism in India although the Indian critics never lost the balance and sanity of their mind nor did they shut their eyes to the superior spirituality of Hindu civilisation.

Abhinavagupta frequently uses *Tantric* terminology in his discussion on *Rasa* and it seems he must have the *Tantric* concept of *Bhava* at the back of his mind while formulating his theory of *Santa Rasa*. In the *Tantric* vocabulary, the mental states (*bhavas*) are placed under three main categories. These are known as 'the hero' (*vira*), 'the dark-witted animal of the herd' (*pasu*) and 'the god-like, luminous saint' (*divya*).⁸⁷ The first is possessed by the man who is self-contented and seldom thinks

86 Pandeya, K.C. *Comparative Aesthetics* Indian Aesthetics, p. 239.

87 Zimmer, Heinrich : *Philosophy of India* (London, 1951), p. 588.

of liberation. The second is possessed by the man who makes effort for liberation. He is also called 'a dignified animal' (*uttamapasu*). The third is possessed by the man who attains liberation. Abhinavagupta has the last ideal in mind when he thinks of *Santi* as the main attribute of soul. Again the concept of *Nirveda* is definitely alien to Richards. It is, in fact, alien to all western literary critics who touch barely the fringe of the realm of life's deeper philosophy. The concept of selfless service (*nishamakarma*) which denies the desire for the fruit of labour is likewise alien to the Europeans. Therefore, it is not surprising if Richards does not mean *Sama* by his synaesthesia.

The *Rasas* as described in *Rasa-sastra* have been subjected to various interpretations on the basis of modern psychology. Rakesh Gupta, for example, tries to justify that *Rasa* theory can be studied on the basis of the researches of modern psychology.⁸⁸ He meticulously applies western psychology to Bharata's theory of *Rasa* with a view to demonstrating that *Rasa* theory is in reality a psychological theory and *Rasas* and *Bhavas* are something like emotion, sentiment and instinct described by McDougall, and other psychologists. And since such a parallelism is impracticable, he tries to improve upon Bharata's theory of *Rasa* by pointing out its pitfalls and replacing the old classification of *Rasa*, *Bhava*, *Vibhava*, *Anubhava* and *Sancari-bhava* by a new one. He completely overlooks the fact that any attempt to find an equation between emotion, sentiment or feeling and *Rasa* is foredoomed to failure because *Rasa* is in essence a principle of beauty and truth. The concept of *Rasa* pre-supposes aesthetic experience and perception of beauty. As a matter of fact, *Bhava* cannot be identified with any classification of emotion made by modern psychology. Moreover, Richards is not interested, as the Sanskrit rhetoricians are, in describing the different kinds of emotions or moods but in the final and total poetic experience. The theory of *Rasa* lays down that everyone cannot be equally moved by an excellent and movable writing. A dull man looks at a beautiful thing and shows no reaction towards it while a man in whom the reflective intellect predominates thinks over it and composes a verse on it. A beautiful thing stuns the one and leaves the other cold and passive. The feelings of the reader are evoked according to his power of receptivity. The difference between Richards' views and those of the Indian rhetoricians on this point can be best illustrated by a comparison

88 Gupta, Rakesh : *Psychological Studies in Rasa*, pp. 160-69.

of the former's *Principles* with Bharata's *Natyasastra*. While, for Richards, emotion is nothing more than the readers', affective state of mind, Bharata characterises *Bhava* as that property of mind which evokes *Rasa*. In Indian aesthetics, stress has been laid on the maturing of *Bhava* leading to *Rasa*. Mere presence of *Bhava* is not enough. It is necessary that *Bhava* should lead to its proper goal i.e., revelation of *Rasa*. *Vibhavas* and *Anubhavas* have almost the same affinity which bridges stimulus and response. The eight *Sattvic-bhavas* described by Bharata may hardly be called *Bhavas* in the modern sense because they are no mental affections and all of them are physical conditions. *Rasa* theory clearly states that mere bodily change is no proof of an emotion being experienced. The outer experience of emotion is the subject-matter of either psychology or physiology. When emotion assumes the quality of poetic enjoyment and is related to the sense of beauty, it becomes the subject-matter of aesthetics and criticism.

CHAPTER 4

POETIC EXPERIENCE AND RASANUBHUTI

Some of the views of Richards on poetic experience have their close parallels in the Indian theory of *Rasa*, though, as it has been suggested, the Indian theory of *Rasa* is philosophy-oriented as contrasted with Richards' literary criticism which deliberately discards abstract metaphysics. Richards' critical tenet sets him apart from most of his predecessors and even from some of his contemporaries by reason of its novelty of thought and freshness of approach. As a critic, he is as much antithetical to Aristotle, Longinus, Kant and Croce as he is to Wordsworth, Matthew Arnold and Carlyle. He has no illusion about the literary critic ever getting at the ultimate truth in the sense a scientist arrives at certain truths verifiable in all circumstances. To study poetry as a product of the poet's mind containing his direct experiences is Richards' principal concern. His criticism demonstrates how necessary it is for a critic to understand the imperative need to cultivate an objective view of poetry. His critical treatises provide a guide line for understanding poetry, and poetic experience on purely psychological basis. In him, as Herbert Dingle puts it, "We find the thread of psychological language running everywhere parallel to that of direct statement of experience."¹ But, as it would appear, he says nothing about poetry or poetic experience which is impossible.

It is to the credit of Richards to tackle the problem of poetic experience in the most scientific and convincing manner. He begins with the basic assumption that artistic instinct is not *su/ generis* or one of its own kind. He finds the use of phrases like 'aesthetic intuition' or 'aesthetic state' quite unsatisfactory and unhappy.² He observes : "A few conjectures, a supply of admonitions, many acute isolated observations, some brilliant guesses, much oratory and applied poetry, inexhaustible confusion, a sufficiency of dogma, no small stock of prejudices, whimsies and crotchets, a profusion of mysticism, a little genuine speculation, sundry stray inspirations, pregnant hints and

1 Dingle, Herbert : *Science and Literary Criticism* (New York, 1949), p. 53.

2 Richards : *Principles*, pp. 14-15.

random aperçus; or such as these, it may be said without exaggeration, is extant critical theory composed."³ And then he quotes a few specimens from eminent critics like Aristotle, Longinus, Horace, Boileau, Dryden, Addison, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Carlyle, Matthew Arnold and some modern critics to show where they err and what leads them to the mystification and exaggeration of their concept of poetic experience. He goes on to say : "above them and below them, around and about them can be found other things of value, of service for the appreciation of particular poems and works of art; comment, elucidation, appraisal, much that is fit occupation, for the contemplative mind."⁴ He is convinced that "the modern student, surveying the field and noting the simplicity of the task attempted and fragment of the works achieved, may reasonably wonder what has been and is amiss."⁵ This state of critical uncertainty, which he calls "chaos of critical theories"⁶ ended in what he calls "the phantom of aesthetic state."⁷ "The phantom problem of the aesthetic mode or the aesthetic state", he observes, "is a legacy from the days of abstract investigation into the good, the Beautiful and the True."⁸ Richards states that in spite of all brilliant pronouncements made by the renowned critics, "the central question, what is the value of the arts, why are they worth the devotion of the keenest hours of the best minds, and what is their place in the system of human endeavours? is left almost untouched...."⁹ The problem remains "is there any such thing as aesthetic state or any aesthetic character of experience which is *sui generis*?"¹⁰ His *Principles and Practical Criticism* are brilliant essays dealing with poetic experience. There is a separate chapter on poetic experience in his *Science and Poetry*.¹¹ Everywhere he clearly states that poetic experience is in no way different from any other experience. Psychologically speaking, experience implies the play of nerves. So poetic experience

3 Ibid., p. 6.

4 Richards : *Principles*, p. 7.

5 Richards : *Principles*, p. 5.

6 Ibid., p. 5.

7 Ibid., p. 11

8 Ibid., pp. 11-12.

9 Ibid., p. 7

10 Ibid., p. 14

11 Richards : *Science and Poetry*, pp. 13-32.

cannot be esoteric because this is also a matter of nervous system. In *Principles*, he states "we have not pleasures, but experiences, of one kind or another, visual, auditory, organic, motor and so forth, which are pleasant. Similarly, we have experiences which are pleasant."¹² In *Practical Criticism*, Richards seems to be anxious to bridge the gulf between poetry and life. In the tone of a positivist, he defines poetry as a product of life's actual experiences. In his words, "For there is no gulf between poetry and life as over-literary persons some times suppose. There is no gap between our everyday emotional life and the material of poetry. The verbal expression of this life, at its finest, is forced to use the language of poetry."¹³ The experience of poetry is not different from any other experience and it is wrong to mystify this experience by associating it either with intuition or with divine grace. "Poetry translates into its special sensory language a great deal that is given in the ordinary daily intercourse between minds by gesture, tones of voice, and expression, and a reader who is very quick and discerning in these matters may fail for purely technical reason to apprehend the very same things when they are given in verse."¹⁴

He wonders why some people take poetry as a mysterious product when "it is not inevitable, or in the nature of things, that poetry should seem such a remote, mysterious, unmanageable thing to so large a majority of readers."¹⁵ Thus, according to Richards, poetic experience contains nothing 'mysterious', or 'other worldly' or 'frenzied' about it. Hence any discussion of poetry ought to be confined to what is visible, verifiable and demonstrable. He pleads that ordinary experience includes poetic experience and, therefore, a study of poetic experience must follow the laws that govern ordinary experience.

In *Science and Poetry*, Richards describes the function of mind during aesthetic experience. In his words, the mind is "a system of very delicately poised balances, a system which so long as we are in health is constantly growing. Every situation we come into disturbs some of these balances to some degree. The ways in which they swing back to a new equipoise are the

12 Richards : *Principles*, p 92.

13 Richards : *Practical Criticism*, p 319.

14 *Ibid*

15 *Ibid.*, p 309.

Impulses with which we respond to the situation. And the chief balances in the system are our chief interests."¹⁶ This means that Richards believes that poetic experience is directly concerned with balance of impulses. What he calls 'interest' is the consummation of aesthetic experience.

Here a pertinent question arises : where lies the difference between the reality of the material world and the reality of the world of poetry? Again, another related question is what is the nature of the mental equipoise that is aimed at by Richards? Richards explains that poetic experience "is more highly and more delicately organized than ordinary experiences of the street or of the hillside; it is fragile. Further, it is communicable."¹⁷ He further says : "the aesthetic experience may contain no unique constituent, and be of the usual stuff but with a special form."¹⁸ In fact, there is no qualitative difference between poetic experience and the ordinary experience of life.

Richards says that "the experiences with which criticism is concerned are exceptionally accessible, we have only to open the book, stand before the picture, have the music played, spread out the rug, pour out the wine, and the material upon which the critic works is presently before us."¹⁹ This is because "the artist is concerned with the record and perpetuation of the experiences, which seem to him most worth-having."²⁰ These statements go a long way to show that Richards believes in the peculiarity of poetic experience though he thinks that despite all peculiarities, it is appreciable and analysable. The poems give us concrete experiences. "The myth of a 'transmutation' or 'poetisation' of experience and that other myth of the 'contemplative' or 'aesthetic' attitude, are in part due to talking about poetry and the 'poetic' instead of thinking about the concrete experiences which are poems."²¹ According to Richards, poetry is concrete. So its experience is also communicable.

To any student of literary criticism, the echo of the theory of *Rasanubhuti* as contained in the Indian theory of *Rasa* may be

16 Richards : *Science and Poetry*, p. 20.

17 Richards : *Principles*, . 78.

18 Richards : *Principles*, p. 15.

19 Richards : *Principles*, p. 15.

20 *Ibid.*, p. 5.

21 *Ibid.*, p. 61.

heard in Richards' theory. The ideals of the Indian rhetoricians were roughly the same as stimulated Richards, though evidently their approaches and methodologies differ. Like Richards, the critics of *Rasa* school also hold that *Rasanubhuti* is a concrete experience and is communicable. It is a fact that the Indian critics are reluctant to appreciate anythetic system of Indian philosophy. Neither a new concept nor a new literary theory or critical principle could live in India for long, if it was completely alienated from the main channel of Indian thought. Indian poetics gives importance to only those ideas, which are in consonance with the Idealist view of life including Hindu faith in divinity, righteousness and supreme reality. But it does not mean that the Indian rhetoricians isolated the real experience of life while considering the excellence of poetry.

Right from the time of Bharata we get a clear, consistent and logical account of the process of poetic experience in the Indian theory of *Rasa*. The Sanskrit critics hold that poetry gives us pleasure, which is unique, subtle but appreciable, realisable and communicable. To some extent, it is on par with *Brahmananda* because it is altogether different in stuff from ordinary mundane pleasure. Poetic experience is basically an experience of imagination. Whether *Rasa* is manifested (*abhivyakta*) or produced (*Vyanjita*) it is certain that it is realised when it becomes *Sadharanikrta*, i.e., when it is brought home properly and communicated to the cultured reader. *Sadharanikarana*, is an active process of intrinsic perception through intense concentration. The Indian aestheticians use the term 'bliss' (*ananda*) or *Rasa* to denote the superior kind of poetic experience. But at the same time it would be a mistake to hold that it is beyond the reach of the sympathetic reader. Drawing analogy from *Paka Sastra*, Bharata observes that "as 'taste' results from a combination of various spices, vegetables and other articles, so the Dominant States (*sthayibhava*), when they come together with various other States (*bhavas*) attain the quality of the sentiment (i.e. become sentiment)."²² It needs to be mentioned here that Bharata never mean special pleasure by the word *Rasa*. By *Rasa*, he simply means "delectability" (*asvadyata*). His interpretation of *Rasa* is objective (*vastuvadi*). According to him, the ultimate aim of *Bhavas* is consummation (*siddhi*).²³ He

²² Ghosh : ii Bharata's *Natyasastra*, p. 105.

tells us that *Rasa* and *Bhava* lead to the *Siddhi* of *Rasa*. The aim of dramatic art is to attain this *Siddhi*. The spectator who wants to attain this *Siddhi* is required to exploit the resources of *Bhavas*, *Rasas* and *Abhinaya*. In his words, "when human character with all different states is represented with suitable gestures, it is called the drama."²⁴ *Siddhi* is of two kinds—Divine (*daivi*) and human (*manusi*). The former is eternal and everlasting while the later is short-lived. The *Daivi Siddhi* keeps the spectator in a state of perfect-bliss. It involves no physical disturbance. *Rasa*, *Bhava* and *Abhinaya* are the media through which *Daivi Siddhi* can be attained. At least the two interpreters of Bharata's aphorism on *Rasa* (*rasa-sutra*) namely, Bhatta Lollata and Sankuka take *Rasa* as an instrument for the fulfilment of divine pleasure. Therefore, they do not lay emphasis on its pleasurable quality. They ignore its dependence on the reader. But the two other interpreters of Bharata's *Rasa-sutra* namely Bhattanayaka and Abhinavagupta take *Rasa* as existing in the reader himself. Thus, they go one step ahead of their predecessors in explaining the manifestation of *Rasa*. They make *Rasa* the cherished goal of literary composition. Abhinavagupta was particularly keenly interested in giving a scientific explanation of poetic experience. He says : "It is *Rasa* which is called the fruit of result (*phala*) of darma."²⁵ Abhinavagupta further says "Poetry is like a tree, the acting of the characters is like flowers and the spectator's experience of pleasure is like the fruit."²⁶ Thus, Sanskrit critics do not commit the mistake of confusing poetic experience with ordinary daily experience which also precisely seems to be the spirit of Richards' statements concerning poetic experience. According to them, poetic experience is fundamentally different from ordinary experience because it has different ingredients and constituents. Abhinavagupta, however, gives a more detailed account of *Rasa* than Bharata adding to it some philosophical speculations according to his belief and creed. He says that *Rasa* is equivalent to and yet different from ordinary experience. It is equivalent to ordinary experience in the sense it can be relished. It is different from ordinary experience because it is unique and uncommon. In the most strict psychological sense, it may be said

23 Bharata : *Natyasastra*, 7/121.

24 Ghosh : tr. Bharata's *Natyasastra*, p. 509.

25 Abhinavagupta : *Abhinava-Bharati*, p. 267.

26 Ibid. p. 294.

to be concrete depending upon our sense perception, but it is possible only in an inspired and impassional moment. Poetic experience is incessant and undiluted. In the terminology of Indian poetics, poetic experience is *Akhandā* and *Saghana* meaning which does not allow any other element to creep in between.²⁷ Though it is accessible through the senses, it does not wholly depend upon senses. It is self-contained, absolute and self-sufficient, something like the pleasure derived from the communion with God (*brahmananda-sahodara*). It can be attained only when *Tamoguna* and *Rajoguna* are overpowered by *Sattvaguna*. At this stage, God Himself becomes *Rasa* (*raso'vaisah*). Knowledge of ultimate reality has for its brother artistic pleasure *Rasananda*. Abhinavagupta's system of poetic enjoyment is fully based on Bharat's aphorism on *Rasa*.

Abhinavagupta differentiates the relish of *Rasa* from the relish of food. The relish of food depends upon the sensitiveness of tongue whereas the relish of *Rasa* depends upon mental plate (*rasendriya*).²⁸ *Rasa* is, according to Abhinavagupta, neither wholly mundane experience (*laukika anubhuti*) nor wholly super mundane experience (*alaukika-anubhuti*). Poetic experience is characterized by uniqueness (*chamatkara*). *Chamatkara* is "aesthetic experience of tasting."²⁹ *Chamatkara* is inherent in poetic experience itself. It is sandwiched between the two - the worldly and the other worldly, the sensuous and the supersensuous, the ordinary and the extra-ordinary. Since it is not entirely worldly, it is called unique (*lokottara* or *camatkarapurna*). Abhinavagupta states that the implication of the word *Alaukika* is that it is with some special form i.e., *Aloka-samanya*.³⁰ *Aloka-samanya* is first used in Sanskrit poetics by Anandavardhana in his *Dhvanyaloka* (*aloka samanambhivakti paristurantam pratibhivisesam*) to characterize the extraordinary genius or creative imagination of poet. Visvanatha, following Abhinavagupta, regards *Rasanubhava* by the *sahridaya* also as *lokottara* or *Aloka-samanya* which just means what is not universal *Rasa*

27 Coomaraswamy, A.K. : The Transformation of Nature in Arts (Harvard, 1934), p. 209.

28 Abhinavagupta : Abhinava-Bharati, p. 290.

29 Gnoli, Raniero : The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta (Roma, 1956), p. 72.

30 Abhinavagupta : Abhinava-Bharati, p. 230.

svada is said to be unique experience which is unlike all other mundane joys as the one experienced by good news like *Putrastejatah*. This is what makes it akin to spiritual or mystic ecstasy. *Rasanubhuti* signifies that *Rasa* is to be experienced by a plate or *Rasana*.³¹ The Sanskrit critics use the word *Carvana* to denote the concrete form of *Rasa* and its experience.³²

Richards lays emphasis on the coordination and balancing of impulses for aesthetic experience. According to him, the experience of poetry is an impossibility without mental equipoise. Richards' views on poetic experience take him away from the Kantian and Crocian positions. The German philosopher-critic Kant holds that artistic experience is distinct from ordinary experience because it belongs to a different group of feeling. According to Kant, "though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience."³³ Croce represents the Italian variety of Idealism of which Hegel was the fountain head. In Hegelianism, there is no room for individuality. According to Hegel, the world is full of contradiction and the absolute mind is the supreme reality. But it expresses through the concrete reality. Croce is different from Hegel by reason of an emphasis on individuality and particularity. He believes in the independence of poetic experience. He holds that a work of art is true only insofar as it embodies the intuition of the artist. There is no poetry of things but only of impression of a sentiment or about things. In his words "Art is expression of impressions, not expression of expression."³⁴ The knowledge we acquire by intuition is the knowledge we acquire by imagination. Logical knowledge is based on intellect. Intuition is the direct knowledge of reality. "Intuitive knowledge is expressive knowledge"³⁵ because "to intuit is to express."³⁶ Croce's theory that intuition is expression sounds a strange doctrine in this age of science. Similarly, the Kantian doctrine that artistic experience is inexplicable because it belongs to a different group of feelings is questionable. These theories appear contrary to the plainest

31 samanya here means 'universal' as used in philosophy.. p. 261.

32 Abhinavagupta : *Dhavanvalokalocana*, p. 164.

33 Kant, *Immanuel* : *Critique of Pure Reason*, tr. Norman Kemp Smith (Macmillan, London, 1963), p. 41.

34 Croce : *Aesthetic* tr. Douglas Ainslie, p. 13.

35 *Ibid.*, p. 11.

36 *Ibid.*

teaching of experience. It is absurd to say that we have the experience of art too deep for word and also there are men of great creative genius like Dante, Shakespeare, and Kalidasa who have not only had inspiration, but who have also had the natural or acquired gift to express their inspiration. Richards breaks away from the conventional view that poetic inspiration cannot be adequately clothed in words. In this respect, he differs both from Kant and Croce by reason of his dependence on actual sensory experience even for explaining poetic experience.

In his *Principles*, he quotes a score of writers who consider poetic experience as belonging to a different category. A.C. Bradley believes in the absolute independence of artistic experience and maintains that of all the forms of human expression, poetry is the most natural and direct and our heart always responds to it in moment of exaltation. In his words, "For its nature is to be not a part, not yet a copy, of the real world, but to be a world by itself, independent, complete, autonomous; and to possess it fully you must enter that world, conform to its laws, and ignore for the time the belief, aims, and particular conditions which belong to you in the other world of reality."³⁷ In his view "there floats an atmosphere of infinite suggestion"³⁸ about the best of poetry. The experience of poetry cannot be expressed in words. No sequence of word can do so. Poetry, according to Bradley, "is a spirit. It comes we know not whence. It will not speak at our bidding, nor answer in our language. It is not our servant; it is our master."³⁹ Clive Bell is another art-critic, who is severely criticized by Richards. Clive Bell believes in a strange artistic instinct which gives strange artistic experience. In his words : "the starting point for all system of aesthetics is the personal experience of a particular emotion. The objects that provoke this emotion we call works of art."⁴⁰ Clive Bell says that there is a peculiar kind of emotion provoked by words of visual art, and that sculpture, buildings, pots, carvings. All subjects of aesthetics, therefore, must be based on personal experience. In other words, aesthetic experience must be subjective. To appreciate a work of art we need bring with us nothing from life, no knowledge of its ideas and affairs, no familiarity with its

37 Bradley, A.C. : Oxford Lectures on Poetry (London, 1950), p. 5.

38 Ibid., p. 26.

39 Ibid., p. 27.

40 Bell, Clive : Art (Chotto & Windus, 1940), p. 1.

emotion. Richards finds obvious discrepancies in these statements because they all base their findings on philosophy or metaphysics or mysticism. The philosophical approach to artistic experience is also found in the writings of St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas and Tolstoy. Richards, however, gives a different explanation of poetic experience. According to him, poetic experience depends upon the play of our interests and impulses. He defines mind as a nervous system. He admits that "the mind is a nervous system, or rather a part of its activity, has long been evident...with every advance of neurology...the evidence becomes, more over-whelming."⁴¹

Positive sciences like psychology or neurology do not believe in any unique constituent of pleasure. For these sciences, every pleasure is an experience and experience is a matter of sense-data. Whatever might be the nature or category of experience, it is analysable. Since pleasure is a physical phenomenon, it is also communicable. Richards states that the immediate object of poetry is the communication of pleasure. But he denies any special kind of pleasure, which poetry might afford. The pleasure of poetry is always presented in unison with truth, a unison which cannot be found in the pursuit of ordinary pleasure. Again there is ambiguity in the use of the term "pleasure" and then also in his chief phrase "experience". In spite of all psychological bearing, they are misleading when they are used in the context of art and poetry. Moreover, Richards shows no interest in explaining how poetic experience is made of a different stuff. Pleasure is a wide and abstract term and cannot be properly explained by psychological theories. Though Richards repeatedly states that the intensity of poetic experience and its quality depend upon harmonization of impulses, he does not elaborate this theory nor does he give an idea of the mental state during aesthetic experience.

Richards falls into the same kind of error into which Eliot falls when the latter says that "poetry is a superior amusement."⁴² Scott James also admits that "the pleasure derived from a work of art is its own intrinsic pleasure and none others."⁴³ All these writers join the fold of Richards in not clearly stating the superior

41 Richards : Principles, p. 83.

42 Eliot : The Sacred Wood (London, 1957), p. VIII.

43 James, R. A. Scott : The Making of Literature, p. 227.

nature of poetic experience. They are simply content with saying that poetic experience is something higher than and superior to ordinary experience because it receives inspiration from a different source.

The only critic who dwells at large on this subject is Coleridge who propounds the theory of suspension of disbelief. The disbelief based on insincerity cannot be suspended because suspension of disbelief can be voluntary only when the reader is convinced that the poet has really felt what he has expressed.

The critics of *Rasa* school, unlike Richards, clearly and categorically state what makes poetic experience superb. Of all the critics belonging to the *Rasa* school, Abhinavagupta has done pioneering work in this field. His theory of poetic experience is tinged with philosophy, yet his philosophical speculations do not obscure his thinking. At this point, an account of *Kasmira Saivism*, under whose influence Abhinavagupta propounded his theory of *Poetic Anubhuti* seems essential.⁴⁴ Kasmira had a stronghold of *Tantric Saivism*. *Pratyabhijna* or *Trika* or *Kasmira Saivism* is the representative of the Northern *Saivism*. *Kasmira Saivism* had three distinct branches called *Pratyabhijna Darsana*, *Krama Darasana* and *Kaul Darsana*. *Pratyabhijna* literally means knowing or recognition. This cult believed in Siva as pure consciousness. When Siva lives the life of *Advaita*, he is confined to his own self. This is the state of Siva's eternal and infinite 'I am'. He is the only reality. Here there is complete lack of self-awareness. He is infinite consciousness and absolute independence. It is a state in which Siva and Sakti, intermingle and there is no duality in Siva. This is a state of *Samarasata* or *Anviti* of primal forces. At this stage, *Mana*, *Krama* and *Jnana* do not exist apart from and independent of each other. Apart from Siva, the world is not; different from Siva, the soul is not. This pure 'I' in Siva seeks for a relation with Sakti who helps his manifestation. When the role of Sakti begins, Siva feels self-awareness and is then filled with *Asami-tatva*. Siva is being, Sakti is becoming.

The *Karma* system, however, puts all its emphasis on the absolute supremacy of Sakti. Sakti is at once the efficient cause

44 See J.C. Chatterjee's *Kasmira Saivism* (Patna, 1978), p. 17, 40. Also see Ksemaraja's *Pratyabhi Jnahrdayam*, tr. Jaideva Singh (Motilal Banarasidas, Patna, 1977), pp. 45-48.

(*nimittakarana*) and the material cause (*upadanakarana*) of this world. She is variously designated as *Para*, *Parma*, *Citti*, *Mahacitti*, *Paravak*, *Khecari*, *Pratibha*, *Sakti*, *Kauliki Sakti*, *Svacchanda Sakti*, *Pasyanti*, etc. She is said to behold the truth direct. She is also said to be the supreme sound. The world is not an illusion but a reality—a transformation of Sakti herself who permeates this world and yet transcends it (*citti savadhinbhuta svatma sakti*). Through the five important aspects of Sakti known as *Chit Ananda*, *Ichcha*, *Jnana* and *Kriya* emerge Siva, Sakti, Sadasiva, Isvara and Suddhavidya the five transcendental *Tattvas*. That force of Sakti which enables the infinite to appear as finites Purusa is the sixth *Maya-tattva*. It gives rise to the five *Kancukas*—power (*Kala*), knowledge (*vidya*), attachment (*raga*), time (*Kala*) and space (*niyati*). A love-sick damsel is not supposed to get joy even in the company of her lover unless she recognizes him. It is only the dawning of recognition that gives her mirth and joy, this is the implication of the famous Mantra *Tat Tvam Asi*. Recognition breaks all shackles. The liberated soul becomes one with Siva and enjoys everlasting mystic bliss of oneness with the Lord. *Jivanamukti* is admitted.

The two extremes of *Pratyabhijna* and *Krama* systems are reconciled in *Kaul Saivadvaita* which lays down that though Siva and Sakti are separate, they are ultimately one and the same force. But, this assumption, it may be urged, may seem an absurdity. It is impossible for Siva or pura-consciousness not to be aware of his own self. But this assumption is not as ridiculous as it sounds. Unconscious and yet conscious—this proves that in reality Siva and Sakti are co-mingled. The co-mingling of Siva and Sakti is personified in *Ardhanarisvara*. This state is called a state of *Anuttara* in *Kaul Saivism*. It puts all its emphasis on the harmony that exists between Siva and Sakti, in feeling and in action, which also characterizes the fundamental unity of creation. *Kula* means Sakti or *Kundalini* and *Akula* means Siva. He alone is a *Kaul* who succeeds in uniting sakti with Siva. This is a state of pure bliss, a meeting of kindred points. Abhinavagupta holds that this eternal bliss can be achieved only by the Yogi—a seeker after union with God. But this can be achieved, at least for some time, by the reader of poetry also, when he is at-one-with-God. Visvanatha, who thinks almost on the same lines says that *Rasa* enkindles inextinguishable light in the reader

and gives him joy which is ceaseless and all pervading.⁴⁵ Abhinavagupta's *Paramarthasara*, *Pratyabhijna Vimarsini* and *Tantraloka* are the important works on this system.

Abhinavagupta holds that it is the blissful soul which is experienced in the forms of *Rasa*.⁴⁶ He holds that all *Rasas* are equally joyful. But there is one *Rasa* which may be called the basis of all *Rasas*. This *Paramarasa* or *Maharasa* is like the first sound of the universe (*sphota*).⁴⁷ Besides this, the nature of other *Rasas* is qualified by the adjective *Sukha* while the nature of *Maharasa* is qualified by the adjective *Ananda*. Obviously, by *Maharasa*, Abhinavagupta means *Santa Rasa* which according to him is the primordial *Rasa*.

The difference between Richards' approach and that of Abhinavagupta is now clear. Richards believes that howsoever trained and refined the reader may be, he must suffer from all those frailties from which man in general suffers. Psychology has proved that the mental life of man is the most disturbed area and man has to wrestle with hostile forces in order to live. Receiving poetic experience means extracing something useful from an alien arrangement of things. But in India, the point of view is different. The Indian critics lay all their emphasis on the harmony and coherence that exists between the individual and universal, the finite and the infinite, the soul and God. This hankering after unity and harmony is not only an idle philosophy in India; it is the life's policy and the cherished mission of the Indians to attain this unity in practical life as well as in poetic creation. Where Richards does not go beyond the unity of some discordant impulses, the Indian critics lead us to the world profounder than that of science and make us aware of the inner perspective and cosmic experience and deeper roots of beauty and truth. In India, the poets are called seers (*Kavir manisi parbhu svayambhu*) only because they live in perfect harmony with man and nature and hence in quiet union with God.

The theorists of *Rasa* school believe that poetic pleasure is on a par with spiritual bliss because the joy of the poet is perennial, *Amrtam*. Though Abhinavagupta is a *Saivadvaitvadi*, he is greatly influenced by the *Abhasavada* of Utpalacarya. This

45 svanatha : *Sahitya Darpana*, 3/2, 3, p. 105.

46 Abhinavagupta : *Abhinava-Bharati*, p. 292.

47 Ibid.

cult, though it is slightly different from the *Advaitavadi* philosophy of *Vadanta*, is deeply coloured with *Vadantic* philosophy. It conceives *Madhesvara* as the ultimate reality, an energy which is indivisible and at the centre of three-fold activities i.e., self-enlightenment (*atma-prakasa*), self-knowledge (*atma-jnana*) and self-urge (*atmecccha*). According to this philosophy, the souls are the shadows (*abhasa*) of the great power. But they are incapable of experiencing the divine pleasure because they are enchained in three *Gunas* – *Sattva*, *Raja* and *Tama*. There are five main ties which stiffen and pollute the purity of soul. They are *Kala*, *Vidya*, *Raja*, *Niyati*, and *Kala*. When the soul breaks these shackles, it rises to the level of *Siva* and looks back at its own original and pure form and our form and experiences unhindered pleasure. This pleasure is the outcome of self-realization.

In Hindu philosophy, the soul is said to exist quite apart from body. It is also immortal. Therefore, the simple meaning of *Atmananda* is to pass beyond carnal pleasure and enter the realm of eternal bliss where there is no shadow of worldly anguish and pain. It is in this sense that poetic experience is considered a marvel (*camatkara*) in *Rasa* theory. Poetic pleasure becomes spiritual bliss.

Much of the confusion with regard to Richards' theory of poetic experience results from the odd selection of his illustrations. Another difficulty with him is that he sometimes gives a too mechanical explanation of the problem relating to poetry and art. The difficulty is enhanced when his versions are taken literally. It is unjust to discard Richards' theory of poetic experience as Eliot unfortunately does⁴⁸, because it is unjust to depend upon the literal meaning of what he says. In *Practical Criticism*, Richards observes, "Poetry which has no other very remarkable quality, may sometimes take very high rank simply because the poet's attitude to the listener - in view of what he has to say - is so perfect."⁴⁹ He assigns a high rank to poetry because the meaning of poetry does not lie in the meaning of words but in the totality of various kinds of impressions it evokes. This is why poetry has no obvious utility. Richards observes that "imaginative life is its own justification."⁵⁰ He gives great weight to the

48 Eliot : *The Use of Poetry*. 17.

49 Richards : *Practical Criticism*, p. 206.

50 Richards : *Science and Poetry*, p. 73.

imaginative aspect of poetry. In Coleridge *On Imagination*, he agrees to Coleridge's theory of 'Sense of Musical Delight' which, as he says, depends upon "totality of meaning."⁵¹ In *Principles*, he gives a detailed account of the availability of the poet's experience. He says that "Availability, not mere possession"⁵² is what is essential. He also describes the rivalry in the domain of impulses and asks the poet to make a search as to their unity and control.⁵³ In *Science and Poetry*, he states clearly that for poetic experience "a passionate knowledge of poetry and a capacity for dispassionate psychological analysis are required."⁵⁴ In all these statements, he seems to be conscious of the specific function of poetry. His views on poetic truth or poetic belief are thought-provoking. He distinguishes emotional truth from scientific truth. He says that the difference between the "emotive beliefs and scientific beliefs is not one of degree but of kind."⁵⁵ It is easy to find a correspondence between Richards' concept of emotional belief and Sanskrit critics' concept of *Kavyagata Staya*. It is not only the hard fact that is to be relied upon but also the thing existing in imagination that has reality. Tennyson has said 'Poetry is truer than fact' If it be not so, one cannot enjoy or even understand the Satan of Milton's *Paradise Lost* or *Alaka* of Kalidasa's *Meghaduta*. In the same manner Cordelia, Perdita, Miranda, Radha, Sakuntala, Sita, Kadambari are the possessions of our *Rasa Loka*. Poetry does not only present the things as they are. What is apparent and explicit in this world becomes imaginative and emotive in poetry.

Poetry is produced when the heart of the poet is united with nature. But between the poet's heart and nature, there is the third intermediary power called imagination. Imagination is that integrative power which not only embodies what is present and visible but also what is probable, even impossible. In fact, truth is not limited to what we see with our naked eyes. It transcends the visible and the real. It may also enter the region of ideas. There are many aspects of our life which cannot be seen in the material sense. Man is more than an aggregate of sense organs or a

51 Richards : Coleridge on Imagination, p. 120.

52 Richards : Coleridge on Imagination, p. 120.

53 Ibid., p. 182.

54 Richards : Science and Poetry, p. 15.

55 Richards : Principles, p. 278.

number of separate sensations and emotions brought together into mass or group. Therefore, it is wrong to take life as perfect in its outer manifestations. Man is man in his unlimited feelings, aspirations, emotions and attitudes. Therefore, in order to have a full view of human life, it is necessary to consider his outer as well as inner content. The emotional truth is in no way inferior to the material or scientific truth. The truth of poetry or what Richards calls 'poetic belief' is not short-lived like the 'scientific belief'. One 'scientific belief' is superseded by another scientific belief in course of time. It is a thing of common observation that many scientific theories have been traversed, refuted and replaced by new scientific theories and there is no guarantee that the new scientific theories will stand for ever. The theorists of *Rasa* school, like Richards, hold that the human world is finite whereas the poetic world or *Rasa Loka* is infinite. The poet is a dweller of *Rasa Loka*. From there, he collects materials for his poetry. This is why what he says cannot always conform to the rules of logic or the theories of science. His truth is the truth of imagination. It is basically different from the truth obtained from the minute observation of the scientist or dry speculation of the philosopher. This truth is attained by concentration or *Dhyana*. The poet looks at the truth enshrined in beauty. Poetry is truth and not fact. Truth and fact are two distinct things. Only the heart of man can respond to the emotional truth and can give an impression of *Satya-jagata*. The poetic truth cannot be arrived at by intellectual exercise. Fact may stimulate poetry. But fact is not all. It cannot be the essence of poetry. Therefore, in Indian *Vangamaya*, truth is said to take two different shapes, poetry and *Sastra*. In *Sastra* one gets factual information useful for life. This is called *Preya* which gives worldly pleasure. In poetry, there is a synthesis of both *Preya* and *Sreya* i.e., the highest other-worldly achievement. Only crude truth is the subject-matter of science or philosophy. Only *Siva* is the subject of religion. Only *Sundaram* is the subject of *Kala*. The aim of science is to explore stark truth which is changeable. *Siva* is secondary to it. *Sundaram* is negligible, even repugnant to it. Religion projects *Sivam* on *Sundaram*. On the path of beauty, *Satya* is transformed into *Siva*. This truth, when mingled with *Bhavana* and *Kalpna* in the poetic world, assumes the form of *Sundaram*. Therefore, in Indian poetics, *Kavya* is

called a eternal combination of *Satyam*, *Shivam* and *Sundaram*.

Richards has something useful to say regarding the nature of poetry and the accomplishments of the poet. According to him "the emotional dishonesty is an evil which is the more dangerous, the more it is hedged about with emotional sanction."⁵⁶ He admits that the main business of poetry is to "give order and coherence, and so freedom to a body of experience."⁵⁷ Giving great importance to emotion in words, he observes, "the experience itself, the tide of impulses sweeping through the mind is the source and sanction of the words."⁵⁸ In the chapter entitled 'Poetic Experience' in *Science and Poetry* he quotes the following line from W.B. Yeats' famous poem 'The Tower'.⁵⁹

How can we know the dancer from the dance?

Obviously, the 'poem' is the dance and the poet the dancer. One must look closely at the poem in order to know what it is about and how much valuable experience it contains.

Richards admits that "both a passionate knowledge of poetry and a capacity of dispassionate psychological analysis are required, if it is to be satisfactorily prosecuted."⁶⁰

Poetic experience always means the experience of the reader. An imagination literature must have sufficient power to evoke the emotion of the reader. This is what Richards means by the emotional content in literature. By the phrase emotional element in literature, he means the power of literature to evoke emotion in those who read it.

Here, a question crops up whether any and every reader can have the experience of poetry. Richards' reply is in the negative. He prescribes certain conditions for an ideal reader. Leavis says that "an ideal critic is an ideal reader."⁶¹ In the same tone, Richards also says that the recipient must possess all the qualities of a good critic. He must have "discrimination, suggestibility, free and clear resuscitation of elements of past experience disentangled from one another, and control of irrelevant personal details and accidents."⁶² Similarly the speaker

56 Richards : *Principles*, p. 287.

57 Richards : *Science and Poetry*, p. 61.

58 *Ibid.*, p. 31.

59 *Ibid.*, 13.

60 *Ibid.*, 15.

61 Leavis, F.R. : *The Common Pursuit* (Penguin, 1962), p. 212.

or the active communicator should have the power to use "past similarities in experience and the control of these elements through the dependence of their effects upon one another."⁶³ One who has passionate knowledge of poetry must acquire valuable experience. But what is more essential is the detachment or the dis-interestedness of the reader. This aim cannot be achieved unless the reader's sympathy is enlarged. In Richards' words, "to respond, not through one narrow channel of interest, but simultaneously and coherently through many, is to be disinterested."⁶⁴ In *Science and Poetry*, he observes, "it is never what a poem says which matters, but what is is. The poet is not writing as a scientist. He uses these words because the interests whose movement is the growth of the poem combine to bring them, just in this form, into his consciousness as a means of ordering, controlling and consolidating the uttered experience of which they are themselves a main part."⁶⁵ In these statements, there is a tendency to differentiate poetry from other discourses. There is also the tendency to distinguish poetic experience from other experiences. Keeping in view this fact and commenting on Richards' theory of poetic experience, Eliot says that poetic experience is so dense and intense that it is "partially translatable in words."⁶⁶

Richards thinks that the question How true : while reading Shakespeare is to misuse his work and to waste time.⁶⁷ It is useless to go to the poet for scientific accuracy of his utterance. It is always fruitful to go to him to share his poetic experience. And the quality of poetic experience, though somewhat superior to the ordinary experience, is not an unattainable quality. For once, we suppose, that poetic experience is distant from the ordinary experience of life, its natural corollary would be that poetry does not reflect life nor there is any necessary connection between life and poetry. But as we know, Richards does not belong to art for art's sake school. He believes that poetry and life are closely related to each other. His theory of value is the direct

62 Richards : Principles, p. 180.

63 Ibid.

64 Richards : Principles P. 251.

65 RICHARDS : SCIENCE AND POETRY, P. 31

66 Eliot : The Use of Poetry, p. 17.

67 richards : Principles. p. 273.

outcome of actual experiences in real life.

The only limitation of Richards is that his thoughts do not travel beyond the functioning of some nerves and muscles described in physiology and neurology. His method does more justice to the unity of mental process than to the inner content and enjoyment of poetry. The anatomy of mind done by him is no doubt interesting and illuminating. But it ignores the philosophical aspect of experience which is the concern of the critics of *Rasa* school. It is not easy to understand mind. "Human brain", in the words of Charles Sherrington, "is a great unravelled knot and the master tissue of the human body."⁶⁸ Therefore, its study is the most challenging of human sciences. The method of psychology can be applied to aesthetics with certain reservations. Aesthetics can manage to exploit its experiences in its own terminology. The critics of *Rasa* school strike a balance between the physical and the mental, the concrete and the abstract, the apparent and the concealed. The theory of *Rasa* is true to the kindred points of heaven and home. It follows inevitably from the central vision of life which reveals the poetic world as the projection of an enlightened mind which makes it dazzling in its brilliance. The Indian *Rasa* theory is inspired by spiritual idealism and proceeds on spiritual principle and proposes to itself a higher aim. For the critics of *Rasa* school, poetry is something more philosophic and of graver import than other literary disciplines. The reader perceives the uniqueness of poetic experience with his mind's eye and realizes poetic beauty in the depths of his being. What is called *Rasana* or *Asvadana* by the Indian critics is nothing but the experience of poetry. Poetic experience is distinguished in *Rasa* theory from what may be called its logical opposite, the ordinary experience. Though *Rasa* theory does not give an elaborate account of the neural system of mind, as Richards does, it gives a clear picture of the mental state when a piece of poem is enjoyed. Richards asserts that "in time psychology will overhaul most of our ideas about ourselves, and will give us a very detailed account of our mental activities."⁶⁹ If the Indian view of the mysteriousness of mind is accepted, Richards' aforesaid assertion bears doubtful validity.

Richards uses the word 'synthesis' for the mental poise

⁶⁸ Ruch, Ployd L. . *Psychology and Life* (Bombay, 1970), p. 53.

⁶⁹ Richards : *Practical Criticism*, p. 323.

necessary for poetic experience. In Indian terms, we may say that the reader gets *Rasandra* at the moment he perceives beauty. *Saundaryabodha* depends upon the equipment and the poetic sensibility of the reader. His ear must be fully on the alert to listen to the 'unheard melodies' which are sweeter than the heard ones. For this, tranquility of mind is essential. Besides this, the reader must be an adept in the art of poetic appreciation. All these and many other factors combine to entitle the reader to enjoy poetry and receive its experience. *Rasa* is an aesthetic principle which describes pleasure generated from a work of art, distinct from the various emotions that combine to the final effect. This can, to some extent, be related to Richards' theory of "synthesis" meaning the mood of aesthetic pleasure.

In *Rasa* doctrine, relish (*asvada*) is distinguished from poetic relish (*rasasvada*). In ordinary relish, the reader simply grasps the feelings, ideas, emotions and imagination of the poet as they are presented to him. His heart may not favourably respond to them. There may be a case, when he is unable to agree to the poet's view and appreciate his poetry. But in poetic relish, the reader derives pleasure through the process of *Sadharanikarana* i.e., transpersonalization. He enters the consciousness of the poet and derives the same pleasure which is felt by the poet. In short, the sentiment of the poet is enjoyed by the reader because the reader shares the sentiment of the poet. Only an agreeable taste or relish can give pleasure. On the level of poetic enjoyment everything becomes favourable to the reader. Madhusudan Sarasvati calls "the mundane experience as fragmentary (*khandā*) and insignificant (*ksudra*) like that of the momentary spark of a glow-worm and poetic relish as the fully matured relish (*paripurna rasa*) of Divine like the luminous sun."⁷⁰ Abhinavagupta is of the opinion that as poetic experience does not fall within the province of gross worldly activities, it cannot be defined in words. It is purely mental because it is the delight of the soul (*atman*). Appreciation of poetry means the appreciation of its beauty (*carutva pratiti*).⁷¹ This beauty or *Carutva* is of a different class (*visesa jati*). It cannot be proved or explained by any worldly example. Self experience (*svanubhava*) is its only testimony.⁷²

70 Madhusudan Sarasvati - *Bhakti-Rasayana*, 2/77

71 Abhinavagupta - *Dhavanyaloka-Locana*, p. 104.

72 Abhinavagupta : *Abhinava-Bharati*, p. 279.

Uptil now, we have discussed the nature of poetic experience according to Richards and the critics of *Rasa* school. We have seen that both in the West and the East, poetic experience has been considered as of a different stuff. The view that poetic experience is like ordinary pleasure is inadmissible to both of them. Richards tells this in a rather roundabout manner. But the Indian critics are quite vocal on this point. Another related and more important question is how this experience or pleasure is obtained by the reader. From the very face of this question, it is clear that it involves a psychological process. This question has been considered by Richards in his own way in his *Principles*, particularly in the chapter on "Pleasure".⁷³ The critics of *Rasa* school discuss it in the context of *Rasa-nispatti*.

Richards begins with the description of the conscious characteristics of impulses and states that they include 'sensation, imagery, feeling, emotion together with pleasure, unpleasure and pain.'⁷⁴ What is pleasure and how it is received by the reader is a question which is directly concerned with psychology. Feeling of pleasure and unpleasure is quite distinct from sensation. It does not demand an external stimulus. In Richards' words, "Tone, volume, and intensity are features in the sound closely dependent upon the stimulus, pleasantness is dependent not on external stimulus but upon factors, very obscure at present, in us."⁷⁵ An object which gives pleasure at a time may cease to give pleasure at another time in a changed circumstance. "A sound which is pleasant for a while may become very unpleasant if it continues and does not lapse from consciousness."⁷⁶ Yet the sensation of sound must have its effect. Even in the changed circumstance, the sensation "may remain a qua sensation."⁷⁷ "The sound sensation may remain unchanged in tone, volume and intensity yet vary widely in pleasure-unpleasure."⁷⁸ The stimulus, which forms an emotion brings about change all over the body. "The whole body resounds in what would seem to be a fairly systematic way."⁷⁹

73 Richards : *Principles*, pp. 92-102.

74 Ibid., p. 92.

75 Richards : *Principles*, p. 94.

76 Richards : *Principles*, p. 94.

77 Ibid., p. 94.

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid.

Whether this immediate effect of bodily disturbance also 'gives a tone to consciousness' is a question about which nothing can be said with certainty. The obvious and coarser manifestation of the effect of stimulus can be found, in Richards words, in the forms of "a lump in the throat, a yearning of the bowels, horripilation, breathlessness."⁸⁰ These organic disturbances "fuse with the whole mass of internal sensations to form the coenesthesia, the whole bodily consciousness."⁸¹ It has not yet been decided whether pleasure-unpleasure is a quality of organic consciousness or whether it is something quite different from it. Experience shows that it is "not a quality of our auditory sensation in the sense in which its loudness, for instance, is a quality."⁸² Sensory qualities are characters of the impulse at a certain stage. Pleasure, thus, becomes an effect signifying that a certain cherishable object has been attained and the will is satisfied. In Richards' words, "Pleasure ensues in most cases when this goal is reached."⁸³

So far as the question of the reading of a poem is concerned, the same principle of experience and pleasure holds good. Pleasure is the natural outcome of a sincere labour and if a poem is read carefully, it must give the desired result. A reader who takes care of reading the poem successfully must get pleasure from it. Hence, he is always interested in the poem, its verbal and rhythmical effects, its imagery, symbol, cadence, and musical effect. The objects which give pleasure to the poet at the moment of poetic composition, must create the same pleasure in the reader if the emotion is properly conveyed to him through various devices of the poem. But the pleasure thus got should not be the chief aim of the reader. His main concern is the poem which gives pleasure. The poem is not read for the sake of pleasure but for the sake of exploring organic beauty which lies not in its component parts but in its totality of meaning. Pleasure comes to the reader as a natural consequence of reading. Seeking pleasure while reading poetry amounts to putting the cart before the horse. The object of the reader is to read the poem from all possible angles and pleasure automatically follows his critical pursuit. Pleasure may be useful for the reader but the reading of the poem is more

⁸⁰ Ibid, p. 95.

⁸¹ Ibid

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

useful than any other activity. Richards says that "the noise made by a motor-cycle - useful though it is as an indication of the way the machine is running - is the reason in the normal case for its having been started."⁸⁴

By way of explaining the process in which the pleasure is derived from poetry, Richards states that poetic pleasure is in fact rooted in poetry itself. The poetic activity can well justify how far the poetic product is efficacious. If the delight of the poet is intense at the time of creation and if the poet is faithful in his expression, he is bound to succeed in creating the same intensity of delight in his readers.

Richards, however, does not elaborate his theory of poetic experience to show the different channels through which the pleasure of the poet passes on to the reader. This task has been accomplished by the critics of *Rasa* school.

How *Bhavas* are felt and experienced was not explained by Bharata which task was accomplished by the four critics who were born after Bharata. They interpret Bharata's aphorism on *Rasa* (*rasa-sutra*) from their own points of view. Bhatta Lollata insists on the production of *Rasa* as a consequence of the assimilation of poetry (*kavya*), primary cause (*karana*) and ancillary cause (*sahakari karana*). According to him *Sanyoga*, coming in Bharata's *Sutra*, indicates three-fold connections. It means the connections between the produced and the producer (*utpada-utpada*); the accessible and that makes accessible (*gamy-gamaka*) and the fostered and the fosterer (*posya-posaka*). *Abhivyakti* has also three meanings - production (*utpatti*), manifestation (*abhivyakti*) and nourishment (*pusti*). The *Vibhavas* produce *Rasa* through the connection of produced and producer, the *Anubhavas* manifest *Rasa* through the connection of accessible and that makes accessible and the *Vhavicari-bhavas* nourish *Rasa* through the connection of the fostered and the fosterer. According to Lollata, the *Samajika* is disillusioned by the skilful role of the actors playing on the stage and so he takes them as original characters which gives him joy.

Giving logician's account based on inference, Sankuka holds that *Rasa* is produced because the spectator, at least so long he witnesses the show, takes the actor and actress as the original ones. This imposition of characters on the actors on the

stage enables him to draw an inference (*ahumana*) that the actors are Rama, Dusyanta, etc. This is an illusion of reality. This is possible because of successful imitation. For him, the meaning of *Sanyoga* is *Anumanya-Anumapaka* relationship. The *Citra-turaganyaya* by which a painted horse is taken to be a real horse is quoted by him in support of his argument. Sankuka's concept of inference came to be challenged by some critics of *Dhvani* school. Mammata, for example, argues that Sankuka's theory of inference is rendered invalid as direct experience is the right process of relish and not the indirect. We cannot enjoy *Rasa* if we get it second hand.

Bhattanayaka postulates a more systematic theory of poetic experience than the two critics mentioned above. He says that there are three stages through which a word has to pass in order to become *Rasa*. These three stages are *Abhidha*, *Bhavana* and *Bhoga*. *Abhidha* is the literal meaning of the poem. *Bhavana* means investigation (*anusandhana*). This enables the reader to ponder over the meaning of the poem again and again. The meaning of the poem is not derived on the basis of literal meaning but on the basis of association of ideas, hints, and implications. At this stage, the personal *Sthayi Bhavas* of the poet become impersonal losing their personal characteristics. They become general (*samanya*) and so fit to be relished by everybody. This *Vyapara* or *Bhavana* is called *Vibhavana Vyapara*. Through this, the ideas of the poet are generalized. The process through which the ideas of the poet are generalized is technically called *Sadharanikarana* by Lollata. Lollata shows how through a process of *Sadharanikarana*, *Rasa* is experienced by the spectator (*samajika*). He argues that art has a unique quality to purify our heart. This purification of heart is attained by the purgation of the quality of passion (*rajoguna*) and the quality of ignorance (*tamoguna*), which alone can lead us to the supremacy of the 'quality of brightness' (*sattvaguna*). By the quality of brightness, he means the 'quality of knowledge'. The abandonment of personality enables the spectator to enter the consciousness of the poet. At the time of poetic experience, the reader rises above his personality. His heart rings in tune with the heart of the world. This mental elevation gives him pleasure. When the word *Bhoga* is used in the context of *Rasa*, this should

not be taken in its literal sense. *Bhoga* means the knowledge of pleasure, in the form of effulgent radiance, produced by *Sattvaguna*. Through *Bhoga*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* are subdued giving way to *Sahvaguna*. This gives pleasure to the reader.

Abhinavagupta, the fourth Interpreter of Bharata's aphorism on *Rasa*, who has great regard for Bhattanayaka, points out that the Dominant States (*sthayi bhavas*) like love (*rafi*), terror (*bhaya*) are innate, and they permanently dwell in the heart of man in the form of *Sanskara*. They are manifested (*abhivyakata*) and not produced (*utpanna*). They are manifested when proper conditions prevail. This is to say, they are fertilized when Determinants (*vibhavas*) become instrumental and by communicative process make *Rasa* suitable for revelation and realization.

Rasa is realized by the statement of *Vibhavas*. Abhinavagupta argues that when the *Viyutpatti* and *Siddhi* of *Rasa* are proved by its relish (*caravan*), what more do we require ?⁸⁵ Mammata corroborates the view of Abhinavagupta and says that the experience of *Rasa* is proved by *Anvaya* and *Vyatireka*.⁸⁶ It is not the effect (*karya*) of any cause (*karana*) because in that case its existence will be beyond the access of sense perception (*indriyajnana*) with the disappearance of the *Vibhavas*. It is the knowledge of something because that something is present before and after its being known. As *Rasa* is realized, its existence cannot be denied. But *Rasa* is there in the poem whether we relish it or not. This quality of pervasiveness adorns *Rasa*. It is *Siddhi*, not a blemish or *Dusana*.⁸⁷

There is a good deal of controversy on the point of experience of *Rasa*. Instead of solving the problem whether *Rasa* is produced, revealed or manifested, it is better to bank on the verdict of Abhinavagupta that the heart of man is the seat of all *Bhavas*. The *Bhavas* reside in human heart in the form of inherited instincts or *Sanskaras*. When the same *Bhavas* are found exhibited on the stage or expressed in poetry, they are sure to evoke the *Sanskara* of the reader. Past memory is a helpful aid in this respect. When the poet is moved by a particular situation and communicates the same situation to his readers

85 Abhinavagupta : Abhinava-Bharati, p. 164.

86 Mammata : Kavya-Prakasa, p. 217.

87 Ibid., p. 110.

through the medium of poetry, there is no reason why the reader should not be moved by the description of the poet. The *Bhavas* which alike live in the hearts of the poet and the reader act as a link between the two. This fact is not denied by Richards. At this point, Richards and Abhinavagupta seem to meet. But Richards refuses to give any philosophic explanation of poetic experience which he considers as an unnecessary digression. Abhinavagupta's theory of poetic experience stems from philosophy. The reason is that he is a philosopher as well as a critic which combination is hardly found in Richards. Further, the concept of *Rasa nispatti* is typically Indian and it cannot have any parallel in Western literary criticism.

The much debated question in Sanskrit literary criticism as also in the Western literary criticism is how it is possible to derive pleasure from a pathetic scene. Richards has to say something very original about it. In Richards' view, there is nothing like pure tragedy or pure comedy. It usually happens that a tragic dramatist wilfully ignores the bright aspect of life or somehow tries to explain away what is agreeable and good in life. He deliberately brings out the tragic lot of man and ridicules the high ideals of religion and morality. He tries to show a tension between what is good and what is bad in life. He sees evil in good. A true tragic playwright does not see evil in good. On the other hand, he tries to distinguish real good from real evil. Richards states that human destiny is an aggregation of a number of apprehensions and possibilities. Sorrow is not to be discarded in life. Without sorrow, pleasure will not have its existence. In his *Principles*, he swears by tragedy as the acid test of aesthetics and literature. Tragedy is not exhausted by pity and terror, the impulse to approach and the impulse to run away, which to the Greeks did not mean an unhappy ending, which according to Aristotle, its formulator, gives a delight. Richards' poise is pitiful besides delight. He defines tragedy as "a proof against irony and irrelevance"⁸⁸ This means that tragedy can absorb anything into itself and still remain a tragedy. It can absorb the untragic and anti-tragic elements. If this standard is applied, most Greek, French and Elizabethan tragedies will be found deficient. Only the best of Shakespearean tragedies can stand this test. Obviously, Richards' concept of tragedy is based on his theory of balance of opposite impulses. As life is a meeting point of diverse

88 Richards : *Principles*, p. 282.

elements, the tragedies depict life as it is in all its dimensions and facets. Richards holds that one who understands the realities of life must take a tragic play seriously. Where there is a question of seriousness, there cannot be any scope for joy or grief. Aristotle had tried to solve this problem of tragic joy by putting forward his theory of catharsis. By catharsis, he means the purification and purgation of emotions by art. It connotes the emotional experience of a spectator who, having his pity and terror purged, faces the realities of life with strength and courage. The approach of the Sanskrit critics brings us nearer to Richards' aesthetics. There is complete lack of tragedy in Sanskrit literature - tragedy in the sense in which Richards takes it. Sanskrit plays like *Abhijana Sakuntala* and *Mrksakatika* are, in fact, comedies though they have some tragic elements in them.

Jaganatha says that pain becomes pleasure because of unique poetic process (*alaukika kavya vyapara*).⁸⁹ This process makes even unagreeable feelings enjoyable. In ordinary life, every emotion has a pre-disposing factor. Dominant States like love (*rati*), pathos (*soka*), and pleasure (*harsa*) have three concomitant circumstances. They are cause (*karana*), effect (*karya*) and accessories (*sahacara*). Cause means that element which evokes emotion, for instance, a particular scene, an object or a person. Effect means the visible signs in body, for example, a specific gesture or movement in the organs of the body. Accessories mean other auxiliary emotions which are attached to the Dominant States (*sthayibhavas*). The same cause, effect and accessories, when they appear in drama or poetry, produce *Rasa*. They are recognized as Determinants (*vibhava*), Consequents (*anubhava*) and Transitory States (*vyabhicari-bhava*). Their purpose in literary composition is different. This is one reason why they are given different names. Whenever we find somebody in an angry mood, we at once understand by inference that he is angry with his enemy or some unpleasant situation has provoked his anger. In a literary piece, the purpose of cause, effect and accessories is only to produce *Rasa*. When the feelings are crystallized into *Rasa*, they become the property of everybody.

Jagannatha uses the word *Camatkara* in the sense of 'super-mundane' (*lokottara*).⁹⁰ What is beautiful must be true and what is true must be beautiful. Nothing can strike us unless it

89 Jagannatha : *Rasa Gangadhara*, 1/1.

90 Jagannatha : *Rasa Gangadhara*, p. 11.

bears the quality of uniqueness. Anandavardhana, therefore, defines poetic beauty as residing in its quality to startle us.⁹¹ Visvanatha calls *Camatkara* as a sort of expansion of soul.⁹² He assigns eight qualities to *Rasa*. It is *Akhanda*, *Sva-prakasa*, *Anandamaya*, *Cinmaya*, *Vedantarasparsasunya*, *Brahmasvadasahodara*, *Lokottara-camatkaraprana* and *Svakaravadabhinna*.⁹³ *Rasa* is *Akhanda*. This means it is indivisible and is relished by all the *Sahrdayas* alike. Though *Rasa* is constituted of its component parts i.e., *Vibhava*, *Anubhava* and *Sancaribhava*, none of its parts can be separated from it. *Rasa* is self-effulgent or *Sva-prakasa* i.e., no device is necessary to bring it to light. *Rasa* is *Anandamaya*. This implies that the personal experience of the *Sahrdaya* takes the shape of *Rasa* which by its very nature is blissful. *Rasa* is *Cinmaya*. This means that it pervades or is permeated by consciousness. It affords us pleasure which is different from ordinary worldly pleasure. *Rasa* is *Vedantarasparsasunya* meaning while experiencing *Rasa*, no other knowledge (*vedya* or *jnana*) intrudes and interferes the realization of the *Sahrdaya*. *Rasa* is *Brahmasvadasahodara*. This means that for the time being the *Sahrdaya* derives similar pleasure from poetry which the *Yogi* gets in the communion with *Brahma* with the difference that *Brahmasvada* is never followed by *Laukika Vikaras* whereas *Kavyasvada* may be followed by such *Vikaras*. *Rasa* is *Lokottara-camatkaraprana*. This refers to the enlargement of heart which is the natural result of *Ahlada*. This is to say, though the *Ahlada* of *Rasa* is worldly, it is basically different from other worldly *Ahladas*. The expression *Svakaravadabhinna* means that *Rasa* is relished in an integral or *Abhinna* form. Visvanatha tells us that the *Pramata* or *Sahrdaya* enjoys *Rasa* only with *Sattvotreka* i.e., when his mind is completely purged of *Rajoguna* and *Tamoguna*. The word *Mana* or mind should be taken here as though used metaphorically, to suggest the nature of mind.

The word *Camatkara* seems to have been borrowed by the Sanskrit literary critics from philosophy. In *Yogavasistha*, the word *Camatkara* is used in the sense of self-flashing of thought.⁹⁴ The lack of it is called 'morbidity' (*jadata*). The heart which is fit to

91 Anandavardhana . Dhvanyaloka, 1/13 vrtti.

92 Visvanatha : Sahitha Darpana, 3/3 vtti.

93 Ibid., 3/2-3.

94 Dasgupta, S.N. . History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II (Cambridge, 1932), p 236.

receive poetic pleasure can alone relish *Camatkara*. *Camatkara* is, strictly speaking, the experience of beauty (*saundarya svada*).

How even the tragic feeling is transformed into delightful experience was not explained by the originator of *Rasa* theory i.e., Bharata in his *Natyasastra*. Later, Abhinavagupta argued that the worldly experience makes us feel pleasure and pain, attraction and repulsion. We laugh and weep. In reading a literary composition also, we may laugh or weep. But while the experience of our routine life is purely subjective, the experience of poetry is objectified. This is because of the fact that we receive it in an impersonal state of mind. Poetic experience lifts the veil of ignorance of self-interest. It is not gross, but subtle, not rigid or fixed but fluid, incessant and exhilarating. It is a state when self merges in the aggregate. This self-forgetfulness or self-negation (*atma-vismrti*) is the cause of our unhindered joy. If the reader is not able to achieve this end, he is not a fit reader. A true and deserving reader always rises beyond his self, which enables him to gain poetic pleasure. So long as he is self-centered, he is miserable. The moment he breaks the fetters of self, he becomes happy. Abhinavagupta says that pleasure is derived due to intentness (*tanmaya-bhavana*).⁹⁵ This enlargement of the ego is the secret of pleasure in pain. This is a more convincing explanation of pain turning into pleasure than what Aristotle offers and suggests. A dispassionate attitude frees the mind from all obstacles and moorings, 'killing care and grief of heart', as Shakespeare would say.

This precisely seems to be the ideal of I.A. Richards also. He does not say that tragedy always gives us pain. The tragic situations described in the tragedy and the pathos brought out in the lives of the tragic characters, remind us of the stern realities of life. Sita bewails her evil fate when she is kidnapped forcibly by Ravana and, thus, separated from her husband Ramchandra. Similarly Sakuntala bewails her misfortune when she is cursed by Rishi Durvasa and is separated from her lover, Dusyanta. We definitely feel pity for them. But their pity brings us wisdom. It teaches us how to face the grim realities of life. Thus, sorrow and pleasure are mixed here in a peculiar way. Richards' concept of tragedy is more akin to the Indian view of life than to the Greek or even Shakespearean view of life.

What is more, Richards gives a scientific explanation of poetic experience. In spite of all philosophical speculations, there

95 Abhinavagupta : *Dhvanyaloka* Locana, p. 40.

is no empirical support for the view, held by many, that *Rasa* theory believes in mystical poetic experience. In India, we do not get any critical formulation which alienates man from the real world. The Indians are not pessimists or escapists. They are quite practical in their day-to-day life. The European thinkers usually underrate Indian literature and literary criticism on the plea that they are the products of an ideal or a relaxed mind. This is indisputably a superficial judgment.

We have seen that the word *Rasa* was originally used to denote the pleasure derived from the witnessing of dramatic performance. Bharata does not use the word *Alaukika* in the context of *Rasa*. The *Taittiriya Upanisad*, for the first time, philosophized the experience of *Rasa*, when it said that God Himself is *Rasa*.⁹⁶ The typical Upanisadic approach to the problem has been expressed by Rabindranath Tagore who states "It is this perfectness of being that leads to the imperfection of becoming, that quality of beauty which finds its expression in all poetry, drama, and art."⁹⁷ What Tagore means here is that aesthetic joy is the fore-taste of spiritual realization and that all art is, thus, a spiritual aid. In the field of aesthetics, Bhattanayaka was the first critic to follow the track of philosophy. He states that poetic pleasure is on a par with divine bliss. His views on poetic pleasure have been quoted by Abhinavagupta in his *Abhinava-Bharati*.⁹⁸ Abhinavagupta himself is also not free from the influence of Upanisadic philosophy on this point.⁹⁹ Visvanatha says that *Rasa* is realized when our mind is partly connected with this world and partly transcends this world. This is called plus-minus i.e., (*yukta-viyukta*) state of mind.¹⁰⁰ Kuntaka¹⁰¹, Hemchandra¹⁰² and Mahimbhatta¹⁰³ also hold the same view. What is called 'supreme pleasure' in India is called 'pure and elevated pleasure', and 'joy for ever' in the West.

96 *Taittiriya Upanisad*, II. 7. 1.

97 Tagore, R.N. : *Sadhana* (Macmillan, 1979), p. 135

98 Abhinavagupta : *Abhinava-Bharati*, p. 277

99 Gnoli : *The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta*, p. 56.

100 Visvanatha : *Sahitya Darpana*, 3/25.

101 Kuntaka : *Vakrokti-Jivita*, 1/2 vrtti.

102 Hemchandra : *Kavyanusasana* (Bombay, 1934), p. 3.

103 Mahimbhatta : *Vyakti-Viveka* (Chowkhamba, Varanasi, 1964), p. 71.

CHAPTER 5

COMMUNICATION AND SADHARNIKARANA

In this chapter, an attempt is made to show the necessity of communication i.e., transpersonalisation in art and literature and also to compare Richards' theory of communication with the literary theories of the critics of Indian *Rasa* school. It would be seen that Richards' theory of communication bears a close resemblance to some aspects of Indian *Rasa* theory.

In the beginning, justification must be given for equating the English word 'Communication' with the Sanskrit word *Sadharanikarana*. The two words have been purposely juxtaposed here because it is roughly through the process of *Sadharanikarana* that communication is possible and *Sadharanikarana* forms the basis of poetic experience or *Rasasvada*. The word *Presaniyata* or *Sampresana*, so frequently used in Hindi criticism now-a-days for 'communication' is not available in classical literary criticism. The reason seems to be that the classical Sanskrit critics said everything about communication while discussing *Sadharanikarana*. But, at the same time, it must be borne in mind that the word *Sadharanikarana* has a philosophical overtone which is not conveyed by a too technical word like communication the implication of which is confined to something material and mechanical. *Sadharanikarana* includes the western concepts of communication, generalization and universalization.¹ Another obvious difference between the two words is that while communication is a two-way traffic involving the poet who gives and the reader who receives, *Sadharanikarana* describes the mental condition of the reader at the moment he appreciates poetic excellence. The thrill denoted by *Sadharanikarana* is never suggested by the word communication.

1 S.K. De and K.C. Pandeya translate the word *Sadharanikarana* as generalization and universalization respectively. See *Some Problems of Sanskrit Poetics*, P. 25 and K.C. Pandeya's *Comparative Aesthetics*, P. 149. C. Kunhan Raja translates the word *Sadharanikarana* as 'Universalization', see *Survey of Sanskrit Literature* (Bharatiya Vidya Bhawan, Bombay, 1962), transpersonalisation p. 258. The appropriate translation of the word *Sadharanikarana* will, however, be communication which conveys its spirit.

Our worldly experience is temporary and bound by the laws of time and space. Not satisfied with this feature of our experience, we want to make it universal and permanent. Extension as regards space and everlastingness as regards time is the natural urge of our temperament. The poet discovers eternal passions in his temporary flashes of ideas. Here the question arises that it is logical to think of the pleasure of the poet by his creation, but how far it is logical to think that the spectator, reader or critic should get the same pleasure from a work of art when he is not directly concerned with it. The reader indisputably shall have to rise to the mental level of the artist leaving his own personality in order to enjoy the beauty revealed in a piece of art. It is at this point that the problem of literary communication crops up. Indian critics and the western critics like Croce, Richards, Eliot and Leavis including the psychologist Lipps give importance to common susceptibility in the appreciation of art. The common sympathy of the artist and the perceiver or the reader works as a tie between the two that binds them together. Words like 'empathy', 'common sympathy', 'ideal reader', 'impersonality', 'psychic distance', etc., are quite common in the Western critical vocabulary.

Literature, says Abhinavaguptas, is different from the empirical situation. It is distinct from a mere reproduction, reflection, analogy or superimposition of real life. It may not give valid knowledge. Yet it does not lead to error or doubt or vacillation. The experience that literature evokes in one of *Rasa*, the soul of a given work of art. In the experience of the whole wherein the separate meanings of individual units do not exist as separate or distinct ones, the various components appear as universals that are not conditioned by factors like time and space (*desa-kaladi*). It is universalization or idealization (*sadharanyam*) pervades the entire work or art like the pervasive relation between the light and smoke. The resulting experience is one and it is of the nature of the flow of consciousness (*avighna samvit*)

No literary composition can be called significant unless the ideas expressed in it are properly communicated to its readers. Howsoever meritorious and extra ordinary a literary composition is, it cannot stand the test of time unless it appeals to its readers. Kalidasa justly remarks : "Until the experts testify, I do not deem the drama a success."² And it goes with the popular saying : "The

poet composes poetry, but its beauty is appreciated by the sensible *Pandita* (*kavi karoti kavyani, svadam jananti panditah*). Literature is not produced for its own sake. Like all other arts, literature is also a communication. Hence, the history of literature is the history of complex relationship between the writer and the reader. Poetry, as Wordsworth says, "is the image of man and nature" and is also "the breath and finer spirit of all knowledge", rather "first and last of all knowledge."³ Here, the problem of communication is considered more seriously than in any other form of literature. Poetry directly appeals to our emotions. 'Poetry', as C.S. Lewis observes, "must often communicate emotions not directly, but by creating imaginatively the grounds for these emotions."⁴ And manifestly, the communication of emotion is more difficult than the communication of thoughts and ideas.

So far as the question of literary communication is concerned, there is much in common with Richards and the critics of Indian *Rasa* school. Richards stands on similar ground as the critics of *Rasa* school by holding that it is the perception of beauty which should be aimed at, that for communication the natural urge of the poet and the competency of the recipient are essential and that receptibility is a necessary pre-requisite for successful communication. Richards devotes a whole, and fairly long chapter, of *Principles* to an account of communication. In *Practical Criticism, Science and Poetry, Interpretation in Teaching and Speculative Instruments* also, he deals with the subject. His theory of communication is based on modern researches in the various branches of psychology. It should be made clear that Richards is up against dogmatic metaphysics. He explains communicative process keeping in view an ideal artist and an ideal reader. He also accounts for the emergence of values.

From the point of view of Indian theory of *Rasa*, poetry is nothing but a manifestation of *Rasa*. *Rasa* is evoked when poetry conforms to certain norms and fulfils certain conditions. The entire mansion of *Rasa* is founded on the broad assumption that poetry is not self-communication but mass-communication and

2 Kalidasa : *Abhijnana Sakuntala*, 1/2.

3 Wordsworth, William : *Preface to Lyrical Ballads*, *English Critical Essays* (Nineteenth Century), ed. Edmund D. Jones (Oxford, 1971), pp. 14-16.

4 Lewis, C.S. : *Studies in Words* (Cambridge University Press, 1960), p. 218.

that communication is a definable whole and it is something more than a combination and aggregation of speaking and listening. It has much to do with the perfection of art.

Sadharanikarana is not possible unless the ideas, images, rhythmical effects and the total impression of the poem are adequately communicated to the reader. *Sadharanikarana* makes emotions aesthetic or realizable as *Rasa*. *Rasa* can only be evoked after it is experienced by the reader. Since such an experience is impossible unless the emotion expressed is properly communicated, it is through the enquiry - how does communication operate? - that the whole communicative process can be understood and appreciated. According to the theory of *Rasa*, the only method or process through which unfamiliar ideas are made familiar is *Sadharanikarana*. (*asadharanam sadharanam karoti iti sadharanikaranam*). *Sadharanikarana* involves subtle mental processes. The questions related to *Sadharanikarana* are also connected with what is called the 'manifestation or revelation of *Rasa*' (*rasa-nispatti*). Thus, the theory of *Sadharanikarana* is an inevitable outcome of the theory of *Rasa*.

For Richards "Poetry itself is a mode of communication" and "What it communicates and how it does so and the worth of what is communicated form the subject-matter of criticism."⁵ The greatest pre-occupation of literary criticism is to discuss and solve the problems concerning communication. Richards admits that "one and the only goal of all critical endeavours, of all interpretation, appreciation, exhortation, praise or abuse, is improvement in communication."⁶ Richards agrees that communication is a complicated process.⁷ It involves subtle mental processes. The most complex machinery on earth is man. Man is the only creature who exploits the resources of language. His use of words and reactions to words are much akin to other people's use of words and reactions to words. It is a fact that he often communicates his feelings by a shrug of his shoulders, a thumb down movement, a nod or a wink, using them as symbols. But it is chiefly through speech and language that he communicates his feelings, emotions and intentions. His ability to

5 Richards : Practical Criticism, p. 11.

6 Richards : Practical Criticism, p. 11.

7 Richards : Principles, p. 177.

use words is a mark of language sophistication. The properties of communication are, to some extent, inherent in language itself. But every language is not fit to be communicated nor every feeling is worth communicating. Likewise the communication of some feeling is difficult. An expression garbed in a specific kind of language is difficult to be communicated.

Richards considers communication a necessary concomitant of the theory of value. According to him : "The two pillars upon which a theory of criticism must rest are an account of value and an account of communication."⁸ The facts of science are self-communicated because science deals with truth—flat and naked. It is only when the question of communication of poetic experience is taken up that real difficulty crops up. The poet's emotion produces diverse and disparate reactions. If he is unmindful of the social appeal of his creation, he will be self-possessed like the exponents of the movement called 'Art for Art's sake'. But since art is closely related to life, a writer cannot afford to confine his interest within himself. He must write for some one. He must have the reader in view. Whether consciously or unconsciously, he must dedicate himself to others. He cannot allow his experience to remain just an internal activity of mind. Richards describes the successful reading of poetry as the formation in the reader, through the medium of the poem, of a state of mind similar to that of the poet. The excellence of the poem rests on the medium to which it allows communication to recur and on the value of the state of mind communicated. For a successful communication, it is necessary that the impulses and the stimuli of the poet and the recipient be uniform. Where there is any gap, the poet should make them communicable through the help of imagination. The value of poetry depends upon its emotional appeal, its communicative efficacy, its power to move the reader. In other words, it is the element of communication that is the deciding factor, though it is sometimes seen that good art is communicated with great difficulty. So it is less saleable. Nevertheless, the importance of communication in the realm of literature cannot be ruled out. "Value", as Richards argues, "cannot be demonstrated except through communication of what is valuable."⁹ The communicative process is inherent in valuable creation. What is communication and how communication is effected and what bridges the gulf between the poet and the

8 Ibid., p. 25

9 Richards : *Practical Criticism*, p. 12.

reader are questions which have been examined in detail by Richards.

As before the critics of *Rasa* school, so before Richards, there is the question of competency or worthiness of the reader. If both writer and reader have the same belief, there is established between them more than the relationship of author and admiring reader. There grows between them a genuine empathy, an assimilation of mind and heart with mind and heart. Now whether the experience of poetry is communicated to an awakened man, a sensible and conscious reader or whether it is communicable to a conscious reader and an idiot equally deserves serious consideration.

Another allied question is whether the poet, at the time of creation or communication concentrates his attention on communication. Richards says that for successful communication both the writer and the reader are required to fulfil certain conditions. In his words : "courage, audacity, enterprise, goodwill, absence of undue pride or conceit, honesty, humaneness, humility in its finest sense, humour, tolerance, good health, and the Confucian characteristics of the 'superior man' are favorable general conditions for communication."¹⁰ By adducing forceful arguments, Richards refutes the popular notion that communication is the aim of the artist. Richards argues that for successful communication, the artist need not divert his attention from his self to any other object.

Again, it is necessary that the poet and the reader should be mentally alert and aesthetically alive at the time of communication. Communication is a reciprocal arrangement between the poet and the reader. In Richards' words, "Unless 'A' has remarkable gift of description and 'B' an extraordinary sensitive and discriminating ability, their two experiences will tally at best but roughly."¹¹ So, there should be readiness on the part of the poet to give and on the part of the reader to receive. This reciprocity is the Key-note to communication. If the reader is inert and dull, beauty cannot have any appeal for him. Conversely, if the poet is self-content, he would write for himself, this is to say for the sake of his own pleasure. In this case, the question of communication of his feeling does not arise. Richards observes :

¹⁰ Richards : Principles, p. 180.

¹¹ Richards : Principles, p. 178.

"For successful communication a number of impulses with their effective stimuli must be common to the communicators, and further the general ways in which impulses modify one another must be shared."¹² In the opinion of Richards, the "greatest difference between the artist or poet and the ordinary person is found ...in the range, delicacy, and freedom of the connections he is able to make between different elements of his experience."¹³ "An intelligent man can 'see how a thing works' when a less intelligent man has to 'find out by trying'".¹⁴ Richards is of opinion that communication is not a mechanical or arid process. The question of communication applies to all human species in general but "the arts are the supreme form of communicative activity."¹⁵ Without a responsive heart, communication is not possible. In *Principles*, Richards describes the gift of the communicator as well as the recipient. He says : "The use of past similarities in experience and control of these elements through the dependence of their effects upon one another, make up the speaker's, the active communicator's gift. Discrimination, suggestibility, free and clear resuscitation of elements of past experience *disentangled from one another*, and control of irrelevant personal details and accidents, make up the recipient's gift."¹⁶ The reader must have a feel for poetry. In Richards' words, he "requires a sensitiveness and discrimination with words, a nicety, imaginativeness and deftness in taking their sense"¹⁷ A successful style forms a link between the poet and the reader because it is a product "of the perfect recognition of the writer's relation to the reader in view of what is being said and their joint feeling about it."¹⁸ Richards lays utmost emphasis on 'close mental correspondence between the poet's impulses and possible impulses in his reader.'¹⁹ The poet and the reader are

12 Richards : *Principles*, p. 191

13 Ibid . p. 181

14 Ibid p. 111

15 Ibid p. 26. cf "For evidently, whatever else literature may be communication it must be : no communication, no literature." Abercrombie, Lescelles *Principles of Literary Criticism* (Bombay, 1958), p. 24.

16 Richards : *Principles*, p. 180.

17 Richards : *Practical Criticism* p. 198

18 Richards . . p. 207

19 Richards : *Principles*, p. 29

bound with each other by the tie of common sensibility. Thus, according to Richards poetry is not made for all and sundry. Not all readers are equally competent to read and appreciate poetry. The reaction of an unresponsive reader is of little importance. The critics belonging to *Rasa* school maintain that communicative process bridges the gulf between the artist and the critic. The language of the poet suggests the emotion to the *Sahrdaya*. *Sadharanikarana* works in a cyclic order. It begins with the poet and the poem and ends with the reader. A trained and cultivated reader is called *Sahrdaya* meaning 'one of the same heart'. Abhinavagupta imposes a heavy task on the *Sahrdaya*. According to him "Sahrdaya is one whose mirror of heart (*manamukura*) is cleansed of impurities and who has developed the ability to become one with the poet."²⁰ The meaning of *Sahrdaya* is 'identical heart' (*tatsama hrdaya*). In the beginning of his *Locana* commentary, Abhinavagupta pays tribute to the *Tatva* which effects a unification between the poet and the *Sahrdaya*.²¹ The prefix "Sa" in *Sahrdaya* does not suggest 'with' but 'equal' (*samana*). 'Hrdaya' is an epithet which stands for a vibrating and responsive heart. The feelings expressed in poetry enkindle the *Sthayins* lying dormant in the *Sahrdaya* in the form of inherited instinct or *Sanskara*.

In the *Rg Veda*, there is a *Mantra* which states that for coordination, like thought and like heart and like mind are essential.²² The Vedic *Rsis* found a responsive heart not only in man but also in inanimate things like rocks and mountains. They even addressed the rocks—*Smota Gravanah*²³—and they responded to their call. Sayanacaraya interprets this *Mantra* in his *Rg Veda Bhasya Bhumika* and tells us that the Vedic *Rsis* wanted to communicate their feelings not only to men but to all the things existing on this earth.²⁴

The common truism - "We admire our own cult" (*svajane parama prthi*), throws sufficient light on the condition of communication. In order to appreciate the feelings and emotions

20 Abhinavagupta : *Dhvanioka-Locana*, p. 40.

21 Ibid., p. 1.

22 *Rg Veda*, 10/9/4.

23 *Taittiriya Samhita*, 1/3/13/1.

24 Sayanacarya : *Rg Veda Bhasya Bhumika* (Chaukhamba, Varanasi, 1960), p. 8.

of the poet, it is necessary that the reader should make his heart so as to be able to receive what is communicated to it by the poet. Obviously, the heart of one man cannot be the heart of other. It can only resemble the heart of other. This fact can be illustrated by drawing an analogy from instrumental music. As in lyre, the string which is closer to the string played upon, vibrates simultaneously, so also the emotion of the poet, on account of affinity, directly stirs the emotion of the reader whose heart is like that of the poet. There is a *Samvada* between the hearts of the *Kavi* and the sympathetic reader (*sahrdaya*). the good-hearted and compassionate reader (*sahrdaya*) possesses a colossal heart (*virata-hrdaya*) lest he should not enter the consciousness of the poet. In the theory of *Rasa*, the words *sahrdaya* and *Samajika* are frequently used for the critic. This means that the reader should be social as well as large-hearted so as to know the heart of every individual living in society. He, being a man of *Sanskara* establishes relationship between his heart and that of the poet. This enables him to catch the vision of the poet. At this stage, his vision corresponds with that of the poet. Upto this point, he is called 'contemplating' (*bhavuka*). He is fully submerged in the emotion and imagination of the poet. Then he reverts to his own self and looks back at his own position. He, however, retains the trail of his mental impressions or sacraments (*sanskara*). Now he begins to think about the creation of the poet from his own angle. He is now called *Bhavaka* or one who is gifted with the faculty of appreciation. No body can claim to be a *bhavaka* unless he is at the sametime a *Bhavaka*. It is possible that one is only *Bhavuka* and not a *Bhavaka* or critic. A *Bhavuka* is devoid of his own vision. He has no independent judgment. He merely gets the vision of the creator. He is almost a parasite. But a *Bhavuka* or a critic enjoys his full independence of thought and autonomy of judgment. He is no more tagged to the creator's ideals. In the beginning, he establishes close intimacy or identity (*tadatmaya*) with the creator. This close intimacy is a sort of *Abheda*. It is said that *abheda* wipes out all considerations (*sattaike mithobhedastadatmyam*). Where there is no duality, there is no confusion. "What he is, so I am" (*so atma svarupam vasya tasya bhavah*). Vishvanatha says that the reader feels at-one-with the character and this tendency enables him to appreciate even the improbable, far-fetched and the absurd. Once, the reader identifies himself with Hanumana, there is no

reason why he should feel difficulty is understanding and appreciating how Hanumana crossed the unfathomable seven-seas.²⁵ One can easily understand the logical fallacy involved in this statement. It sounds like a *Vadato Vyaghata* -- a self-contradictory statement. Can anybody assuredly say that he is exactly the same man what his counterpart is? Can his impulses be exactly those of the other? At best, one can say that one's emotions are like those of the other fellow or that one shares the other fellow's emotions. In *Sadharanikarana*, which is a sort of scaffolding built upon *Tadatmya*, the consciousness of 'I' (*aham*) of the perception of the world as an objective reality does not cease. Doubtless the reader is immersed in the lively and powerful description of the poet. He looks at everything from a reasonable distance. But, as Visvanatha says, "One who has no feeling is just like the pillars of the theatre which cannot respond to the performances going on the stage."²⁶

The Indian concept of *Tadatmya* is different from the western 'empathy' which connotes power of entering into another's personality and imaginatively experiencing his experience. 'Tadatmya' is a state of the reader or spectator who loses for a while his personal self-consciousness and identifies himself with some character in the story or scene. While in 'empathy', he shares the feelings of others, in 'Tadatmya', he feels intentness and temporarily forgets himself.

It has been pointed out above that according to the theory of *Rasa*, *Rasa* cannot be felt and enjoyed by an impure and dry heart. For this, a clean and receptive heart (*vimala pratibha sali hrdaya*) is essential which alone can make the reader *Adhikari* to appreciate the ideas communicated to him by the poet.²⁷ Anandavardhana tells us that the nuances of poetic meaning can be appreciated only by a *Sahridaya* because it is *Sahrdava Slaghya*.²⁸ Bhoja mentions that a true *Rasika* is he in whose heart *Rasa* permanently dwells.²⁹ So it is proved that *Sadharanikarana* is an act of reciprocation of giving and taking, each to and from each. Abhinavagupta calls the process of *Sadharanikarana* as whispering of hearts i.e., *Hridayasamvada* depending upon

25 Visvanatha : *Sahitya Darpana*, 3/9,10, p. 54.

26 Visvanatha : *Sahitya Darpana*, 3/8 vrtti, p. 54.

27 Abhinavagupta : *Abhinava-Bharati*, p. 279.

28 Anandavardhana : *Dhanyaloka*, 1/2.

29 Bhoja : *Sringara Prakasa*, p. 466.

Tanmayi-bhavana.³⁰ Rajsekharā demands critical faculty (*bhavayitri-pratibha*)³¹ from an ideal reader without which he cannot appreciate the ideas communicated to him. Bharata says that "the message of the poet runs through the heart of a worthy reader as fire soon inflames a dry wood."³² Relinquishing one's all private and personal angularities and giving up one's all idiosyncrasies and narrowness of feeling are necessary conditions for the enjoyment of poetry. Anandavardhana says that mere knowledge of word meaning is not enough for poetic appreciation. It is the understanding of the essence (*tattva*) of poetry which should be aimed at and this *Tattva* is known by an able reader only³³. In his words "As only a jeweller knows the secret of precious stones, so the connoisseur alone knows the *Rasa* of *Kavya*."³⁴ The knowing of *Rasa* (*rasa-jnana*) means humaneness or tender-heartedness (*sahridayate*).³⁵ The essence of poetry is understood but by a select few. It is said that none but the honey-bee knows the taste of the juice of a flower (*marmikam ka marandanam antarena madhuvratam*). And for this reason, Bhavabhūti, the celebrated Sanskrit dramatist, says that he would eagerly await the birth of the able reader of his drama, who will possess the literary sensibility similar to his own. He is sanguine that such a reader will do justice to his work. Such a reader may not be available at present. But there is no doubt that he will be born in future because time is endless and the earth is vast.³⁶

It would, thus, appear that so far as the question of the competency of the reader is concerned, there is much in common in Richards' literary criticism and the Indian theory of *Rasa*. Though Richards does not state the qualifications of the reader in so many words, he tells us clearly that the reader of poetry must have a responsive heart and alertness of mind. Sanskrit critics tell it more emphatically with the help of several similes and examples. The other English critic who suggests this point with some degree of emphasis is F.R. Leavis. In the Introduction to his book *Revaluation*, he writes: "I think it the

30 Abhinavagupta : *Abhinava-Bharatī*, p. 87.

31 Rajasekhara : *Kavya Mimansa* (Rastrabhasa Parisad, Patna, 1965), p. 30.

32 Bharata : *Natyasastra*, 7/7. Also see Mammata : *Kavya Prakasa*, 8/70.

33 Anandavardhana : *Dhvanyaloka*, 1/7.

34 *Ibid.*, 3/47 vrtti.

35 *Ibid.*

36 Bhavabhūti : *Mahamadhava*, 1/4/3.

business of a critic to perceive for himself, to make the finest and sharpest relevant discriminations, and to state his findings as responsibly, clearly and forcibly as possible."³⁷ In *The Common Pursuit*, he writes: "The critic's aim is, first, to realize as sensitively and completely as possible this or that which claims his attention; and a certain valuing is implicit in the realizing."³⁸ Leavis continues: "The business of the literary critic is to attain a particular completeness of response and to observe peculiarly strict relevance in developing his response into commentary; he must be on his guard against any premature or irrelevant generalizing - of it or from it."³⁹ Leavis describes the critic's requirements more completely than Richards though he leans heavily on his own method of literary criticism.

Richards lays great stress on the training of the reader, a point which brings him closer to Sanskrit literary critics. Richards holds that "Poetry, like the other arts, is a secret discipline to which some initiation is needed. Some readers are excluded from it simply because they have never discovered and have never been taught, how to enter."⁴⁰ This is one reason why "those who have naturally a fine imagination and discrimination, who have a developed sensibility to the values of life, do seem to find the password to poetry with great ease."⁴¹ In Indian terminology such a responsive reader is called Adhikari.⁴² While describing the *Hetus* of poetry, Mammata tells us that along with other *Hetus* of poetry, one of the *Hetus* is *Abhyasa*.⁴³ Rajasekhara also considers *Vyutpatti* as one of the *Hetus* of poetry.⁴⁴ This *Abhyasa* or *Vyutpatti* is not only essential for the poet but it is also demanded of an ideal reader. According to Richards, a responsive reader, endowed with the talent to appreciate poetry, will invariably look at the poem as a complete organism, not as an aggregation of broken fragments. In Richard's words, the equivalents of *Sahrdava* are "suitable reader"⁴⁵, "Fit reader"⁴⁶,

37 Leavis, F. R. *Revaluation* (London, 1959), pp. 8-9.

38 Leavis, F. R. : *The Common Pursuit*, p. 213.

39 Leavis, F. R. : *The Common Pursuit*, p. 213

40 Richards : *Practical Criticism*, p. 319.

41 Ibid.

42 Text of Footnote

43 Mammata : *Kavya Prakasa*, 1/3.

44 Rajasekhara : *Kavya Mimansa*, p. 40.

45 Richards : *Science and Poetry* 31

"competent reader"⁴⁷ and "discerning reader"⁴⁸. It is with reference to such a reader that F.R. Leavis forms the concept of 'complete reader' and 'ideal reader'.⁴⁹ A responsive reader, who is always a complete reader, concentrates his attention on the totality of meaning. In the words of Anandavardhana the beauty of poetry is something different from that which is to be found in its component parts. It is like the grace or *Leayanya* of a girl which does not lie in any of her limbs but in the general impression.⁵⁰ Richards also lays emphasis on the total perception of the reader which alone can enable him to grasp the total meaning. This stress on 'total meaning' or 'total perception' is symptomatic of the influence of gestalt psychology which lays emphasis on integrated structures or patterns that constitute all experience and have specific properties which can neither be derived from the elements of the whole nor considered simply as the sum-total of these elements.

The *Rasa* theory also lays emphasis on the fulfilment of *Rasa* which is technically called *Siddhi*.⁵¹ *Rasa*, in fact, permeates the whole organism of literature. It stretches itself from creation to appreciation. On the part of the creator, it exists in the form of pleasure in creation; on the part of the critic, it exists in the form of pleasure in appreciation. At the time of creation, the poet's consciousness is swayed by multiple thoughts and complex feelings and there is not one spring of emotion but many springs of emotions which compel him to give shape to his ideas. After the completion of the work, the poet detaches himself from his creation and it becomes sometimes very difficult for him to locate which emotion actually prompted him to write poetry. A trained person as a critic is, he is supposed to analyse a poem and understand its import better. The Indian *Rasa* Theory has always laid emphasis on synthetic and integrated experience. It may be said to have anticipated the findings of modern gestalt psychology when it attached importance to the synthesis and crystallization of varied experiences into beauty.

46 Ibid., p. 51.

47 Richards : Principles, p. 97.

48 Richards : Practical Criticism, p. 319.

49 Leavis, F.R. : The Common Pursuit, p. 202.

50 Anandavardhana : Dhvanyaloka, 1/4.

51 Bharata : Nāṭyaśāstra, 6/26.

Long ago, Aristotle had said: "Art addresses itself not to the abstract reason but to the sensibility and image making faculty."⁵² And in the same breath Wordsworth says of the poet: "He is a man speaking to men..."⁵³ The word 'man' here refers to 'man' endowed with more lively sensibility, more enthusiasm and tenderness of heart than ordinary person. In recent years, Oscar Wilde, whose name is often associated with 'Art for Art's sake' school, observes "As art springs from personality, so it is only to personality that it can be revealed."⁵⁴ There is much truth in these statements. The same idea is reiterated by Richards when he dilates upon the qualities of a responsive reader. In India, this truth was comprehended several hundred years back. The Indian critics knew that it is communication which fills the gulf between the artist and the reader. An artist receives into his soul some truths from the great unknown and he transmits them to his followers with the authority born of his conviction. Literature fails to achieve its aim if it is not properly communicated to those for whom it is intended.

The natural corollary of Richard's theory of responsive reader is the theory of communication. Here Richards finds a formula to define communication and states that communication is inseparable from and an integral part of experience. Strictly speaking, communication of experience forms no part of the poet's task. Communication is not the be all and end all of the poet. The poet must aim at the perfection of his product. He must strive for and achieve this laudable aim. "In the course of his work he is not as a rule deliberately engaged in a communicative endeavour, when asked, he is more likely than not to reply that communication is an irrelevant or at best a minor issue and that what he is making is something which is beautiful in itself, or satisfying to him personally, or something expressive, in a more or less vague sense, of his emotions, or of himself, something personal or individual."⁵⁵ The depth of his experience can be assessed on the basis of his capability to arouse identical experience in others. If his product is unable to do it, it can be

52 Butcher : Aristotle Theory of Poetry and the Fine Arts p. 127

53 Wordsworth : Preface to Lyrical Ballads, English Critical Essays (Nineteenth Century), p. 14.

■ Wilde Oscar : 'The Critic as Artist', The Works of Oscar Wilde, ed G.F. Maine (London, 1954), p. 973.

55 Richards : Principles, p. 26.

safely inferred that the poet has not succeeded in embodying his experience in his creation.

Communication should not prove an obsession for the artist. The artist should always be on guard against making communication his primary preoccupation. His primary preoccupation is perfection of his art. By 'Perfection', Richards means that the artist's product be such as to overwhelm the perceiver with a sense of beauty and give him perennial pleasure. Perfection implies communication and communication implies perfection. If this view is accepted, communication becomes an integral part of perfection. If the artist abandons this main object i.e., perfection and concentrates his mind on the secondary object i.e., communication, he does so much to the detriment of his efficiency and craftsmanship. Richards observes that "the artist is not as a rule consciously concerned with communication but with getting the poem or play or statue or whatever it is, 'right'."⁵⁶ "Communication takes place when our mind so acts upon the environment that another mind is influenced, and in that other mind an experience occurs which is like the experience in the first mind, and is caused in part by that experience."⁵⁷

Art aims at neither communication nor pleasure but at creating a world of beauty wherein man will be better accomplished, more human and large-hearted and less jealous and ostentatious. It is possible only when perfection of art will be the sole criterion. The idea is in accord with Kantian aesthetics and also the aesthetics as laid by Ruskin. Kant says that an object is perfect when it is purposive for itself. A work of art is never intended to please us. We never wish to find in a work of art anything of an intention to please.

If a work of art is perfect, it is purposive. In the words of Kant "perfection is internal (real, objective) purposiveness, and utility is external purposiveness, both for a definite purpose; beauty, on the other hand, is purposiveness without a purpose, formal, subjective purposiveness."⁵⁸ Richards also holds that beauty depends upon its being perceived. For perception of beauty,

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 177.

⁵⁸ Falckenberg, Richard : History of Modern Philosophy (Calcutta, 1953), p. 404.

equanimity of mind is essential. Richards, however, like Kant does not stress on the essence or substratum of an artistic creation nor does he fall into a paradox of purposiveness without a purpose. Ruskin says that "there is no desirable quantity of a work of art which, in its perfection, is not in some way or degree sublime."⁵⁹ Ruskin's concept of sublimity makes him a pure philosopher. Richards is more a literary critic than a philosopher - much less a philosopher in the sense it is used today. It is clear from his literary criticism that he enunciates no theory of sublimity. But his idea of perfection of art takes him nearer to Ruskin's theory of sublimity. His theory also brings him close to Indian aesthetics which has its root in sublimity.

Richards adds a new dimension to literary criticism by assigning heavy responsibility to the artist. It is none of the concern of the artist to see whether the art he creates will be good or bad, effective or ineffective. If he does his work well and with full concentration, there is no reason why his output will be prosaic. Art is not intended to be beautiful for its own sake. It must be judged to be so. There is nothing startling when the poet urges to express himself. But his uniqueness and extraordinariness lie in the fact that he urges to express himself to perfection. Communication and perfection are not incompatible. Feeling precedes expression. The artist's intention to make his art perfect impregnates his art with charm and grandeur. These are the basic properties which attract the notice of the reader. The 'feel' in poetry helps its proper communication.

When Richards gives preference to perfection in art, he does not mean that the problem of communication should be sidetracked altogether. His insistence on perfection does not in any way belittle the importance of communication. Richards defends the apparent inconsistency involved in the argument in an almost logician's term when he tags the urge for communication to the qualitative gradation of emotion. While, as a rule, the artist should endeavour to make his art perfect, he should not be oblivious of the universal truth that his art is meant for the public. "The reluctance of the artist", Richards observes, "to consider communication as one of his main aims and his denial that he is at all influenced in his work by a desire to affect

59 Ruskin *Modern Painters*, I, 40 cited, Carrutt, E.F. : *The Theory of Beauty* (London, 1962), F.N. at p. 163.

other people is no evidence that communication is not actually his principal aim."⁶⁰ The poet cannot totally disregard the communicative aspect of his experience. From the very childhood, man is accustomed to communicate his feelings and ideas because it is his natural urge. That sometimes he is unconscious of this urge is another matter. He often communicates his experiences to his fellow brothers without his being conscious of it. Richards says that "The emphasis which natural selection has put upon communicative ability is overwhelming."⁶¹ An experience is actually formed to be communicated and whether it is communicated or not, nothing can deter it from being shaped. "An experience has to be formed", Richards observes, "no doubt, before it is communicated, but it takes the form it does largely because it may have to be communicated."⁶²

All emotions, according to Richards, are not to be communicated. There are certain emotions which are by their very nature subtle and complex while there are some other emotions that are simple and easily communicable. "Communication involving attitudes are deeper than those in which references alone are concerned."⁶³ By attitude, Richards means the complexity of meaning and ambiguity which characterise poetry. Flat literal meaning is conveniently communicated. It just points to an object. Its ambit is limited. On the contrary, the scope of meaning in which attitude is communicated is wide and comprehensive.

Language, Richards holds, plays a vital role in communication. Language is deceptive by its very nature. It has mercury like quality. Richards observes, "Language is a virtuous enemy. It has to be satisfied."⁶⁴ If language is given proper attention to, it rewards the writer lest it should deceive him at every step. Freud tried to understand Leonardo da Vinci and Jung tried to understand Goethe in their own manner. But they miserably failed in their attempts. The simple reason for their failure was that they could not go beyond psychological interpretations of their works. They had no insight to understand

⁶⁰ Richards : Principles, p. 27.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 25.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid., p. 179.

⁶⁴ Richards : Principles, p. 30.

the subtleties of their meaning. The creative process is abstruse. In Richards words "What went on in the artist's mind is unverifiable even more un-verifiable than similar speculations as to the dreamers mind."⁶⁵ Without knowing the mind of the artist, it is difficult to understand his linguistic peculiarity and without appraising the linguistics peculiarity, it is difficult to appreciate his work. It is now clear that for communication of worthwhile experience, it is necessary that the artist's mind and his medium should be understood. "Sometimes art is bad because communication is defective, the vehicle inoperative; sometimes because the experience communicated is worthless; sometimes for both reasons".⁶⁶

Richards account of communication may seem to stand at the opposite extreme of *Crocian* aesthetics. For *Croce*, art does not depend upon communication. It has its existence in expression. Nothing is beautiful if it is not vividly expressed through a visible medium. The passion expressed by a poet in a particular poem can reveal to the reader only on the condition that the reader had such passion to express. In other words, while reading the poem, the reader expresses himself. He cannot appreciate a character, good or bad, unless something of that character is already there is his own character. *Croce* does not consider communication as essential to art. He insists on creative intuition. For him, all art is intuition. That poet communicates his ideas only to preserve or propagate them otherwise self-satisfaction is all that can be expected from an artistic product. It is intuition which is externalized in the outer forms of art. But like *Richards*, *Croce* too, believes in the 'qualified recipient'⁶⁷ in whom art will produce the same intuition. For *Richards*, art is necessarily concerned with communication. The artist is endowed with a sensibility and a power of communication. The artist receives much more from events than most men receive. And he can transfer what he has received with a peculiar penetrative force.

Richards' concept of 'communication' is, to some extent, similar to his concept of 'pleasure'. As pleasure-consciousness drives a man from pleasure, so communication-consciousness is an impediment in the way of literary creation. As *Richards* puts it

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ *Richards* : Principles, p. 199.

⁶⁷ *Croce* : Aesthetic, p. 111.

"It is no less absurd to suppose that a competent reader sits down to read for the sake of pleasure than to suppose that a mathematician sits down to solve an equation with a view to the pleasure its solution will afford him."⁶⁸ It is a fact, that the success and failure of art depends upon its communicative efficacy. But it is also true that the power of communication is inherent in the quality of art itself. The artist is under no moral obligation to present a useful idea but to present an idea well. Richards believes in the supreme power of art. This is why he urges upon the artist to be loyal to his duty: "The very process of getting the work 'right' has itself, so far as the artist is normal, immense communicative consequences."⁶⁹ Richards further makes this point clear in his discussion on 'connaesthesia', a term derived from psychology meaning 'common sensibility' or 'common consciousness'. He observes that aesthetic impressions, by their very nature, are conaesthetic because they are affective. The conaesthetic process is a two-way traffic. On the one hand, it affects the writer, and on the other, it affects the reader. And for this reason, even "the 'intuitive' person uses his conaesthesia as a chemist uses his reagents and a psychologist his galvanometer."⁷⁰ In art and literature, the conaesthetic process is always at work. Since art is created for the public and it has relation with life, it has a social purpose to serve. The artist is always eager for self-expression. He cannot resist the temptation to convey his ideas and feelings if he finds a responsive man. The importance of communication is self evident in the sphere of art and literature.

When Richards says that the artist is not as a rule directly concerned with communication this does not mean that communication is not his primary object - he seems to blow hot and cold at one and the same time. But the inner meaning of his statement can be easily appreciated and the fallacy inherent in it resolved when the unconscious process of communication is taken into consideration. The poet, though he likes to communicate his experiences, does so unconsciously. Communicative process is in reality an unconscious process. This accounts for the apparent contradiction in Richards' critical formulation. From the Indian point of view, the poet's job is to be

68 Richards : Principles, p. 97.

69 Richards : Principles, p. 27.

70 Richards : Principles, p. 99-100

faithful to his work. The success of his communication depends upon the depth of his experience. Though the receptibility (*grahanasilata*) of the reader is a necessary condition, the work of communication begins with the poet, Kalidasa, Bhavabhuti, Sudraka, Banabhatta, Harsa and many other gems of Sanskrit literature are treated as master artists only because they are faithful to their experiences and expressions. It is the duty of the poet to create a suitable mental state in the *Shardaya* so as to enable him to experience *Rasa*. The feelings, experiences, emotions, thoughts and ideas expressed in poetry are not bound to the personality of the poet. They are extended and crystallized into *Rasa* through the process of *Sadharanikarana*. The experience which can amuse the readers can only be called poetic experience. So long as the poet gives utterance merely to his subjective feelings, he has no right to the title. He must rise above his 'ego' to touch the tender chord of every human heart. This is what Keats calls 'negative capability'. This aim is difficult to be achieved unless the poet is fully absorbed in his creation leaving other considerations. It is *Dhyanana* which entitles him to the position of a seer or a prophet. The Indians believe that the poet is a *Manisi*⁷¹ and a *Prajapati*.⁷² It is the concentration of the poet that enables him to give *Ramaniyata* to his work.

Thus poetry has a social function too. It must appeal to the readers. The experience of the poet can be appreciated by the sensible reader only much in the same way in which the beauty of Parvati is admired only by Lord Siva and none else.

It has been said that "none other than a 'seer' is a poet, for the word *rsi* (seer) is etymologically derived from the root *drs* meaning 'to see', i.e., from the fact of his 'seeing' (*darsana*). That 'seeing', again, is awareness (*prakhyā*) of the truth (*tattva*) of aspects or characteristics of specific or individual entities (*bhava*), of striking features in individual objects as against general notions. Such a *darsana* or awareness is enough to entitle one to be styled as 'kavi'. But the title 'kavi' in general is given by the people at large (*loka*) only when one combines in himself both *Darsana* and *varnana* which go together. This is the correct interpretation of Bhatta Tauta's statement *Darsanad vasnane artha loka drshta kain smrtah*."⁷³

71 Yajurveda. 40/8.

72 Anandavardhana : Dhvanyaloka. 3/43.

Richards formulates his theory of communication primarily with the poet in view whereas the Indian theory of *Sadharanikarana* has been propounded with the *Grahita* or the *Sahrdaya* in view. Richards is silent on the point of the mental state of the *Sahrdaya* or the reader at the time of receiving poetic experience. The critics of *Rasa* school discuss this issue at great length and even carry their theory to the realms of philosophy and spiritualism.

In the Indian theory of *Rasa*, the first critic to give the concept of *Sadharanikarana* a psychological treatment was Bhattanayaka, though its germs may be found in Bharata's *Natyaśāstra* also. Bharata says that the Nispatti of *Rasa* is possible when *Bhavas* are presented in a generalised manner.⁷⁴ Bhattanayaka gets inspiration of 'constant pondering' (*bhava-katva-vyapara*) from Bharata who defines *Bhava* as the inner idea of the playwright (*kavi*) pervading the mind of the spectators.⁷⁵ In Bharata's *Natyaśāstra*, the word general (*samanya*) is equivalent to 'common' (*Sadharana*).

According to Bhattanayaka, the *Sadharanikarana* of the poetic experience is essential in order that it is properly conveyed to the reader. According to Bhattanayaka, this is done by *Vibhavana Vyapara* i.e., when the reader broods over the meaning of the poem again and again. The poetic appeal gets widened through the process of *Sadharanikarana*. Where there is emotional exuberance, there will be no *Sadharanikarana*. If one starts weeping at the sight of a weeping man, one is likely to desist from taking a full view of the situation. For the appreciation of emotion, a certain psychic distance is necessary. Absorption is necessary for the relish of a particular emotion. But absorption does not mean losing one's identity altogether. Absorption and at the same time knowledge of the self is the clue to the realisation of *Rasa*. In its absence, response to a particular situation will indicate nothing but reaction (*pratikriya*).

Bhattanayaka admits the existence of *Rasa* in the heart of the reader. Poetry is made of words and words act in three distinct ways. The first and the primary function of word is to convey

73 Bhattatauta as quoted by Hemchandra in his *Kavyanusasana* (Bombay. Also see Raghavan, V. : *Studies in Some Concepts of the/ 1938*), p. 432. *Alankara Sastra* (Adyar, 1942), p. 92, 48.

74 Bharata : *Natyaśāstra*, 7/6 vṛtti

75 Ibid , 7/2

Abhidha, its flat, prosaic and literal meaning. Its second function is *Bhavana* meaning the discovery of meaning, by constant pondering. This is called *Bhavakatva* or *Vibhavana Vyapara*. *Bhavana* is of supreme importance because it depersonalises the poet and makes emotion available for everybody. Bhattanayaka calls this function of *Bhavana* as *Sadharanikarana*. The third function of word is *Bhoga* meaning the knowledge of pleasure due to the predominance of the quality of purity and goodness (*Sattva-guna*), the very form of which is bright. At this stage, the reader for a moment, is lifted from the worldly entanglements and gets never-ending joy. This joy is unalloyed. It is *Rasa* itself. Hence, it is called 'the twin of divine bliss' (*brahmanandasahodara*). Joy or bliss transcends human experience. From this point of view, the psychology of Bhattanayaka finds a place in the innermost corner of the heart of *Sahridaya* where the materials of *Rasa* are rendered impersonal. This corner of heart, which is the repository of *Rasa* materials, experiences the bliss of *Rasa* in *Sattvic* way. The process in which it is done cannot be properly explained in terms of modern psychology because it defies the principles of psychology. The critics of *Rasa* school, thus, make a clear distinction between pleasure and joy. When the experience of the poet becomes *Sadharanikrta*, the *Sahridaya* gets joy, not pleasure. Pleasure and joy are two different things - the former is worldly, limited and ephemeral while the latter is supersensuous, infinite and everlasting.

Abhinavagupta gives a systematic and logical foundation to the theory of *Sadharanikarana*. He accepts Bhattanayaka's *Vibhavana-vyapara* and points out that it is the only source through which poetic experience can be obtained. Abhinavagupta brings out some of the hidden implications of *Sadharanikarana*. He stresses on the *Sadharanikarana* of all the four constituents of *Rasa* - the Determinants (*vibhava*), the Consequents (*anubhava*), the Transitory States (*sancaribhava*) and the Dominant States (*sthavi-bhava*). Later critics of the school of *Rasa*, like Visvanatha, Jagannatha and Mammata also lend their support to Abhinavagupta's theory of *Rasa* synthesis and consider it the main axis of *Sadharanikarana*.

As Richards' criticism sprang as a reaction against the stultifying effect of didactic and mystifying traditional criticism, so *Rasa* theory and its natural outcome the theory of

Sadharanikarana emerged as a reaction against the academic criticism which laid too much emphasis on the formal aspects of poetry like the arrangement of words, the use of auspicious and inauspicious letters, rhyme, metre, poetic flows (*dosas*), etc. The concept of good poetry, according to *Rasa* theory, necessarily involves richness and *Sadharanikarana* of the poetic experience.

Richards, in the manner of Bhattanayaka and Abhinavagupta, discusses in detail the psychological aspect of communication though he has chiefly the poet within his ken. He holds that mere representation of nature is never the aim of art. No true art is wrought direct from a living model. The artist's store of memory colours and moulds the outer things. His power of imagination is a fine means for this purpose. Art must possess the quality to move the audience. All great art, whether it is poetry or sculpture or painting, must represent keenness of memory picture with added power. Great art speaks to the many and not to a select few and in a language which can be appreciated by many, not in a language which is singularly personal and grotesque. Great art springs from the common life. Richards insists on the poet's mode of expression. The work of a poet is to express feeling or attitude in such a manner that it can evoke similar feeling or attitude in the reader. This is why the words of a poet are emotionally charged ones and evocative in nature.

Richards holds that it is easy to communicate bare information to others. But subtle and complex emotions and attitudes are difficult to be communicated. For this, an uncommon medium is necessary. Carefully chosen words, with the aid and assistance of one another, and after properly assimilating with one another, present such a special medium. It is in this sense that the metrical language of poetry is more helpful in communicating the experience of the poet than the language of prose.

Richards considers literature as universal, its appeal crossing all frontiers. Even if a poet composes for self-satisfaction, communicative element must creep into his poetry unconsciously. Communication is an unconscious process of poetry. Poetic creation is sometimes prompted by unconscious and sometimes by sub-conscious forces. The experience of the poet must assume a concrete shape before it is communicated. In order to become communicable, experience has to be

concretised. It is just possible that the poet is unaware of the outer requirement at the time of creation. But if his creation is valuable, it must have all the properties of a good art. It includes communicative efficacy. This quality of universality depends upon emotion rather than upon the style. Howsoever deft the selection of words, poetry cannot be appealing in the absence of valuable emotions. In this way, Richards lays stress on the emotional aspect of poetry.

Richards states that "the difficulty which has always prevented the arts from being explained as well as 'enjoyed' is language."⁷⁶

"Happy who can

Appease this virtuous enemy of man!"

It is necessary that the importance of arts should be understood and in this direction, language plays a significant role. "The arts are our storehouse of recorded values. They spring from and perpetuate hours in the lives of exceptional people, when their control and command of experience is at its highest, hours when the varying possibilities of existence are most clearly seen and the different activities which may arise are most exquisitely reconciled, hours when habitual narrowness of interests or confused bewilderment are replaced by an intricately wrought composure."⁷⁷ This is how Richards gives a psychological interpretation of the creative moment.

In the opinion of Richards, it is always fruitful to apply psychological method to explore the working of the artist's mind at the creative moment though. "Whatever psycho-analyst may aver, the mental processes of the poet are not a very profitable field for investigation. They offer far too happy hunting-ground for uncontrollable conjecture. Much that goes to produce a poem is, of course, unconscious"⁷⁸. Therefore, "the attempt to display the inner working of the artist's mind by the evidence of his work alone must be subject to the gravest danger."⁷⁹ There are some critics who venture to investigate the sources from which the poet got impetus to write a particular poem and also try to analyse the working of the poet's mind at the time he is engaged in creation.

⁷⁶ Richards : Principles, p. 31.

⁷⁷ Richards : Principles, p. 31.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 29.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

Mr. Graves in one such critic to analyse Coleridge's 'Kubla Khan'. Coleridge himself indicates some of the sources from which he got his materials for this poem, for example, from Bartram's *Travels in North and South Carolina* and Maurice's *History of Hindustan*. But it is always risky to dive deep into the working of the poet's mind. The example cited above serves as a "warning against one kind at least of possible applications of psychology in criticism."⁸⁰ Eliot takes up the same issue in his discussion of criticism of explanation in which criticism merges into scholarship. He specifically mentions that John Livingston Lowe's indication in his book *The Road to Xanadu* of the sources from which Coleridge borrowed his images and phrases to be found in 'Kubla Khan' and 'The Ancient Mariner' is not at all helpful in understanding these poems of Coleridge.⁸¹ For the same reason, Eliot brands James Joyce's *Finnegans Wake* as a "merely beautiful nonsense."⁸²

Richards' conclusion that the working of the poet's mind at the time of creation is not a proper field of psychological investigation is, thus, akin to Eliot's conclusion that "too much information about the origins of the poem may even break up my contact with it,"⁸³ and that "the psychological conjectures about inner experience"⁸⁴ are least helpful in understanding the creative process of art, much of which is mysterious. This romanticization of the creative process of art brings both Richards and Eliot on the same footing. This also brings them nearer to Indian poetics, which takes poetic experience in the sense of *Brahmasavada*, and *Atmanada*.

It would appear that Richards tells us little about the enjoyment of poetry from the side of the reader. The Indian theory of *Sadharanikarana*, as has been discussed above, focuses its attention on this aspect of literary creation. It holds that the enjoyment of poetry is a complex experience. In it, several forms of satisfaction are involved. This intermingling or assimilation is found in different proportions in different *Sahridayas* according to their mental make up, capability and sense of beauty.

⁸⁰ Richards : Principles, p. 31.

⁸¹ Eliot, T.S. : "The Frontiers of Criticism", On Poetry and Poets, p. 108.

⁸² Ibid., p. 109.

⁸³ Ibid., p. 112.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 111.

Richards' discussion of Tolstoy's 'Infection theory of art' further reminds us of the Indian theory of *Sadharanikarana*. Tolstoy's 'Infection theory of Art' assumes that "art becomes more or less infectious in consequence of three conditions; first, in consequence of greater or lesser peculiarity of the sensation conveyed; second, in consequence of a greater or lesser clearness of the transmission of this sensation and third, in consequence of the sincerity of the artist, that is, of the greater or lesser force with which the artist himself experiences the sensation which he is conveying."⁸⁵ Tolstoy considers infectiousness as a sign of good art. For him, "the degree of infection is the only standard of the value of art."⁸⁶ "A work of art is then finished when it has been brought to such clearness that it communicates itself to others and evokes in them the same feeling that the artist experienced while creating it."⁸⁷ Tolstoy apparently confuses communication with expression though he is right in saying that art bereft of genuine and vital passion is just a luxury. Richards objects to Tolstoy's phrase 'degree of infection' which, according to him, is ambiguous. Everyone cannot be equally infected by a piece of art. Infection "may be equivalent to the number of persons who may be infected and also the completeness with which the experience is reproduced in them."⁸⁸ Tolstoy's argument that the more the sensation to be conveyed is special, the more strongly does it act upon the receiver, is a faulty one because art is not great in proportion to its quality to infect others and it is a mistake to suppose that some special experiences are interesting. Richards admits that the triumph of art depends upon its wide appeal. But he disagrees with Tolstoy on the point that only typical experiences can be appealing. There are many experiences which are unusual and typical but they are unattractive, even repellent. In Richards' words: "Dyspeptics, amateurs of psycho-analysis, fishermen and golfers, have very often most remarkable things to recount. We shun having to listen precisely because they are so special. Further, many experiences by their very oddness are incommunicable."⁸⁹ Richards thinks that Tolstoy's 'infection

⁸⁵ Richards : Cited, Principles, p. 186.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 187.

⁸⁷ Tolstoy : What is Art > tr. Aylmer Maude (O.U.P., 1950), p. 53.

⁸⁸ Richards : Principles, p. 187.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

theory' has the obvious defect that it proposes a universal communicative process. The reality is that emotion at its highest pitch is difficult to be communicated. "A lighting flash, for example, which just misses one upon a summit, is much more difficult to describe than the same flash seen from the valley."⁹⁰ So, it is safer to assume that when Tolstoy refers to the sincerity of the artist, he aims at the "fullness, steadiness and cleanness with which the experience to be communicated develops in the mind of the communicator at the moment of expression."⁹¹ This 'completeness' or 'wholeness', according to Richards, is "the rarest and the most difficult condition required for supreme communicative ability."⁹² Tolstoy himself accepts that "the recipient of a truly artistic expression is so united to the artist that he feels as if the work were his own and not some one else's as if what he had long been wishing to express."⁹³ This reconciles Richards' stress on emancipation of the artist from special emotion to Tolstoy's theory of infection in art.

Richards makes no distinction between the world of poetry and the ordinary material world we live in save that the poetic word is "more highly and more delicately organized."⁹⁴ This leads to the conclusion that poetry is bound to follow the same laws and rules which govern ordinary day-to-day life. A poem is, therefore, subject to analysis and examination and the findings about it are communicable. The devices of communication, therefore, require to be studied conscientiously. Richards admits that though "we acquire many of our ways of thinking and feeling from parents and others", "the effects of communication go much deeper than this."⁹⁵ In *Speculative Instruments*, Richards provides a "communications diagram" to show the "cross-sections of activities ... made at the points where what is prepared for transmission and what has been decoded and developed may be supposed-in a successful communication-to resemble one another most nearly."⁹⁶ Richards seems to anticipate the existentialist thinking that the author exists for

90 Ibid., p. 188.

91 Richards : Principles, p. 189.

92 Ibid.

93 Tolstoy : What is Art?, p. 228.

94 Richards : Principles, p. 78.

95 Richards : Principles, p. 25.

96 Richards : Speculative Instruments, pp. 25-26.

himself as well as for the reader. Sartre observes : "It is not true, that one writes for oneself. That would be the worst blow. In projecting one's emotions on paper, one barely manages to give them a languid extension. The creative act is only an incomplete and abstract moment in the production of a work."⁹⁷ The typical Indian point of view includes both the Tolstoyan concept of infection in art and Richardsonian concept of artistic perfection. An artistic product be so as to appeal the perceiver. Again, the appeal of art is implied in its perfection. The Indian critics and philosophers believe that there are four channels through which knowledge is gained by the perceiver *Indriya*, *Mana*, *Buddhi* and *Atman*. Among these, *Indriya*, *Buddhi* and *Mans*, are *Prakṛta-Kṛta* i.e., natural products and *Atman* is *Svayambhu* i.e., self-existent, or absolute. *Indriya*, *Buddhi* or *Mana* are objects of perception (*drśya*). *Atman* is the perceiver (*drasta*) because it is *Svayambhu*. The object of perception are perishable while the perceiver is imperishable. Therefore, *Atman* is *Suddha*, *Buddha*, *Mukta* and *Satya*. The object of *Indriya* is *Padartha*. The object of *Mana* is *Sankalpa* and *Vikalpa*. The object of *Buddhi* is *Nirṇava*. But the object of *Atman* is pure joy. The reader or the *Sahrdava* gets pure joy that generates from his *Atman* with the *Udreka* of *Sattva*. Thus, Richards' theory of communication and the Indian theory of *Sadharanikarana* meet at several vital points as mentioned above. The difference between the two approaches is also obvious. Richards puts emphasis on the accomplishments of the poet. He says little about the reader. The critics of *Rasa* school are more interested in bringing out the mental state of the *Sahrdava*. Richards does not believe in the sublime aspect of poetry and hence he does not philosophize his theory of communication. The Indian theory of *Sadharanikarana* is deeply coloured with philosophy. But it stands to reason. Richards cannot imagine of *Sattvodoreka* which is at the root of *Sadharanikarana*.

97 Sartre, J.P. : 'Why Write?; What is Literature, tr. Bernard Frenchman, (Mathuen & Co., 1967), p. 29.

CHAPTER 6

EMOTIVE MEANING AND RASADHVANI

Communication being inextricable and inseparable from poetic experience, the next step is the examination of the vehicle of communication i.e., poetic language. Richards' discussion of emotive meaning as distinct from scientific meaning and his illustrations of how meaning of words vary with their contexts, how usage can change the referential meaning of a given word and many other theories relating to poetic language remind us of the Indian theory of meaning. It was to the credit of Anandavardhana and later to Abhinavagupta who wrote his brilliant commentary on Anandavardhana's *Dhvanvaloka* to apply Bharata's theory of *Rasa* to poetic meaning by an extension of its import as *Dhvani* or *Vyangya*. Like the ancient classical critics, Richards is chiefly concerned with the role of meaning in poetry. Richards' semantic interest is deeper than that of any other critic of our time. In considering the problems relating to the semantic approach to literature—he goes far ahead of all the critics of our time. He has raised some very important questions relating to the place of meaning in poetry. He states: "the answers to those apparently simple questions : 'What is a meaning?' 'What are we doing when we endeavour to make it our?' 'What is it we are making out?' are the masterkeys to all the problems of criticism."¹ As an anatomist of language, he suggests his own solutions to the various questions connected with meaning. His treatment of meaning is fairly exhaustive and elaborate covering a wide range from the study of word as sign to referential and emotive meaning. But as it would appear from this study, a large part of his theory of meaning was already anticipated by the critics of *Rasa* school.

The place of meaning in poetry is self-evident. Poetry is made of words. The end of poetry is to provide poetic experience. In painting, priority is given to the display of colours. Music employs inarticulate sounds not well joined together. Poetry directly speaks to our heart. No medium is so effective in stimulating and stirring the imagination as language. Meaning is inherent in the very definition of language for without meaning language will turn into a nonsense jingle. Prose has idea but no emotion. Poetry has

¹ Richards : *Practical Criticism*, p. 180.

emotion conveyed in a language liquid and meaningful. In no literary form is meaning so carefully investigated and explored as in poetry. It uses select words which are symbolical, metaphorical and suggestive. It uses complex words where there is room for alternative reactions. It uses images wrought in colourful words and phrases. In poetry, we often feel the presence of something in the words that is much more than their literal meaning. In other words, the entire effect of poetic language depends upon its multidimensional meaning.

When we turn to the Indian theory of meaning, we are immediately struck by its depth and variety. The science of meaning is relatively of recent origin in the West though it formed an integral part of the critical study in India as a result of which many critical theories were formulated from time to time. The contribution of the critics of *Rasa* school is immense in this direction. So, while discussing the problem of meaning, not only are the theories of meaning as propounded by the Indian linguists and grammarians helpful but the theories of the critics of *Rasa* school should also be taken into consideration. While the ideas advanced by *Vyakarana*, *Nyaya* and *Mimansa* are confined to the semantic aspect of language, the critics of *Rasa* school study the problem of meaning from the standpoint of poetry and creative literature. For ancient Indian scholars, grammar, linguistics, semantics and even philosophy were inseparable parts of literature. Richards is credited with a scientific bias in rejecting philosophical assertions with regard to meaning for a more plausible and acceptable linguistic theory. But as the study presented here will show, the Indian theory of meaning is much broader in outlook than Richards'. In fact, no part of Richards' critical formulation has been left out from its compass. And what is more, it tells us something more than is contained in the critical treatises of Richards. True, like Empson's, Richards' literary criticism stands on the borderline of literary criticism and semantics. But a close scrutiny of his theory of meaning will reveal that it simply touches the periphery of linguistics and nothing very original has been said about poetic meaning.

As it has been said above, interest in the science of meaning is of recent origin in the West though the modern linguists and critics have done some commendable work in this field.² Among

2 I. A. Richards : *The Meaning of Meaning* (1923); Tillyard, E.M.W. : *Poetry Direct and Oblique* (1934); Lasz 10, Antal: Question of

the literary critics who have taken up this problem with great interest, the names of Richards and his follower William Empson are worth mentioning. Empson's treatment of meaning is not as complete as that of Richards'.³ In a way, he simply elaborates the critical theories outlined by Richards. His literary criticism is, to some extent, an extension of the critical principles enunciated by Richards. Richards, in the words of Lemon, "treats the problems of meaning more completely than Empson and more clearly than Eliot."⁴ Richards has been particularly influential for his semantic approach to literary criticism. In the classical Sanskrit criticism also, we find a deep probe into the problems of language. The Indian philosophers even looked upon word as the main source of the manifestation of life and objects.

Among the contemporary critics, the two critics and teachers of Cambridge University, namely Richards and Leavis—have the credit to insist on close attention to the meaning of poetry. Richards is, however, more scientific in his approach than Leavis who is primarily a critic of poetry. It is to be noted that many of the conclusions of Richards regarding meaning in general are analogous to those arrived at by the literary critics and linguists of India.

Richards has to say a lot about the power of word. Quoting Lafcadio Hearn, he says that "words have colour, form, character. They have faces, ports, manners, gesticulation : they have moods, humours, eccentricities : they have tints, tones, personalities."⁵ It is, therefore, quite natural that one should be lost in the "Enchanted wood of words."⁶ From a rigorously linguistic standpoint, Richards lists sixteen main definitions of 'meaning' which, as he says, "reputable students of Meaning alone, have favoured."⁷ But as our concern here is with poetic meaning, we shall only take into account that part of Richards' theory of meaning which has direct bearing on the subject. Richards admits that it is "easy to be mysterious about the power

Meaning (1963); *Complex Meaning and Understanding*; Chase, Stuard : *The Tyranny of Words* (1950), *Power of Words* (1955) ; Cohen, Laurence Jonathan : *The Diversity*.

3 Wimsatt and Brooks : *Literary Criticism : A Short History*, p. 637.

4 Lemon, Lee T. : *The Partial Critics* (New York, O.U.P., 1965), p. 57.

5 Ogden & Richards : *Meaning*, pp. 235-36.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 138.

7 *Ibid.*, p. 186.

of words" and one can easily "speak of the 'Inexplicable' magic of words and indulge in romantic reveries about their semantic history and their immemorial past", but "it is better to realize that these powers can be studied, and that what criticism most needs is less poetising and more detailed analysis and investigation."⁸ Richards says that "From the beginning civilization has been dependent upon speech, for words are our chief link with the past and with one another and the channel of our spiritual inheritance."⁹ It is very difficult to define a word. Defining a word is something like knowing the self, knowing reality or knowing the actual existence of God. Richards observes "what is a word? is one of the founding question – along with "what am I?" "what is a fact?" and "what is God?" – on which all other questions balance and turn."¹⁰ In Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, Polonius finds prince Hamlet with a book and asks him what he is doing with the book. Hamlet replies, "words, words, words." This means that words are the chief media of expression and the poet's success depends upon his proper and skilful handling of words. According to Richards, word is a "component of an act of the mind so subtly dependent on the other components of this act and of other acts that it can be distinguished from those interactions only as a convenience of discourse."¹¹

So far as poetic meaning is concerned, the Indian critics hold that it should always aim at the manifestation of *Rasa*.

Language cannot be placed in a strait jacket either in poetry or in ordinary speech. Sometimes we speak in the language of gesture and every bit of our gesture works as a substitute for language because each has the power to communicate our feeling. The word is also used to convey meaning. As compared with the other devices of communication, language is relatively effective. Patanjali observes : "word is used to convey sense."¹² Indian grammar and philosophy put much stress on the power of word. In the *Rg. Veda*, *Vani* is said to be incomprehensible as it is

8 Richards : *Practical Criticism*, p. 364.

9 Richards : *Practical Criticism*, p. 321.

10 Richards : "The Interaction of Words", *The Practice of Criticism*, ed. Sheldon p. zitner, James O. Kissane & M.M. Liberman (Bombay, 1975), p. 235. The Article is reprinted from *The Language of Poetry*, ed. Allen Tate (Princeton University Press, 1942).

11 Richards : "The Interaction of Words", *The Practice of Criticism*, ed. Sheldon, Kissane & Liberman, p. 238.

12 Patanjali : *Mahabhasya*, 2/1/1.

impossible to comprehend the glorious Stotras or God Himself."¹³ In *Satapatha Brahmana*, the importance of word has been recognized because it is the only source of our experience, expression, suggestion and knowledge.¹⁴ According to *Vaisesika* philosophy, *Sabda* is one *Guna* out of twenty four *Gūnas*. *Brhadaranyaka Upanisad* considers *Sabda* as the emperor of the universe.¹⁵ *Agni Purana* tells us that *Sabda* is lively, and lighted God.¹⁶

The Indian grammarians and critics believe in the eternal relationship between word and meaning. Bhartrhari says : "It is *Sabda Brahma* which holds the entire universe." The relationship between word and meaning is eternal (*Nitya*) and divine (*apauruseya*). Patanjali, the author of the well-known classic Sanskrit manual on grammar *Mahabhasya*, elucidates the *Vartika* of Katyayana which says that "the relationship between word and meaning is eternal."¹⁷ He says that even the correct user of one word is entitled to salvation.¹⁸ Word is likened in India to a heavenly cow yielding all desires (*kamadhenu*). It gives as many meanings as one desires. Bhartrhari preaches all wisdom as depending upon word.¹⁹ He says: "without words, knowledge is unattainable. It is only from their integrated form that the entire knowledge is brought to light."²⁰ Much later, Jagannatha made 'delightful word' by itself stand for poetry.²¹ Yaska in his *Nirukta* says that the relation between word and meaning is like the relation between flower and its smell.²² Kalidasa, in the benedictory *Sloka* of his *Raghuvansa* considers word and meaning as inseparable like *Siva* and *Parvati*.²³ There is yet another school in India which holds that meaning is not something inherent in the word but is attached to it by convention (*sanketa*). In this sense, the word remains no more than a sign. This sign may stand for anything. The meaning of a word used as

13 Rg Veda, 10/114/8.

14 Satapatha Brahmana, 8/1/2/7.

15 Brhadaranyaka Upanisad, 4/1/2.

16 Agni Purana, 338/1.

17 Patanjali : Mahabhasya, See Vakya Padiya, 1/23.

18 Patanjali : Mahabhasya, 1/9.

19 Bhartrhari : Vakya Padiya, 1/119.

20 Ibid., 1/124.

21 Jagannatha : Rasagangadhara, p. 10.

22 Yaska : Nirukta, 1/20.

23 Kalidasa : Raghuvansa, 1/1.

sign is that which we intend to mean by it. If the word 'sun' is used for 'God', it actually means 'God' and not an astronomical star. word the has tremendous power. Properly used it produces the effect of *Mantra*. Wrongly used, it spells disaster. Panini points out that the erroneous use of a single vowel marred the prospects of Indra.²⁴

Ogden and Richards in 'Meaning of Meaning' look at word-meaning relationship from the linguistic point of view. According to them, words are nothing more than a sign or symbol. There is no direct and necessary relation between symbol and referent i.e., the word and the object. Symbol here means a sign or mark representing something and referent means an object for which the sign or mark stands. They argue that the direct relationship of symbol is with emotion. It is the emotion that works as a halfway house between referent and symbol and unites them. The basic triangle presented by them illustrates this hypothesis. Meaning is that mental element which is the meeting point of events and referents on the one hand and symbols and words used for them on the other. If the same news is published variously in different news papers, the symbols and words used by the different editors will vary in their emotional overtones. Some expressions might suggest the sympathy of the editor while others might indicate their malice, ill-will, prejudice, and even opposition. In this way, the relationship between referent and symbol is a mental activity.

There is a striking similarity between the views of the Indian grammarians and those of Richards on the point of recognizing the power of words, the relationship between word and meaning and the indirect connection that stands between the reference and the referent.

P.C. Chakravarti says that Richards does not recognize the essential relation between word and object, a presumption which goes against Indian semantics.²⁵ He holds that the Indian linguists and philosophers are great votaries of word-object relationship. The idea, however, does not seem to be correct. It is a fact that in *Practical Criticism*, Richards observes, "Words on the whole *Now*, however, it may have been in the remote past do not resemble the things they stand for."²⁶ For Richards words are

24 Paniniya Siksā, 52. The utterance of the Mantra 'Indra sarty vardhanam', instead of 'Indra satru vadhanam' gave prosperity to Indra's enemy.

25 Chakravarti, Prabhata Chandra : The Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus (Calcutta, 1933), F.N. 1 at p. 392).

no more than signs or symbols and signs and symbols have no essential resemblance with the things signified. In *Meaning*, Ogden and Richards deny any necessary connection between symbol and referent i.e., word and object. They state that the connection between symbol or word and referent or object is indirect or imputed. Word is related to object via thought or reference. They quote the statement of Dr. Postgate: "Throughout the whole history of human race, there have been no questions which have caused more heart-searching, tumults, and devastations than questions of the correspondence of words to facts ... Now, it is the investigation of the nature of correspondence between words and facts, to use these terms in the widest sense, which is the proper and highest problem of the science of meaning."²⁷ They tell us that words in themselves denote nothing. They have no intrinsic meaning. "Words, as everyone knows, 'mean' nothing by themselves, although the belief that they did ... was equally universal."²⁸ They further observe "It is only when a thinker makes use of them that they stand for anything, or in one sense have 'meaning', they are instruments."²⁹ They argue, "It may appear unnecessary to insist that there is no direct connection between say 'dog' the word, and certain common objects in our street, and that the only connection which holds is that which consists in our using the word when we refer to the animal."³⁰ They hold that the sense of word is rooted in our consciousness, not in any external activity. "We say that the gardener mows the lawn when we know that it is the lawn-mower which actually does the cutting, so, though we know that the direct relation of symbols is with thought, we also say that symbol record events and communicate facts."³¹ Hence, it is difficult to say that word is rooted in facts or things. "That every living word is rooted in facts of our mental consciousness and history it would be impossible to gainsay but it is a very different matter to determine what these facts may be."³² Ogden and Richards prefer to call 'referent' in place of

26 Richards : *Practical Criticism*, pp. 363-64.

27 Ogden & Richards : *Meaning*, p. 2.

28 Ibid., pp. 9-10.

29 Ibid., p. 10.

30 Ogden & Richards : *Meaning*, p. 12.

31 Ogden & Richards : *Meaning*, p. 9.

32 Ibid., p. 9.

'thing', 'entity', or 'object' because these words are restricted to material substances.³³

In India, Patanjali and Nagesa Bhatta did appreciable work in the field of semantics. Nagesa Bhatta is of the opinion that word has direct relationship with *Buddhi* or *Mana*. If words were directly related to object, the very utterance of the word *Agni* would have burnt our mouths. But this does not happen. This means that it is the mind or *Buddhi* which mediates between the word and the object.³⁴ Patanjali says that meaning depends upon its use. The object for which a word is used is its meaning.³⁵ But before accepting or rejecting the views of Ogden and Richards with regard to the relationship between word and object or symbol and referent, it is proper to examine the problem in the light of the Indian theory of meaning. Nagesa Bhatta says that it is the knowableness in word (*boddhavyata* or *janakata*) which is its potency (*sakti*). Although this knowableness is inherent both in word (*pada*) and object (*padartha*), their relationship cannot in any way be proved. Therefore, the relationship between word and object is some other element which we may call the idea of predicable or denoted and denoting (*vacya-vacakabhava*). Here *Vacaka* means word (*pada*) and *Vacya* means meaning (*artha*). Their understanding is due to the identification (*tadatmya*) or Unity (*abheda*) resulting from misimposition (*adhyasa*) of one on the other. This may be called sign (*sanketa*). This sign can be found in word (*pada*). Therefore, sign is *sakti*. It cannot be the connecting link (*sambandha*). It cannot assume either the form of identity (*abheda*) or of difference (*bheda*). Quoting Patanjali, Nagesa Bhatta observes that sign (*sanketa*) is the remembrance (*smrti*) of the misimposition of word and object on one another. This remembrance is so that it enables us to recognize the oneness of word and object. We feel that what is word is meaning and what is meaning is the real meaning. It is attached to remembrance (*smrti*) because without the memory of meaning, it is impossible to know the word. So, it is the known symbol of sign (*jñata sanketa*) which denotes potency or *Sakti* of word. Man imposed meaning on word is not sign. It is *Laksana*.

The question of the relationship between word and object occupies a central place in two important classical systems of

33 Ibid., p. 2.

34 Nagesa Bhatta : *Valyakarana Sidhanta Manijusa* (Chowkhamba, Varanasi, Samvat, 1985), p. 45.

35 Patanjali : *Mahabhasya*, 5.1.119.

Indian philosophy, namely *Nyaya*, and *Vaisesika* - the former is attributed to Gautama, nicknamed Aksapada, "the foot-eyed who wrote *Nyaya Sutra*, as early as 150 B.C., and the latter to Panini."³⁶

The *Purvamimansa-sutra* of Jaimini presupposes a long history of argument. "There is evidence", states A.B. Keith, "that the science was in full vogue as early as the middle of third century."³⁷ The method of Richards resembles to some extent to that of Jaimini's scholastic discussion. Jaimini's *Purva-mimansa* supports a theory of meaning as inherent in sound. The *Mimansa* doctrine does not recognise the existence of God. Nevertheless, it supports the infallibility of the Vedas. The language of the Vedas i.e., Sanskrit is not a historical tongue based on convention, but on emotion of being (*sat*) in sound (*śabda*). Hence the power of the sacred *Mantras* and of the *Vedic* hymns so touch the chord of human heart.

Mimansa supports the relationship between word and object through the medium of thought or mind. Object means anything that exists and has the property to be known and communicated. Broadly speaking, words are always intended to mean some objects. No word is meaningless. Even an apparently meaningless word may acquire meaning in future. Similarly, a word may lose its meaning or may acquire different shades of meaning with the passage of time due to certain geographical or linguistic reasons. Bhartrhari says that word is the cause of object, because object is born of word."³⁸ So, word may be regarded as the cause of object.

Word also means some object according to the theory propounded by *Nyaya*. The *Mimansa* school, however, has the credit to emancipate language from metaphysical considerations.

From the foregoing discussion, it follows that Richards' theory that there is no direct relationship between word and object i.e., symbol and referent is not very far from the Indian theory of meaning. Richards lays stress on thought which decides the meanings of words. The Indian point of view is that word always means something. What bridges the gulf between

36 Zimmer, Heinrich : *Philosophies of India* (London, 1951), p. 610.

37 Keith, A.B. : "The Karma-Mimansa", *The Heritage of India Series* (London & Calcutta, 1921), pp. 2-3.

38 Bhartrhari : *Vakya Padiya*, 3.32.

word and object is *Buddhi* or *Mana*. This is what Richards calls 'reference' or 'thought'. Thus, there seems to be an essential contradiction between the views of Richards and those of the Indian grammarians on this point. It is with reference to a particular object that a word is coined. When the speaker utters a word, he means an object. Words cannot stand without an object. The Indian grammarians do not deny that words act as *Sanketa*. But by *Sanketa*, they always mean the *Sanketa* towards a particular object. Richards fails to grasp this truth because he does not consider the ultimate function of sign or symbol. Words are, no doubt, a sign or symbol. But symbol always denotes something. This something is the object. Richards' theory of sign or symbol has, therefore, apparent limitations. He cannot find that words, apart from object, can exist at all. This error accounts for the supposed distance between the word and the object. As linguistics in its strict sense is outside the sphere of this study, we shall not discuss Richards' theory of meaning from the standpoint of Indian semantics and we shall confine our studies to literary criticism only.

Richards' theory of emotive meaning can be easily related to the Indian concept of *Rasadhvani*. His central doctrine of basic dichotomy of language between its emotive and referential uses is most cogently outlined in *Meaning*, written in collaboration with C.K. Ogden. Richards further explains his position in *Principles*, which, in many ways, seeks to synthesise his earlier views. In *Practical Criticism*, he gives a description of four-fold meanings of word and demonstrates by citing specific examples how it is the emotive meaning or intention which is dominant in poetry. Emotive meaning is often not easy to decipher because in it all the four important ingredients of word behaviour i.e., sense, feeling, tone and intention are fused together. According to Richards, the referential use of language is to be found in scientific discourse, which deals with facts and theories. This use points to the truth or falsity of a statement in the scientific sense. The truth it seeks to convey is demonstrable and verifiable. The emotive use of language is intended to evoke our emotion or influence our attitude.³⁹ It has no relation whatsoever with fact since it is the outcome of emotion. When words are used as signs and symbols, they do refer to something. This is what is called scientific or referential use. But poetry is concerned with

³⁹ Ogden and Richards : *Meaning*, p. 149.

'pseudo-statements' meaning they are neither true nor false but in keeping with the imaginative truth. "Poetry has no concern with limited or direct reference. It tells us or should tell us nothing."⁴⁰

As in "strict symbolic language the emotive effects of the words whether direct or indirect are irrelevant to their employment"⁴¹, so in "evocative language ... all the means by which attitudes, moods, desires, feelings, emotions can be verbally incited in an audience are concerned."⁴²

Poetry which is concerned with emotion is said to use emotive language. By emotive word, Ogden and Richards mean its capacity to express or excite feelings and attitudes. "The symbolic use of words is statement; the recording, the support, the organisation and the communication of references. The emotive use of words is a more simple matter, it is the use of words to express or excite feelings and attitudes. It is probably more primitive. If we say 'The height of the Eiffel Tower is 900 feet' we are making a statement, we are using symbols in order to record or communicate a reference, and our symbol is true or false in a strict sense and is theoretically verifiable. But if we say 'Hurrah!' or 'Poetry is a spirit' or 'Man is a worm', we may not be making statements, not even false statements; we are most probably using words merely to evoke certain attitudes."⁴³ Richards considers poetry "as the supreme form of emotive language."⁴⁴ Whether a given piece of language is symbolic or emotive depends upon the relevancy of the question: "Is this true or false in the ordinary strict scientific sense? If the question is relevant then the use is symbolic, if it is clearly irrelevant then we have an emotive utterance."⁴⁵

In *Principles*, Richards' views on referential or scientific vs. emotive uses of language may be found in detail.⁴⁶ Richards observes: "Words, when used symbolically or scientifically, not figuratively or emotively, are only capable of directing thought, to a comparatively few features of the more common situations."⁴⁷

40 Ogden & Richards : *Meaning*, p. 158

41 Ogden & Richards : *Meaning*, p. 149.

42 *Ibid.* , p. 235.

43 *Ibid.* , p. 149.

44 *Ibid.*, p. 159

45 Ogden & Richards : *Meaning* 150.

46 Richards : *Principles* p. 267

As "emotions are primarily signs of attitudes", the value of an emotive utterance rests on the "texture and form of the attitudes involved."⁴⁸ It is the peculiarity of poetic language that it has nothing to do with statement. The poet looks at life in an inspired moment and his spectacle gives him physical angles and mental images to which under normal conditions he is a stranger. As he is true to himself, he cannot be false to other men. A true poet does not intend to state. In *Practical Criticism*, Richards describes the modes through which the poet succeeds in subjugating statement to emotive purpose. "A poet may distort his statements; he may make statements which have logically nothing to do with the subject under treatment; he may, by metaphor and otherwise, present objects for thought which are logically quite irrelevant; he may perpetrate logical non-sense, be as trivial or as silly, logically, as it is possible to be; all in the interest of the other functions of his language - to express feeling or adjust tone or further his other intentions."⁴⁹

In *Science and Poetry* which is substantially a restatement, in a smaller compass, of the arguments advanced in *Meaning and Principles*, he once again lays stress on emotive meaning in poetry. The poetic experience may be divided into two classes - the intellectual and the emotional. "Intellectual stream", he says, "is the less important of the two."⁵⁰

According to Richards, "A pseudo statement is a form of words which is justified entirely by its effect in releasing or organising of impulses and attitudes..., a statement, on the other hand, is justified by its truth, i.e., its correspondence in a highly technical sense with the facts to which it points."⁵¹ "It is never what a poem says which matters but what it is."⁵² The literal or surface meaning of poetic utterance is of little importance and what matters most in it is the suggestion that it bears, the idea that it intends to express, the meaning that it points to.

Richards' attempt to separate emotive language from other forms of discourse does not suit the new Aristotelians who refuse to recognize any vital difference between poetic diction as

47 Ibid., p. 131.

48 Ibid., p. 132.

49 Richards : *Practical Criticism*, pp. 187-88.

50 Richards : *Science and Poetry*, p. 47.

51 Ibid., p. 57.

52 Ibid., p. 31.

diction, and the diction of any other composition.⁵³ A linguist, Thomas Clark Pollock, finds Richards' theory of emotive scientific use of language deficient because it suffers from the defect of elementalism. This is to say, it endeavours to define the scientific use of language in terms of intellectual elements, such as 'thought' and 'reference' and emotive use of language in terms of non-intellectual elements such as 'emotion' and 'attitudes'.⁵⁴ Richards tries to resolve this contradiction in his *Speculative Instruments* where he meets the objection raised by Max Black. He admits that "the bandying about of 'emotive' has done more harm than good".⁵⁵

The development of Richards from *Meaning* to *Speculative Instruments* shows that in his later writings he tries to make a compromise between emotion and cognition. But this does not in any way diminish the importance of his theory of the twin functions of language i.e., its emotive function and its scientific function. He keeps emotive meaning reserved for poetry because he thinks that it is only through emotive meaning that poetry achieves its aim.

So far as poetic meaning is concerned, there is much in common with Richards and the critics of *Rasa* school. The critics of *Rasa* school hold that it should always aim at the manifestation of *Rasa*. As Bharata puts it: "without *Rasa*, no meaning is possible."⁵⁶ By 'meaning' here, Bharata means the meaning of a dramatic performance. But its application was later extended to poetry and other forms of imaginative literature. Abhinavagupta, clearly states "While bringing out the meaning of poetry, Bharata says that poetic meaning is invariably *Rasa*."⁵⁷ He further says "It is said that the meaning of poetry is always suffused with *Rasa*."⁵⁸

The best Indian parallel of Richards' theory of emotive meaning is Anandavardhana's theory of *Dhvani*, which describes the place of beauty as inherent in suggestion, hints, inklings and

53 Olson, Elder : William Empson, *Contemporary Criticism and Poetic Diction*, Critics and Criticism, ed. R.S. Crane (Chicago, 1942), p. 68.

54 Pollock, T.C. : *A Critique of I.A. Richards's Theory of Language and Literature* (Institute of General Semantics, Chicago, 1942), p. 10.

55 Richards : *Speculative Instruments*, p. 40.

56 Bharata : *Natyasastra*, 6/31.

57 Abhinavagupta : *Abhinava-Bharati*, p. 278.

58 Abhinavagupta : *Commentary on Natyasastra*, 16/7 (B.H.U., 1975), p. 1257.

ambiguities. Anandavardhana in his *Dhvanyaloka* elaborates his theory of *Dhvani*. It is held that *Rasa* gets revealed only in *Vyanjana*. *Rasa* is invariably *Vyangya*. Anandavardhana does not ignore *Rasa*. He simply takes *Rasa* as the culmination of *Dhvani* or the best form of *Dhvani* called *Rasadhvani*. Anandavardhana makes three broad divisions of *Dhvani*—content suggestion (*Vastu dhvani*), figurative suggestion (*alankara dhvani*) and emotional suggestion (*resadhvani*).⁵⁹ *Vastu-dhvani* refers to plot or its-vrt. Its application is limited to the suggested content of a single verse or verse-paragraph. It cannot apply to a whole Act or episode even. In *Alankara-dhvani* suggestion is made through a figure of speech. Among these three kinds of *Dhvani* – only *Rasadhvani* is appreciated and relished spontaneously and incessantly without any intervention, much in the same manner in which a needle pierces through hundred fold leaves. This is what is called *sata-patra-bhedana-nyaya*. This highest form of *Rasadhvani* is called *Asanlaksyakrama-vyangya*. The other two kinds of *Dhvani* i.e., *Vastudhvani* and *Alankaradhvani* are appreciated and relished with some interruption. So they come under the category *Sanlaksyakrama-vyangya*. According to Anandavardhana, the three specimens of poetry are: poetry of suggestion (*dhvani-kavya*), poetry of subordinate suggestion (*gunibhuta-vyangya*) and portrait poetry (*citra-kavya*). The first one is the best kind of poetry and the last one is the worst kind because it is not poetry but only a combination of portrait or pictures.

Anandavardhana holds that *Dhvani* is the very soul of poetry.⁶⁰ Abhinavagupta says that *Dhvani* is the source of beauty (*carutva*) in poetry.⁶¹ How suggestion conveys the emotional content and how suggestive meaning or *Dhvanyartha* sparkles amid a cluster of meanings are described in detail by Anandavardhana. It is the plurality of meaning which is the starting point for him. The plurality of meaning emanates from the coiled language of poetry which by its very nature is flexible. Anandavardhana describes the power of word and says that it has three powers (*saktis*). They are indication (*abhidha*), metaphor (*laksana*), and suggestion (*Vyanjana*).

59 Anandavardhana : *Dhvanyaloka*, 1/4 vrtti.

60 Anandavardhana . *Dhvanyaloka Locana*, p. 19.

61 Abhinavagupta : *Dhvanyaloka Locana*, p. 19.

In a non-literary expression, the Indicative function is operative. 'This is a pen' is a flat and bald statement which has no other meaning save what it conveys on the surface. But it is not mere information that we achieve when we say "He is an ass". This sentence is more intensive in effect than its denotative paraphrase. For a moment, the man referred to is compared with an ass and the two are fused together in metaphorical identity which enables us to realize the stupidity of the man in greater vividness. In such a case, the metaphorical (*laksanika*) function of language has a definite purpose to serve. *Vyanijana* gives an entirely different meaning than the *Abhinideyārtha* or *Laksyārtha*. It leads to the emotional realisation of meaning. In the statement: 'O sage! You can now move freely in the forest because the dog (*sunaka*) which had made so much of ravages in the past has now been killed by the lion,"⁶² the surface meaning is in the positive while its intended meaning is in the negative. In fact, the speaker asks the sage not to come to the forest any more because it is now frequented by a lion more ferocious than the dog. It is not uncommon for the beloved to say 'No' when she really means 'yes'.

According to Anandavardhana and his followers, it is the predominance of *Rasadhvani* which makes poetry glow with real charm. Figure of speech i.e., *Alankara*, *Guna* and *Chanda* are individually parts of *Dhvani*. Parts cannot be treated as the whole. Even collectively, they are the parts of *Dhvani* and not *Dhvani* itself. They are confined to the body of poetry, its exterior organism. They cannot be treated as the soul of poetry. Anandavardhana says that *Alankara*, *Guna* and *Chanda* can be easily subordinated to *Dhvani*. They cannot be as important as *Dhvani* itself in the same manner in which the attendant cannot occupy the place of the king himself.⁶³

Anandavardhana does not lay much stress on words. He pays more attention to meaning. He says that a sensible person (*sura*) gives more importance to meaning than to the word⁶⁴ It is the meaning which is of paramount importance in poetry much in the same manner in which *Atman* is of supreme importance in the living body.⁶⁵ Meaning is not confined to what is only understood

62 Anandavardhana : *Dhvanyaloka*, 1/4 vrtti.

63 Anandavardhana : *Dhvanyaloka*, 1/13 vrtti.

64 Ibid., 1/2.

when a word is spoken. It is its rudimentary form. The real form is all embracing. It is not limited to what the word conveys exically. For this, a separate dictionary and a separate grammar are required. This dictionary is the dictionary of feelings and this grammar is the grammar of *Sanskara*. *Dhvanyartha* depends upon feeling. The Innumerable and infinite meanings are not in themselves beautiful unless they are instinct with *Rasa*. In order to be beautiful, a poetic meaning has to be saturated with *Rasa*. This is called *Rasa-sansparsa*.

Anandavardhana is of the opinion that the *Vyangyārtha* is realized when *Vacyārtha*, *Abhidheyārtha* and *Laksyārtha* become inoperative. *Vyangyārtha* is always realised emotively and imaginatively. In *Dhvani*, the intended meaning is embedded in the words themselves. Anandavardhana gives another name of *Dhvani* i.e., *Pratiyamana-artha*.⁶⁶ It is the *pratiyamana-artha* which is of greater significance is an imaginative composition. It is not what is said as what is left behind and conveyed through *Dhvani* or *Vyanjana* is of supreme importance. This is because in Keats' words, "heard melodies are sweet but those unheard are sweeter."⁶⁷ When Visvanatha defines poetry as an utterance steeped in *Rasa*⁶⁸ or when Anandavardhana speaks of the *Carutva*⁶⁹ or poetry, they definitely refer to the *Dhvanyārtha* of poetry.

Rasa theory has much to do with the theory of *Dhvani*. Anandavardhana differentiates *Vacyārtha* from *Pratiyamana-artha* or *Vyangyārtha* and lays down that the latter is to be found in the works of ambitious and great poets. *Vacyārtha* or *Mukhyārtha* can be likened to the various parts of the body such as the eyes, the nose, and the hands but *Pratiyamana-artha* is like the grace (*lavanya*) of a woman the radiant existence of which can be perceived over and above these.⁷⁰ Knowledge of grammar is of little help in arriving at *Pratiyamana-artha*. Anandavardhana observes that *Pratiyamana-artha* is not known only on the basis

65 Ibid.

66 Anandavardhana : *Dhvanyaloka*, 1/4.

67 Keats " 1Ode on a Grecian Urn", 11-12. The Poetical Works of John Keats, ed. H. Buxton Foreman (Oxford, 1945), p. 232.

68 Visvanatha : *Sahitya Darpana*, 1/2, p. 23.

69 Anandavardhana : *Dhvanyaloka*, 4/8.

70 Anandavardhana : *Dhvanyaloka*, 1/4.

of the knowledge of word and meaning. It is known only by the *Tattvajña* of *Kavyaratha*.⁷¹ How then can we know the *Pratiya-man-ārtha* or *Dhvanyārtha* that gleams from behind the cloak of words and their *Vacyārtha*? what then helps us to know *Dhvanyārtha* which in the words of Mammata "is like the veiled breasts of a woman,"⁷² or in the words of Ramaswami Sastri, "like the moon behind the hill, hidden yet flinging a finer light."⁷³ Kuntaka says that the excellence of poetry lies in the peculiar turn (*bhanitī vaicitrya* or *bhangi-bhanitī*). It is only through a specific use of words that meaning creates delight in the heart of the sympathetic reader (*sahṛdaya*). This strikingness of expression (*vakrokti*) is the secret of good poetry.⁷⁴ Mammata says, "many factors are responsible in bringing home *Dhvanyārtha* – the speaker, the listener, the tone of the voice, the expressed meaning, the presence or absence of the third person, the context of utterance, the place and the time, and so on. In addition to these, the interpreter must himself be a man of imagination."⁷⁵ And it is here that we come to another aspect of *Dhvani* – the role of imagination in the creation as well as the appreciation of poetry. As abhinavagupta says, "the cooperation of the hearer's imagination with that of the speaker is the very lifebreath of *Dhvani*."⁷⁶

It is easy to recognize the supremacy of *Dhvani*. Once the nature of *Dhvani* or *Vyangva* is understood, it becomes convenient to understand much that may appear to be obscure, untidy and ambiguous in poetry. Ambiguity then may appear to be only a cross-road leading to *Vyangyārtha*. It is held by Anandavardhana that "suggestion enlivens the meaning in the same way in which the tree shoots forth new leaves at the advent of spring."⁷⁷ Not only words but sound and sound-clusters, symbols, images, morphemes bound as well as free, the syntactical arrangement, the usual word order as well as its

71 Ibid., p. 1/7.

72 Mammata : *Kavya Prakasa*, 5/45-46 vrtti.

73 Sastri, Ramaswami : "The Dynamism of the Indian Concept of Rasa", *Kuppuswami Sastri Commemoration Volume* (Madras, 1935), p. 126.

74 Kuntaka : *Vakrokti-Jivita*, 1/9 vrtti.

75 Rajasekhara : *Kavyamimansa*, p. 32.

76 Abhinavagupta : *Abhinava-Bharati*, p. 279.

77 Anandavardhana : *Dhvanyaloka*, 4/4.

violation, everything may seem to contribute to the final purpose of the poem - the evocation of *Rasa*.

Vyanjana far surpasses either the literal meaning or the metaphorical meaning. Visvanatha says that where literal (*abhidha*) or metaphorical (*lakṣana*) meanings or total or final purport (*tatparya*) become ineffective, it is the suggestive meaning (*vyanjana*) which comes to our help. It is through *Vyanjana* only that we can know the deeper implication of an utterance.⁷⁸ *Vyangyārtha* is not understood logically or scientifically. In it the emotional signification is very important. *Dhvanyārtha* is no doubt sometimes based on fact particularly at the initial stage. But even this points to an emotional mood. It is wrong to suppose that *Vyanjana* completely ignores *Abhidha*. It is the words of Anandavardhana, "as a man aspiring for light must take care of the flame of the lamp with the assistance of oil, etc., so also one who aspires for *Vyanjana* must not forget *Abhidha* which is its root."⁷⁹ Visvanatha calls *Abhidha* the first power (*agrīma-abhidha*).⁸⁰

Although Richards considers the speaker's intention to be of great value, he does not ignore the importance of either sense or feeling which contribute to the formation of intention. While describing the interrelation between sense and feeling, he draws our attention to three situations when sense and feeling may seem to overlap. There may be a case where the feeling is generated and governed by the sense. This is to say, the feeling evoked is the result of apprehending the sense. Again, there may be a case where the word first expresses a feeling, and such sense as it conveys is derived from the feeling. And finally, where sense and feeling are less closely knit and their alliance comes about through their context.⁸¹ This interrelation between sense and feeling shows that feeling cannot work independently. As *Vyanjana* has to take the aid of *Abhidha*, so feeling has to take the aid of sense in order to show its energy. In *Meaning*, Ogden and Richards state that the symbolic and the emotive uses of language are not diametrically opposed to each other. The "subtle interweaving of the two functions is the main reason why recognition of their difference is not universal."⁸²

78 Visvanatha : *Sahitya Darpana*, 2/12, p. 75.

79 Anandavardhana : *Dhvanyaloka*, 1/9.

80 Visvanatha : *Sahitya Darpana*, 2/3, p. 40.

81 Richards : *Practical Criticism*, pp. 210-211.

The full significance of a literary piece is understood when *Rasa-dhvani*, the ripest form of *dhvani*, is appreciated. The insistence on the emotional aspect of language is, in fact, one of the signal contributions of the *Dhvani* school to the science of meaning. Anandavardhana is chiefly concerned with poetry and he successfully establishes that in all great poetry, the final meaning is *Rasa-dhvani* which is understood through the process of *Vyanana*.⁸³ The word that the poet uses, the images he selects and wields, the scenes he delineates — all have to serve only one purpose, namely the evocation of *Rasa*. Poetic diction or *Guna* depends on the stylistic perfection through aesthetic mode of arrangement of words. Even this arrangement in its final analysis, seems to be intimately related to *Rasa*.

The critics of *Rasa* school maintain that *Rasa* can never be expressed in words. It can only be suggested by a description of the appropriate situation. *Rasa* can never be *Vacya*. It can only be *Vyangya*. Mammata, therefore, states that *Vacya* cannot evoke *Rasa* even in dream.⁸⁴

Vyanjana may be dependent upon word (*sabdasrta*), may not be dependent upon word (*asabhasrta*), may be dependent upon gesture (*cestasrta*), and may yet extend to various forms of expression. According to the supporters of *Vyanjana*, *Vyanjana-Vyapara* may be divided into two parts, first *Vyanjana* depending upon *Sabda* i.e., *Sabdanistha* and second *Vyanjana* depending upon *Artha* i.e., *Arthanistha*. These two types of *Vyanjana* may further be divided into two parts, *Abhidhamula* and *Laksanamula*. *Sabdanistha Abhidhamula Vyanjana* is also called *Sabdivynjana*. In this way, there are, on the whole, three divisions of *Vyanjanavyapara*, — *Sabdi Vyanjana* or *Sabdanistha Abhidhamula*, *Laksanamula* and *Arthi Vyanjana* or *Arthanistha Abhidhamula Vyanjana*. In *Sabdi Vyanjana*, there is the predominance of suggestive word whereas in *Arthi Vyanjana* there is the predominance of suggestive meaning.⁸⁵ In *Slesa* also, a word has more than one meaning. But the difference between *Slesa* and *Sabdi Vyanjana* is that while in the former, all the meanings of a word are *Vacya*, in the latter there is one level of meaning which is not *Vacya* but *Vyangya*. In *Slesa*, the different

82 Ogden & Richards : *Meaning*, p. 150.

83 Anandavardhana : *Dhvanyaloka*, 1/5.

84 Mammata : *Kavya Prakasa*, 5/47 vrtti.

85 Ibid., 2/20, 21, 22.

meanings of a word are either contextual (*prakaranika*) or non-contextual (*aprakaranika*). But in *Sabdi Vyanjana*, a group of meaning is contextual (*aprakaranika*). This theory of *Sabdi Vyanjana* is, however, not free from dispute. It is argued that *Vyanjana* is never the *Vyapara* of *Sabda*. *Vyanjana* implies meaning and it is always connected with meaning. Again, it is argued that *Vyanjana* is the *Sakti* of *Sabda* and, therefore, it is improper to conceive of *Arthi Vyanjana*. The fallacy involved in these arguments can be resolved if it is assumed that in *Arthi Vyanjana*, the meaning is superimposed on the literal meaning. where *Vyanjana* is inherent in *Sabda*, we get *Sabdi Vyanjana*. On the contrary, where *Vyanjana* is inherent in *Artha* and *Sabda* comes only as a help and becomes ancillary, we get *Arthi-vyanjana*. Thus, the argument to show the impossibility of *Sabdi* or *Arthi-vyanjana* is negated by the fact that *Vyanjana* is the *Sakti* of *Sabda* and it may either come out direct from *Sabda* or may lie deep in its surface meaning.

When *Vyanjana* is at work, its *Vyapara* is called *Dhvanana Vyapara*. Poetry in which *Vyanjana* overrides other functions of language is called *Dhvani-kavya*. *Dhvani-kavya* is ordinarily divided into two parts—*Abhidhamula* and *Laksanamula*. The other name of *Abhidhamula* is *Viyaksitanyanaravacya Dhvani*. The other name of *Laksanamula* is *Avivaksitavacya Dhvani*. *Laksanamula* or *Avivaksitavacya dhvani* is put into two classes i.e., *Arthantara-sankramita vacya Dhvani* and *Atyanta Tiraskrta Vacya Dhvani*. *Abhidhamula* is also put into two classes i.e., where the process is realized (*sanlaksyakrama Vyangya*) and where the process is not realized (*asanlaksyakrama vyangya*). *Asanlaksyakrama Vyangya* is nothing but *Rasa* itself. In it, the intermediary link is not felt and the listener straightway understands the *Dhvanyartha* which is instinct with *Rasa*. *Sanlaksyakrama Vyangya* is concerned either with actual object (*vastu*) or with figure of speech (*alankara*). In this way, the supporters of *Dhvani* not only advocate the place of *Rasa* in *Dhvani* but also clearly state that the beauty (*camatkara*) of the other varieties of *Dhvani* depends upon *Rasa- Dhvani*.⁸⁶ The poet's utterance hits the target as a sharp arrow. while speaking one thing, he means several things at a time. But of all the meanings, the only *Dhvanyartha* or *Pratiyamanaartha* is aimed at by the poet. A.C. Bradley would say "The poet speaks to us of one

86 Anandavardhana : *Dhvanyaloka*, 1/5 vrtti.

thing, but in this one thing, there seems to lurk the secret of all. He said what he meant, but his meaning seems to beckon away beyond itself, or rather to expand into something boundless which is only focussed in it."⁸⁷ It is the *Pratiyamana Artha* of Anandavardhana which is called *Anumeyartha* by Mahima Bhatta and *Vakrokti* by Kuntaka. Mahima Bhatta and Kuntaka are *Abhidhavadi* critics. But in one way or the other, they also accept the emotive function of language. Anandavardhana calls it *Vyangyārtha*. *Dhvani* is *Kavyātma* and, therefore, it is *Alankārya* i.e., an object to be decorated. It cannot be *Alankāra* i.e., a device for decorating poetry.

The revelation of *Dhvani* is possible only when the word shakes off its literal meaning and the literal meaning is subordinated to the intended meaning.⁸⁸ This intended meaning is evocative and leads to the revelation of *Rasa*. Anandavardhana applies Bharata's theory of *Rasa* to lyric and other variants of verse where there is absence of determinant (*vibhava*). His theory of *Dhvani* is a successful attempt in the direction of effecting a synthesis between *Dhvni* and *Rasa*.⁸⁹

It would now appear that Richards' concepts of referential meaning and emotive meaning are not very far from the Indian concepts of *Vacaka Sabda* and *Vyanjaka Sabda*. Like the critics of *Rasa* school, Richards says that the referential use of language is the language of statement whereas the emotive language is the language of poetry. Richards' emotive meaning includes both *Laksyārtha* and *Vyangyārtha*. The Indian critics state that the stated meaning i.e., *Abhidheyārtha* and the metaphorical i.e., *Laksyārtha* culminate in the suggestive meaning i.e., *Vyangyārtha* which is totally different from the stated or metaphorical meanings. The different types of *Dhvani* mentioned by Anandavardhana may be taken as different types of intended meaning in order of increasing complexity. Richards states:—"A feeling is thus an innocent and unfallacious thing in comparison with thoughts and intentions. It may arise through immediate stimulation without the interception of either thought or intention."⁹⁰ Now here, he clearly aims at the ideal which

87 Bradley, A.C. : Oxford Lectures on Poetry, p. 26.

88 Anandavardhana : Dhvanyaloka, 1/13.

89 Anandavardhana : Dhvanyaloka, 1/1.

90 Richards : Practical Criticism, p. 331.

Anandavardhana tried to attain when he propounded the theory of *Asanlaksyakrama Vyangya*.

Richards' theory of four-fold meanings as put forward in *Practical Criticism*, once again reminds us of *Rasa Dhvani*. Here Richards looks at the problem of meaning from a different angle. "The all important fact", Richards observes, "for the study of literature—or any other mode of communication—is that there are several kinds of meaning."⁹¹ Richards holds that words have myriad meanings. He makes four divisions of meaning depending on Sense, Feeling, Tone, and Intention.⁹² The poet lays emphasis on any of these four meanings. Sense is pure statement or factual description. Feeling is the bias or accentuation of interest towards a particular statement that gives some personal flavour or colouring of feeling to a given statement. Tone indicates the speakers' attitude towards his listener. Intention is the final meaning that suggests the speaker's purpose. These four meanings are aimed at by the speaker as the occasion warrants. The psychologists may insist on meaning No. 1. He will try to keep aside meaning No.2 He may place his ideas before the readers for their opinion about meaning No. 3. But a speaker who will like to impress the public by his speech will attach greater importance to meanings No.2 and 3 although he cannot completely ignore meaning No.1. In literature, great importance is attached to meanings No 2 and 3 although no hard and fast rule can be laid down in this connection.

It is only by reading poetry closely and examining all its ingredients that the reader can be fully aware of the tone and intention of the poet. Hasty reading of poetry prevents the reader from taking a full view of its meaning. Richards guards us against 'over literal' reading which is a great impediment in the way of poetic appreciation. Literal meaning is, no doubt, a passage to other meanings more important than it because it is on the basis of the literal meaning that other meanings are understood and appreciated. But if one is only concerned with the literal meaning, one may miss the tone and intention of the poet. Richards points out the twin dangers which work as 'jostling rocks' between which too many ventures into poetry are wrecked. These twin-dangers are careless, 'intuitive reading' and prosaic 'over-literal reading'.⁹³

91 Richards : *Practical Criticism*, p. 180.

92 Ibid., pp. 179-88.

In poetry, the four kinds of meaning described above are synthesised. But Sense, Tone and Intention are of considerable importance in making out the meaning of a poem. In Richards' words "Where conjecture or what is left behind, is writer's weapon, it seems unnatural to bring this under the heading of sense or statementIt is no long step to admitting that the form or construction or development of a work may frequently have a significance that is not reducible to any combination of our other three functions. This significance is then the author's Intention."⁹⁴ Tone, which is something like Indian *Kaku*, clearly bridges the gulf between the speaker and the knowable, what is called *Bodhavya* in Indian poetics. It forms an integral part of intention. Tone is not independent of the other kinds of meaning.⁹⁵ The sound of a word has plainly much to do with the feeling it evokes, above all when it occurs in the organized context of a passage of verse.⁹⁶ Intended meaning is an important constituent of *Dhvani*. The understanding of what the speaker says depends upon several factors i.e., the knowledge of his mood, purpose, intonation and stressing on word. Intention cannot be judged in isolation. It is constituted of all the three other dimensions of meaning i.e., Sense, Feeling and Tone. Richards observes : "A perfect understanding would involve not only an accurate direction of thought, a correct evocation of feeling, an exact appreciation of tone and a precise recognition of intention but further it would get these contributory meanings in their right order and proposition to one another, and seize—though not in terms of explicit thought—their interdependence upon one another, their sequences and interrelations."⁹⁷

A close study of the four-fold meanings indicated by Richards would reveal that Sense is nothing more than Indian *Abhidha*. The other three meanings i.e., Feeling, Tone and Intention may be easily related to Indian *Vyanjana*. Keith considers Tone and *Dhvani* as synonymous.⁹⁸ It is, of course, not Richards' Tone. Richards himself gives utmost importance to Intention which,

93 Richards : Practical Criticism, p. 191.

94 Ibid., p. 356.

95 Ibid., p. 211.

96 Richards : Practical Criticism, pp. 209-10.

97 Ibid., p. 332.

98 Keith, A. B. : A History of Sanskrit Literature (O.U.O., 1953), p. 388.

according to him, "may completely subjugate the others."⁹⁹ Emotive meaning takes into account belief and emotive belief is the "use of the idea – by our interests, desires, feelings, attitudes, tendencies to action and what not."¹⁰⁰ Strictly speaking, "the question of belief or disbelief, in the intellectual sense, never arises when we are reading well."¹⁰¹ Richards' concept of Intention, which is a crystallization of Sense, Feeling and Tone, can be easily related to the Indian concept of *Rasa-dhvani*. Even the Western concepts of ambiguity, paradox and irony have much to do with the Indian concept of *Rasa-dhvani*.

The ancient Sanskrit critics made a distinction between *Sastra* and *Kavya* and accordingly between *Sastrokti* and *Kavyokti*. *Sastrokti* uses the language of statement. It uses denotative words or *Vacaka Sabdas*. Its function is referential. *Kavyokti* uses connotative words or *Vyanjaka Sabdas*. The meaning of the former is fixed and rigid while that of the latter is subject to change with time, space, and use. The basic distinction is very close to that made by Richards in his division of language into scientific and emotive categories. Richards' concept of poetic meaning is surprisingly close to the idea of ancient rhetoricians, specially those of the *rasa-dhvani* school like Anandavardhana and Mammata.

Richards states that the poetic meaning which is shorn of complexity is not worth considering because complexity of meaning is one of the signs of good poetry. Mammata also maintains that poetry which contains no *Vyangya* is poetry of the lowest order i.e. *Avara Kavya*. It is nothing more than a picture in words (*arthacitra*).¹⁰² It sometimes happens that the *Vyangyārtha* of poetry is not better than its *Vacyārtha*. Considering the minor role (*gunibhava*) played by *Vyangyārtha* in such places, it is called *Guni Bhuta Vyangya*. *Vyangya* here is never prominent and, therefore, poetry containing *Guni Bhuta Vyangya* is called *Madhyama Kavya*. But where *Vyangyārtha* is quite prominent as compared with *Vacyārtha* or *Laksyārtha*, the meaning is derived straight from *vyanjana Vyapara*. Poetry containing such *Vyangya* is called *Uttama* or *Dhvani Kavya*. Richards does not draw a rigid demarcating line between sense, Feeling, Tone and Intention.

⁹⁹ Richards : Practical Criticism, p. 185.

¹⁰⁰ Richards : Practical Criticism, p. 275.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 277.

¹⁰² Mammata : Kavya Prakasa, 1/5.

But it is clear that according to his scheme, poetry which conveys only sense is of inferior kind. Feeling, Tone and Intention are arranged in classes or groups to show emotional gradation. According to Richards, the best variety of poetry must communicate the intention or the *Dhvanyartha* of the poetic piece. Again, Richards' theory of emotive meaning is reminiscent of Bhoja's concepts of *Svabhavokti*, *Vakrokti* and *Rasokti* i.e., literal statement, crooked statement and emotive statement.¹⁰³ Bhoja's *Svabhavokti* is Richards' Sense. *Vakrokti* refers to poetic diction. But it may also be related to Richards' concept of feeling and tone, because feeling and tone both indicate the poet's or speaker's attitude. *Rasokti* is Richards' Intention or emotive meaning.

Richards explores the resources of meaning in his own manner. He tries to solve the problem : how a word behaves and how it acquires meaning? He holds, like other linguists, that word does not have its own meaning. It means something when it is used to convey an object. In other words it acquires meaning when it is used to mean something. In *Interpretation in Teaching* he lays down that word is merely a sign and derives its meaning "through belonging to a recurrent group of events, which may be called its context"¹⁰⁴ A word's context is the words which surround it in the utterance, and the other contemporary signs which govern its interpretation. In *Principles* he admits that "words have no intrinsic literary characteristics. None is either ugly or beautiful, intrinsically displeasing or delightful. Every word has instead, a range of possible effects, varying with the conditions into which it is received."¹⁰⁵ In meaning, he observes that "no word carries a fixed meaning quite irrespective of its context."¹⁰⁶ In *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, which is a continuation of the studies he began with C.K. Ogden in *meaning*, he once again dismisses the doctrine of 'usage' and suggests in its place a theory of context and 'interanimation of words'. He argues that meaning is essentially contextual and it is determined by the words which come before after a particular word. The meaning of word cannot be judged if it is torn out of its context. Its meaning changes according to context. "Context",

103 Bhoja : Sarasvati Kanthabharana, 5/8.

104 Richards : *Interpretation in Teaching*, p. VIII

105 Richards : *Principles*, p. 136.

106 ogden & richards : *Meaning*, p. 58.

Richards observes : "is a set of entities (things or events) relocated in a certain way; these entities have each a character such that other sets of entities occur having the same characters and related by the same relation; and these occur 'nearly uniformly.'¹⁰⁷ In *Rhetoric*, he elaborates his theory of context and points out that "what a word means is the missing parts of the contexts from which it draws its delegated efficacy."¹⁰⁸ To know these 'missing parts' of the context is to know the exact meaning of a word. And these can be known only when the import of the situation and the intention of the speaker are understood.

Richards' notion of 'context', to some extent, resembles the Indian concept of *Prakarana*. The *Dhvani* of poetry can only be appreciated with regard to its *Prakarana*. It is the speciality of *Dhvani* that it changes according to *Prakarana*. The same expression 'the sun is set', may convey different meanings to a farmer, a school boy, a shopkeeper and a prostitute. *Prakarana* means the context in which a given citation can be properly understood. For example, if one says—"Ram Krisna", the juxtaposition of the two words in the context of the *Bhagavata* shows that only *Balarama* and *Krisna* are implied, not *Dasaratha's* son. In the context of eating "*Saindhavamanaya*" means 'bring salt' not 'horse'.

Akanksha is the expectancy in a sentence raised by, say, the subject for the predicate. The linguistic aspect of context has been discussed in detail by the *Mimansa* school of philosophy in India. The *Mimansa* defines sentence "as a group of incomplete words (*akanksha*) awaiting their completion in a context."¹⁰⁹ Words do not possess independent meaning unless they are used in a specific context. The argument advanced by *mimansa* is that in case words would have their independent meaning it would not have been essential for them to have justified their meaning in relation to the words that come before and after them. The very fact that words require the help of other words to complete their meaning is sufficient testimony to the fact that they do not have their own independent meaning. When they are used in a sentence, say, in a context, they are impregnated with meaning as and when occasion demands.

107 Ogden & Richards : *Meaning*, p. 59

108 Richards : *Rhetoric*, p. 35.

109 Pandeya, P.C. *The Problem of Meaning in Indian Philosophy* (Motilal Banarsidas, Patna, 1962), p. 77.

The sentence is like a web in which words are inseparably connected with one other. Ogden and Richards observe : "to say, indeed, that anything is an interpretation is to say that it is a number of a psychological context of a certain kind. An interpretation is itself a recurrence."¹¹⁰ And in another place, they say : "Our interpretation of any sign is our psychological reaction to it, and determined by our past experience in similar situations and by our present experience."¹¹¹ If this psychological view of context is accepted, context becomes an aggregate of all the reactions that the reader shows towards a particular situation. This view is nearer in approach to the Indian view of *Prakarana*.

Since meaning is contextual and context is not always clear, there is every possibility of the poetic meaning being ambiguous. The diversity and flexibility of human word-use lend density to poetic language. While ambiguity in everyday intercourse may be embarrassing, it is a source of delight in the realm of poetry. The poet does not like to express himself completely before his readers. On the other hand, he often wants to lock some of his meanings for the initiated reader. The carefully covered meaning is no less valuable than the obvious meaning.

Words "may come between us and our objects in countless subtle ways."¹¹² Often uncertain grammar forces the readers to invent meaning and explore various interpretations of a word.¹¹³ In *Principles*, Richards tells us that "very much of the best poetry is necessarily ambiguous by its immediate effect."¹¹⁴ He admires Eliot's "The Waste Land" for its ambiguity of meaning and says that "even the most careful and responsible reader must reread and do hard work before the poem forms itself clearly and unambiguously in his mind."¹¹⁵ In *Science and Poetry*, Richards states that "most words are ambiguous as regards their plain sense, specially in poetry."¹¹⁶ The word cannot be understood on the basis of the meaning provided in the dictionary. "The real danger of dictionary understanding is that it so easily prevents us from perceiving the limitations of our understanding."¹¹⁷ Most of

110 Ogden & Richards : *Meaning*, p. 56.

111 *Ibid.*, p. 244.

112 Ogden & Richards : *Meaning*, p. 45.

113 *Ibid.*, pp. 152-53.

114 Richards : *Principles*, p. 45.

115 *Ibid.*, p. 108.

116 Richards : *Science and Poetry*, p. 28.

the words we use in our daily life are ambiguous by their very nature. The ambiguity of our speech is open to various interpretations and diversities of actions. In Richards' words : "every interesting abstract word apart from those that have been nailed down to phenomena by the experimental scientists is inevitably ambiguous — yet we use them daily with the pathetic confidence of children."¹¹⁸ Richards states that ambiguity "is an inescapable feature of poetry."¹¹⁹ In *Interpretation in Teaching*, he points out that there is no contradiction in the principle that "if a passage means one thing it can at the same time mean other incompatible things."¹²⁰ He also brings out the importance of ambiguous expression in his book *How to read a page*.¹²¹ Ambiguity suggests different meanings in addition to the fundamental meaning.

Poetic ambiguity is, however, different from Radiation (which is also called Polysemia or Multiplication). While the former stands for the plurality of meaning that adds to the charm of poetic expression, the latter implies the development of secondary meanings round about the primary meaning of a word. The secondary meanings, in Radiation, are supposed to radiate from the primary meaning at the centre just as the rays of the sun at the centre. The word 'hand' means a 'limb'. But it may be used variously as 'I have no hand over him' (authority), he had money in his hand (possession), he has no hand in the crime (share), he has a hand in drawing (skill), etc.,. Similarly, several secondary meanings may radiate from the word 'head', as 'two heads in a family' (the possession of the heads), 'heading a ball' (verb), 'heading a liar' (trapping), 'heading a procession' (leading), 'heading forwards disaster' (moving), etc. In poetic ambiguity, the secondary meanings must be so as not to vitiate the primary meaning, rather they must unfold new vistas of beauty and grandeur. In Radiation, use of the secondary meanings may itself become a centre with clusters of new meanings developing around it which may be called Secondary Radiation. The original or primary meaning of the word is not lost in Radiation. So also in poetic ambiguity, primary meaning is

117 Richards : Practical Criticism, p. 327.

118 Richards : Practical Criticism, p. 340.

119 Ogden & Richards : Meaning, p. 248.

120 Richards : Interpretation in Teaching, p. VII.

121 Richards : How to Read a Page (London, 1934), p. 237.

never lost sight of. It has simply the additional quality of being bewitching which vivifies the poetic expression.

'Ambiguity' is, also, not 'indefiniteness' when "we do not know which one of several different meanings we are to take—mere multiplicity, when the sentence means many things, all of which are to be taken as, collectively, its meaning."¹²² It is the interaction of meaning—that is what Richards calls ambiguity—which makes poetry readable. Tillyard's 'obliquity', Warren's 'irony', Cleanth Brook's 'paradox', Blackmur's 'gesture', Philip Wheelwright's 'theory of untranslatability of poetic symbols', Ransom's 'tension', Empson's 'ambiguity', and many other such catch phrases, with varying stresses, insist on the truth that words used in poetry behave differently, that it is the organic unity of the poem which is of supreme importance, that poetic meaning cannot be reduced to mere prose paraphrase, that in poetry rhythm and imagery, metaphor and symbol, verbal music and cadence—are functional rather than mere decorative devices.

In *Rhetoric*, Richards takes ambiguity "as an inevitable consequence of the powers of language and as the indispensable means of our most important utterance."¹²³ By this time, Richards comes to recognise that ambiguity is the general characteristic of language and one cannot avoid it even if one likes to do so.

Richards' concept of poetic ambiguity is close to the Indian theory of *Vyanjana*. Richards definitely does not use the word ambiguity in the sense of *Aspastata* but in the sense of *Artha-bhangima*. It is in this special sense that this word was later used by Empson in his book *Seven Types of Ambiguity*. 'Ambiguity' is also not pun or *Slesa* because it signifies complexity of meaning arising out of a single statement whereas pun or *Slesa* denotes several meanings of a single word—all independent. In 'ambiguity', the different meanings of a statement are not independent as we find in *Slesa*. Anandavardhana, in his analysis of *Dhvani*, takes a different view and says that *Slesa-dhvani*, like *Upama-dhvani*, *Utpreksa-dhvani*, etc., is also possible. The theory of *Dhvani* and *Rasa* attempt to answer the same questions that Richards tries to grapple with: what language makes poetry worth reading? For both Richards

¹²² Richards : *Interpretation in Teaching*, p. 154.

¹²³ Richards : *Rhetoric*, p. 40.

and Anandavardhana, it is the multiplicity of meaning which is the starting point. This multiplicity of meaning emanates from the ambiguous and complex character of words used by poet, words which by their very nature are coiled, transparent, allegorical and multi-dimensional. Richards and Anandavardhana agree on the basic point that the poetic substance is based upon its total effect and that it is derived from meaning and that words in poetry convey more than literal meaning. It is the hidden meaning or the missing meaning which is of greater significance. What is left half said or unsaid is of greater value than what is said. Anandavardhana's theory of meaning gets its vital sap from the theory of Bharata, though Bharata does not put forward the theory of *Dhvani*. The germ of this theory may also be found in a *Mantra* of the *Rgveda* which states : "One sees *Vak* and yet sees not : One hears *Vak* and yet hears not : *Vak* lays bare (*Visastre*) her body beautiful only to an exceptional person to whom she is attached almost like a well-dressed wife charming (*usati suvasah*) exclusively to her dear spouse."¹²⁴ The whole *Mantra* is a good example of paradox or *virodhabhasa alankara*.

The difference between the critical formulation of Richards on this point and that of the Indian rhetoricians lies in the fact that where Richards takes ambiguity as one of the devices to beautify poetry, not its only essence, Anandavardhana considers *Dhvani* as the soul of poetry (*kavyasyatma dhvanih*). For Richards, a good poem has always a complex structure. The triumph of a poem depends upon the delicate equilibrium among the group of the words around the poem. It is not always what the poem conveys explicitly is worth considering. Sometimes even an absurdity adds to its beauty. As Richards puts it, even "nonsense is admissible in poetry."¹²⁵ Usually, "in poetry the means are justified by the end."¹²⁶ When the end is disappointing, it is proper to "look into the means to see whether or not *the kind of use the poet has made for them helps to explain why his end is unsatisfactory.*"¹²⁷ A good poet always aims at his end regardless of the clarity of language. If he thinks fit, he may even "dissolve its coherence altogether."¹²⁸

¹²⁴ *Rg Veda*. 10.6.71.

¹²⁵ Richards : *Practical Criticism*, p. 194.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷ Richards : *Practical Criticism*, p. 194.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

Just as Richards' concept of ambiguity stands for plurality of meaning, so the Indian theory of *Dhvani* stands for plurality of meaning. The Indian rhetorician divide *Dhvani Kavya* into two basic types i.e., *Sabda Dhvani* meaning ambiguity resulting from the sound of the word and *Artha Dhvani* meaning ambiguity resulting from the sense of the word. *Rasa* doctrine believes in the maxim that the beauty of poetry does not lie in any of its parts but in the totality of its meaning, in the proportionate assemblage of the beauty revealed in its different organs. Richards too, maintains that the beauty of poetry lies not in its component parts or its superficial direct meaning but the attitude it evokes. In his words "no word can be judged as to whether it is good or bad, correct or incorrect, beautiful or ugly, or anything else that matters to a writer, in isolation."¹²⁹ The resemblance of Richards' theory of ambiguity to that of *Rasa* theory in the results, as well as in moral enthusiasm, though not in the immensity of philosophic background which characterizes *Rasa* theory, is sufficiently striking.

Since meaning and *Bhava* co-exist and multiplicity of meaning implies multiplicity of *Bhavas*, Richards' notion of ambiguity may be likened to the Indian concepts of *Bhava-sabalata* and *Bhava-sandhi*. If by 'ambiguity' Richards means myriad meanings as a consequence of the interaction of meanings and assimilation of several feelings at a time, it is not very far from the mode of treatment of the same subject by the critics of *Rasa* school. *Sabalata* literally means multi-coloured, spotted or variegated. In *Bhava Sabalata*, diverse *Bhavas* emerge in close succession. For example, if a particular situation gives birth to several feelings like *Autsukya*, *Udasinata*, *Dainya*, *Lajja*, etc., it will come under the category of *Bhava-sabalata*. The trial-scene in Shakespeare's *The Merchant of Venice* is a fine example of *Bhava-sabalata* where the whole atmosphere is charged with curiosity, expectation, anxiety, suspense, fear and terror because the life of Antonio, the hero of the play, trembles in the balance and the laws of Venice are put to an acid test. In *Bhava-sandhi*, two *Bhavas* of equal potency emerge at a time. For example, when the polarity of two contrasted or opposed feelings like pleasure and pain is described, it will be an example of *Bhava-sandhi*. What is common with Richards and the critics of *Rasa* school is the insistence on the synthesis of variegated

¹²⁹ Richards : *Rhetoric*, p. 51.

feelings. The difference should also be noted. While the Indian concepts of *Bhava-sabalata* and *Bhava-sandhi* aim at describing each *Bhava* emerging from the same situation separately in different words, Richards' concept of ambiguity pins up all the feelings in one ambiguous word or statement. Ambiguity alludes to meaning whereas *Bhava-sabalata* and *Bhava-sandhi* are directly concerned with *Bhavas* or feelings.

Richards' views on metaphor remind us of *Laksana* and *Vyanjana Vrttis* of Indian *Alankara* Sastra though it would be a mistake to consider Richards' concept of metaphor as the translation of either *Laksana* or *Vyanjana*. In Indian poetics, we get an almost exhaustive study of *Laksana* and *Vyanjana* as the specific powers of word. In the literary criticism of Richards such an exhaustive study of metaphor as word power is lacking-though he has tried to postulate the broad principles of meaning. Again, the Indian *Dhvani-karas* have illustrated each definition of the different ramifications of *Laksana* and *Vyanjana* by citing suitable examples which method has not been adopted by Richards. He seldom goes into the details and except in a few cases hardly substantiates his point by citing example. His concepts of ambiguity, emotive meaning, pseudo-statement, sense, feeling, tone, intention, attitude, association, context, interanimation of words and above all of metaphor are reminiscent of one of the other variety or aspect or *Rasatmaka* or *Dhvani-Kavya*.

To begin with, Richards' concept of metaphor as "a semi-serruptitious method by which greater variety of elements can be brought into the fabric of the experience"¹³⁰ is interesting enough. The statement is brief and cryptic and hence it does not make Richards' point explicit. But what we understand from it takes us straight to *Gudha Vyangya Laksana* described by Visvanatha. Visvanatha makes two divisions of all the eight kinds of *Prayojanavati Laksana* namely *Gudha Vyangya* and *Agudha Vyangya*. The meaning of *Gudha Vyangya* is that the suggestion made here is difficult and this type of abstruse and different suggestion is appreciated only by those readers whose poetic sensibility has matured due to constant study of *Kavyartha Tattva*.¹³¹ *Agudha Vyangya* means the suggested meaning which

¹³⁰ Richards : Principles, p. 240.

¹³¹ Visvanatha : Sahitya Darpana, pp. 68-69.

can be appreciated by any and everybody. The former is appreciated only by a *Sahrdaya* while the latter by any man with average talent. Both are used with some purpose in view and, therefore, are reckoned under the broad category of *Prayojanavati Laksana*. Its stock example is "my house is on the Ganges" meaning thereby that "my house is on the bank of the holy Ganges river. Richards seems to give an inkling of *Gudha Vyangya* by his phrase 'semi-serruptitious' meaning which operates 'stealthily' or 'secretly'. It is clear that Richards considers metaphor something more than an ordinary figure of speech. No doubt, metaphor is the use of words to indicate something different from the literal or fundamental meaning. In the sentence "he has heart of stone", the word 'stone' has been used metaphorically to suggest a hard, cold and unsympathetic heart. But metaphor, as Richards states, "provides us an opportunity to exploit the accidents of the versatility of words, something in place occasionally but requiring unusual skill and caution".¹³² Metaphor combines several images in one central knot. It is the device through which the range of meaning is enlarged. Metaphorical and figurative expressions are best suited to the language of poetry because they enable the poet to express maximum of feelings in a few words. Ordinary language is denotative and it cannot compete with the metaphorical language which contains meanings that are far removed from the literal or denotative sense of the word. Richards' concept of metaphor touches both the Indian concepts of *Laksana* and *Vyanjana*. Mukula Bhatta, in his book *Abhidhamatrkā Vrtti*, tries to merge the concept of *Vyangyārtha* or *Pratīyamana Artha* in *Laksana* and Kuntaka makes a similar attempt to merge *Pratīyamana Artha* in *Upacara Vakrata*, a variety of *Vakrokti*. As Richards' dichotomy of language is fundamentally different, it would be unjust to find an exact equivalent of Indian *Sabda Saktis* in his critical formulations.

In its simplest and general form, as Richards states, metaphor "is the use of one reference to a group of things between which a given relation holds, for the purpose of facilitating the discrimination of analogous relation in another group."¹³³ Richards does not deny the importance of 'reference' because it is only through the knowledge of reference that its

¹³² Richards : *Rhetoric*, p. 90.

¹³³ Iodgen Richards : *Meaning*, p. 213.

association with other group of things can be determined. The Sanskrit critics are also of the opinion that where there is the existence of *Vyanjana*, there must be at the root the existence of either *Abhidha* or *Laksana*. In *Abhidhamula Vyanjana*, the word has two senses of which one is *Vacya* and another is *Vyangya*. In *Laksanamula Vyanjana* also, there are two senses of a word of which one is *Laksanika* and another is *Vyangyārtha*. In both, the word is crucial and, therefore, both are called *Sabdi Vyanjanas*. *Laksanamula Vyanjana* is always used to fulfil some purpose (*prayojana*). It may have two forms *Gudha Vyangya* and *Agudha Vyangya* – the former reserved for initiated readers while the latter made available to the average reader. Richards lays great emphasis on attitude and attitude may here be taken as a counterpart of *Vyangyārtha*. In Richards' words, "many arrangement of words evoke attitude without any reference required enroute. They operate like musical phrases but usually references involved as conditions for, or stages in, the ensuing development of attitudes, yet it is still the attitudes, not the reference which is important. It matters not at all in such cases whether the references are true or false. Their sole function is to bring about the support the attitudes which are the further response."¹³⁴

In *Rhetoric*, Richards observes; "In asking how language works we ask about how thought and feeling and all the other modes of the mind's activity proceed about how we are to learn to live and how that "greatest of all", a command of metaphor-which is great only because it is a command of life-may best, in spite of Aristotle, be imparted to another"¹³⁵. It shows Richards' belief that words are not a mere copy of life but life itself. Words are meeting places of experiences which do not otherwise meet. Tenor and Vehicle relationship is not just verbal but goes beyond words. How language works is an exploration of how thought and feeling move, how we live, etc.,. Sometimes the tenor tyrannises over the vehicle, sometimes the vehicle may oust the tenor. Metaphor is the compound of both. One may not agree to Richards' view on poetry. He is Arnoldian in this respect. How language works is ultimately how we learn to live. To know the interanimation of words Tenor and Vehicle is to know the adequacies and inadequacies of the things compared. Metaphor

¹³⁴ Richards : Principles, pp. 267-68.

¹³⁵ Richards : Rhetoric , p.95.

is new knowledge. Knowledge means experience, experience is wisdom, and wisdom is mastery of life. So mastering metaphor means mastering life.

One may also consider the word 'metaphor', (mete = beyond + pherin = carry, hence the combination means carry beyond, transfer, translate). In 'metaphor', the quality or property of one thing is carried over to another. This is possible only when the person effecting a metaphor has complete knowledge of things and their properties. This knowledge is not so much acquired as is conferred by some mysterious power and the people upon whom it is conferred are real poets. Homer was blind. He had never taken part in a war and yet, he describes battles with astonishing knowledge of the technicalities of armed combat. According to Aristotle, Ben Jonson, Coleridge, Shelley and many others who would not agree among themselves on many other points, metaphor is the sure mark of a poet. Everything in the poetic art can be learnt but the insight that goes to create a metaphor cannot be.

To find the same thing in a technical language, every metaphor has a tenor and a vehicle i.e., in "the arrows of his intellect are sure and piercing" 'intellect' is 'tenor' and 'arrow' is 'vehicle' because the gravity of intellect has been conveyed through the vehicle arrow'. The quality of arrow has been carried over or transferred to the intellect. The resemblance is itself of two kinds obvious or fundamental and created by the attitude of the maker of the metaphor. In both, knowledge of things in life is essential and knowledge is power. One who has knowledge of life has also power over life; and it is in this sense that the command of metaphor is command of life. The command is, however, not acquired. It is innate and is the hall-mark of the real poet.

According to Richards, metaphor may be simple as well as complex. The 'leg of a table' is an example of simple metaphor. It has only some of the characteristics of the leg of the horse though the difference is also obvious. A table does not walk with its legs. Its legs only give it a support and hold it up. Here metaphor depends upon the correspondence of two things. But a "metaphor may work admirably without our being able with any confidence to say how it works or what is the ground of the shift." "Consider some of the metaphors of abuse and endearment. If we call some one a pig or a duck, for example, it is little use looking

for some actual resemblance to a pig or a duck as the ground. We do not call some one a duck to imply that she has a bill and paddles or is good to eat. The ground of the shift is much more recondite."¹³⁶ The expression 'the legs of a table' which Richards treats as an example of simple metaphor will come under the category of *Rudha Laksana*, the meaning of which is derived from convention. In what is called *Rudha Laksana* may be seen the reflection of the popular figure of speech named 'metonymy' in which the name of a particular thing is changed and given another name. In the sentence 'pen is mightier than the sword' or 'he is reading Shakespear', the word 'pen' stands for 'intellectual power' and the word 'Sword' for physical power and 'Shakespeare' for the 'works of Shakespeare'. Metonymy may, thus, approximate the Indian concept of *Rudha Laksana*. The second example i.e., when we address somebody by scurrilous words like "swine" or "duck", a hint is made at our *Gauni Saropa Laksana* where the projected object (*aropyamana*) and the subject on which such a projection is made (*aropya*) are identified with each other. *Gauni Saropa* is always used with an ellipsis and invariably contains an attribute to be applied. Thus, when in Hardy's novel *Far From the Madding Crowd*, Boldwood says to Sergeant Troy "you jugglar of Satan! You Black hound" or when in Shakespeare's play *The Merchant of Venice*, Shylock reminds Antonio of his misbehavior that only the last Wednesday, he called him a dog, the metaphors employed are the examples of *Saropa Laksana*. *Saropa* is the basis of *Rupaka Alankara* where *Upamana* is imposed on *Upameya*. The uses of such metaphors as "Queen-moon" or "hungry generations" by Keats in his poem "Ode to a Nightingale" or "Icy Hand" by James Shirley in his poem "Death the Leveller", are examples of *Saropa Laksana* based on obvious similitude. But there may be a case where the comparison between the dissimilar things is wilfully avoided and only a metaphorical word is used with reference to a particular man. This is a more complex type of metaphor. This is called *Gauni Sadhyavasana Laksana* in Indian rhetorics. When somebody is simply addressed as 'lion' without a comparison having been made between his courage and that of the lion, it will be an example of *Sadhyavasana Laksana*. Richards gives a hint at this type of *Laksana* when he says : "talk about the identification or fusion that a metaphor effects is nearly always

¹³⁶ Richards : *Rhetoric*, p. 117

misleading and pernicious.¹³⁷ Often it becomes difficult for us to say "how it works or what is the ground of the shift."¹³⁸ When somebody says—"he is an ass", the comparison between the addressee's attributes (*gunas*) like dullness, foolishness, stupidity and ugliness and those of an ass are conspicuous enough. The *Laksana* used here is *Gauni Saropa*. Similarly, when in one of his Lucy poems, Wordsworth addresses Lucy as a phantom of delight, the *Laksana* used here is *Gauni Saropa*. But when this comparison is dropped or is not made explicit, the result is *Gauni Sadhya Vasana Laksana*. In *Gauni Sadhyayasana*, we have an attribute to be merged. Richards' illustrations borrowed from Shakespeare's *Hamlet*¹³⁹ and Swift's *Gulliver's Travels*¹⁴⁰ reinforce this point. In *Hamlet*, Shakespeare writes, "what should such fellow as I do crawling between earth and heaven." In *Gulliver's Travels*, Swift writes, "the bulk of your natives appear to me to be the most pernicious race of little odious vermin that nature ever suffered to crawl upon the face of the earth." In these examples, the link that unites the two things i.e., man and certain insignificant tiny insect crawling upon the earth is missing. This may lead to an absurd conclusion. But such an absurdity is admissible in poetry for emotional effect. Richards observes "the poet often perpetrates 'logical nonsense'"¹⁴¹ An example of *Gauni Sadhyavasana Laksana* may be found in the title of Eliot's famous poem "The Waste Land" where 'Waste Land' represents the sterility and moral bankruptcy of our age. The characteristic features of our age have been symbolically indicated in this title. Such a use may again be found in Stephen Spender's poem "The War God" where the poet tells us of the descending of dove, a symbol apparently used for peace. And when in his satire 'Mac Flecknoe', Dryden alluding to the famous Greek poet and musician Arion says of Shadwell "Me thinks I see a new Arion sail", he uses metaphor which is called *Sadhyayasana Laksana* in Indian *Alankara Sastra*. By the concept of *Sadhyavasana Laksana*, the Indian Rhetoricians anticipated the modern western concept of symbol which means sign or mark looked upon as representing something. When *Upama*

137 Richards : *Rhetoric*, p. 127.

138 *Ibid.*, p. 117.

139 *Ibid.*, p. 119.

140 *Ibid.*

141 Richards : *Practical Criticism*, p. 180.

becomes *Rudha*, it becomes symbol as 'white' is the symbol 'purity' where 'white' becomes *Rudha* for purity. The seeds of *Sadhyavasana Laksana* may be found in hyperbole or *Atisayokti Alankara* where exaggerated statement, not intended to be taken literally, is made for poetic effect. Richards seems to believe in the symbolic and emotive metaphorical language though he defines symbol situation rather differently. For him, symbolic use of word is confined to statement only as opposed to emotive use of language which is intended to evoke attitudes.¹⁴² Whenever a term is taken outside the universe of discourse for which it has been defined, it becomes a metaphor.¹⁴³ The term 'energy' conveys something more to a physicist than to a schoolmaster.¹⁴⁴ The term 'energy' is used in symbolic metaphorical language by an ordinary man whereas it is used in emotive metaphorical language by a poet.

As in metaphor, so in *Laksana* the literal meaning of the word is always discarded. In *Suddha Laksana* as opposed to in *Gauni Laksana*, *Upacara* or *Sadharmya* is apparently denied. It is simply suggested. *Upacara* is a technical word used by Visvanatha meaning to conceal the difference between the two words.¹⁴⁵ Mammata makes two divisions of *Suddha Laksana* i.e., *Upadana Laksana* and *Laksana Laksana*.¹⁴⁶ These categories show how far the metaphorical meaning marks a departure from the literal meaning (*mukhyartha*). In *Upadana Laksana*, the literal meaning is not altogether disregarded. Instead, something is added from outside. In *Laksana Laksana*, the literal meaning is altogether disregarded. Here, the word completely casts off its *Mukhyartha* and suggests *Laksyarth* only. Wordsworth in his poem 'To the Cuckoo' uses the metaphor 'visionary hours' to mean 'hours of childhood in which mysterious dreams are seen'. The word 'hours' is indicative of time. It cannot be visionary i.e., existing only in the vision or in the imagination. The meaning of the word 'hours' in relation to 'visionary' is difficult to be appreciated unless it is read with 'childhood'. Here, the word 'hours' retains its original meaning and then with its association with 'childhood' acquires additional meaning of its being visionary. This is an

142 Ogden & Richards : *Meaning*, p. 149.

143 Ogden & Richards : *Meaning*, p. 111.

144 Ibid. V

145 Visvanatha : *Sahitya Darpana*, p. 66.

146 Mammata : *Kavya Prakasa*, 2/10.

example of *Upadana Laksana*. Again in Shelley's poem "To a Sky Lark", the line 'the moon rains out her beams', suggests metaphorically that the moon spreads out her beams. The words 'rains out' are used here figuratively and they completely leave off their literal meaning and simply suggest the pouring of moon's ray of light. This is an example of *Laksana Laksana*. Richards does not give any clear indication of these two types of *Laksanas*. Therefore, any attempt to find out exact parallels of all sorts of *Laksanas* described in the Indian *Alankara Sastra* in Richards' analysis of metaphor will be misleading. Richards, in fact, does not work up his doctrine of metaphor in the light of Indian *Laksanas*. Still, once he admits that metaphor is a "semi-scriptitious method by which a greater variety of elements can be brought into the fabric of experience", he admits all the possible varieties of *Laksana* described by the Indian rhetoricians.

While dealing with the structure of metaphor, Richards bifurcates it into two parts i.e., 'tenor' and 'vehicle'¹⁴⁷ meaning the thing to be discussed and the thing to which an object is compared. In the drift of speech, where the likeness of two things is suggested, the tenor part of the speech invites a comparison and the vehicle part suggests the comparison. In the example, 'he has the heart of stone', the part which refers to the heart is 'tenor' and the part which refers to the stone is vehicle. In Indian terminology, they will be called *Aropya* and *Aropyamana* or *Upameya* and *Upamana* respectively. No metaphor can exist without these two units. But it would be wrong to say, in the absence of conclusive proof, that "he borrowed the idea from the ancient Indian poetics."¹⁴⁸

In Indian poetics, we get the description of four elements which are at work while comparing one thing with another. They are subject to be compared (*upameya*), object with which the comparison is made (*upamana*), the attribute common to both the things (*dharma*) and the word with which the comparison is qualified (*vacaka*). For example, in the comparison 'her face is as bright as moon', 'face' is *Upameya*, 'moon' is *Upamana* 'bright' is *Dharma* and 'as' is *Vacaka*. But this principle holds good only in respect of *Upama Alankara*. This is often violated in *Laksana*. It is

¹⁴⁷ Richards : *Rhetoric*, p. 94.

¹⁴⁸ Sharma, R.P. : *I.A. Richards' Theory of Language* (S. Chand & Co., New Delhi, 1979), p. 99.

a fact that there may be cases where 'tenor' or *Aropya* is skilfully buried and the task to discover it is left to the prudence of the reader. This happens in the case of *Sadhyavasana Laksana* which is the most subtle and microscopic of all the forms of *Laksana*. In Visvanatha's *Sahitya Darpana*, a reference has been made to the processes of permutation and combination by which the number of *Laksana* can be increased to eighty.¹⁴⁹ This shows the extraordinary ingenuity shown by the Indian rhetoricians in classifying the different types of *Laksana*. Some of these types might appear far-fetched and might not seem to justify their names and the purpose for which they have been designed and singled out. Still, it is difficult to disbelieve the critical acumen of the Sanskrit critics who took the stupendous task of studying *Laksana* from all possible angles. Richards, obviously, shows no interest in making divisions and sub-divisions of metaphor or ambiguity in the way Sanskrit critics did. But what he says about metaphor and ambiguity cannot be underrated. He states that "the metaphorical aspects of the greater part of language, and the ease with which any word may be used metaphorically, further indicate the degree to which, especially for educated persons, words have gained contexts through other words."¹⁵⁰ Words have the amazing power to attract the attention of the reader and evoke his feelings and attitude. "Through statement, through the excitement of imagery (often effected at low levels of refinement by the use of metaphor); through metaphor itself—used not as in strict symbolizing, to bring out or stress a structural feature in a reference, but rather to provide, often under cover of a pretence of this elucidation, new sudden and striking collocations of references for the sake of the compound effects of contrast, conflict, harmony, interanimation and equilibrium which may be so attained, or used more simply to modify and adjust emotional tone; through association; through revival; and through many subtle linkings of mnemonic situations, words are capable of exerting profound influence quite apart from any assistance from the particular passions, needs, desires or circumstances of the hearer."¹⁵¹ There is no limit to the evocative range of metaphorical or suggestive words. The result is that language is invariably used as gesture. "Words, whenever they

149 Visvanatha : *Sahitya Darpana*, p. 74.

150 Ogden & Richards : *Meaning*, p. 214.

151 Ogden & Richards : *Meaning*, p. 214.

cannot directly ally themselves with and support themselves upon gestures, are at present a very imperfect means of communication."¹⁵²

In Richards' opinion, metaphor is an omnipresent principle of language.¹⁵³ In *Rhetoric*, Richards takes a comprehensive view of metaphor. He states that "even in the rigid language of the settled sciences, we do not eliminate or prevent it without great difficulty."¹⁵⁴ In *Interpretation in Teaching*, Richards advocates metaphorical language and says that "thought is itself metaphoric."¹⁵⁵ In *Speculative Instruments*, he insists on the study of the essentials of metaphoric language as a part of the study of language.¹⁵⁶ Language in general and poetic language in particular are always evasive and gives opportunity to the play of imagination. As Richards states : "language has an annoying way of anticipating our utmost intellectual flights with smooth and effortless puns."¹⁵⁷ In fact, many of the common words that we use everyday are metaphorically transferred words. Thus when we speak of the leg of a table, or the leaf of a book, we are unconsciously comparing the table to a man, and the book to a tree. When we speak of deep sorrow or a bright boy, we are similarly comparing the sorrow to a sea and the boy to a star. It is on such considerations that we say that most words in a language are worn-out metaphors. Not metaphors only but often figures of speech also are embedded in words that we use without the least suspicion that they are in any sense poetical. If Richards' concept of metaphor is taken as a workable substitute for Indian *Laksana* and *Vyanjana* , particularly because he does not make any separate category of word power on the lines of Indian critics, it is easy to relate his views to those of Abhinavagupta, Anandavardhana and Mammata on this point.

Abhinavagupta says that *Dhvani* is a prodigious subject (*mahavisaya*) and it is all pervasive and is the basis of every utterance.¹⁵⁸ Anandavardhana considers *Dhvani* as the *Atman* of poetry. In the manner of Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta,

¹⁵² Ogden & Richards . *Meaning*, p. 15.

¹⁵³ Richards : *Rhetoric*, p. 92.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid

¹⁵⁵ Richards : *Interpretation in Teaching*, p. 49.

¹⁵⁶ Richards : *Speculative Instruments*, p. 41.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid , p. 153.

¹⁵⁸ Abhinavagupta : *Dhvanyaloka Locana*, p. 119.

Richards says that metaphor is the omnipresent principles of language.

In the Indian *Rasa* doctrine, unlike in Richards' literary criticism, a clear distinction has been made between *Laksana* and *Vyanjana*. *Vyanjana* is a more efficacious word power than *Laksana* in as much as it is not controlled by word alone but also by the meaningless sounds and bodily gestures.¹⁵⁹ Kuntaka is not wrong when he says that genuine poetry, like the sound-effect of music, pleases the readers only by the excellence of its composition and it is not always necessary that the literal meaning of the word should be taken into account.¹⁶⁰ Visvanatha says that *Vyanjana* alone is the real poetic meaning.

Indian Rhetoricians, like Richards, lay emphasis on association or *Sahacarya* of words. *Sahacarya* means the impact of words coming before and after a particular word. They also attach importance to context because it is only in a given context that the meaning of a particular statement can be determined. In Indian grammar and Rhetoric, importance has also been given to the usage or *Vyavahara* of word which to some extent, decides its meaning. They technically call it *Sanketagraha*. Richards rejects the theory of usage in preference to the theory of context.

The Indian concept of *Dhvani* is the logical conclusion of Bharata's theory of *Rasa* which is regarded as the life-blood of Drama. Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta, Mammata, Visvanatha and Jagannatha apply the theory of *Rasa* to poetic meaning. *Rasa* is in the form of *Asvada*. It is *Anandamaya* and *Jnanamaya*. No sequence of word can fully express it. Words give us only referential meaning. What is called signification is the exact meaning of a word. But *Rasa Dhvani* is more than that. It is not confined to conventional or literal meaning of a word. It is completely free from all limitations and barriers. *Dhvani* may have three dimensions as and when it is connected with *Vastu*, *Alankara* and *Rasa*. Where *Alankara* is not suggested, it is *Vastu Dhvani*. When *Alankara* is suggested, it is *Alankara Dhvani*. They come under the broad group *Sanlaksyakra* *Vyangya*. *Rasa Dhvani* is the supreme form of *Dhvani* and is called *Asanlaksyakra* *Vyangya*. In *Vastu Dhvani* and *Alankara Dhvani*, the relationship between word and meaning is quite apparent

159 Mammata : *Kavya Prakasa*, 2/20.

160 Kuntaka : *Vakrokti Jivita*, 1/37

(*sanlaksita*) where as in *Rasa Dhvani* it is not apparent. This is why *Rasa Dhvani* is called *Asanlaksyakrama Vyangya*. But it should not be denied that even *Vastu* and *Alankara* cannot impress us unless they are touched with *Rasa*. *Dhvani* can only claim to be the *Atman* of poetry when it is enlivened by *Rasa*.

The doctrine of *Dhvani* "which the grammarians did not accept could be based on a philosophical opinion of the grammarians themselves. They recognize the *Sphota*, a mysterious entity, a sort of hypostatization of sound, of which action sounds were manifestations, and the same idea of revelation of something inherent (*Vyanjana*) is found in the Vedanta, where all is a manifestation of the underlying reality, the *Brhman* or absolute."¹⁶¹ The grammarians take *Sphota* in the sense of an eternal and *Akhand* sound and the Vedanta too considers creation at sound-oriented. Anandavardhana pays elegant tributes to the grammarians "as the first and the foremost theorists (*prathame hi vidyanso vaivakaranah*)."¹⁶²

It would appear that Richards' theory of poetic language can be easily tied up with the Indian theory of *Rasa Dhvani*. Richards' concepts of metaphor and ambiguity at their best can be treated as the wielding of Indian *Laksana* and *Vyanjana*. Yet, *Laksana* and *Vyanjana* are not what we mean by the Western concepts of metaphor or ambiguity. While Keith is partially correct in translating *Laksana* as 'transferred sense',¹⁶³ because *Laksana* refers to the meaning which is removed from the literal one, the translation of the same Sanskrit word as 'indication' by S.K. De is misleading¹⁶⁴ because the literal meaning or *Abhidha* also indicates something. The ramifications of *Laksana* and *Vyanjana* show that the classical Sanskrit critics, unlike Richards, were vitally interested in deep and accurate study of word powers. The word *Bhakta* meaning 'boiled rice' is also used in the sense of *Laksana* because *Laksana* effects a fusion amongst various symbols. *Bhaktivada* holds that word has only two meanings – staple or leading (*mukhya*) and secondary (*gauna*). The power of word which works in *Mukhyartha* is *Abhidha* and the power which works in *Gauna Artha* or *Amukhyartha* is *Laksana*. Apart from these two meanings, there is no third meaning. Thus,

¹⁶¹ Keith : A History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 387.

¹⁶² Anandavardhana : Dhvanyaloka, p. 138.

¹⁶³ Keith : A History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 387.

¹⁶⁴ De, S.K. : Some Problems of Sanskrit Poetics, p. 210.

even if this school holds *Vyanjana* different from *Abhidha*, it tries to merge *Vyanjana* in *Laksana*. This stand, however, makes no difference because even according to this school *Vyanjana* is recognized as the basis of poetic meaning. Richards' study of metaphor, ambiguity and emotive meaning is not exhaustive as compared with the Indian speculation on *Dhvani* or *Vyanjana*.

The question whether the Western concepts of irony, paradox, ambiguity, gesture, tension, archetype, myth, structure and many other such critical terms as have currency in contemporary literary criticism may have parallels in classical Sanskrit literary criticism is not quite irrelevant. Similarly, whether Richards' concept of sign, symbolic and emotive uses of words, ambiguity, metaphor, interanimation of words, context, sense, feeling, tone, intention, impulse and attitude have any positive bearing on Sanskrit critical terms is a question which deserves serious consideration. It is a fact that the literary criticism of the two countries—England and India, flowered under two different conditions and influences and cultural and ethnical specialities. But critical sensibilities being the same in all the countries, it is not wrong to pursue the criticisms of both the countries for common pool of thought.

CHAPTER 7

IMAGINATION AND PRATIBHA

Emotive meaning makes a demand on Imagination because it is only through Imagination that emotive meaning or *Kavyartha* can be understood and appreciated. Richards and the critics of *Rasa* school have something very useful to say about the imaginative faculty of the poet. Richards' views on imagination, though they have definite psychological and linguistic bearing, are to some extent, nearer in approach to those on *Pratibha* held by the critics of *Rasa* school. From the Indian point of view, *Vyanjana* is that power of language which passes beyond the literal meaning or *Abhidheyartha*. Literal meaning operates only in *Sastra*. This presupposes the importance of imagination. In poetry, *Rasa* is *Vyangya* and *Vyangyarth* is difficult to be deciphered unless imagination is put to action. An ordinary literal or factual statement can be appreciated by any average man. But oblique hints, suggestions and ironical statements can be appreciated only by that man who has the gift of imagination. It is only the ability to use *Vyangya* and *Vyanjaka* that makes *Mahakavi* worth his name and not the mere Composition of *Vacya* and *Vacaka*.¹ Abhinavagupta says that the only notable *Vyapara* of *Kavya* is *Rasa-dhvani* and it is really *dhvani* which is the *Atman* of poetry.²

As the Westerners conceive it, imagination is that faculty which represents an object, not as it is in itself, but, as it is moulded by thoughts and feelings into as infinite variety of shapes and combinations. The poet always aims at clothing ideas with imaginary splendour. Poetry is meant to cast over us the spell of a 'light that never was on sea or land'. Poetry is pre-eminently emotional and imaginative and the poet, by the sheer exercise of his imagination, transforms the existing realities and 'gives to airy nothing a local habitation and a name'.³ what is called poetic licence is actually the poet's freedom from ordinary rules of language and word-order allowed in verse.

The poet enjoys this liberty because he works more by Imagination than by reason and intellect. The poet, from an airy

1 Anandavardhana . *Dhvanyaloka*, 1/8 vrtti.

2 Abhinavagupta : *Dhvanyaloka Locana*, p. 50.

3 Shakespeare : *A Mid Summer's Night Dream*, Act V, Sc. 1, 17.

substance, can create 'things more real than living man' which may be 'nurslings of Immortality'.⁴ Imagination, which is called 'esemplastic power'⁵ by Colaridge meaning "to shape into one"⁶ is the faculty of ideal creation which may or may not be consistent with reality and yet which bears greater truth than the scientific truth of calculation, verification and laboratory experiment. Imagination "Is the power of reproducing images stored in the memory under the suggestion of associated images or of recombining former experiences to create new images".⁷ It is that plastic, shape-giving power that enables the poet to give concrete expression to thoughts and feelings. Nothing is more autonomous than the imagination of the poet. It has unlimited power of mixing, assimilating and synthesizing ideas in all the varieties of fiction and vision.

Imagination, as the image-making faculty of the poet, is universally acknowledged as a distinct faculty of the poet. While it is generally accepted that some gifted poets are in possession of it, it is also held that it is a rare quality and vast majority of the poets are lacking in it. Milton, Shelley, Keats and Coleridge were imaginative poets of the first order whereas Gowley and Dryden were handicapped in this respect. It is generally believed that the Romantic poets had fertile imagination whereas the poets of the eighteenth century were content with such poetic fineries as wit, pun, irony and sarcasm.

In Richards' literary criticism, the word 'Imagination' occurs frequently though it carries not one sense but several senses. In *Rasa* doctrine, the word used for imagination is *Pratibha*.⁸

4 Shelley : " Prometheus Unbound", complete Works of Wholly, ed. T. Mutchinson (O.U.P., 1009), p. 221.

5 Coleridge : *Biographia Literaria*, Ed. J. Shawcross (O.U.P., 1962), Vol. I, Part XIII, p. 195.

6 Scott James, R. A. : *The Making of Literature* (London, 1970), p. 221.

7 The Random House Dictionary of the English Language (Allied Pub., Bombay, 1975).

8 Vamana : *Kavyalankara Sutra Vrtti*, 1/3/11, 1/3/16.

Bhamaha : *Kavyalankara*, 1/5.

Anandavardhana : *Dhvanyaloka*, 1/6, 4/6.

Kuntaka : *vakrokti-Jivita*, 1/29 Vrtti.

Abhinavagupta : *Dhvanyaloka Locana*, p. 93.

Jayadeva : *Candraloka*, 1/6.

Also see Paliwal, B. B. : 'Symbolic Imagination and Dhvani' *Principles of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit*, p. 174 and Sharma, D.S. : *Literary Criticism in*

In the words of P.V. Kane, "It is usual to translate *Pratibha* by Imagination."⁹ The words *Prajna* and *Pratibha* are synonymous to 'reason' and 'imagination' of western literary criticism. In *Rasa* doctrine *Pratibha* is variously designated as *Sakti*¹⁰ and *Prakhyā*¹¹. *Pratibha* is used here as *Kavivyaapara* and *Kavikausala*.

A detailed account of *Pratibha* is found in Sanskrit literary criticism in the context of the equipment of the poet (*Kavyahetu*). It is laid down that the ingredients necessary for poetry are *Pratibha*, *Vyutpatti* or culture and *Abhyasa* or constant practice.

First of all, it is necessary to distinguish between the implications of the two words 'imagination' and *Pratibha*. *Pratibha* literally means "the creative intellect which is responsible for all poetic creation."¹² P.V. Kane defines the role of *Pratibha* thus : "*Pratibha* is that power whereby the poet sees the subjects of his poem as steeped in beauty and gives to his readers in apt language a vivid picture of the beauty he has seen. It is a power whereby the poet not only calls up in his reader's heart the impression of faded experiences, but whereby he presents ever new, wonderful and charming combinations and relation of things never before experienced or thought of by the ordinary man."¹³ Let us now turn to 'imagination'. The word 'imagination' is derived from the word 'image' meaning mental picture or idea, reflection, figure, likeness or copy of the shape of anything. Imagination is the power of the mind to imagine. It is the poetic and creative faculty as activated in the vivid conceptions and combinations. Imagination is a rare faculty of the poet, a faculty recalling vividly, and of seeing objects that are no longer before him. It is reproductive because it helps the poet in recalling past memories which are transformed into mental images. It is further possible by imagination to apprehend ideas of which, though subsisting in the cosmic consciousness, have

Sanskrit and English (Madras, 1950), p. 12.

9 Kane : History of Sanskrit Poetics, p. 335.

10 Anandavardhana : Dhvanyaloka, 3/8 vrtti.

Abhinavagupta : Dhvanyaloka Locana, p. 346.

Rudrata : Kavyalonkara, 1/15.

Mammata : Kavya Prakasa, 1/3 vrtti.

11 Abhinavagupta : Dhvanyaloka Locana, p. 1.

12 Pratibha-bhaveanga : Vacaspathyam.

13 Kane : History of Sanskrit Poetics, p. 334.

not yet assumed and may never assume, a physically visible form. It is for the poet to portray the ideal world of true reality, the world of imagination, and not the phenomenal world perceived by the senses. In moments of exaltation, when the poet is in the grip of a passion, the sense impressions leap up and get related to the sensations that arise in the mind of the poet, modify them and are modified by them. The moment they come within the magnetic field of his passion, they fly to attach themselves to it and thus is born the pattern which is called the poetic image. The process of image-making is intricate. The objects of perception are related to one another. These are in turn related to our sensations which are quickened by passion. Image results from the union of the object with sensations. These images inherit characteristics from both parents and yet have an individuality of their own, being different from either. It is in the images thus created that we have what is called 'poetic truth' as distinguished from 'matter-of-fact' or 'scientific truth'. The image thus created gets related to other images similarly born, by the forces of an inner principle, which the poet himself discerns but dimly at the initial stage. The vision of the poet gets clearer as he proceeds and is complete only when the poem is composed. These images work through the unconscious, and the inner law which unites them also proceeds from the unconscious. This union of images in obedience to a unifying principle is what we call a poem. It would be true to call the whole poem the projection of the poet's one image. It is only when the poet's imagination is not working adequately that a cluster of images crowd to weaken the final pattern.

Faced with the problem of how the first carpenter thought of the first table, Plato built up that strange and obscure system of ideas, which enabled him to degrade the artist on the ground that the painter of a picture table produced a mere secondary shade of the carpenter's primary shade of ideal reality—the poor imitation of an imitation. A close study of *rasa* doctrine would reveal that *Pratibha* is a much broader term than imagination. It encompasses such western concepts as 'intuition', 'imagination' and 'genius'. We get a fairly elaborate account of *Pratibha* in *Rasa-sastra*.

In the beginning, imagination and fancy were the two names of one single poetic faculty. The Greek philosophers named this faculty as 'phantasia'. According to Plato 'Pantastic' is an

off-shoot of imagination in which the artist works solely with imagination instead of taking help from outside materials. Plato was probably the first critic to cut the throat of imaginative literature. He maintained that most imaginative literature is harmful.¹⁴ Elliot has said that the barking of a dog, the clicking of typewriter and reading of Spinoza are all unconnected experiences to an ordinary man. But in a poet's mind they form one coherent whole. Poetry enables us to amalgamate disparate experiences. Colridge had called this "the esemplastic function of the Imagination" which organises contraries into a meaningless whole. Since Plato has been one of the greatest influences on western thought, it is not surprising if many puritans consciously or unconsciously moved on his foot prints. Socrates does indeed offer the poetic imagination the greatest tribute, he suggested that it is a divine madness; and the poets of posterity have gratefully acknowledged it. The poets are no doubt, 'possessed' in Plato's real conclusion. But the spirit that possesses them may be good or evil, truthful or deceiving. Of what use then, are the poets? They are delirious dervishes whose dreams come as easily through the gate of ivory as of horror.

To this, Aristotle replied that art was no doubt "reproduction". But so far from being a pale copy of a copy it was, on the contrary nearer to the ideal, the general, the universal; so that the imaginative poet could claim to be more of a philosopher than the historian of actual events. It was by no way work representation, but its power to reproduce the feeling of real life that the magic won for Aristotle the title of most animetic of all artists. Another advance made by Aristotle was his recognition of the importance in literature the power of combining images; the gift of metaphor, of seeing likeness; is for him the real stamp of genius, born and not made. Aristotle indicated in his *Poetics* that the playwright ought to enter, with his imagination, into his character and situation in order to achieve the desired effect of his creation. He says that "without the imagination the intellect cannot work..."¹⁵ Plotinus gives a rather metaphysical explanation of the imaginative power of the poet and compares it with God's power to create. Philip Sidney, in his *Apology for Poetry* calls imagination by a different name i.e., 'invention'.

14 Plato : *Republic*, tr. B. Jowett (Random House, New York, 1960), Book X, pp. 369-74.

15 Butcher, S.H. : *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and True Art* p. 126.

Either the poet creates such creatures as are not to be seen on this earth or else he creates a world of beauty which is much superior to the God created world. That in the eighteenth century, a good deal of discussion is found on fancy and imagination though the impact of philosophers like Hobbes, Locke, Desecrates, Hume, Spiroza, Tolend and Hartley cannot be denied, on the critical Speculations of this period. The eighteenth century considered imagination to be a form of visualization. On the whole, the critics of this period held that imagination is the function of mind to receive all external images brought of sense organs and then to conjure them up for systematic presentation. "Hume's position on the eighteenth century watershed gave him no glimpse of the Coleridgian 'imagination', though that faculty assumes increasing importance in Hume for very different reasons and quite otherwise conceived."¹⁶

The materialists like Democritus, Epicurus and Lucretius were also puzzled by the imagination. Vision and visualization for Lucretius are both caused by casual films of extreme truth, radiated in endless succession from all sides. We have conceptions of the gods. Therefore, said Epicurus, the gods do exist. No wonder opponent like Cicero made great fun of so materialistic a theory of imagination. And yet, the idea that imagination is the outcome of the images in the mind was a step in the right direction.

Greek poetry and Drama were largely content with lovely variations of that imaginative mythology whose origins were lost even for them; their best prose concentrated not on fiction but on oratory, history and philosophy.

Coleridge's Platonism provides an important step in the formulation of his theory. He vehemently refutes Hartley's Associationism and says that human mind is the exact replica or copy of God's mind and what is filled with divine power cannot remain idle, inactive, passive or blank. On his thought can be easily traced the influence of German philosophers like Kant and Shelling. In his *Biographia Leteraria*, Coleridge makes a distinction between primary imagination and Secondary imagination and also distinguishes imagination from fancy. He observes: 'The imagination then I consider as Primary and Secondary. The Primary imagination, I hold, to be the living

16 Willey, Basil : The Eighteenth Century Background (London, 1946), p. 113.

power and prime agent of all human perception; and repetition in the finite mind of the external act of creation in the finite I AM. The Secondary Imagination I consider as an echo of the former, co-existing with the conscious will, yet still as identical with the primary in the kind of its agency and differing only in degree, and in the mode of its operation. It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates in order to recreate and when the process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to idealize and unify. It is essentially fixed and dead. Fancy, on the contrary, has no other counter to play with, but fixities and definitives ... a mode of memory emancipated from the order of time and space... blended with ... choice. fancy must receive all the materials ready made from the law of Association."¹⁷ In English literary criticism, Imagination and Fancy long remained the same.

A distinction between Imagination and Fancy, however, does appear in Dryden's Preface to *Annus Mirabilis* where he divides wit or Imagination into invention, which invents, and Fancy, which varies and arranges these materials provided by invention, and Elocution, which weilds the style. But Dryden's idea of Fancy as a part of imagination does not seem to have had much success. The two words lived on side by side. Later came Coleridge to put these words, firmly asunder.

The Primary Imagination is a form of the highest activity of the human mind. the Secondary imagination can only 'idealize and unify' the objects. The former can work even with the universal, the latter cannot unify the universal. It is concerned only with the material offered by the phenomenal word. The distinction between the primary and the secondary forms of imagination involves a differentiation of the unconscious from the conscious activity. It was Wordsworth's poetry that led Coleridge to an enquiry into the nature of imagination and fancy. In Coleridge's theory, imagination does not exist independent of the senses and also involves visual factor. Imagination is an activity, similar to that of the creative process. It modifies or transforms the material on which it operates. Fancy is its opposite. It cannot modify the material since it can only combine or group together mechanically. Fancy depends upon the succession of events in time. It combines these events in such a way that the event retains its original character. Imagination, on the other hand, is a

17 Coleridge : *Biographia Literaria*, Vol.I, Part XIII, p. 202.

principle introducing harmony, into the manifold, and by virtue of this it transforms the given into a whole. Fancy is not totally passive; but compared with the imagination, it is passive. The excess of fancy is delirious, of Imagination mania.

The Aeolian harp is Coleridge's symbol of the mind of the artist. According to Coleridge, imagination is independent of time and space like reason. It can transform the potential or the possible into the actual or real, essence into existence. Such an imaginative activity is like the absolute of the Idealists. This theory of imagination begins to border on mysticism. It is designed to explain the relation of the one to the many.

In the hands of Richards, the concept of imagination undergoes a change of scope and content. It is clear from what he says about Imagination that he has been greatly influenced by Coleridge. Coleridge was his guide at least in two directions; in giving a psychological interpretation of creative process of art and in giving a correct account of the role of imagination in the making of poetry. His ideas on imagination are much in accord with Coleridge's. Richards does not, like Greek critics, philosophize Imagination. His analysis of imagination is in a great measure psychological. The aesthetic aspect of imagination as described by Richards is fully in agreement with the practice of Indian poets and critics.

Of imaginative faculty, Richards does not give a very clear and consistent account, much less does he give a description of imagination as a 'faculty divine'. The *Principles* furnishes no complete theory of imagination and *Coleridge on Imagination* is primarily devoted to examining Coleridge's views on imagination something like Abhinavagupta's *Abhinava Bharati* and *Dhvanvaloka Locana* wherein the critic examines and analyses Bharata's views on drama and anandavardhana's views on poetry. Richards' other books like *Meaning, Practical Criticism* and *Science and Poetry* give mere hints at what he thinks about imagination. Richards does not deal with imagination exhaustively in any of his books though there is a separate chapter on imagination in his *Principles* and he offers many personal comments on this subject in *Coleridge on Imagination*. Thus, he leaves some leading principles about imagination which we shall try to follow out.

What is imagination, what is its form and how the poet uses it- are some very important questions relating to poetry. Richards

asserts that imagination has the characteristic of belonging to a form. According to Richards, imagination is also, like thousands of our mental activities, is a mental activity. The mental process involved in imagination can be studied and analysed. It is not a secret activity of mind. In a specific circumstance, our mental state undergoes changes and various types of impulses get stimulated. Some of these impulses are without any reasoning which, according to Richards, may be called imagination. As Richards puts it: "Imaginative life is its own justification".¹⁸

Richards gives special attention to the significance of imagination in its widest sense. He defines image in the following manner: "An image may be, for example, a visual image, a copy of sensation; or may be an idea, any event in the mind which presents something; or it may be a figure of speech, a double unit involving comparison."¹⁹ Here, his psychological bias comes to shape his notion of image for he defines image as a copy of sensation also. In this definition, he tries to resolve the old controversy whether imagination is an active or passive faculty of mind. Bertrand Russell differs from the popular view that imagination is necessarily connected with image. His argument is that "images are often, even usually, present when we imagine, but they need not be. A man can improvise on a piano without first having images of the music he is going to make; a poet might write down a poem without first making it up in his mind."²⁰ Richards, like Russell, takes imagination as an acutely active state of mind. He broadens the concept of image to include any event in the mind which presents something. This means that image may proceed or succeed thinking. It may even go simultaneously as in the art of talking without thinking. The essence of imagination is a novel combination of known and unknown elements. Novelty is a necessary pre-requisite of imagination because if nothing is novel, one can have nothing more than a case of memory. In the novelties present in imagination one is likely to have perception. Perception will open the doors for visual imagination. There is no 'idea' without an antecedent. This principle applies to image also. In image, there is always an element which resembles some element in previous perception. This position gives us double unit involving a

18 Richards : *Science and Poetry*, p. 73.

19 Richards : *Coleridge on Imagination*, pp. 32-33.

20 Russell, Bertrand : *An Outline of Philosophy* (London, 1949), p. 198.

comparison between two or more dissimilar things. Imagination operates well in some figures of speech like simile and metaphor. Richards also admits the role of past experiences in the formation of Imagination.

The critics of *Rasa* school look upon the poet as a seer or a prophet.²¹ It implies that the poet is a visionary and a man who has the gift of Imagination. The truism *Kavyah kin na pasavanti* stands sufficient testimony to the unbounded strength of the poet's Imagination. It is said in the *Atharva Veda* that the whole world is God's poetry which neither ends nor wanes.²² Though the necessity of practice and training for the poet cannot be ruled out, the fact remains that no amount of practice and training can do if the poet is deprived of imaginative gift.

It is actually the imaginative faculty which differentiates a poet from an ordinary man. *Pratibha* gives the poet that strength with which he renders his vision into appealing language and creates a new world which is independent and self-sufficient. It is in this sense that Anandavardhana takes *Pratibha* as a medium to make manifest the unknown.²³ Anandavardhana further says: "the poet is a creator in this infinite world of poetry, that the universe assumes the form as he wills, that whatever *Rasa* he puts into his poem, the world is immersed therein and that if he himself is devoid of *Rasa*, then all follow his suit."²⁴ According to Anandavardhana, the only faculty which goes to create immortal poetry is *Pratibha*. The poet whose *Pratibha* is sharp and fertile can easily find his materials within his reach. In the absence of *Pratibha*, the poet cannot see novelty in nature. He observes: "there is no limit to poetic meaning if the poet is endowed with *Pratibha*."²⁵ Every poet cannot rise to the stature of an epic poet. When a gifted poet sets his feet on imaginative poetry, Goddess *Bhagavati* herself comes to his help and unfolds before him the unbounded beauty of nature.²⁶ Only then he occupies the position of an epic poet. Meaning is enlivened with freshness in the *Kavitva* of *Mahakavi*.²⁷ Kuntaka takes *Pratibha* as the poet's

21 Yajurveda, 40/8.

22 Atharva Veda, 10/8/32.

23 Anandavardhana : Dhvanyaloka, 3/43 vrtti.

24 Ibid., 1/6.

25 Ibid., 4/6

26 Ibid., 4/17.

greatest tool and thinks that deprived of *Pratibha*, the poet is unable to create refreshing poetry.²⁸ Abhinavagupta takes *Pratibha* as the faculty which enables the poet to create novel things.²⁹ He says that this faculty makes the poet capable of conceiving things which are not available on this earth and it is through the medium of *Pratibha* that he saturates feeling and language with *Rasa*.³⁰ This implies that the business of immediate recollection of word and meaning is assigned to *Pratibha*. Jagannatha takes only *Pratibha* as the proof of poetry. He defines *Pratibha* as the readiness of the mind to use word and meaning according to the need of poetry.³¹ Abhinavagupta uses the word freedom (*svatantrya*) to single out the function of *Pratibha*. The poet succeeds in discriminating poetic qualities (*gunas*) and poetic blemishes (*dosas*) of poetry because of this faculty of freedom. Again, it is with this freedom that the poet protects worthy ideas even when he apparently violates the conditions of nature and the laws of creation. In his *Tantraloka*, Abhinavagupta observes: "*Pratibha* may be dim in the beginning. But it is brightened as a result of the perceptorial instruction and imitation, performance of the ritual, practice of Yoga, etc. They are like the puff, which removes the ashes from over the cinders and makes them shine brightly: or they are like water and manure which bring about the full development of the seed of *Pratibha* into a full grown tree."³² A gifted poet who has imaginative power, can get real pleasure from the object of the word whereas for a vulgar man the world is nothing but a monotonous place full of misery and drudgery. An imaginative poet spins out a beautiful world out of his own imaginative stuff which may not always resemble the material world. Even this dry material world scatters before him the precious gems of veriegated beauty which the bounty of nature is capable of providing. *Pratibha* makes the roughly, rugged and insipid parts of nature administer to the

27 Ibid., 4/17 vrtti.

28 Kuntaka : *Vakrokti-Jivita*, 1/7 vrtti, 1/29 vrtti.

29 Abhinavagupta : *Dhvanyaloka Locana*, p. 93.

30 Ibid , pp. 93.94.

31 Jagannatha : *Rasagangadhara*, p. 27.

32 Abhinavagupta : *Tantraloka Anmika* XIII, 111, tr. Pandey, Dr. K.C. .
Abhinavagupta : *An Historical and Philosophical Study* (Chowkhamba, Varanasi, 1963), p. 701.

poet's pleasure so that he looks at the whole world, as it were, in another light, and discovers in it a multitude of charms that conceal themselves from the generality of mankind.³³ Vamana defines *Pratibha* as the seed of poetry.³⁴ Bhattatauta regards *Pratibha* as that strength of the poet by which he succeeds in conceiving new thought and clothing them in new words and phrases. *Pratibha* enables the poet to think of ever new ideas.³⁵ Bhamaha traces the root of poetry to *Pratibha*.³⁶ In short, the majority of Sanskrit critics consider *Pratibha* an important equipment of poetry (*kavya-hetu*).

In *Principles*, Richards jots down six distinct meanings of the word 'imagination'.³⁷ Here 'imagination' has been taken in an extended sense to cover a large variety of mental activities and sense-perceptions. In the first sense, imagination produces visual images, usually vivid and clear. This is the simplest and commonest of all the forms of imagination. Hence, it is least interesting. In the second sense, imagination works in figurative language. Simile and metaphor are not possible without it. Those writers who take recourse to rhetorical language for the expression of their feelings and emotions are usually called imaginative writers. In the third sense, imagination makes sympathetic reproduction of other people's state of mind possible, particularly their emotional states. It is necessary for communication. But it does not imply value. In this sense, the writer or the reader may be called imaginative who sympathetically reproduces other people's emotions and sentiments. In the fourth sense, imagination is indicative of inventiveness meaning that it brings together remote and disintegrated elements. It can be found in fantastic romance. It is nearer value. Still, it is too general. The fifth category of imagination is scientific. It is that mental power by which the scientist explores co-relation amongst imperceptible objects. It establishes relevant connection amongst things which are ordinarily considered to be unconnected. It is exemplified in scientific discourse. It is concerned with ordering of impulses in definite ways and for a definite end or purpose, not necessarily

33 Abhinavagupta : *Dhvanyaloka Locana*, p. 93.

34 Vamana : *Kavyalankarasutra*, 1/3/16.

35 Bhattatauta : *Kavyakautuka* cited Ksemendra : *Aucitya Vicara Carica*, p. 218.

36 Bhamaha : *Kavyalankara*, 1/5.

37 Richards : *Principles*, pp. 239-42.

deliberate and conscious, but limited to a given field of phenomena. Its role can be seen in the technical triumphs of Arts. As it is concerned with ordering of impulses, it implies value though this value may be limited or conditional. In the sixth sense, imagination is that synthetic power which brings order in discordant and dissimilar things. It is the skilful handling of Imagination which produces monumental literary works. Coleridgean Imagination insists on this kind.

Coleridge calls imagination that synthetic and magical power which reveals itself in the balance and reconciliation of opposites of discordant qualities. Its main function is to add novelty and freshness to old and familiar object. It gives what Coleridge says "the sense of musical delight". Richards appreciates Coleridge's concept of imagination. He, too, like Coleridge, considers imagination an element which adds to the beauty and grandeur, novelty and freshness of a poetic masterpiece. But he does not retain the purity of Coleridge while explaining Imagination. Despite all fervour to explain imagination, the chapter on "The Imagination" in *Principles*, is probably the least animated in this book. "It emphasizes, without in any radical way developing, Coleridge's definition from the 14th chapter of *Biographia Literaria*."³⁸

The above mentioned six-fold meanings of imagination cover a wide range. They even enter the range of emotion and volition. Richards is with Coleridge in acknowledging Imagination as an integrative power which 'orders and systematises varied, discordant and mutually contradictory images. Its area is wide. Richards has not explained the six-fold meanings of imagination by giving illustrations. But on the basis of his account, one may safely illustrate them in the following manner.

The first type of imagination which according to Richards is the simplest one may be found in commonplace vivid images. The image "the yellow fog that rubs its back on the window panes ... Licked its tongue into the corners of the evening" occurring in Eliot's "The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock" is an example of this type of imagination. The second type of imagination which is operative in figurative language can be illustrated by drawing an example from Shakespeare's *The Merchant of Venice* where Shylock reminds Antonio that only the other day he called him a

38 Read, Herbert : Review of Richards' *Principles of Literary Criticism*, The Criterion, Vol. III, No. 11, April, 1925, p. 447.

dog. This use of metaphorical language enhances the effect of Shylock's statement. Figurative language is used not in the literal sense but in an imaginative way. For example, when 'Fiery' is used for a man who is easily made angry, the word is used in a figurative sense. The third type of Imagination comes to operate when one starts describing in a sympathetic manner other people's feelings and emotions. In doing so, one usually tries to make one's description spicy by blending his own Imagination. When Othello, in the open court, and also in the presence of Brabantio, Desdemona's father, starts reproducing the feelings of Desdemona which are her reactions against his sufferings, he becomes highly imaginative. Without the help of imagination he could not have recalled to memory and reproduced how Desdemona felt when he narrated the stories of his wars and moans, wondrous adventures, triumphs and defeats. The following example will show this specific meaning of Imagination.

My story being done,
 She gave me for my pain a world of sighs:
 She swore, in faith, 't was strange, 't was passing strange;
 'T was pitiful, 't was wondrous pitiful:
 She wished she had not heard it, yet she wished
 That heaven had made her such a man;
 She thanked me,
 And bade me, if I had a friend that loved her,
 I should teach him how to tell my story,
 And that would woo her.

Shakespeare: *Othello*, Act I, Sc. III, 186-196.

The fourth type of imagination works in fantastic romances where it is merely the inventiveness of the writer which is uppermost in his mind. In this case it is not necessary that what is described is always logical. It has nothing to do with mathematical accuracy. Its excellence depends upon imaginative rapture. The writer spins out fantastic yarns of imagination and the reader gets thrilled at his description irrespective of his reasoning. It can be seen in such writings as Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe* or *The Arabian Nights Entertainments* or Stevenson's *The Treasure Island*. The following passage quoted from R.L. Stevenson's *The Treasure Island* will illustrate this meaning of imagination.

"It was one January Morning, very early - a pinching, frosty morning - the core all gray with hoar- frost, the ripple lapping softly on the stones, the sun still low and only touching the hill tops and shining for to seaward.

The capital had risen earlier than usual and out down the beach, his cutless swinging under the broad skirts of the old blue coat, his brass telescope under his arm, his hat tilted back upon his head. I remember his breath hanging like smoke in the wake as he strode off, and the last sound I heard of him, as he turned to big rock, was a loud snort of indignation, as though his mind was still running upon Dr. Livesey".³⁹

The fifth type of imagination, which is purely scientific in character, enables the writer to find logical relation between two or more unconnected things. It can be found in scientific writings. The scientist begins with some hypothesis which requires the play of imagination. What appears absurd to an average man might be true to the scientist. The following extract quoted from Charles Darwin's *The Descent of Man* will illustrate this form of imagination.

"By considering the embryological structure of man, - the homologues which he presents with the lower animals, - the rudiments which he retains, - and the reversions to which he is liable, we can partly recall in imagination the former condition of our early progenitors; and can approximately place them in their proper place in the Zoological series. We thus learn that man is descended from a hairy, tailed quadruped, probably arboreal in its habits, and an inhabitant of old world".⁴⁰

The sixth type of imagination is usually displayed in poetry of high order. Here it is synthetic in nature. It imbues and enlivens the subject by adding new dimension to it. The flash of imagination makes a subject appear in a new garb. Shelley's "Prometheus Unbound", Keats's "Hyperion" and Coleridge's 'Christable' are the best examples of this type of imagination.

The six meanings of imagination noted by Richards may seem to overlap like Empson's seven types of ambiguity and their difference is so subtle that they can hardly be differentiated. Another important point to be noted is that Richards carries

39 Stevenson, R.L. *The Treasure Island* (London & Glasgow, 1914), p. 9.

40 Darwin Charles *The Origin of Species and The Descent of Man* (New York, 1952), p. 911

imagination to the realm of emotional and volitional response to poetry. It is one of the reasons why his theory of imagination is rejected by D.G. James who remarks: "Mr. Richards has sought to transfer interest from the theory of the imagination to a theory of the emotional and volitional response to poetry."⁴¹

Turning to *Rasa* doctrine, we get that it is *Pratibha* which unites the poet's *Rasa-loka* or the imaginative world to his *Dr̥syā-loka* or the material world. *Pratibha* acts as a medium here. It gives material shape to the poet's *Dhyāna-loka*. This does not mean that the subtle emotions of the poet become *Sthūla* after they are put into words. It simply means that with the aid of *Pratibha*, the *Sadharanikarana* of *Kavyārtha* is rendered easy. The poet's *Pratibha* colours both the subtle and the crude in poetry as they are made accessible after such a colouring.

The poet, with the help of *Pratibha*, creates a *Bhava-loka* which is beyond ordinary reach. This *Bhava-loka* is perfect and self-sufficient in itself. The poet transports the reader to his *Bhava-loka* with the help of imagination and enables him to experience *Rasa*. This task is accomplished by the process of *Sadharanikarana* of *Bhavas* as a consequence of which poetic language is charged with *Dhvanyārtha*. It is because of *Pratibha* that the poet's fame endures and he is respected by the posterity. Milton, Wordsworth, Yeats, Eliot, Kalidasa, Bhavabhuti, Bana, Magha, Dante, Virgil, etc., still live though their physical bodies perished long ago.

It, thus, follows that *Pratibha* is helpful in reaching from *Alambana* to *Bhava* and in attaining what is called *Rasa-dāsa*. *Pratibha* is *Bodha-vṛtti*, the function of which is to synthesize and not to analyse and dissect like science. From this point of view, *Pratibha* has been placed under three broad groups—*Utpadaka* or creative, *sanyojaka* or associative and *Avabodhaka* or interpretative. *Utpadaka* is that form of *Pratibha* which creates every thing out of nothing. Abhinavagupta calls it, *Apurva Vastu Nirmana Kṣama Prajna*,⁴² which means that it is the faculty of the poet to create ever new and refreshing things. The work of *Sanyojaka Pratibha*, which to some extent corresponds to Coleridge's and Richards' 'synthetic imagination', is to find

41 James, D.G. : *Scepticism and Poetry : A Essay on the Poetic Imagination* (London, 1960), p. 9.

42 Abhinavagupta : *Dhvanyaloka Locan*, p. 93.

harmony amongst apparently uncorrected things and coordinate them with one another. The work of *Avabodhaka Pratibha* is to invoke new meanings not always relevant. This is found in the delineation of imaginary characters and situations. It brings forth truth of imagination. It is usually displayed in fictional narratives where there is ample scope for the play of imagination. Obviously, this *Avabodhaka Pratibha* is neighbored by Richards' fourth type of imagination which he finds operating in fantastic romances.

According to Richards, the ideal form of imagination is that which presents in a harmonious manner the many sidedness of life. Human life is vast and varied. The skill of the poet lies in the successful handling of its diversities and presenting it in its entirety. The life, as one sees it, is uneven, often ruthless and unpleasant. The poet's imagination presents it in a coherent and systematic way. In a tragedy, the dramatist presents pity and terror in such a way that the total effect is neither of pity nor of fear but of undiluted pleasure. Richards considers imagination as a miraculous power which embodies the discord of life. The beauty of human life is more palpably present in the poet's creation than in any other place. Unlike other critics, Richards thinks that the main function of imagination is not to create images but to bring harmony in apparently inconsistent impulses. Imagination not only controls these impulses and puts a check on their sway but also coordinates them. Ordinarily impulses run parallel in a single direction. Imagination moulds them, channelizes them and unites them. Impulses are mutually contradictory. It is the function of imagination to form a web out of their loose tissues.

In Richards' view, the role of imagination can be seen where images are created through pictures. There are several stages through which the reader has to pass when he reads a poem. In the beginning, his eyes are fixed only on the printed words which give him visual sensation of them. Then his attention shifts to the images closely connected with these sensations. The images may be of two kinds - free and tied. As Richards puts it, "in the poetic experience words take effect to their associated images, and through what we are, as a rule, content to call their meaning."⁴³ Visual sensations of words do not work independently. They work together with certain other images tied to them. This is why they are called tied images. Amongst them,

43 Richards : Principles, p. 118.

auditory image has an important role to play. The auditory image is "the sound of the words in the mind's ear".⁴⁴ Then there is the image of articulation - "the feel in lips, mouth, and throat, of what the words would like to speak."⁴⁵ Auditory images of words are most conspicuous of mental happenings. "Any line of verse or prose slowly read, will, for most people, sound mutely in the imagination somewhat as it would if read aloud."⁴⁶ There may, however, be an obvious difference between the image-sounds and the actual sounds that the reader would produce. "The sensory qualities of images, their vivacity clearness, Fullness of detail and so on, do not bear any constant relation to their effects."⁴⁷ Sensory images, however, feeble they might, are of supreme importance. "What gives an image efficacy is less its vividness as an image than its character as a mental event peculiarly concerned with sensation."⁴⁸ So it is a mistake to suppose that the efficacy of image depends upon its clarity and vividness.

There are people who do not experience an Imagery but are capable of art experiences. In such people, something works unconsciously as image - substitute. It is a thing of common observation that delicacy and vivacity of Imagery heighten its effect. Poets and critics of high order possess vigour of Imagery. The usefulness of Imagery cannot be disputed. The second type of image i.e., articulatory is seldom noticed. Yet, as Richards observes, "the quality of silent speech is perhaps even more dependent upon these images than upon sound-images."⁴⁹ Unpleasant and awkward collocations of syllables are irritating to the ear. Auditory and articulatory images are closely related to each other. In a silent recitation, the presence of both may be experienced. For the sake of convenience both of them may be called 'verbal images'. They provide the reader with the stuff which is called the 'formal structure' of poetry. They essentially differ from the 'free images' in bringing images of words.

For a better understanding of the imaginative process as described by Richards, it is necessary to examine and analyse

44 Ibid., pp. 118-19.

45 Ibid., p. 119.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.

48 Richards : Principles, p. 119.

49 Ibid., p. 121.

the role of free-image. Its one distinct from, visual image, which as opposed to auditory image, draws picture of something neatly. Richards firmly holds that visual images "occupy a prominent place in the literature of criticism, to the neglect somewhat of other forms of imagery."⁵⁰ Images differ from reader to reader. As Richards puts it, "Fifty different readers will experience not one common picture but fifty different pictures."⁵¹ But those persons who assess the merit of poetry on the extent of visual images are grossly mistaken. Its clue can be found if we shift our interest from the sensory qualities of imagery to the more fundamental qualities upon which its efficacy depends. Images do not always resemble sensations though they may represent them and replace them. Images are not always prominent and so they cannot be judged as pictures are judged. "What is sought in poetry by those painters and others whose interest in the world is primarily visual is not pictures but records of observation, or stimuli of emotion."⁵² In this way, Richards considers Imagination as something more than the power to create image. It is directly concerned with emotion. It is a step towards psychological interpretation of imagination.

Richards observes that the "critic is, throughout, judging of experiences, of states of mind; but too often he is badly ignorant of the general psychological form of the experiences with which he is concerned."⁵³ No two poets use the same word or vocabulary. Swinburne is different from Hardy because he has a different set of words to employ. So the difference of Pope from Shelley can be easily marked on the basis of their choice of words.

In *Practical Criticism*, Richards describes images in relation to irrelevant associations and stock responses. For the visualizing or image-producing readers, images appear in a spontaneous process. But this principle does not hold good in respect of all the readers. The impression that the poets work through imagery is an accident.⁵⁴ Images often fall outside the control of the poet. Where the meaning embodies itself in imagery, the poem may be judged in terms of imagery. Richards

50 Richards : Principles, p. 121.

51 Ibid., p. 122.

52 Ibid., p. 123.

53 Ibid., p. 114.

54 Richards : Practical Criticism, p. 235.

agrees to the fact that Imagery serves as a useful Index to the meaning.⁵⁵ But "the merit of the poem is not the Imagery."⁵⁶ Irrelevant Imagery cannot be relied upon. Therefore, it is safer to hold that what is most important in poetry is the evocation of emotion and concrete experience. It is necessary for the poet to bring home the emotion he wants to convey to his readers.

Richards is eager to connect his theory of Imagination to his theory of value. As his theory of value is based on his ethics, so his theory of imagination is also based on his ethics. His ethics is that poetry is valuable in proportion to its power to bring balance amongst our discordant impulses. Life itself is full of contradictions. It is the work of poetry to bring poise in life. On the same lines, Richards holds that Imagination is useless if it fails to add to the experience of life. Imagination, if it is unable to add substantially to poetic value is of no avail. Richards' notion of Imagination has certain obvious limitations. It does not reflect so much on what Imagination is as on what Imagination does. It is a fact that 'act' cannot be separated from 'form'. But Richards ought to have described the nature of Imagination and its constitution. Another difficulty is that Richards does not take pains either to discriminate the different types of Imagination or to show their relative merits. The Imagination which produces vivid images is said to be the commonest one and the least interesting. The inventive function of Imagination is reserved for fantastic romances. Its associative function is said to work only in the scientific field and in the technical triumphs of art. The fallacies involved in these arguments do not require to be brought out in detail. All the great critics have laid emphasis on vivid images. Inventiveness is the very core of Imagination. Not to say of fantastic romances, its role can be seen in all the forms of creative writing. Richards actually takes us to a blind alley when he tells us that image-formation is not the function of Imagination. "Such impulses I call imaginative, whether images occur or not, for image-production is not at all essentially involved in what the critic is interested in as imagination."⁵⁷ If image production is not the function of Imagination, what else it can be? Again, no one can think of an impulse which is completely divorced from Imagination. Imagination presents the poet's grasp of the subject

55 Ibid., 236.

56 Ibid.

57 Richards : Principles, p. 192.

with precision, vividness, force and economy and makes such an impact on the reader that he takes it as belonging in one way or the other to the fabric of his life. Emotion and impulse are not to be separated from imagination. One cannot expect all images to be rich and copiously suggestive. A poet thinking of imagery and finding its materials in the things he perceives around him may use such materials with glaring ineptitude. Alternatively, he may startle us by an excellent image used with terseness and agility. Imagination has the power to assimilate different kinds of experiences and fuse multiple sense-perceptions. It is at this stage that thought and emotion are crystallized into an imaginative poetic utterance.

Rasa theory deals with *Pratibha* not as an independent theory, but as an inseparable part of the creative process of art and as an inevitable link between the poet and his creation. Most of the critics of *Rasa* school hold that the equipments or the *Hetus* of poetry are three-fold—imagination (*Pratibha*), culture (*vyutpatti*) and practice (*abhyasa*). This is the view of Dandin,⁵⁸ Bhamaha⁵⁹, Rudrata⁶⁰, and Mammata⁶¹, of which only the last belongs to the *Rasa* school. Of these three, the first i.e., *Pratibha* is of paramount importance. Vamana points out three roots of poetry, namely, practical knowledge of worldly affairs (*loka-jnana*), acquaintance with different Sastras (*vidya*) and knowledge of scattered literature (*prakirna*). Under *Prakirna*, he gives place to six elements i.e., study of other's poetic works (*lakshya-jnana*), dexterity (*abhiyoga*), acquiring knowledge through master's service (*vrddha-seva*), practice to use apt words in the apposite context (*aveksana*), imagination (*pratibha*) and concentration of mind (*citekagrata*)⁶². *Agnipurana* lays down that birth in human form is a rarity, rarer is the acquiring of knowledge, still rarer is the poetic faculty and the rarest is *Sakti*.⁶³ Bhattatauta observes that the *Prajna*, which goes to create ever new meaning, is called *Pratibha*.⁶⁴ In describing *Pratibha* or *Sakti*, the word which recurs in *Rasa-sastra* is *Prajna*. The word *Prajna* is

58 Dandin : *Kavyadarasa*, 1/103.

59 Bhamaha : *Kavyalankara*, 1/5.

60 Rudrata : *Kavyalankara*, 1/14.

61 Mammata : *Kavya Prakasa*, 1/3.

62 Vamana : *Kavyalankara Sutra*, 1/3/11.

63 *Agnipurana*, 3/4.

64 Bhattatauta : *Kavyakautuka*, cited Ksemendra : *Aucitya Vicara Carca*, p. 218.



used here in the sense of poetic accomplishment. It is that talent of the poet which enables him to present ever green flashes of ideas. Anandavardhana has the extreme view in this regard. He maintains that without *Sakti* or *Pratibha*, the poet is completely incapable of doing anything.⁶⁵ Mammata, one of the chief exponents of *Rasa* theory, holds that the synthesis of *Pratibha*, *Nipunata* or skill and *Abhyasa* or practice is necessary for poetic creation. Yet *Pratibha* is the rock-bottom of poetry without which the poet cannot compose poetry at all.⁶⁶ Mammata has high regard for the poet and he says that the poet's creation is beyond man-made laws. It is free, pleasure-giving and instinct with *Rasa*. Vagbhatta gives prime importance to *Pratibha*. He relegates *Vyutpatti* and *Abhyasa* to the secondary position. They are mere ornamentation of poetry. They are not essential qualities for a poet.⁶⁷ Hemchandra was probably the first theorist to admit *Pratibha* as the only real equipment of poetry.⁶⁸ Pandita Raja Jagannatha defines *Pratibha* as the power to use charged words in which there is a happy union between word and meaning that suits the context.⁶⁹ He considers *Pratibha* as the only *Hetu* of poetry.⁷⁰ It is because of the strangeness and many-sidedness of *Pratibha* that poetry acquires colorfulness and strikingness.⁷¹ All the poets cannot have equal imaginative power nor they can have equal capacity to write poetry.

According to the Indian critics who were also great philosophers, the phenomenal world is nothing but just an imagination particularly when it recedes from one's view. In India, mind is always taken as an infinite power. The startling glimpses of the magical spell that *Pratibha* casts is no less strange than the semantic analysis of meanings. Poetry is generally regarded as a product of mind in the west. But in India, the world is itself considered as product of mind. The world is externalized in and by the mind. Mind and the world are closely related to each other. The world is nothing but a scaffolding of the mind. For if the world is not in the mind, only a miracle can bring it to existence. One and the same light refracts into a million photographs each

65 Anandavardhana : *Dhvanvaloka*, 13/5.

66 Mammata : *Kavya Pralasa*, 1/3 and 1/3 Vrtti.

67 Vagbhatta : *Vagbhattachalankara*, 1/3-4.

68 Hemachandra : *Kavyanusasana*, pp. 5-6.

69 Jagannatha : *Rasagangadhara*, p. 27.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid., p. 34.

different from all others. *Pratibha* enters into the essence, the very substratum of nature and brings forth subtle realities of the world. *Pratibha* may be both Inborn (*sahaja*) and cultivated (*utpada*)⁷² though the latter is of lesser importance. It is the inborn or innate *Pratibha* which is of greater importance. Mahimbhatta calls it the third eye of Lord Sankara.⁷³ In *Rasa* process, nature or object is said to be visibly present before the *asraya* as an excitant. But the object that arouses emotion i.e., *Alambana* is usually imagined by the poet or the dramatist. The mere presence of *Vibhava* whether physically as in *Uddipana* or mentally as in *Alambana* – impels the configuration of *Pratibha* to change it in no time. The intermediary process is not perceived as the act of tasting (*rasanavyapara*) begins soon after *Pratibha* comes in contact with *Vibhava*.

Pratibha is the outcome of wisdom (*prajna*) or knowledge (*jnana*). Knowledge is of two types-logical (*vikalnatmaka*) and non-discursive (*sankalpatmaka*). The former is concerned with intellect and the latter with intuitive knowledge. *Pratibha* is the product of intuitive knowledge. So intuitive knowledge is called *Pratibha-jnana*. *Pratibha* knows no restraint. But this does not lead to the inference that the poet is unbridled. It is not in the exercise of his imagination, but in the utter abuse of the logical faculty that the danger to sanity lies. Poetry is a revelation and it reveals us to ourselves and to the Nature around us. With the magic touch of the imagination, it transfigures the things of nature, giving us thereby a clearer realisation of the nature of things.

In *Rasa* theory, the experience of *Rasa* is said to depend upon the reader's quality to experience it. *Rasa*, which takes into account imaginative meaning, tone, suggestions and adumbrations, cannot be enjoyed by a blunt and unimaginative mind. The Indian critics, like Richards, do not go in details in their study of images and symbols, which are relatively new concepts. But they deal at large with the process through which poetry is enjoyed.

Richards' concept of imagination is not very different from that of the critics of *Rasa* school. Richards considers imagination as of great importance because it brings coordination in our

72 Rudrata : *Kavyalankara*, 1/16.

Also see Dandin : *Kavyadarśa*, 1/103.

73 Mahimbhatta : *Vyakti-Viveka*, 2/118.

impulses and thus adds to the value of poetry. The critics of *Rasa* school, almost in the manner of Richards, consider *Pratibha* as an integrative power. Imagination leads to the realisation of *Rasa*. *Rasananda* i.e., the pleasure of poetry, emerges from Imagination. The poet creates an emotional world where general rules are set aside. The emotional world is perfect and Independent in itself. The poet externalises the world which does not exist in the material sense. In this business, it is only Imagination which coordinates the emotional world of the poet with the mundane existence. Imagination here acts as a coordinating link between the imaginative world and the material world. It lends grossness to the poet's world of meditation. Imagination is greatly helpful in the poet's voyage from the *Vibhava* to *Bhava*. Its function is synthesis or *Samslesana* as contrasted to the analytic function of science. Imagination does not create the actual materials. This is beyond its capacity. But its creation usually depends upon the real phenomena of life. It is Imagination which conjures up the meaning of individual words and instals a complete figure which excites the emotion lying dormant in the heart of the reader. This ultimately turns into *Rasavastha*. It is emotion which makes one realize the invisible and the esoteric secrets of life and world.

The Indian critics admit four important elements of poetry—the cognitive element (*buddhi-tattva*), the imaginative element (*pratibha-tattva*), the emotional element (*ragatmaka-tattva*) and the poetic element (*kavyanga-tattva*). Among these, the importance of *Pratibha-tattva* has been acknowledged by all the major critics of *Rasa* school. In *Rasa* doctrine, *Bhava* is considered as the cause of *Vibhava*. Indian philosophers point out five stages of knowledge—cognition (*parijnana*), imagination (*pratibha*), recollection (*smarana*), thought (*vicara*) and intuition (*sahaja-jnana*). *Pratibha* occupies an important place in this list.

Pratibha is necessary for both—the poet and the critic. The idea is not alien to Richards. *Pratibha* helps the poet in creation and the reader in appreciation. Rajasekhara uses the word *Pratibha* in the sense of *Kalpana*. He divides *Pratibha* into two parts—creative imagination (*karyitri-pratibha*) and critical imagination (*bhavayitri-pratibha*) respectively.⁷⁴ Creative imagination is found in the poet with the help of which he creates

74 Rajasekhara : *Kavya-mimansa*, p. 40.

poetry. Critical imagination is found in the critic with the help of which he passes judgment on the quality of poetry. It leads to the success of what he calls 'the creeper of poetry.'⁷⁵ According to Rajasekhara, at least two faculties are demanded of a poet — *Pratibha* and culture (*vyutpatti*). It is on the basis of these two faculties that the poets are put into two classes. pure poet (*kavya-kavi*) and rule making poet (*sastra-kavi*). *Pratibha* illumines words, meanings, figures of speech and other poetic devices. Bereft of *Pratibha*, the poet cannot touch even the fringe of the visible objects — not to say of invisible objects. Creative Imagination is put into three classes — innate (*sahaja*), acquired (*aharya*) and blessed (*aupadesika*). Innate Imagination is the fruit of *Sanskara* of past life. Acquired imagination is the result of constant practice. The cause of blessed imagination is the teachings or blessings of gods. The poets who possess these three kinds of imagination are called gifted or with whom goddess Sarasvati is pleased (*sarasvata*), industrious (*abhyasika*) and blessed (*aupadesika*) respectively.⁷⁶ As Rajasekhara puts it, *Pratibha* helps the poet see even those things which are actually not before him and thus even invisible things are made visible before his eye-sight.⁷⁷ *Pratibha* is said to be cultivated (*utpada*) and God gifted (*sahaja*) by Hemcandra.⁷⁸ It is generally accepted that *Pratibha* is indispensable for poetry while *Vyutpatti* and *Abhyasa* simply further its aim and polish, brighten and sharpen its edge. The idea that imagination is two-fold — critical and creative is also held by Richards. Richards seems to believe in both the forms of imagination — creative and critical. He observes : "to set up as a critic is to set up as a judge of values."⁷⁹ The critic's power to know and appreciate poetic value depends upon his imagination. If the critic lacks the innate power to bring out the excellence of an artistic product, he cannot be a good critic. A dry heart cannot do justice to an artistic product. Therefore, it is necessary that the heart of the critic should be sufficiently receptive. The critic must be imaginative enough to appreciate the beauty inherent in poetry. In *Practical Criticism*, Richards lays stress on the need of

75 Ibid., p. 30.

76 Rajasekhara : *Kavya-mimansa*, pp. 27, 30-31.

77 Ibid., p. 27.

78 Hemchandra : *Kavyanusasana*, 1/5.

79 Richards : *Principles*, p. 60.

imagination in the reader who wants to portray the feelings of the poet. In order to bring out the sense of the poem, an intelligent use of dictionary, logical acumen, a command on syntax and pertinacity are needed. But to describe the feeling of the poem, "the qualities of sensitiveness and imagination, the power to use remote experience and to create metaphors, gifts which may seem to belong by birthright to the poet alone"⁸⁰ are essential even for the reader. Richards also lays stress on the training of the reader which, in Indian terms, may be called *Abhyasa*. Richards, like Rajasekhara, says : "Doubtless to some degree poetry, like the others arts, is a secret discipline to which some initiation is needed. Some readers are excluded from it simply because they have never discovered, and have never been taught, how to enter."⁸¹

It is the singular achievement of *Rasa* theory that it endeavours to establish a synthesis between creation and criticism treating *Sarjana* and *Bhava-katva* as the two phases of the same coin. Abhinavagupta in his *Dhvanyaloka Locana* imposes a condition on the poet that he must also be a *Sahrdaya*. This was a laudable aim which was achieved by such great poets as Valmiki, Kalidasa and Anandavardhana. Abhinavagupta, therefore, adores a poet who, besides being a poet, is also a critic or *Sahrdaya* (*sarasvatyastatvam kavisahrdayakhyam vijayate*). In English literature, creative writers like Wordsworth, Shelley, Keats, Coleridge, etc., had this blend of creative and critical faculties. This synthesis of creative and critical faculties has been the cherished goal of Richards and Eliot.

As compared with the western concept of imagination, the Indian concept of *Pratibha* has a wider connotation. It suggests various capacities including the capacities to adorn, synthesize, assimilate, conceive, create and recreate. *Rasa* is produced at a point when *Bhava*, *Anubhava* and *Sancaribhava* get assimilated in the proper manner. *Pratibha* plays an important role in this assimilation. The poet solely banks on *Pratibha* for giving fresh meaning to what he says. *Pratibha* is then fused to his sense of beauty (*ragatmika-vrtti*). For both the kinds of *Pratibha* – creative (*karvitri* or *vidhayaka*) and critical (*bhavavitri* or *grahaka*), experience of beauty is a necessary pre-requisite. *Rasa* theory considers *Pratibha* not an end in itself, but as a means to an

80 Richards : *Practical Criticism*, p. 224.

81 *Ibid.*, p. 319.

end-the end being the realization of *Rasa*. Unfortunately, western criticism confuses the medium with the object and considers imagination as the primary aim of poetry. Though every poem begins with emotion, it does not follow that any and every emotion, will make a poem. So also, it is absurd to suppose that all imagination whatsoever will make poetry grand and appealing. As a stale emotional expression cannot make a poem, so also an uncontrolled imagination cannot make poetry effective. For that, an ingenuous, genuine and controlled imagination is required. In fact, the Indian concept of *Pratibha* is so wide that all the elements of western concepts of style, expression, image, symbol, language and rhetorical accomplishments are merged in it and yet it remains something more than an integration of these elements.

There has for sometime now been little need to argue for the influence of the Coleridgean imagination on the new apologists for poetry. This awareness might take us a long way towards understanding the extent to which Richards' critical formulations are akin to Coleridgean epistemology. Lacking in metaphysical tone, which is the main essence of Coleridgean criticism, Richards takes imagination almost in the same sense in which *Pratibha* was taken by the theorists of *Rasa* school. According to Richards, imagination resolves much of the contradictions existing in the world of impulses and brings poise and harmony in them. Richards' assumption that poetry and for that reason imagination brings balance in discordant impulses can only be accepted if we suppose that poetry is essentially imaginative. Richards' notion that imagination is essential for poetry and it is the power of the poet to combine several feelings and images is a truth which is accepted by the Indian critics as well. The critics of *Rasa* school give an idea of the integrative power of imagination in their account of *Sanlakshyakrama Vyangya*. In this form of *Vyangya*, the *Dhvani* based on *Vastu* and *Alankara* is not appreciated all on a sudden, but through a clear process usually demanding investigation by the reader. The subtle meanings are gradually unfolded as the reader ingeniously goes on exploring their possibilities. Here the imagination of the reader is at work. At least one variety of *Sanlakshyakrama Vyangya* named *Kavipraudhokti*⁸² is directly concerned with imagination because here the *Vyangyārtha* is justified by the sheer imagination of the

82 Anandavardhana : *Dhvanyaloka*, 2/24.

poet. Here the poetic utterance, is not testified on the basis of fact. Many hyperbolic, antithetical and paradoxical statements of the poet are justified only because they are the products of the poetic Imagination and bear poetic truth. Anandavardhana says that even familiar meanings look strange and refreshing when they are enlivened with *Rasa* as the trees give a charming look in the spring season.⁸³ Richards' notion of Imagination is not far from this concept. According to Richards, Imagination invariably uses emotive language which gives us 'imaginative experience'.⁸⁴ This 'imaginative experience' is nothing but *Kavyagatasatya* or poetic truth.

Richards extends his theory of Imagination to tragic plays in which its role can be best demonstrated. Aristotle in his *Poetics* stresses on the two important constituents of tragedy—namely, pity and terror. He puts forward his theory of *catharsis* meaning purgation of subjective, potentially morbid emotions through pity for the tragic hero. *Catharsis* defines the psychological effect of pathetic scene on the audience. Richards takes Aristotle's theory of *Catharsis* in a different light and says that it suggests the psychic harmony effected by a tragic scene. "Tragedy", Richards observes, "is perhaps the most general, all accepting, all ordering experience known. It can take anything into its organization, modifying it so that it finds a place."⁸⁵ In tragedy our sense of pity and terror is aroused. Pity and Terror are contradictory emotions—one attracts and the other repels. Tragedy is great because it presents the two contradictory emotions side by side. The pleasure peculiar to tragedy arises from the fact that our impulses are harmonized and emotions released by an intellectually conditioned structure of action. The joy of the tragic experience is "not an indication that all's right with the world or that 'somewhere, somehow, there is justice'; it is an indication that all is right here and now in the nervous system."⁸⁶ Tragic experience thus, turns out to be a precious experience, "only possible to a mind which is for the moment agnostic or Monichean."⁸⁷ If this interpretation of *catharsis* is accepted, Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet* cannot be regarded as a

83 Ibid., 4/4.

84 Richards : Principles, p. 237.

85 Richards : Principles, p. 247.

86 Ibid., p. 246.

87 Ibid

tragedy in the sense in which *King Lear* is. Better is the play of imagination, superior is the harmony effected amongst the discordant impulses. And superior the harmony of impulses, better the tragedy. According to him, the main function of imagination is to bring reconciliation in mutually contradictory impulses. The poet not only controls and co-ordinates those impulses which flow concurrently in one direction but he also finds unity in those impulses which are dissimilar, heterogeneous and different in kind.

The pleasure principles as applied to tragedy can be found in the study of *Karuna Rasa*. But here, there is nothing like Richards' notion that tragedy effects better organization in our impulses. Indians are *Anandavadis*. The Indian view is that every tragedy is made comedy if man develops a sort of stoic indifference towards the good and the bad happenings of life. Those Indian critics who take *Karuna* at the centre of all *Rasas* extend the meaning of *Karuna* to include sympathy for the whole of Universe. Once a man identifies himself with the world-consciousness, nothing remains for him like sorrow or grief. Of all the *Rasas*, *Srngara* is called the *Rasaraja* or the king of *Rasas*. But so far as the question of the depth and intensity of feeling of *Sthayibhava* is concerned, *Karuna Rasa* is unparalleled.

Richards believes in the imaginative moments of the poet. He observes that the imaginative moments are "the most formative of experiences, because in them the development and systematization of our impulses goes to the furthest lengths."⁸⁸ In the imaginative experience, as he suggests, the obstacles which confront ordinary life are removed. "Thus what happens here, what precise stresses, preponderances, conflicts, resolutions and interanimations, what remote relationships between different system of impulses arise, what before unapprehended and inexcusable connections are established, is a matter which, we see clearly, may modify all the rest of life."⁸⁹ Dwelling upon the place of arts in civilization, Richards says that what is required is an improvement of response. It "is the only benefit which any one can receive, and the degradation, the lowering of a response, is the only calamity. When we take into account not merely the impulses actually concerned in the experiences but all the allied

⁸⁸ Richards : Principles, p. 237.

⁸⁹ Richards : Principles, pp. 237-38.

groups which thrive or suffer with it, and all the far-reaching effects of success or failure upon activities which may seem to be independent, the fact that some people feel so keenly about the arts is no longer surprising.⁹⁰

In the Indian theory of *Rasa*, every *Rasa* has been given equal importance. There is scope for the play of imagination in all the *Rasas*. Here there is no theory that the pathetic sentiment gives larger scope for the play of imagination.

In *Coleridge on Imagination*, Richards makes a departure from the widely diffused methodological positivism to a condition of mind that is pretty accurately described by the term "romanticism".⁹¹ Coleridge's theory of the imagination, different from Fancy, remained one of the most famous speculations. Indeed, it has been treated by Richards as of vital importance to the spiritual failure of the human race—a skip "of the same type as that which took Galileo into the modern world."⁹² He points out that the distinction between imagination and fancy as made by Coleridge—the former standing for the power of forming mental images of what is not actually present, the power that brings several images into one, and the latter for an assembling and aggregating power, a power that unites a random, arbitrary idea often transient—should not be pressed hard. "Coleridge often insisted—and would have insisted still more often had he been a better judge of his reader's capacity for misunderstanding—that fancy and imagination are not exclusive or inimical to one another."⁹³ In Richards' opinion Coleridge never tried to bring out the mental dependence of imagination and fancy.⁹⁴ Quoting from Coleridge's *Table Talk*, April 10, 1833, Richards states that "though a poem may be fancy as regards the mode of interaction, one with other, of its separable parts, the consistency of its *total meaning*, when it is such that the sense of musical delight arises, is imaginative."⁹⁵ He examines in detail the two opposed passages from Shakespeare's *Venus and Adonais* which

90 Ibid., p. 237

91 Forster, Richards : 'The Romanticism of T.A. Richards'. *Journal of English Literary History*, 1950, Vol. 26, p. 91.

92 Richards : *Coleridge on Imagination*, p. 75.

93

94 Ibid, p. 75.

95 Ibid, p. 120.

Coleridge quoted as examples of fancy and imagination respectively. For fancy, Coleridge quoted the following lines :

Full gently now she takes him by the hand,
A lily prisoned in a gaol of snow,
Or ivory in an alabaster band;
So white a friend engirts so white a foe.

And as an example of imagination, he quoted the following lines :

Look : how a bright star shooted from the sky
So glides he in the night from Venus' eye.

Richards analyses these lines in detail. He finds that the two lines in the first passage are specially remarkable in respect of comparison. In the example quoted to illustrate imagination, "the more the image is followed up, the more links of relevance between the units are discovered."⁹⁶

It is difficult to understand from Richards' account of imagination and fancy whether he considers imaginative poetry superior to fanciful poetry. He is out to challenge Coleridge who takes imagination as of greater importance than fancy and proceeds to argue that imagination can be shown in trivial examples and fancy in important matters.⁹⁷ How then can one know that Richards prefers imagination to fancy? This is a problem which is never convincingly solved by Richards. It is, indeed, difficult to agree to Richards' view that Fancy and imagination are two words with the same meaning or one is the lower and the other the higher degree of the same power.⁹⁸ The question raised by Richards can be properly understood only by placing it in its historical perspective.

The term 'Phantasia' was first used by Plato to indicate a faculty of the human mind which obstructs reason. But later in his Dialogue *Timaeus*, he allowed to 'Phantasia' the power of apprehending mystical truths, truths that are beyond the power of mere intellect. As such 'Phantasia' is not anti-rational but supra-rational. Later Latin writers translated the term as 'Imagination', and this was the beginning of the view that

⁹⁶ Richards Coleridge on Imagination, p. 83.

⁹⁷ Richards Coleridge on Imagination, P P. 91-92.

⁹⁸ For Richards' faulty view, see P S. Sastri's Coleridge's Theory of Poetry (S Chand & Co, New Delhi, 1979), F N 20, p. 24.

Imagination and Fancy are identical terms, a view that persisted all through the Renaissance. Hobbes observed : "After the object is removed, or the eye shut, we still retain the image of the thing seen . . . And this it is, the Latins call Imagination from the Image made or seeing . . . But the Greeks call it fancy, which signifies appearance".⁹⁹

From the seventeenth century onwards, this view of identity began to be doubted from various quarters. Bacon in his *Advancement of Learning* (1605) asserts that the poet's Imagination may "at pleasure join that which Nature hath severed", while to Fancy is given only a decorative function. By "joining that which Nature hath severed" is basically implied the power of inventing new and newer similes in which most remote objects are joined together. The appearance of Metaphysical poetry brought in another term—WIT. Remote things could be harnessed together by 'wit' also, and not only by 'imagination'. But there is a difference. While 'imagination' 'joins', 'wit' merely 'harnesses'.

In the beginning of the Eighteenth century, philosophers like Berkeley derived Imagination from Image, and explained it in terms of Associational psychology. In Berkeley's *The Principles of Human Understanding* (1710), direct perception through the senses forms images. Images pertaining to one sense become associated with the other senses. e.g., the whirling sound in the open sky presents the visual image of an aeroplane. In the absense of actual things, the images in the mind associate and arrange themselves in various orders and combinations. The faculty which manipulates them is the faculty of Imagination. This concept of Imagination distinguishes it from Fancy and Wit, and here begins the hectic activity to differentiate the two by the romantic critics.

Wordsworth and Coleridge, both attempted to differentiate one from the other, but each with a different motive. Wordsworth's motive was to draw attention to that aspect of his poetry, which, according to him was the work of Imagination, and superior to that of mere fancy. Thus speaking of his poem 'To the Daisies', in which he played with similes, he says, "Loose types of things through all degrees", a process in comparison with Imagination "slight, limited and evanescent". Ruskin, a great admirer of Wordsworth, in his *Modern Painters*, vol. II quotes

⁹⁹ Hobbes : *Leviathan*, 1.3.

from the third, fifth and sixth stanzas and calls them "two delicious stanzas of Fancy regarding (believing in her creations) followed by one of heavenly Imagination." It is the old distinction between Fancy and Imagination which the romantic theorists discussed so elaborately. Keeping this distinction in mind, Shelley's "To a Skylark" would be a work of fancy, while Wordsworth's "To the Skylark", that of imagination; because in two series of six stanzas each, Shelley simply keeps playing with delicate similes. In Wordsworth's poem there are not only fanciful comparisons, but a creative transformation of a bird into a symbol.

Coleridge's purpose in stressing the difference between Fancy and Imagination was to load his literary criticism with metaphysical subtleties which he had learnt from the German masters, and thus to assert his superiority over the English critics, who, at that time, were not conversant with German philosophical modes. That Coleridge did not want Fancy and Imagination to be taken as synonymous terms is evident from several passages in *Biographia*. One example may be taken : "It is not, I own, easy to conceive a more apposite translation of the Greek *Phantasia* than the Latin Imagination; but it is equally true that in all societies there exists an instinct of growth, a certain collective, unconscious good sense working progressively to *desynonymize* (*underlining mine*) those words originally of the same meaning..."¹⁰⁰ words which begin as synonyms, get desynonymized with the progress of culture. Fancy and Imagination might have begun as synonyms, but one mark of progress of culture is to make finer distinctions in language to express more accurately the growing complexity of ideas. In the primitive state of culture and language, Fancy and Imagination began as synonyms. With the development of the faculty of making finer distinctions in the human mind, the two came to be differentiated from each other. This passage establishes beyond doubt that Coleridge did not want the two terms to be taken as synonyms. In the same passage, to illustrate his point, he observes : "Milton had a highly imaginative, Cowley a very fanciful mind."¹⁰¹ Now if there is a difference between Milton and Cowley as poets, there is a difference in the same degree between Fancy and Imagination.

¹⁰⁰ Coleridge : *Biographia Literaria*, Part IV, p. 61.

¹⁰¹ Coleridge : *Biographia Literaria*, p. 62.

We may now turn to another, a better celebrated passage from *Biographia Literaria* which has already been quoted. "The primary IMAGINATION I hold to be the living power and prime Agent of all human perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM."¹⁰² It is a pity that Coleridge did not stop to clarify or elaborate this cryptic assertion. Perhaps he did not think it necessary because he assumed a knowledge of Scriptural matters in his Western readers. According to the *Old Testament*, when Moses brought the Commandments to his people from Mount Sinai, the latter wanted to know who the author of these Commandments was. So next time Moses enquired about it from God. "And God said unto Moses; I AM THAT I AM : and he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you."¹⁰³ This is what Sir Thomas Browne refers to in *Religio Medici* : "I AM THAT I AM, was his own definition unto Moses; and it was a short one to confound mortality that durst question God or ask him what he was."¹⁰⁴ who can say "I AM." (*Aham*) : Only He who exists without any cause; only He who is 'Swayam Bhuh' : And there is only one Being that is 'Swayam Bhuh' and that is God. It is by virtue of this distinction in His character that He is the Creator of all. No one else can lay claim to be a creator when he himself is a creature. Thus the two terms cannot be taken as synonymous if we were to take our guidance from their use by great critics and thinkers.

Coleridge's early contemplations on this problem produced the image of an Aeolian harp; the chance play of the wind over a mechanical device. Coleridge effectively reconciled imagination with reason. The lighter values of poetry were relegated to fancy, imagination was considered essential to all knowledge. Thus, poetry in Coleridge's view, became a serious form of knowledge. For Richards too, poetry is a serious discipline and imagination has a very equivocal sense. When it is associated with poetry, it becomes the highest indication of value. Reason and imagination are not two different faculties. They are complementary. The over-valuing of imagination may lead the poet to care little for logical sequence of images.

¹⁰² Ibid., pt. XIII, p. 202.

¹⁰³ Old Testament Exodus, Ch. 3, Verse 4.

¹⁰⁴ Browne, Thomas : *Religio Medici*, ed. James Winny (Cambridge University Press, 1963), pt. I, Sec. XI, p. 13.

Coleridge's distinction between fancy, primary Imagination and secondary Imagination is the consequence of his analysis of mental activity. Fancy is arbitrary and is not governed by any higher discriminating principle. Primary imagination is possessed by all men and is the basis of all human perception. Above all it is the activity of the secondary Imagination which is the poetic faculty. The secondary imagination transforms the sense perception modified by the primary imagination. For Coleridge, a major difficulty remained in distinguishing art from normal perception which is what he intended by dividing secondary from primary imagination. Richards does not consider art as the product of any special instinct. Therefore, instead of accepting Coleridge's distinction between fancy, primary imagination and secondary imagination, he gives a psychological interpretation of imagination. His conception of imagination follows from the psychological, as distinguished from the metaphysical analysis by Coleridge and from his apparent interpretative hypothesis that non-empirical 'value' is the subjective contribution of the mind in the knowledge process. As Richards puts it, "The primary Imagination is normal perception that produces the usual world of the senses... the world of motor—buses, beef-steaks, and acquaintances, the framework of things and events within which we maintain our every day existence, the world of the routine satisfaction of our minimum exigencies. The secondary imagination, reforming this world, gives us not only poetry—in the limited sense in which literary critics concern themselves with it—but every aspect of the routine world in which it is invested with other values than these necessary for our bare continuance as living beings; all objects for which we can feel love, awe, admiration, every quality beyond the account of physics, chemistry and the physiology of sense-perception, nutrition, reproduction and locomotion; every awareness for which a civilized life is preferred by us to an uncivilized."¹⁰⁵

It would appear that Richards makes no notable advance upon what Coleridge had to say about imagination. He himself admits that "except in the way of interpretation, it is hard to add anything to what he (Coleridge) has said."¹⁰⁶ Circumstances led Coleridge "to carry his further speculations upon imagination into the realms of Transcendentalism."¹⁰⁷ But "there is enough in his

¹⁰⁵ Richards : Coleridge on Imagination, pp. 58-59.

¹⁰⁶ Richards : Principles, p. 242.

description and in the many applications and elucidations scattered through *Biographia Literaria* and the *Lectures* to justify Coleridge's claim to have put his finger more nearly than anyone else upon the essential characteristic of poetic as of all valuable experience."¹⁰⁸ According to Richards, Coleridge "was more interested in the product than in the process."¹⁰⁹ As Abhinavagupta in his *Dhavanaloka Locana* Projects his own views while commenting on Anandavardhana's theory of *Dhvani*, so also Richards projects his own theory on Coleridge's theory of imagination. His *Coleridge on Imagination* is, in fact, Richards on imagination.

In *Rasa* doctrine, there is nothing like Coleridge's fancy or primary imagination. Richards' argument that fancy and imagination are interdependent does not fit in Indian poetics. The critics of *Rasa* school believe in the poet's *Pratibha* by which they meant the power of the poet to write great poetry and give new colouring to poetic meaning. As fancy and primary imagination cannot be helpful in this respect, they fall outside the ambit of *Pratibha*. Richards' notion of imagination as the "superior power of ordering experience" comes nearer to the Indian view. It is a fact that the Indian theorists do not take the pains to analyse the diversities and ramifications of imagination. But nothing important is left out from their concept of *Pratibha*. The critics of *Rasa* school treat imagination as a means to an end, not as an end in itself. It is one of the major weaknesses of Richards' aesthetics that it gives exaggerated importance to imagination.

107 Ibid.

108 Richards : *Principles*, pp. 242-43.

109 Richards : *Coleridge on Imagination*, p 154.

CHAPTER 8

APPETENCY AND AVERSION: MAITRI AND SATRUTA OF RASAS

This chapter, in the main, is a study in comparison and contrast between Richards' theory of balancing of impulses, on which as himself states, depends poetic value¹ and the theory of friendliness or *Maitri* and enmity or *Satruta* of *Rasas* as enunciated by the critics of *Rasa* school. *Maitri* and *Satruta* are figurative expressions for cordiality and animosity of *Rasas*. A connoisseur knows that there are, in poetry, situations where one gets interruption of aesthetic relish (*Rasa-bhanga*) or discordance of *Rasa* (*Rasa-virodha*) and it comes in the way of enjoyability of *Rasa* (*Rasa-vatta*). Where there are such situations, there is no *Rasa* but a mere semblance of *Rasa* (*Rasabhasa*). For emotive or aesthetic relish (*Rasa-svada*), there should be proper and adequate combination of *Rasas*. In contemporary literary criticism, the problem of poetic value has been tackled with renewed interest. "The primary critical act", observes Helen Gardner, "is judgment, the decision that a certain piece of writing has significance and value".² The special quality of an artistic product which makes it appealing, enduring and worth having and through which we get pleasure is called value. Eliot thinks that it is the historical sense of the creative artist, his awareness of the vital stream of consciousness that runs through the ages, which make his writing valuable.³ The new critics and the new Aristotelians, in their craze to squeeze out meaning by pressing the poem as regards its structure, verbal arrangement, syntax, sounds-effect, symbol, imagery, parenthesis, etc., deliberately ignore value-judgement or subordinate value-judgement to the formal perfection of poetry. The school of verbal-analysis shifts the centre of critical activity to some point outside the proper confine of poetry to grammar, semantics, phonetics, or to an arbitrary combination of these and partial studies of language. Richards is concerned with poetic value in a different sense. His theory of balance of impulses or psychological theory of value is

1 Richards : Principles, p. 48.

2 Gardner, Helen : The Business of Criticism (O.U.P., 1959), p. 6.

3 Eliot, T.S. : 'Tradition and Individual Talent', Selected Essays (London, 1953), p. 14.

outlined in his *Principles* though its underlying idea may be found in his *The Foundations of Aesthetics* written in collaboration with C.K. Ogden and James Wood, *Science and poetry* and *Practical Criticism* as well.

Richards' theory of Appetency and Aversion, the former standing for attraction and seeking after and the latter for repulsion⁴ is the main hinge of his theory of value. "Richards" as Hotopf, observes, "justifies the value of art...by means of naturalistic ethic".⁵ This means that he explains his theory of value by means of balancing of impulses that is effected by nature. It sounds something like the theory of *Maitri* and *Satruta* of *Rasas* as postulated by the critics of *Rasa* school. But, as it will be seen, these two theories are poles asunder and it is only their outward structure that seems to resemble. Richards here works out a more plausible poetics than the exponents of *rasa* school and one may even feel the desirability to overhaul the list of *Mitra* and *Satru* *Rasas* in the light of modern psychology and amend the principle itself keeping in view the growing complexity of modern life. In order to compare Richards' theory of balance of impulses with the Indian theory of *Maitri* and *Satruta* of *Rasas*, it is germane to give a short account of their specific characters. From the very beginning, Richards was vitally interested in moral problems. When at Cambridge, he was an ardent student of mental and moral philosophy. Tillyard recalls a statement of Chadwick made in 1919 that Richards "got a first in moral science."⁶ As a student of moral science, he is fully conscious of the fact that "mechanical inventions, with their social effects, and a too sudden diffusion of indigestible ideas, are disturbing throughout the world order of human mentality, that our minds are, as it were, becoming of an inferior shape thin, brittle and patchy, rather than controllable and coherent. It is possible that the burden of information and consciousness that a growing mind has now to carry may be too much for its natural strength. If it is not too much already, it may soon become so, for the situation is likely to grow worse before it is better. Therefore, if there be any means by which we may artificially strengthen our

4 Richards : *Principles*, p. 47.

5 Hotopf, W. H. N. : *Language, Thought and Comprehension : A case Study of the Writings of I.A. Richards* (London, 1965), p. 42.

6 Tillyard, E.M.W. : *The Muse Unchained* (Bowes and Bowes, London, 1958), p. 76.

minds' capacity to order themselves, we must avail ourselves of them. And of all possible means, poetry, the unique, linguistic instrument by which our minds have ordered their thought, emotions, desires... in the past, seems to be the most serviceable".⁷ Richards' theory of value depends upon the broad principle of accepting what is desirable and agreeable by discarding what is undesirable and unwholesome, not through violence but through reconciliation. He begins with the description of impulses which present a spectacle of unity in diversity. But it is impossible to think of diversity without at the same time thinking of unity.

According to Richards, experiences can be valuable in two different ways—in consideration of the number of impulses directly satisfied and in consideration of the increased capacity for coordinating and systematizing impulses that results from the equally important in the general scheme of balance of impulses. Poetic value, according to Richards, depends upon equilibrium or systematization of worthwhile impulses. How these worthwhile impulses can be brought together and coordinated? Do they actually belong to a particular clan? Richards' answer is in the negative. He says that impulses are of two kinds. The first group is composed of those impulses which attract us. They are called Appetencies. The second group is made up of those impulses which distract or repel us. They are called Aversions. In Richards' words, "mind has appetencies or seeking after and anything is valuable which will satisfy an appetency without involving the frustration of some equal or more important appetency"⁸ Its opposite extreme is aversion meaning the set of impulses which are repellent.

For Richards, poetry is a transvaluation of the values of life. Where Eliot defines poetry "as an escape from emotion" and "an escape from personality," Richards defines it as an "organisation of impulses."⁹ Poetry is valuable in proportion to its capacity to effect balance and reconciliation not only amongst our agreeable impulses but also amongst those impulses which are discordant and uninviting. The impulses ordinarily remain in a chaotic and disorderly state. This view is a direct antithesis of Rousseau's

7 Richards *Practical Criticism*, p. 320.

8 Richards : *Principles*, p. 47.

9 Richards : "Science and Poetry , " *The Great Critics*, ed. Smith and Parks (New York, W.W. Norton & Co., 1951), p. 757.

philosophy that by nature man is peace-loving and he remains undisturbed unless otherwise his peace is disrupted by some external force. Richards' notion also goes against the Indian view of life according to which man is *Amrtanputra* and, being blessed one, always remains in harmony with God, and it is only *Maya* which veils his crystal soul and stirs his impulses. With the development of psychology, it came to be believed that by their very nature, the impulses are in- harmonious like wave, and it is the rationality of man which holds them and keeps them under control. Taking a cue from Sherrington's 'Integrative Actions of Nervous System', Richards puts forward the theory of physical adjustment which also implies psychic adjustment. The adjustment of impulses to their peaceful and harmonious nature is what is aimed at by all idealistic philosophy as also by all fine arts. It is a widely held belief in modern criticism that a poem is a structure of heterogeneous impulses and that, in it contradictory meanings and tones can subsist together in mutual tension, contributing to its dramatic effect. A poet must show recognition, implicit in the expression of every experience, of all kinds of experience which are possible. But all this is a dubious psychology. It is common experience that conflicting attitudes cannot arise at one and the same time. The mind cannot run and take on opposite routes, much can they be held in balance without the stronger impulse extinguishing the weaker e.g., love and Hate clash with each other in the murder scene of *Othello* unless jealousy gains the upper hand. Certain emotions cannot even admit of this position; and it would be height of impropriety to force them into any kind of union. Richards has not given a detailed account of the impulses that fall under the broad group of Appetencies and Aversions. But from the general framework of his theory, it can be assumed that emotion like love, friendship, pity, sympathy, pathos, etc., which are moving and attracting will fall under the category of Appetencies while emotions like terror, dread, repulsion, hatred, jealousy, anger, etc., which have thwarting effect will come under the category of Aversions.

From the Indian point of view, the *Rasas* which can be coordinated with other *Rasas* will be called *Mitra Rasa* and which make such a coordination difficult or impossible will be called *Satru Rasas*. But in the Indian *Rasa* theory, no specific category has been made to show that a particular *Rasa* will ever remain *Satru Rasa* or *Mitra Rasa*. *Satruta* and *Maitri* being relative terms,

It is possible that a *Rasa* which is *Satru* in relation to one *Rasa* may be *mītra* in relation to another. For example, *Santa* is the *Mītra* of *Karuna* while it is *Satru* of *Srngara*, *Raudra*, *Bhayanaka* and *Hasya*. and it is notable, that *Srngara* is the *Mītra* of *Hasya* and *Adbhuta* while *Hasya*. And *Srngara* are the *Satru* of *Karuna*. Thus there is no hard and fast rule that a particular *Rasa* will always be *Satru* or *Mītra*. Their *Satruta* and *Maitra* depend upon situation. The notion of *Maitri* and *Satruta* of *Rasas*, to some extent, corresponds to Wundt's tridimensional theory of feeling, which lays down that feelings vary not only with respect to the dimension of pleasantness-unpleasantness but also, simultaneously and independently, in respect of two other dimensions, strain-relaxation and excitement-calm.¹⁰ This implies that pleasantness involves relaxation and calm while unpleasantness involves strain and excitement. In Richards' words "To set up as a critic is to set up as a judge of values."¹¹ According to him, the value and worth of poetry depend upon coordination of impulses. According to Richards "the two pillars upon which a theory of criticism must rest are an account of value and an account of communication."¹² The main business of criticism is to see that a certain piece of literature is valuable and significant. Richards' criterion of poetic value takes into account the make up of mind.

As mind is nothing more than the nervous system¹³, it is only through the study of the working of mind that most poetic value can be determined. When there is organisation in our impulses, we tend to do good things. Contrary to this, if there is lack of such an organisation, we are inclined towards criminal deeds and mischiefs of various kinds. The main object of poetry is to bring maximum coordination and systematization in our impulses which otherwise remain in a disorderly form. The mind, by its very nature, is in constant agitation. The mind may be likened to a continuous ripple, like the surface of a pond beneath a breeze, shimmering with broken, ever changing, self scattering reflections. There is seldom a harmony amongst the impulses. The wit and wisdom of the poet does not lie in harmonizing only

10 Boring, Edwin, G. : A History of Experimental Psychology (Bombay, 1969), p. 330.

11 Richards : Principles, p. 60.

12 Richards : Principles, p. 25.

13 Ibid. p. 83.

those impulses which are of similar nature, but in effecting organisation and balance amongst those impulses which are refractory and discordant and drive us back or away and are more of a hindrance than a help. Poetry has the unique power to purge these impulses of undesirable elements and make them clean and free from natural impurity. This gives value to poetry. The description of French Revolution given in books of history like Thomas Carlyle's *French Revolution* or Edmund Burke's *Reflections on the French Revolution* or Fisher's *History of Europe* or Ketelby's *History of Modern Times* is basically different from that given in Dickens' *A Tale of Two Cities*. And this difference lies in emotional appeal which Dickens affords against the books on History. Where a historian is concerned with bare facts, dry and undistorted, the creative artist is concerned with imagination and always transforms the historical facts into imaginative truth. This he does by the evocative use of words and also by fusing imagination with reality. In his history plays, Shakespeare is not simply revising and pruning what was said by Holinshed and Plutarch, but he is using the historical materials as to appeal the sense and dramatic values.

In the Indian *Rasa* theory, the same problem has been discussed in a basically different manner. The classical Sanskrit critics apply the principles of *Gunās* and *Dosās* to ascertain the merit of literary composition. In western literary criticism, a group of critics take morality as the water-mark of good literature while others take social values or aesthetic values as the criteria of goodness. Richards relates poetic value to psychology and says that it solely depends upon its power to bring balance amongst our opposed impulses of various characters.

Richards defines impulse as "The process in the course of which a mental event may occur, a process apparently beginning in a stimulus and ending in an act."¹⁴ Then he brings out the importance of impulse thus : "The importance of an impulse can be defined for our purposes as the extent of the disturbance of other impulses in the individual's activities which the thwarting of the impulse involves."¹⁵ From this account, it is clear that the thwarting of impulses involves disturbance in the domain of impulses and the importance of an impulse depends upon its

¹⁴ Richards : Principles, p. 86.

¹⁵ Richards : Principles, p. 51.

capacity to sustain this disturbance taking place in other impulses. This is how he explains the creative process of art. No art is created without harmony in the worthwhile impulses. But before this harmony takes place, mind has to struggle a lot because all the impulses are not of equal nature. Some impulses are easily tamed while others are too wild to be controlled. The impulses which survive this toil become dominant at the end. Richards gives a detailed description of how the conflict between various agreeable and disagreeable impulses takes place and what happens at the end. His notion is that this conflict usually leads to reconciliation among conformable and discordant impulses. Reconciliation is better than defeat. Hence, at the final stage, the various appetencies and aversions lose their distinctive characters and form one harmonious web where there is no chaos or disturbance. "The most valuable states of mind", Richards lays down, "are those which involve the widest and most comprehensive coordination of activities and the least curtailment, starvation and restriction."¹⁶ Richards argues that in the struggle of impulses, mutual arrangement and adjustment should be preferred to violence. There are two ways in which the struggle in the domain of impulses can be surmounted; by suppression or by reconciliation. "One or other of the contesting impulses can be suppressed, or they can come to a mutual arrangement, they can adjust themselves to one another . . . Conciliation is always to be preferred to conquest."¹⁷ The states of mind referred to above are not exposed to introspection : "Appetencies may be, and for the most part are, unconscious."¹⁸ So, pleasure cannot be the criterion of value. It is not the intensity of the conscious experience, its thrill, its pleasure or its poignancy which give it value, but the organisation of the impulses for freedom and fullness of life. "There are plenty of ecstatic instants which are valueless; the character of consciousness at any moment is no certain sign of the excellence of the impulses from which it arises."¹⁹ Richards points out the relative importance of impulses and the relative states of mind. Since impulses crop up in mind – not always but when mind gets stirred up when it comes in contact with some stimulus, the

16 *Ibid.* p. 59.

17 Richards : Principles, p. 39.

18 *Ibid.*, p. 47

19 Richards : Principles, p. 132.

triangle of mind, impulse and stimulus is an inevitable outcome of mind – data equation.

Tragedy, according to Richards, is the best instance of the "balance or organisation of opposite and discordant qualities. Pity, the impulse to approach, and Terror, the impulse to retreat, are brought in Tragedy to a reconciliation"²⁰ Tragedy provides us more than unmitigated experience. "Pity and Terror are opposites in a sense in which Pity and Dread are not. Dread or Horror are nearer than Terror to Pity, for they contain attraction as well as repulsion."²¹ It is for this reason that tragedy is the specimen of all ordering impulses. The discordant impulses get organised in two distinct ways, "by exclusion and by inclusion, by synthesis and by elimination."²² The experiences in which stability and order in impulses are won through a narrowing of response are to be contrasted with those experiences in which stability and order in impulses are won through widening the response. The latter is unquestionably of great value. Poetry and art represent ordered development of a definite emotion like "Sorrow, Joy, Pride or a definite attitude, Love, Indignation, Admiration, Hope or with a specific mood, Melancholy, Optimism or Longing."²³ "The equilibrium of opposed impulses", according to Richards, "which we suspect to be the ground-plan of the most valuable aesthetic responses, brings into play far more of our personality than is possible in experiences of a more defined emotion."²⁴ When the poet's mind moves in several directions at once and at the same time and when he looks at a problem from several angles, his consciousness gets enlarged and he attains what is called "disinterestedness".²⁵ On the contrary, "We cease to be oriented in one definite direction."²⁶ In Richards' view, Keats' "Ode to the Nightingale", presents a better organisation of opposed impulses than Tennyson's poem "Break, Break, Break."²⁷

20 Ibid., p. 245.

21 Ibid., p. 247.

22 Ibid., p. 249.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid., p. 251.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid., pp. 249-50.

Richards dwells upon the necessity of satisfaction of opposed impulses. "For a civilised man, activities originally valuable as means only, often become so important through their connections with the rest of his activities that life without them is regarded as intolerable."²⁸ Prison life for example, is worse than non-existence.²⁹ The balancing or systematization of impulses is a complicated affair. "The plasticity of special appetencies and activities varies enormously."³⁰ There are some impulses which get satisfied not through one means but through many. Sex, for example, has varied means of satisfaction. In Richards' words, "sex has a wider range of satisfactions than hunger."³¹ "Some impulses are by their very nature weak, some impulses can be easily suppressed in the long run, some impulses can be modified, some impulses like well established habits can either be fully satisfied or completely inhibited. The affiliation of impulses depends upon the nature of impulses. Often, quite trivial impulses turn out to be important only because they belong to powerful groups."³²

Though Richards is convinced that the value of poetry as of all arts depends upon the balancing of worthwhile impulses, mostly of discordant nature, he is not sure how this balance takes place. We have at least "incomplete and hazy knowledge of how impulses are related."³³ These organisation and systematization "are not primarily an affair of conscious planning or arrangement."³⁴ In Richards' words, "we pass as a rule from a chaotic to a better organised state by ways which we know nothing about."³⁵ Usually, this organisation takes place because of the influence of other mind. Literature and the arts have to play a vital role in this connection because they are "the chief means by which these influences are diffused."³⁶ Organisation of impulses, whatever might be its method and mechanism, is

28 Richards : Principles., p. 49.

29 Ibid., p. 50.

30 Ibid., p. 51.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid., p. 51.

34 Ibid., p. 57.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

necessary for high civilization because free, varied and unwholesome life, depends upon it which involves absorption of multiple influences.

The organisation of impulses may be difficult. But it is a necessary condition for happy and peaceful life. Richards argues that "no individual can live one minute without a very intricate and, so far as it goes, very perfect coordination of impulses."³⁷ He considers that poetry accomplishes the onerous task of bringing balance and poise in human impulses. Thus, it enables us to live a peaceful and happy life. "Poetry", as Richards puts it, "is the supreme use of language, man's chief co-ordinating influence, in the service of the most integral purposes of life..."³⁸

The complexity of human behaviour often renders the balancing of impulses difficult. The fast changing facets of man's mood and temperament can be studied but inaccurately. "Most people in the same day are Bonaparte and Oblomov by turns. Before breakfast Diogenes, after dinner Petronius or Bishop Usher."³⁹ The mutation in his apparent behaviour is so deceptive that it becomes difficult to say with certainty whether there is something stable in his character behind the flexibility. But a close study of human psychology reveals that behind his changing dispositions there is something which remains constant and unchangeable. Art and literature are concerned with that trait of human character which remains the same amid all outward changes.

The typical Indian view is that poetry is the giver of salvation. The poet who enlivens his poetry with *Rasa* does a great service to the humanity. Poetry relieves man of the worries of life. It makes him live a perfect and divine life. A lover of poetry and music can never embark upon a crime. In this sense poetry best organises human impulses. Even its message as Mammata says is like that of one's wife. (*Kanta-sammata-upadesa-yuje*).

Richards holds that the balancing of impulses, harmonious and inharmonious, involves some sacrifice. Almost in the manner of Darwin, he says that in course of effecting this balance amongst impulses, some weaker impulses die out while other undesirable impulses are weeded out. "By the extent of the loss,

37 Richards : Principles, pp. 51-52.

38 Richards : Coleridge on Imagination, p. 230.

39 Richards : Principles, p. 52. A Mammata : Kavya-Prakasa 1/1

the range of impulses thwarted or starved, and their degree of importance, the merit of a systematization is judged."⁴⁰ In Richards' words, "that organisation which is least wasteful of human possibilities is in short, the best."⁴¹ This thesis may be illustrated by drawing examples from moral code. "The debauches and the victim of conscience alike have achieved organisations whose price in sacrifice is excessive . . . At the other extreme are those fortunate people who have achieved an ordered life, whose systems have developed clearing houses by which the varying claims of different impulses are adjusted. Their free, untrammelled activity gains for them a maximum of varied satisfactions and involves a minimum of suppression and sacrifice."⁴² There are several activities of man which are regarded as heinous and atrocious in society but they are done by unscrupulous persons at the cost of their social prestige and fairname. The doing of such works as swindling and bullying disrupt the doer's whole organisational system of impulses and the loss sustained by him on this account is irreparable. It breeds much social obloquy. In Richards' estimation, it is not only a loss of social esteem but a greater loss involving "actual systematic disability to attain social values."⁴³ Value is the consequence of the abundance and variety of life. "But if our own organisation is broken down, forced to a cruder, a more wasteful level, we are oppressed and temporarily incapacitated, not only locally but generally."⁴⁴ This is because "Finer adjustment, clearer and more delicate accommodation or reconciliation of impulses in any one field tends to promote it in others."⁴⁵ It is now manifest from the account given above that for Richards coordination and balancing of impulses have greater import and they even define the policy of life and the meaning of civilization. If, however, the balancing of impulses is taken in a restricted sense to be applied only to art and literature, it suggests the harmonising of heterogeneous impulses. The theory is highly speculative and D.G. James has expressed doubt in the practical applicability of this theory "Now poetry", D.G. James observes, "as we are told,

40 Richards : Principles, p. 52.

41 *ibid*

42 Richards . Principles. p. 53.

43 *ibid* , p. 54.

44 Richards : Principles, p. 236.

45 *ibid* p. 234.

is the outcome of such a harmonised inner conditon, it is the expression indeed of inner harmony of exquisite poise, such as rarely occur in the life of humanity."⁴⁶

The theory of *Maitri* and *Satruta* of *Rasa* clearly ranges over the field of aesthetic perception. The theory of *Rasa* is, however, made to apply to civilization at large. Its relationship with life cannot be disputed. The critics of *Rasa* school extend the purpose of *Rasa* to all the activities of life. They take *Rasa* as a sort of life's principle. Again, how the *Rasas* are combined and which type of combination is profitable from aesthetic point of view is the main concern of the critics of *Rasa* school.

Anandavardhana was the first critic to give an elaborate account of *Mitra* and *Amitra* of *Rasas*.⁴⁷ Thereafter, following his track, Mammata and other critics drew our attention towards it. In this connection, it is germane to tabulate the *Rasas* which have *Satruta* with other *Rasas*. This list is given by Visvanatha in his *Sahitya Darpana*.⁴⁸

Rasas

1. Erotic (*srngara*)

2. Comic (*hasya*)

3. Pathetic (*karuna*)

4. Terrible (*raudra*)

5. Heroic (*vira*)

6. Horrible (*bhayanaka*)

7. Serene (*santa*)

Satru or Virodhi Rasas

Pathetic (*karuna*)

Odious (*vibhatsa*)

Terrible (*raudra*)

Heroic (*vira*)

Horrible (*bhayanaka*)

Serene (*santa*)

Horrible (*bhayanaka*)

Pathetic (*karuna*)

Comic (*hasya*)

Erotic (*srngara*)

Comic (*hasya*)

Erotic (*srngara*)

Horrible (*bhayanaka*)

Horrible (*bhayanaka*)

Serene (*santa*)

Erotic (*srngara*)

Heroic (*vira*)

Terrible (*raudra*)

Comic (*hasya*)

Serene (*santa*)

Heroic (*vira*)

Erotic (*srngara*)

Terrible (*raudra*)

46 James, D G. ' Scepticism and Poetry, pp. 127-28.

47 Anadavardhana : Dhvanyaloka, 3/18-19.

48 Visvanatha : Sahitya Darpana, 3/254-258.

Comic (hasya)
Horrible (bhayanaka)
Erotic (srngara)

8. Odious (vibhatsa)

The following list of *Virodha* and *Avirodha* of *Rasas* is given by Jagannatha in his *Rasagangadhara*.⁴⁹

Rasas	Maitri	Satruta
1. Heroic (vira)	Erotic (srngara) Sublime (adbhuta) Furious (raudra)	Horrible (bhayanaka)
2. Erotic (srngara)	Comic (hasya) Sublime (adbhuta)	Serene (santa) Odious (vibhatsa) Horrible (bhayanaka) Pathetic (karuna) Furious (raudra) Heroic (vira) Comic (hasya)
3. Pathetic (karuna)	Serene (santa) Horrible (bhayanaka) Odious (vibhatsa) Terrible (raudra)	
4. Serene (santa)	Pathetic (karuna)	Terrible (raudra)
5. Comic (hasya)	Erotic (srngara)	Horrible (bhayanaka) Serene (santa)
6. Heroic (vira)	Sublime (adbhuta)	Horrible (bhayanaka) Serene (santa)

Rupa Goswamin, the noted critic of *Vaisnava-bhakti* cult, jots down the *Maitri* and *Satruta* of *Rasas* in a slightly different manner.⁵⁰

Rasas	Maitri	Satruta
1. Serene (santa)	Devotion (bhakti or prita) Odious (vibhatsa) Dauntless fighter for religion (dharmavira) Sublime (adbhuta)	Pathetic (karuna) Pugnacious (yuddhavira) Horrible (bhayanaka)
2. Devotion (bhakti)	Odious (vibhatsa) Serene (santa) Dauntless fighter for religion (dharmavira) Bountiful (danavira)	Affection (vatsala) Odious (vibhatsa) Terrible (raudra) Horrible (bhayanaka) Pugnacious (yuddhavira)
3. Friendship (sakhya)	Mellifluous (madhura) Comic (hasya) Pugnacious (yuddhavira)	Affection (vatsala) Terrible (raudra) Horrible (bhayanaka)
4. Affection (vatsala)	Comic (hasya) Pathetic (karuna) Horrible (bhayanaka)	Mellifluous (madhura) Pugnacious (yuddhavira) Servitude (dasya) Terrible (raudra) Friendship (sakhya)

49 Jagannatha : *Rasagangadhara*, p. 192.

50 Rupa Goswamin : *Bhakti-Rasamrta-Sindhu*, (Delhi, Up., 1963), 8/2-15.

5. Mellifluous (madhura)	Comic (hasya) Friendship (sakhya)	Affection (vatsala) Odious (vibhatsa) Serene (santa) Terrible (raudra) Horrible (bhayanaka) Horrible (bhayanaka)
6. Comic (hasya)	Odious (Vibhatsa) Mellifluous (madhura) Affection (vatsala) Pathetic (karuna)	
7. Sublime (adbhuta)	Serene (santa) Heroic (vira)	Terrible (raudra) Odious (vibhatsa)
8. Heroic (vira)	Sublime (adbhuta) Comic (hasya) Mellifluous (madhura) Devotion (bhakti)	Horrible (bhayanaka) Often Serene (santa)
9. Pathetic (karuna)	Terrible (raudra) Affection (vatsala)	Comic (hasya) Communion (sambhoga) Erotic (sringara) Sublime (adbhuta)
10. Terrible (raudra)	Pathetic (karuna) Heroic (vira)	Comic (hasya) Erotic (sringara) Horrible (bhayanaka)
11. Horrible (bhayanaka)	Odious (vibhatsa) Pathetic (karuna)	Heroic (vira) Erotic (sringara) Comic (hasya) Terrible (raudra)
12. Odious (vibhatsa)	Serene (santa) Comic (hasya) Devotion (bhakti)	Mellifluous (madhura) Pathetic (karuna)

The charts of *Mitra* and *Satru Rasas* given above will show how the critics of *Rasa* school showed great ingenuity in describing the *Rasas* of various categories and their relationship. A comparative study of the charts given above would reveal that there is hardly any disagreement amongst the critics of *Rasa* school on vital points. *Maitri* and *Satru* of *Rasas* impose the condition that only those *Rasas* can be brought together which are of like nature or correspond in form least they should stand apart and any attempt to fuse them will produce jarring effect.

Where Richards defines poetic value in terms of balancing of discordant impulses, not through defeat or suppression but through reconciliation and amalgamation, the value of poetry, according to the critics of *Rasa* school, depends upon the infallible quality it possesses and the incessant delight it gives.

Richards' coordination of impulses is in reality the co-existence of impulses and the co-existence is not possible

unless the impulses are harmonised. The question whether this co-existence is practicable amongst inharmonious impulses deserves serious consideration. Richards says that it is possible. It would, however, be a mistake to confuse "impulses" with *Rasas*. While an impulse is indicative of a state of mind which marks a tendency to act without reflection, *Rasa* refers to the enjoyment of poetry. It would be unjust to regard *Rasa*, like impulse, either as a physical quality or as an emotional quality. *Rasa* is something more fundamental. It is the basic fact that underlies all aesthetic experience.

The problem of the equilibrium of opposed impulses, according to Richards' own admission, is discussed from a slightly different angle in *The Foundation of Aesthetics*.⁵¹ In this book, he formulates the theory of 'synaesthesia'⁵² meaning a peaceful and tranquil state of mind. He differentiates a synaesthetic state of mind from a state of passivity, over-stimulation of inertia by reason of its being conscious and poised state of mind. The synaesthetic state of mind is said to cover both equilibrium and harmony and is essential for the appreciation of beauty.⁵³ "By the equilibrium of synaesthesia Richards evidently would suggest, then, not the lifeless balance of deadlock but the vibrant poise of the completely co-ordinated personality."⁵⁴ In *Meaning* also, he attributes beauty to objects which induce 'synaesthesia'.⁵⁵ In *Principle*, the key-word used is not 'synaesthesia' but 'conaesthesia'.⁵⁶ The two words suggest neutrality and dispassion. In *Practical Criticism*, he admits that the idea of order and disorder in the mind is derived from Pavlov's 'conditioned reflexes'.⁵⁷ Pavlov has to furnish many valuable information with regard to nervous disorders. The prolonged collision between the two sets of nervous impulses, excitatory and inhibitory in the brain may lead to hysteria and neurasthenia. "Nervous breakdowns occur when the machinery of the brain is unable to cope with too violently opposed systems of contradictory impulses."⁵⁸ Richards, working along the lines of

51 Richards : *Principles*, F.N. 1 at p. 251.

52 Richards et al : *The Foundation of Aesthetics*, p. 73.

53 Richards : *Principles*, pp. 75-76.

54 Brooks and Wimsatt : *Literary Criticism : A Short History*, pp. 616-617.

55 Ogden Richards : *Meaning*, p. 143.

56 Richards : *Principles*, p. 98.

57 Richards : *Practical Criticism*, F.N. 1 at pp. 285-86.

Pavlov, gives an ethical interpretation of human psychology in terms of physiology. It is, however, doubtful whether the whole tenor of our lives can be satisfactorily explained in terms of the conditioning of the responses as man is endowed with more complicated brains and is exposed to much greater variety of stimuli, responding with greater rapidity and sensitiveness. The complexity of human nature does not permit man to become subject of conditioning at least in comparison to animal upon whom Pavlov experimented.

Another important influence on Richards' theory of balancing of impulses is of Sherrington's 'Integrative Actions of Nervous System'. Charles S. Sherrington, who was a British psychologist and physiologist, was associated with the Behaviourist school. He got interested in sensory psychology. He made researches in the field of physiological psychology and described in detail the concepts of reflexes and the integration of reflexes in complex behaviour. Richards, who was greatly influenced by the researches of the Behaviourist school of psychology, conceived of poetic value as a matter of physical and mental adjustment. The question what is the test of great poetry is answered by him on purely psychological basis. Poetry does arouse attitudes. But the value of poetry in a great measure depends upon its strength to harmonise opposed impulses. Since poetry is nothing but experience, the experience of the poet needs to be examined and analysed cautiously. In Richards' opinion "compared to the experience of great poetry, every other state of mind is one of bafflement."⁵⁹ The simple reason of this is that the reading of poetry brings a poise in mind which is rare though not of its own kind. In this state of mind, beauty is perceived. It is the moment of poetic pleasure which is distinguished from other crude pleasures by reason of its subtlety and refinement. The reader's impulses which are not in agreement get reconciled and the consequential thrill is unequivocal. Appetencies counterbalance aversions not by combatting but by mutual adjustment and reconciliation. This happens because the poet writes poem in a moment when his discordant impulses are perfectly balanced. The poet's experiences, "those at least which give value to his work, represent conciliation of impulses which in most minds are still confused, intertrammelled and confusing. His work is the

58 Joad, C.E.M. : *Gupta to Modern Thought* (London, 1942), p. 49.

59 Richards : *Principles*, p. 252.

ordering of what in most minds is disordered."⁶⁰ Eliot says the same thing in the following manner: "when a poet's mind is perfectly equipped for its work, it is constantly amalgamating desperate experiences; the ordinary man's experience is chaotic, irregular, fragmentary. In the mind of the poet these experiences are always forming new wholes."⁶¹ These 'new wholes' are the results of coordination of impulses. The difference between Richards and Eliot is, however, apparent in the degree of emphasis they lay on mental equipoise. where Richards holds that the impulses are basically contrasting, Eliot observes that the poet has a better chance to organise impulses than ordinary men. Richards shifts his interest from aesthetics to physiology and Ethics where there is a seeming tension between aesthetics and psychology in Eliot.

Richards states that every coherent state of mind, in which beauty is perceived, depends upon both methods of organisation—the method of synthesis and the method of elimination. But "it is permissible to contrast experiences which win stability and order through a narrowing of the response with those which widen it."⁶² This once again reminds us of the two sets of *Rasas*, the *Rasas* which win stability and order and the *Rasas* which are prone to violence. The agreeable or *Mitra Rasas* are included and synthesized while the disagreeable or *Satru Rasas* are set aside. One is required to be watchful as to which of a fair number of impulses is stable and homogeneous. The transient impulses cannot add substantially to our experience. The best impulses are those which are least wasteful of human possibilities.⁶³ In *Rasa* theory we get a good description of *Sancaribhavas* attached to *Bhavas*. These *Sancaribhavas* are transitory by nature. But from the Indian standpoint, they are not less valuable because they assist the *Rasa* in its consummation.

In *Science and Poetry*, Richards proceeds on to clarify the manifold implications of the balancing of impulses. In *Principles*, he puts forward two theories in this connection. First, the impulses remain in a disordered state; second, the inharmonious and discordant impulses get reconciled and systematised during poetic creation.. Its natural corollary is that it is the business or

60 Richards : Principles, p. 61.

61 Eliot, T.S. : 'Metaphysical Poets', 'Selected Essays. p. 287.

62 Richards : Principles, p. 249.

63 Richards : Principles, p. 52.

poetry of fine arts to effect balance amongst impulses without adversely affecting any other impulse. Poetry alone can accomplish this task. It is in this sense that poetry is greater than other forms of literature. Poetry and art deal with a particular experience and endeavour to describe that experience in its fullness. In Richards' words : "A very great deal of poetry and art is content with the full, ordered, development of comparative by special and limited experience, with a definite emotion, for example, Sorrow, Joy, Pride, or a definite attitude, love, Indignation, Admiration, Hope, or with a special mood, Melancholy, Optimism or Longing."⁶⁴ The poet who has wide appeal knows how to deal with only specialised impulses. The impulses which are remote from life cannot interest everybody. Such private impulses as only have bearing on the poet's personal life cannot appeal the common reader. Hence the poet always generalises his impulses. Even those impulses which are private ones are generalised in poetry by poetic skill. "The poet of wide appeal", Richards observes, "it is tempting to suppose has an advantage in that the impulses involved are general, have been interested all through life and are very representative of experience. And he has the further advantage perhaps of avoiding a certain dangerous finality."⁶⁵ At this point, /Richards compares Shakespeare and Henry James and finds the latter deficient in sustaining our interest all through because once the required attitude is achieved, no further development is possible.⁶⁶ Richards, however, shows no interest in drawing a demarcating line between important and unimportant impulses, interests and attitudes. He also does not mention anywhere that reconciliation is possible only amongst those impulses which are reconcilable. In his view, even those impulses which are disruptive and thwarting may be reconciled to those impulses which are mild and palliative. This idea goes counter to the *Rasa* doctrine according to which fusion is possible amongst those *Rasas* which are *Mitra* by nature.

In Richards' opinion the process of balancing of impulses is non-mechanical and invariably implies control over the impulses. In *Practical Criticism*, he refers to interdependence of various impulses as 'organism' stands for that kind of interdependence of

⁶⁴ Richards : *Principles*, p. 249.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 213.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

parts which allude to when we speak of living things as 'organisms'. Similarly, for him 'order' is not merely 'tidiness'.⁶⁷ Order in impulses means striking a balance between various kinds of impulses contributing to the totality of effect.

In *Science and Poetry*, Richards concerns himself with mind in which the wave of impulses take place. Mind is defined here "as a system of very delicately poised balances, a system which so long we are in health is constantly growing."⁶⁸ It is the equipoise of impulses which keeps mind in perfect order lest one should go mad. Where there is lack of such a balance, the result is disastrous. The poet would write either nonsense or a third-rate poem and an average man would make a statement wherein there will be hardly any logical sequence. "Every situation", Richards states, "we come into disturbs some of these balances to some degree. The way in which they swing back to a new equipoise are the impulses with which we respond to the situation. And the chief balances in the system are our chief interensts."⁶⁹ The 'Chief interests' described by Richards are reminiscent of *Angi Rasas* of Indian *Rasa* theory. When several *Mitra Rasas*, brought together, lie in perpetual conflict, their quarrel is at last resolved and one *Rasa* comes to dominate at the end while other *Rasas* are made subservient to it. The *Rasa* which finally comes to dominate in the struggle is called *Angi Rasa*. The 'chief interests' pointed out by Richards have almost the same function. They are chief balances in the system and hence the 'chief interests'. But as opposed to the critics of *Rasa* schools Richards holds that these chief balances may be of both characters, Appetencies or Aversions. In poetry, the fine mingling of the two can be seen. In tragedy particularly, this feature is prominent. The theorists of *Rasa* school, on the other hand, state the impossibility of the dominance of *Satru Rasas*. In their scheme, there is no place for the coordination of *Satru* and *Satru Rasas*. Moreover, *Mitra* and *Satru* and relative terms and a *Rasa* which is *Mitra* in one context may be *Satru* in another context.

Richards pleads for the adjustment of impulses upon which good living is said to rest. In a wider sense, it is also said to be a necessary condition for the growth of civilization. The idea is not very far from the concepts of *Gunas* held by the theorists of *Rasa*

67 Richards : *Practical Criticism*, F.N. 1 at p. 288.

68 Richards : *Science and Poetry*, p. 20.

69 Richards : *Science and Poetry*, p. 20.

school. Anandavardhana takes *Guna* as the *Dharma* of *Rasa*. It is also taken as the attribute which adds to the exaltation and excellence of *Rasa*. By the *Carvana* of different *Rasas*, the heart of the *Samajika* attains three distinct states, *Druti*, *Dipti* and *Vyapti*. These are called *Cittavrttis*. The feeling of humidity and compassion (*ardrata*) is called *Druti*. The feeling of radiance and enlargement of heart (*Vistara*) is called *Dipti*. The feeling of extensiveness and pervasiveness of heart is called *Vyapti*. These *Cittavrttis* are called *Madhurya*, *Oja* and *Prasada* respectively. Obviously, they can make life worth living. They are cardinal human virtues which are required for any country which claims to be civilized.

Richards states what makes the struggle amongst the various kinds of impulses possible. His notion is that the impulses struggle for final peace and harmony. If the balance amongst the impulses adds to their value, will not their application in their balanced form add to the value of poetry? This question takes one straight to the core of the problem of poetic value. Richards' explanation is most plausible. Violent impulses, if left uncurbed and unsubdued, may upset the whole mental life of man. So, Richards' remark that "the business of the poet ... is to give order and coherence and so freedom, to a body of experiences"⁷⁰ sounds quite pertinent. The poet is superior to other persons by reason of his better organisation of impulses. Persons belonging to different professions have different mental organisations. With the change in environment, organisation of impulses also changes. In Richards' words "there are evidently a great number of good systematizations and what is good for one will not be good for another. A sailor, a doctor, a mathematician and a poet can hardly have the same organisation throughout. With different conditions different values necessarily arise."⁷¹ Poetry affords organisation which is of the best type.

The pleasure of poetry is of a superior kind. Its quality cannot be compared with that of any other pleasure derived from the other activities of life. Poetry creates a mental state which is all blissful because whatever is unagreeable and discordant in our impulses are finally reconciled to those impulses which are agreeable and pleasing. Thus Richards' analysis of the affective

70 Richards : Science and Poetry, p. 61.

71 Richards Principles, p. 60.

process takes into account both pleasant and unpleasant impulses which he technically calls Appetencies and Aversions.

What is common in Richards' theorizing and *Rasa* doctrine is the emphasis on the equanimity of mind. According to Richards, the tranquil state of mind is obtained through the reconciliation of impulses of both kinds - Appetencies and Aversions. According to the critics of *Rasa* school, it is obtained through self-denial and merging of consciousness in the world's consciousness which in turn is the outcome of the emergence of *Sattva Guna*. This state of *Visranti* is called *Rasa Dasa*. The difference between the two approaches is distinct. Richards' rejection of the metaphysical impulse forces him to assign names to imaginary structures. His theory of balancing of impulses is more based on individual psychology than on common experience and observation.⁷² No Value-judgment can stand only by being a laboratory specimen. And what is more, as D.W. Harding suggests, "Richards does not take pains to indicate the different types of balancing of impulses in respect of different types of artistic products."⁷³ Ignoring "teleological element"⁷⁴, Richards describes his 'ideal order' as a sort of "efficiently, a perfectly working mental Romeo Steel cabinet system."⁷⁵ D.G. James too, attacks Richards' theory of value for its arbitrariness.⁷⁶ Richards' only defined field is psychology and psychological method can be applied in literary appreciation in a very limited sense. And more so if it is applied to metaphysics and abstract morality. Like Richards, with his system of mental magnetic needles, David Hartley (1705-1757) admitted that it is the doctrine of vibrations which defines natural phenomena. But in the lack of authenticity, both Richards' and Hartley's theories may be taken as useful myths.⁷⁷

It has been urged that Richards' omission of the philosophical aspect of criticism takes him away from the critics of *Rasa* school. The term 'metaphysical' is apt to suggest

72 Eliot, T.S. : *The Use of Poetry*, p. 17.

73 Harding, D. W. : "Richards's Literary criticism", *Scurtiny*, Vol. I, No. 4, March 1933, p. 330.

74 Bethell, S.L. : "Suggestions towards theory of Value", *Criterion*, Vol, XIV, No. 55, Jan. 1955, p. 243.

75 Eliot, T.S. : Review, Richards's *Science and Poetry* in *The Dial*, see Richards's *Practical Criticism*, F.N. 1 at p. 285.

76 James, D.G. : *Science and Poetry*, p. 57.

77 Willey, Basil : *Eighteenth Century Background* (Chatto & Windus, London, 1944), p. 142.

something difficult, unusual, ideal and remote. Yet, it has its familiar side. Most of us have times at which, in reflection, we seem to comprehend not with any particular isolated problem, or any particular aspect of our experience but with experience of life, or existence, as a whole. These are what may be called our metaphysical moments. It is not easy to furnish a detailed and exact description of them. But there is no denying the fact that without these metaphysical moments, there would be no point in aesthetics and little in many works of art, poetry and literature in general.

Though Richards attaches great importance to the poised state of mind, he does not state what characterises that state of mind and how in that state of mind the poet or the reader transcend the finite and enjoys pleasure. This part of experience is described by the critics of *Rasa* school is their account of *Rasadasa*. According to them, this state of mind is attained only by the annihilation of the self and the resultant realisation of its unity or identity with universal consciousness with *Brahma*. In India, poetic practice is considered as a *Sadhana*, a process of joyous union or identification with the supreme reality. The novelty of Richards' theory lies in the fact that it caters to the demand of our complex age in which life itself represents a disintegration of impulses and feelings - of which Eliot's 'Prufrock' is a representative. *Rasa* theory begins with the basic assumption that nature as well as human psyche are in need of harmony because peace and harmony are the very traits of soul. The critics of *Rasa* school lay particular emphasis on the emancipating power of poetry. As we enter the realm of poetry, we sever our relation from the material world and yet the material world is not deserted for good. The poet working by illusions transports us to a world of pure bliss where the pressure of our everyday reality is removed and we get aesthetic pleasure as an independent experience. *Rasadasa* gives us unconditional delight because it is the most perfect state of mind where one temporarily forgets one's identity and becomes a seer or a prophet. Abhinavagupta describes the poised state of mind as a state of equanimity or *Sama-sthiti*.⁷⁸ According to him this *Sama-sthiti* is essential for *Santa Rasa*. It is to be noted here that Abhinavagupta takes *Santa Rasa* at the centre of all *Rasas*. This *Rasa* is an addition to the eight *Rasas* described by Bharata. It seems Richards also aims at the attainment of *Santa Rasa*

78 Abhinavagupta : Abhinava-Bharati, p. 262.

through a different channel. Rachards' concept of valuable mental state is not very far from Abhinvagupta's concept of *Sama-sthiti* of *Chitta*.

The categorisation of *Mitra* and *Satru Rasas* made by the critics of *Rasa* school is tentative and it is not very difficult to find exceptions to the rule. For example, in Bhavabhuti's *Uttara Ramacarita*, decidedly a pioneering drama in *Karuna Rasa*, we get a vivid description of the pangs of separation (*Viyoga*). *Viyoga* or *Vipralambha* comes under *Srngara Rasa*, and theoretically *Sragara* is the *Satru* of *Karuna*. Unless it is proved that *Viyoga* may have place in *Karuna*, Bhavabhuti's attempt to fuse *Srngara* with *karuna* may be treated as impracticable. Similarly, Prometheus enchained on the rock is the counterpart of Job on his dunghill. His agony moves us to tears though his suffering is sublime. The predicament of Faust or Henchard is not very different from that of Prometheus or Job. Again, it is a matter of common observation that often romantic people enjoy the pitiable condition of a young girl though erotic feelings are wrapped in seeming sympathy and pity. Some other cases of apparent anomaly may also be noted. *Vira* is treated as the *Virodhi Rasa* of *Srngara*. If it be so, in Shakespeare's *As You Like It* Rosalind could not have loved Orlando only because he was determined to distinguish himself in the lady's eyes by fighting an unequal contest. *Vibhatsa* and *Srngara*, theoretically considered opposite, can also be brought together. In Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, Hamlet is shown to leap into the grave of his beloved Ophelia after her brother Laertes. The look of the grave produces *Vibhatsa Rasa*. But Hamlet's gesture is decidedly connected with *Srngara Rasa*. It is a fact that *Hasya* and *Srngara* are congenial *Rasas* and it is fitting that in Shakespeare's *Much Ado About nothing*, Benedick should ultimately come to love Beatrice, his feminine counterpart in wit and jokes. But how can we account for the piercing wit usually resulting in contempt and pathos? The *Mitra* and *Satru Rasas* have been jotted down to show temperamental adjustment or otherwise and probably the theorists who took pains to point them out did not mean to take it literally. There are moments in life when two apparently contradictory emotions and impulses are subtly interfused. The dropping of Rama's ring by Hanumana in front of Sita creates both *Harsa* and *Visada* in her heart-*Harsa* because the ring belongs to her dear husband and *Visada* because she

apprehends some omen on her husband's part In the *Mahabharata*, Duryodhana is cursed to die at the moment *Harsa* and *Visada* are weighed equally in his life and this happens when he learns that not only the five Pandavas but also their sons have been killed. What actually is needed for aesthetic enjoyment is not a specific combination of *Rasa* but a situation which enables one, blessed with aesthetic sense, to enjoy it. The process of aesthetic enjoyment is mysterious and it is a matter of common observation that sometimes often a *Rasa* not enjoyable is enjoyed because of a particular set-up of the connoisseur's mind.

If the Indian concept of *Rasadasa* and Richards' concept of 'Synaesthetic state' are compared, much fruitful result comes out. While conceiving of Synaesthesia, Richards must have in mind the idea of balancing of impulses. In the final analysis, balancing of impulses may seem to end in synaesthetic state for when the different Appetencies and Aversions - harmonious and inharmonious - are tamed and reconciled - the consequence is a perfect calm when beauty is perceived. This aspect of Richards' critical doctrine may also be likened to the Indian theory of *Rasanispatti* which is the result of the synthesis of *Vibhava*, *Anubhava* and *Sancaribhava*. Bharata simply gave the *Sutra* that the combination of *Vibhava*, *Anubhava* and *Sancaribhava* produces *Rasa*. He did not explain it elaborately which task was later accomplished by other critics, the chief amongst them being abhinavagupta who propounded the theory of *abhivyakti-vada* or manifestation of *Rasa*. His contention is that *Rasa* does not live anywhere outside in this world but in the heart of the theatre-goer or the reader in the form of *Sanskaras*. The combination of *Vibhava*, *Anubhava* and *Sancaribhava* simply help it manifest at the appropriate time. His simple logic is that nothing can come out of nothing. Had this *Rasa* been not pre-existing in the heart of the *Sahradaya*, only a miracle could have brought it to existence. This is a satisfactory explanation of the reader's mental state.

Richards' concept of poetic value, as it has been pointed out above, depends upon the balancing of impulses. The Indian concept of *Citta-visranti* depends upon the purging of *Rajoguna* and *Tamoguna* giving way to *Sattvaguna*. The immediate effect of the emergence of *Sattvaguna* is dispassion and quietude followed by pleasure of a superior kind incompatible with any other carnal pleasure. Both Richards and the critics of *Rasa*

school agree on the crucial point that for the perception of beauty, tranquility of mind is a precedent condition. In Indian terminology, poetry will lose its *Rasavatta*, this is what Richards calls value, if the mental state required for the creation and appreciation of art is not available. This mental state is characterised by harmony of impulses, quietude, prevalence of *Sattvaguna* and complete emancipation from all angularities and personal prejudices.

Richards and the critics of *Rasa* school may be seen on common platform in conceiving the aim and purpose of poetry. Richards as well as the critics associated with *Rasa* school hold that the object of poetry is to mitigate that tension of the reader by palliating the severity of his seriousness. The Indian critics hold that this is done by the poet by creating a sense of beauty in the reader. Richards says that this is done by rendering poetry valuable i.e., impregnating it with values which fulfil our aesthetic taste and strengthen our moral fibres. In his *Science and Poetry*, he dilates upon the alleviatory power of poetry and tells us that poetry alone can salvage humanity from total annihilation. It is in this sense that poetry is the giver of *Mukti* and prosperity. While describing the purpose (*prayojana*) of *Natya*, Bharata says that it gives relief and solace to an afflicted heart.⁷⁹ Jagannatha tells of the dispelling of the illusion (*avarana-bhanga*).⁸⁰ Vamana says that poetry is love-generating.⁸¹ Mammata observes that among the various *Prayojanas* of *Kavya*, one is the removal of ills and attainment of well being. This can be done by poetry through discarding what is vicious and undesirable i.e., *Svetara*.⁸² All that these statements add up to is that poetry should not aggravate but lessen the grief of the reader and soothen his heart so that he may think more of friendship, love and affection and less of jealousy, greed and self-aggrandisement. At this point, there is great affinity between the critical postulates of Richards and those of the Indian critics.

The Indian critics, like Richards, however, do not describe the perception of beauty or poetic value in terms of balancing of discordant impulses. But if the result of balancing of impulses is perception of beauty, it makes no difference whether that is

79 Bharata : *Natyasastra*, 1/111-112.

80 Jagannatha : *Rasagangadhara*, p. 92.

81 Vamana : *Kavyalankarasautra*, 1/1/5.

82 Mammata : *Kavya Prakasa*, 1/2.

achieved by reconciliation of varied, easily tamable or wild impulses or by *Avarana-bhanga* and the emergence of *Sttvaguna*.

Thus, despite many differences between the critical theories of Richards and those of the critics of *Rasa* school, as regards poetic value, there is something common in them which binds them together. What Richards calls organisation and systematization of impulses, Appetencies and Aversions, synaesthesia, conaesthesia, thwarting of impulses, wasteful of human possibilities, comprehensive coordination of activities, satisfaction of interests, in one way or the other, echo the Indian concepts of *Maitri* and *satvata* of *Rasas*, *Rasadasa*, *Visranti*, *Rasadrata*, *Avaranabhanga*, *Rasabodha*, and *Rasa-magnata*. The terminology used by Richards and the critics of *Rasa* school differ and this is but natural. By his own account, Richards's theory is based on psychology. Schiller objects to his theory of balancing of impulses on this very ground: "while Richards' solution to the problem - whether we agree with it or not - is fairly evident in his writings, other difficulties raised, by the theory of evaluation are not so easily overcome. There is, for instance, the tension between the subjectivism of this account and the objective appeal we frequently find elsewhere."⁸³ This attack seems to stem from Eliot's refusal to accept Richards' theory of value because of its individual psychology.⁸⁴ Richards' theory of balancing of impulses like *Rasa-synthesis*, draws on psychology. It may be an individual psychology. But there is nothing in it which can be said to be arbitrary or not based on reason.

Human mind reacts against each new circumstance. This gives rise to a particular type of vibration in mind. Human mind is the meeting place of variegated impulses. Each new situation influences these impulses, and creates a stir in them. This 'stir' is technically called *Manovikara* in the Indian *Rasa* theory. This is what Richards calls "disturbance of other impulses."⁸⁵ This disturbance takes place not only in body but also in mind. Bharata states that human mind ever remains in a tranquil state and as an object is perfumed with some sort of scent, so our mind is perfumed (*bhavita*) with *Manovikaras*. This is why these *manovikaras* are designated as *Bhavas*.

83 Schiller, Jarome P. : *LA. Richards' Theory of Literature* (Yale University Press, London, 1960), p. 104.

84 Eliot : *The Use of Poetry*, p. 17.

85 Richards : *Principles*, p. 51.

If the question whether the coordination takes place amongst discordant impulses as Richards states or it takes place amongst only *Mitra-rasas* is put off for the time being - the final stage aimed at by both Richards and the critics of *Rasa* school is amazingly alike. There is no question of bitter experience in the realm of poetry. In *Rasadasa*, even bitter emotions are transformed into joyous emotions. Aesthetic enjoyment is, thus, a configuration of feeling as well as of experience. According to the Hindu philosophy, mind is continually transforming itself into shapes of the objects of which it becomes aware. Its subtle substance assumes the forms and colours of everything offered to it by the senses, imagination memory and emotions. This is to say, it is endowed with the power of transformation or metamorphosis. The sense impressions coming from without as well as the impulses from within never let us remain in peace. Yoga consists in the stopping of the spontaneous activities of the mind-stuff. Patanjali defines Yoga as the science of controlling senses.⁸⁶ The moment the quieting of mind is complete, the inner man stands revealed. It is in this sense that the practice of poetry is considered Yoga in India. In the words of the *Gita*, while *Tamoguna* pulls down and *Rajoguna* sustains in the middle, *Sattvaguna* lifts to higher regions.⁸⁷ It is only with the emergence of *Sattvaguna* that truth or beauty or bliss can be realised because it is only at this stage that the disturbance in the domain of impulses is subdued. Jagannatha calls it *Bhagna-varana*⁸⁸ because at this stage the veil of ignorance is removed and the pure *Caitanya* is experienced (*asvadya*). In *Siva-sutra*, the state of communion with *Siva* is described as unique, unparalleled, equal to the state of *Samadhi*.⁸⁹

That *Anukulata* begets pleasure (*anukulatvam sukham*) and *Pratikulata* unhappiness is the perennial law of nature. In *Ayurveda*, there is a formula that human body is composed of five elements namely, *Agni*, *Jala*, *Vayu*, *Akasa* and *Prithvi*. All these elements create different bodily *Rasas*. The same elements i.e., *Vayu*, *Agni* and *Jala* are the chief ones. They are given their special names as *Vata*, *Pitta* and *Kapha*. They are called *Tridosas*. A derangement in their equilibrium in the human system gives

86 Patanjali: *Yoga-darsana*, I/1.

87 *Gita*, 14, 18

88 Jagannatha : *Rasagangadhara*, p. 92

89 *Siva-sutra*, 18

rise to multifarious diseases.⁹⁰ It is only their perfect balance that can make man healthy and keep him free from ailments. When balance is required in the primordial elements of body for a happy living, why not the same principle should hold good in so far as poetic value is concerned? Even in ordinary life, we see that when there are differences between two persons, they can seldom make good friends.

Richards again and again refers to the synaesthetic state of mind resulting from the coordination of impulses. This state is nothing but *Rasadasa* referred to by the critics of *Rasa* school. From the standpoint of *Rasa* theory, the worth of poetry depends upon its capacity to satisfy our impulses and strengthen our faith in the higher values of life. This is possible only when peace prevails supreme. This peace is aimed at by Richards in his theory of value. His theory has its root in his appreciation of modern poetry, particularly the poetry of T.S.Eliot and William Empson, where the complexity of modern life and its varied interests are deftly intermingled with the help of homely idioms and striking images and symbols.

The notion of the balancing of discordant impulses has engaged the attention of the eminent western critics of our time. While writing on metaphysical poets, Eliot says that a great poet like Donne could conveniently "amalgamate disparate experiences"⁹¹ Tate describes poetry as "tension", "the full organised body of the extension and the intension".⁹² Richards' concept of the amalgamation of disparate experiences is also reminiscent of Satayana's views: "Now, it is the essential privilege of beauty to so synthesize and bring to a focus the various impulses of the self, so to suspend them to a single image, that a great peace falls upon that perturbed kingdom. In the experience of these momentary harmonies we have the basis of the enjoyment of beauty, and of all its mystical meanings. But there are always two methods of securing harmony : one is to unify all the given elements, and another is to reject and expunge all the elements that refuse to be unified. Unity by inclusion gives us the beautiful; unity by exclusion, opposition, and isolation gives us the sublime. Both are pleasures : but the pleasure of the

90 Bhattacharya, B. "Tridosha in Ayurveda", P.K. Gode Commemoration Volume (Poona, 1960), p. 15.

91 Eliot : "Metaphysical Poets", Selected Essays, p. 59.

92 Tate : Essays of Four Decades (London, O.U.P., 1970), p. 59

one is warm, passive, and pervasive, that of the other cold, imperious, and keen. The one identifies us with the world, the other rises us above it."⁹³ This immediately calls to mind Richards' statement : "Persistent mental imbalances are the source of nearly all our troubles. For this reason, as well as for the simpler reason that suppression is wasteful of life, conciliation is always to be preferred to conquest."⁹⁴ Obviously, Santayana's approach is philosophical while Richards' theory of value draws heavily on psychology and neurology. In fact, Richards is the first critic of note to give a systematic theoretical foundation of the theory of balancing of impulses which most suits the changing taste of our time.

93 Whimsatt, and Brooks : Cited - *Literary Criticism A Short History*, pp. 618-619

94 Richards : *Science and Poetry*, p. 39.

CHAPTER 9

RHYTHM AND METRE : LAYA AND CHAND

It is interesting to note that *Rasa* has also inextricable relationship with *Laya* and *Chanda*. This notion led the critics of the *Rasa* school to examine and analyse *Laya* and *Chanda* from the point of view of *Rasa*. They showed that it is the proper handling of *Laya* and *Chanda* which leads to the evocation of *Rasa*. The success and failure of *Rasa* were attributed to the use and misuse of *Laya* and *Chanda*. At least one critic of *Rasa* school, named Ksemendra worked out this theory in his book *Suvrttatillakam* in great detail. He evinced great ingenuity to show that it is actually the evocation of *Rasa* which should be the aim of *Laya* and *Chand*.

That metrical composition adds to the felicity of poetic diction is a truth which has been recognised through the ages. "Poetry", observes Raymond Howes, "in some of its most usual forms is more or less tinged with a rhetorical element".¹ The importance of rhythm and metre in versification is self-evident. It has been acknowledged by the poets and the prosodists alike, both in the East and in the West. Rhythm is perceived in a sequence of events when they occur so regularly that the time intervals they occupy are felt to be either nearly equal to one another or symmetrical. The experience is charged with emotion and affords a sense of balance. What is heard as a series of recurring strokes or sensed as a sequence of equal temporal periods satisfies an urge which the listener may not be always aware. In both prose and verse, rhythm functions overtly and with particular cogency. In verse particularly, each time interval in a sequence is occupied by syllables and pauses, and is usually marked by a bit. Even a piece of abstract scientific writing suffers if its rhythm is altogether inert. A formal and excessively marked verse rhythm is hardly more deplorable than continuous rhythmical lifelessness in prose. The rhythmical grace of good prose is comparable with that of fine poetry. The effect of rhythm is heightened if it is used to reinforce the context.

1 Hudson, Hoyt H. : "Rhetoric and Poetry". *Historical Studies of Rhetoric and Rhetoricians*, ed. Howes, Raymond (New York, 1961), p. 379.

Richards is committed to the tenets of no school as regards the rhetorical devices of poetry and it is pertinent to observe that he does not wholly subscribe to the Aristotelian critical panacea that metre enhances the general effect of poetry merely because it is an external embellishment. He examines the problem of rhythm and metre anew and adds to the old beliefs a number of penetrating remarks about metre and meaning. "The movement of the verse becomes the movement of the meaning; and prosody, as a study of verse-form apart from meaning is seen to be a product of unwary abstraction"². And further, "The perceived relations between temporal part of an utterance, which seem to the ear to constitute good metre derive from relations between parts of its meaning"³. Till recently, rhythm and metre were considered as mere devices to achieve formal perfection in poetry. They were not considered from the standpoint of poetic meaning. This important task is done by Richards. Some of the ideas of Richards with regard to rhythm and metre have parallels in *Rasa* doctrine. Richards begins with the assumption that both rhythm and its specialised form metre depend upon repetition and expectancy. All rhythmical and metrical effects, necessarily spring from anticipation which is unconscious.⁴ The rhythmical effect depends upon this unconscious preparation and consists largely of the further twist which it gives to expectancy. Ksemendra studies, *Laya* and *Chanda* from the angle of the evocation of *Rasa*.

Richard's views on rhythm and metre are, in the main, outlined in *Principles, Meaning, Practical Criticism* and *Coleridge on Imagination*. The only book in Sanskrit literary criticism which directly deals with the relation of *Chanda* to *Rasa* is Ksemendra's *Suvrttilakam*. According to P.V. Kane, Ksemendra was a Kashmiri Brahmin who flourished in the eleventh century (990 AD-1066 AD).⁵ He was a prolific writer and wrote on a variety of subjects including poetics in which field his contribution is meagre. Although his noted work on poetics *Suvrttilakam* did not exercise any potent influence on later *Alankarasastra*, his account of metres and their uses particularly with reference to *Rasas* is remarkable. Since *Laya* emanates from

2 Richards : *Coleridge on Imagination*, p. 119.

3 Ibid., p. 120.

4 Richards : *Principles*, p. 134.

5 Kane, P.V. : *A History of Sanskrit Poetics*, p. 254.

Chanda, Ksemendra's analysis of *Chanda* includes the possibilities of *Laya* also.

It is worth mentioning that there are several striking points of resemblance between the views expressed by Richards and those of Ksemendra though the differences are equally obvious. In ways, the position of Richards in respect of rhythm and metre is very much akin to that of Ksemendra.

According to Richards, form in poetry is of great importance. Form includes literary style and the application of metre and rhythm. Form contains the magic of rhythm and metre and the self-contained unity of poetic vision. Poetry is that form of literary expression which is characterised by emotional, rhythmical and often symbolic language. The rules that govern rhythm and metre are integral parts of the technique of versification. Rhythm in poetry is like the tinkling of a bell which creates soothing, harmonious and pleasant effects on our mind. It gives what Coleridge calls 'a sense of musical delight' which is the gift of imagination. Contrary to this, an imperfect metre is irritating and exasperating and produces a jarring note in a harmony of sound. Rhythm has various crucial applications. In Richards' view, rhythm is powerfully used to reinforce the content, to add an emotional richness to the poetic meaning, to carry home to the reader the poet's attitudes and feeling and thoughts. In each instance, rhythm is an inseparable part of the total meaning and effect. Rhythm can be of some value when it is used for emphasis and point for enhancing the intensity and subtlety of meaning, for evoking the feeling in the reader that the poet's expression is the right one.

Richards' considered opinion is: "The relations of the form to the meaning—whether dactyl measures suit gay or spondaic grave subjects and so on cease to be a matter for profitable inquiry"⁶ And this is because metre is an integral part of the texture of poetry and there is a necessary connection between metre of poetry. Richards agrees to the popular view that rhythm makes a direct appeal to the emotion. But at the same time, he holds that "the actual sounds...do not carry the sole responsibility for the rhythm."⁷ It is impossible to deal with rhythm apart from meaning." The way in which the sound of a word is taken varies

6 Richards : Coleridge on Imagination, p. 119

7 Richards : Practical Criticism, p. 229.

with the emotion already in mind."⁸ This is precisely the view of Ksemendra who prescribes a particular *Chanda* for the evocation of a particular *Rasa*. rhythm, as rule, always influences meaning. In *Practical Criticism* Richards says : "The difference between good rhythm and bad is not simply a difference between certain sequences of sounds; it goes deeper and to understand it we have to take note of the meaning of the words as well."⁹ In this connection, T.S. Eliot seems to share the views of Richards. In his essay "The Music of Poetry", Eliot affirms the interrelation between rhythm and meaning. In Eliot's words "th music of poetry is not smething which exists apart from the meaning. Otherwise, we could have poetry of great musical beauty which made no sense, and I have never come across such poetry."¹⁰

Richards holds that rhythm is not just a simple modulation of sound or a combination of sound-vibration crystallised into music. The flow of rhythm cannot be erratic. The device through which the flow of rhythm is controlled is called metre. Rhythm is directly concerned with Emotion. The poet seeks to transmit his emotion to others; hence the necessity of rhythmic expression, for music is the natural vehicle of emotion. emotion demands rhythm in poetry. The musical element is to be found in all languages not in poetry alone. But because poetry is more highly charged with emotion than other types of literature, it has always been more closely allied with music, and still follows its laws in its form, which is verse. Man's emotion finds natural expression in rhythmic movement, whether in music, dance, or song. And from the beginning, the three arts - music, dance and poetry are found together. In course of time, they came to have separate development. But poetry still bears traces of its association with music and dance.

Richards argues that the beauty of rhythm does not lie in mere sound. It also rests on meaning. Rhythm is so beautifully fused in poetic meaning that the reader immediately becomes conscious of the emotion expressed through it. Rhythm invariably evokes emotion. In *Practical Criticism*, Richards says "certain rhythms – as in the case of the brass band ...and sounds of a certain quality, perhaps through their association—the

8 Richards : Principles, p. 137.

9 Richards : Practical Criticism, p. 227.

10 Eliot, T.S. : "The Music of Poetry", Collected Prose (Penguin, 1963), p. 53.

trumpet and the nightingale, for example—all these readily facilitate emotional orgies."¹¹ Meaning is a part and parcel rhythm. Rhythm controls meaning. To study rhythm in poetry apart from meaning, since meaning is undoubtedly the controlling factor in the poet's choice of the rhythmical effects he will produce, seems from this point of view an enterprise of doubtful value."¹² Richards argues that rhythmic elements are usually simultaneous instead of being successive so much so that "a quick reader who sees a word as a whole commonly overlooks misprints because the general form of the word is such that he is only able at that instant to perceive one particular letter in a particular place and so overlooks what is discrepant."¹³ Rhythm is, thus, a controlling agent and a vehicle to give flow and pattern to a literary or even non-literary composition.

Both rhythm and metre depend upon repetition and expectancy. There is causal relation between meaning and voice. Poetry is more than an ejaculation or outburst of emotion. Metre gives a special momentum to rhythm. Metre is the specialised form of rhythm.¹⁴ "Metre", Richards holds, "for the most difficult and delicate utterance is the all but the inevitable means."¹⁵ In metrical composition words appear before us in a new garb. Richards is of opinion that in the use of metre no rigidity should be observed. As opposed to this, Ksemendra advocates metrical pattern in verse. Richards thinks that the rules governing metre should not be made inflexible. The possibilities of expression of new ideas should be explored while making experiment with metre. In holding that metre is not inevitable for poetical expression, he seems to share the views of Sidney, Shelley and Wordsworth.

Richards does not agree to the view that there is something like effect of a word or a sound. "words have no intrinsic literary characters. None are either ugly or beautiful, intrinsically displeasing or delightful. Every word has instead a range of possible effects."¹⁶ In *Meaning* Richards and Ogden take words as mere signs.¹⁷ But unlike other signs, each word points in

¹¹ Richards : *Practical Criticism*, p. 257.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 361.

¹³ Richards : *Principles*, p. 138.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 134.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 146.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 136.

several directions and functions in various ways. They state that "rhythms and specially metres have to a small degree an hypnotic effect, the very marked difference in evocative power between words so arranged and words without recurrent system is readily accounted for."¹⁶ Therefore, they feel that "some degree of hyperaesthesia would be a convenient assumption to explain further the greater sensitiveness to vowel and consonantal characters which accompanies metrical reading, and the flat or tiny effect of the same syllables occurring in *vers libres*."¹⁸ While getting metrical experience, we usually forget the right sequence or matter-of-fact statement under what may be called an emotional fit. "Emotionality, exaggeration of belief-feelings, the occurring of the critical faculties, the suppression of the questioning—'is this so as a matter of fact?'—attitude, all these are characteristics of metrical experiences and fit in well with a hypnosis assumption."¹⁹ Similarly, there are "no gloomy and no gay vowels or syllables."²⁰ Therefore, it would be a futile attempt "to analyse the effects of passages into vowel and consonantal collocations."²¹ The sound of a word varies with the variation of emotion and sense. "The way in which the sound of a word is taken varies with the emotion already in being."²² It is incumbent upon the poet that he should use words whose sound expresses their meaning. "This texture of expectations satisfactions, disappointments, surprisals, which the sequence of syllables brings about is rhythm."²³ "The sound of words", as Richards observes, "comes to its full power only through rhythm."²⁴ Metre "is the most specialised form of temporal rhythmic sequence."²⁵ Metre is more than a kind of "metrical drill in which words, those erratic and varied things, do their best to behave as though they were all the same; with certain concessions, licences and equivalences allowed."²⁶ "Metre adds

17 Richards & Ogden : Meaning, p. 70.

18 Ibid., p. 239.

19 Ibid., pp. 239-40.

20 Richards : Principles, p. 137.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.

23 Richards : Principles, p. 137.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid., p. 139.

26 Ibid.

to all the variously fated expectancies, which make up rhythm a definite temporal pattern and its effect is not due to our perceiving a pattern in something outside us, but to our becoming patterned ourselves. With every beat of the metre a tide of anticipation in us turns and swings, setting up as it does so extraordinarily extensive sympathetic reverberations."²⁷ From this, it follows that Richards believes in the relationship between emotion and metre. "Once the metre has begun to catch on they are almost as closely bound up with the sequence of words as the tied verbal images themselves".²⁸ Traditional Metre presupposes rise and fall of pitch.

In Sanskrit, there are two metrical sections—*Svaravṛtta* or *Vedic* and *Varnavṛtta* or *Laukika*. It is only in case of the former that there is a regular variation of pitch (*svara*). *Vedic* metres are usually placed in three categories—*Udatta*, *Anudatta* and *Svarita*. In *Varnavṛtta*, pitch (*svara*) does not necessarily vary. The variation is of *Laghu* and *Guru* syllables in a fixed or controlled manner with the help of *Gana*. In song (music), there are two factors—pitch (*svara*) and time-beat (*tala*). In *Matravṛtta*, consideration of pitch is not necessary. Here, pitch depends upon *Lava*, controlled by a fixed number of *Matras* in each line. In *Tala Vṛtta*, only time-beat is of any consequence, not pitch. The kinship of poetry with music has been universally acknowledged. It is the rise and fall of pitch which makes a piece of verse enjoyable. The process of reading poetry should not be equated with that of singing.²⁹ This is to say, poetry cannot be made a substitute for light music. When it is to say, poetry cannot be vain to compete with the light music singers. Another feature which distinguishes poetry from music is that where poetry is always meaningful, music is mixed with emotion. In song, greater stress is laid on voice. Poetry takes utmost care of emotional effect, song of musical effect. So, "there is no question of definite pitches at which the syllables must be taken, nor perhaps of definite harmonic relations between different sounds."³⁰

Richards partially corroborates Coleridge's and Yeats' views that metrical composition creates hypnotic effect. He quotes Coleridge who holds that "metre tends to increase the vivacity

27 Ibid., pp. 139-40.

28 Ibid., p. 144.

29 Richards : Principles, p. 141.

30 Principles.

and susceptibility both of the general feeling and of the attention."³¹ He also quotes Yeats who holds that the function of metre is to "lull the mind into a waking trance."³² But he suggests that the hypnotic effect of metre comes "not through the surprised element in metrical effect as Coleridge points out but through the absence of surprise, through the lulling effects more than through the awakening."³³ "Among the susceptibility and vivacity of emotion, suggestibility, limitations of the field of attention, marked differences in the incidence of belief-feelings closely analogous to those which alcohol and nitrous oxide can induce, and some degree of hyperaesthesia (increases power of discriminating sensations) may be noted."³⁴ The immediate effects of metre is that it brings about a change in the consciousness of the reader.

Richards' observations of metre are something like those of Coleridge, he traces the origin of metre to the balance of the mind effected by that spontaneous effort which strives to in check the workings of passion. From Richards' assertion, two facts follow. First, metre originates in an excited condition of the mind. Second, metre is the result of a voluntary act of the will and judgment for the purpose of mixed delight with emotion.

When we compare Richards with Coleridge, the superiority of the latter in depth of thought and sufficiency of view point is easily seen. Richards' theory of metre is just an extension of Coleridge's views on this point whose indebtedness Richards frankly admits.

Richards asks us to be on guard against stock response, both in respect of poetic meaning and material achievement. He thinks that in poetry a gross appeal to stock sentiments, lulling and hypnotic use of metre, a flattering use of familiar images are to be eschewed.

Rhythm implies movement. With every rhythmic beat, the line of verse moves forward with sonority. "Movement in poetry" Richards says, "deserves at least as much attention as onomatopoeia."³⁵ Metre is defined by Richards as "a more complex and more specialised form of temporal rhythmic sequences."³⁶ This is true enough. If we are presented with a

31 Ibid., p.143.

32 Richards : Principles, p. 143.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid., pp. 143-44

35 Ibid., p. 143.

36 Richards : Principles, p. 139

sequence of events, we, quite naturally, tend to perceive them rhythmically. They seem to fall into patterns whatever their actual temporal relationship might be.

The question whether rhythm is controlled by meaning is a debatable one. Richards considers Prof. E.A. Sornenscheln's views on this point contained in *What is Rhythm?*³⁷ and considers rhythm an integral part of meaning. Relation of rhythm to meaning is a necessity which is stressed by all the poets ambitious to produce poetic effect by harmonizing rhythm and the component parts of meaning. Rhyme, which ought strictly to be spelt *rime* but has acquired its present spelling through a mistaken association with rhythm is the identity of sound at the end of words. It is not essential to poetry. "The words rhyme and rhythm are not kindred and do not have the same derivation. Rhyme emphasizes rhythm. But it is not as necessary as metre is. Metrical verse organises rhythm in some specific and formal pattern. Such patterns contribute to the grace and dignity of verse. There are some poets who consider rhyme a mere jingle, as Milton did in his later life. Milton cast rhyme aside as unworthy of his great argument in *Paradise Lost*. He avoided the difficulty of carrying rhyme through the vast, discursive effort of his epic.³⁸ But there is no doubt, when properly employed, it adds to the beauty and harmony of verse. On the other hand, rhythm may be found even in non-metrical composition. Modern poetry which observes no metrical rule has also a rhythm of its own.

As in the modulation of music, so in the recitation of poetry, one needs to be careful regarding the rise and fall of pitch. Pitch is an essential part of metre and for that matter the poet's technique. Richards invites us to compare Milton's 'Hymn on the Morning of Christ's Nativity' with Collins' "Ode to Simplicity" and both with the second chorus of Shelley's "Hellas."³⁹ They show the scheme of pitch relations, in their contexts of

That on the better cross
Must redeem our loss;

and of

But com'st a decent maid,
In Attic robe stray's,

In reading the word 'loss', the pitch is lowered. But the same

37 Richards : *Practical Criticism*, pp. 360-62.

38 Wimsatt and Brooks : *Literary Criticism, A Short History*, p. 159.

39 Richards : *Principles*, pp. 141-42.

word is emphasized as compared with 'our' in the same context.

The measured rhythm of poetry, which is called metre, increases the enjoyment which poetry is meant to give. The variety of rhythmic modulations within the given pattern of the verse makes a special appeal to our aesthetic sense. Above all, in its music, verse lifts us from the prosaic plane of our everyday life to that realm of the ideal in which poetry lives and moves and has its being. Nevertheless, poetic effect should not be confused with musical effect. Poetry has meaning. Music may exist even without apparent meaning. It is absurd to think of rhythmic effect or metrical effect as in the thumping of a drum.⁴⁰ As Richards puts it, "The reading of poetry is of course not a monotonous and subdued form of singing."⁴¹

Verse is metrical as well as rhythmical. There is metrical superstructure over the rhythm. In prose, rhythm continues sequentially as long as the text lasts. But verse is chopped up into regularly repeated metrical units. Often, an additional level of phonetic organisation gathers the rhythmical groups into metrical units lines. Metre emerges from the numerical control of rhythm. Metre and rhythm manage to convey the 'feel' of verse.

In principle, any phonological feature of language may provide the basis for metre. Length of syllable is phonologically inactive in English. So in English metres, the question of long and short syllables does not arise. Classical metres were complex in structure. Modern English measures are based on syllabic and stress patterning.

Richards considers rhythm and metre more than "an affair of the sensory aspect of syllables."⁴² Poetry must adopt direct means. "What can be done by sound should not be done otherwise or in violation of the natural effect of sound."⁴³ The reason is the "violation of the natural emphasis and tones of speech brought about for the sake of the further effects due to thought and feeling are perilous, though, on occasion, they may be valuable devices."⁴⁴ Milton used 'mee' in place of 'me' to

40 Richards : Principles, p. 139.

41 Ibid , p. 141

42 Ibid., p. 142.

43 Ibid

44 Richards : Principles, p. 142.

suggest additional emphasis.⁴⁵ And in so doing, he was perfectly justified.

Richards uses Coleridge's conception of projective imagination to improve upon Coleridge's suggestion that the source of musical delight of poetry lies simply in the pleasures provided by the sounds of verse.⁴⁶ Coleridge's deduction that there is necessary connection between metre and poetry deserves serious consideration. When the words of a poem are viewed as being invested with their meanings, the scope of metre is enlarged and it is expected to bear heavy responsibility. In that case "metre becomes a movement of meanings not merely of sounds."⁴⁷ In Richards' word "The perceived relations between temporal parts of an utterance which seem to the ear to constitute good metre derive from relations between parts of its meaning."⁴⁸

From the standpoint of Indian theory of *Rasa*, *Laya* and *Chanda* are of great importance. In *Satapatha Brahmana*, *Chanda* has been considered the seed of all *Rasas*.⁴⁹ The fulfilment of ambition and the expansion of *Yajna* are attributed to the consummation of *Chanda*. Poetry is said to be bound with the rules of *Chanda*. But these rules of *Chanda* are not external. It is wrong to say that poetry follows the rules of *Chanda* as these rules are no more than descriptions of poetic movements. The rules of *Chanda* come out of the flow of life and indicate the system of free movement of soul. It is only in a very limited sense that they are bound by rules. Both *Laya* and *Chanda*, according to *Rasa* theory, are related to *Bhavana*. They are closely related to *Rasa*, because *Rasa* takes into account the imagination of the poet as well as the reader and their feelings and emotions. Primarily, both depend upon internal vibration (*antaravega*). It is only when the strokes of a painter or the modulation of the voice of a musician or the versification of the poet are imbued with *Rasa* that they assume the form of art. In certain forms of verse, as in free verse (*mukta-chanda*) rhythm is predominant. But in metrical composition, rhythm plays an important role. *Laya* and *Chanda* are helpful in the revelation and relish of *Rasa*. They lend musical

45 Ibid., p. 142-43.

46 Richards Coleridge on Imagination, pp. 110-16.

47 Schiller · I.A. Richards' Theory of Literature, p. 27.

48 Richards · Coleridge on Imagination, p. 120

49 Satapatha Brahmana, 1.2.41.6

effect to poetry. Music is indispensable for the expression of emotion - in so far as traditional forms of verse are concerned. Edgar Allan Poe defines poetry as the rhythmic creation of beauty. *Lava* helps concentration of mind. With the help of *Laya*, mind temporarily merges (*laya*) itself in the object. *Laya* governs not only the periodic pulsation but also the symmetrical planning of melody. Though Sanskrit seems to have no equivalent of the Greek word rhythm, the emphasis on metrical patterns is found in most Sanskrit poetry.

Bharata takes a broader view of *Chanda*. He observes: "No word is devoid of metrical quality nor any metre is without word. The co-existence of both word and metre is essential for drama".⁵⁰ Abhinavagupta, who elaborates Bharata's theory outlined in *Natyasastra*, says that metrical pattern is as much necessary in poetry as site is essential for the construction of building.⁵¹

Ksemendra, whose *Suvrttilakam* is a pioneering work in this field, gives some very valuable clues to the revelation of *Rasa* through the application of appropriate *Chanda*. Ksemendra observes: "The poet should use *Chandas* in accordance with *Rasa* and subject matter."⁵² And further, "owing to the discipline of eminent poets *Vrttas* of various kinds become as much commendable as even idiots are moulded to appreciable servants owing to the discipline of a good task master."⁵³ *Vrtta* used ineptly becomes ludicrous as an anklet put on neck.⁵⁴ Ksemendra, from the standpoint of *Rasa*, prescribes certain *Chandas* for certain *Rasa*-effects. For example, *Mandakranta* is most befitting of the description of rainy season as was done by Kalidasa in *Meghaduta*.⁵⁵ Similarly, *Vansastha* is suitable for didactic verse⁵⁶ and *Vasantatilaka* for heroic (*vira*) and terrible (*raudra*) *Rasas*. The consummation of *Rasas* much depends upon the suitability of *Chandas* and *Rasas*. Where *Chanda* is chosen to suit a particular *Rasa*, poetry is bound to succeed. Ksemendra mentions the specific metres in which Sanskrit poets attained enviable success, for instance, Abhinanda in *Anustupa*,

50 Bharata : *Natyasastra*, 15/40.

51 Abhinavagupta : *Abhinavabharati*, 15/227 (B.H.U., 1975), p. 1247.

52 Ksemendra : *Suvrttilakam*, 3/7.

53 Ibid., 3/10.

54 Ibid., 3/13.

55 Ibid., 3/21.

56 Ibid., 3/18.

Panini in *Upjati*, Bharavi in *Vansastha*, Kalidasa in *Mandakranta*, Ratnakara in *Vasantatilaka*, Bhavabhuti in *Sikharani*, Rajasekhara in *Sardula Vikrdita*.

The opposite of it leads to failure of poetry. Ksemendra enlists certain metres which are helpful in the evocation of certain kinds of *Rasas*. Richards does not provide us with any such list. Ksemendra holds that the style of poetry should be enlivened by *Rasa*. Since poetry is a special kind of expression, it takes into account special techniques and gives greater emphasis on rhythm and metre. Richards was endowed with true powers of mind. He could instinctively peretrate into the very core of a matter and his disquistions are comprehensive and profound.

Richards gives a more detailed and more exhaustive account of the functions of rhythm and metre than ksemendra. Richards' concern is, however, not to analyse the different metrical effects with regard to emotion. Since the fundamental assumptions of ksemendra and Richards are different, they encounter the problem differently and arrive at different conclusions. Richards concludes his discussion with the remark that the whole rhythmical and metrical process is unconscious. Ksemendra is more interested in showing the relationship between *chanda* and *Rasa*. But both lay stress, on the crucial role of rhythm and metre. Like Richards, Ksemendra also relates metre to emotion. Like Richards, again, he considers metre helpful in impregnating the meaning of poetry.

CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSION: I.A. RICHARDS AS A TATTVABHINIVESI CRITIC

Richards' literary criticism is so near to us that any attempt at assessing its value and character and exploring its parallelisms to the Indian theory of *Rasa* is apt to be discoloured by our instinctive likes and dislikes and provincial prejudices. The Indian theory of *Rasa* stemmed from its own social and cultural roots, just as Richards' aesthetics has its own special background. There cannot be centpercent equation as Richards' background is different from that of the *Rasa* exponents. Therefore, it is obvious that Richards' critical formulations can be examined and analysed in the light of the Indian theory of *Rasa* with certain reservations. The two doctrines have different vocabularies, traditions and assumptions and one can only discover what each is doing. The underlying premises of the two literary and related critical traditions being so different, there is no critical validity in bracketting Richards with the exponents of the *Rasa* theory in the rigid sense and it would be too much to find point-to-point correspondence between Richards' critical theories and those put forward by the critics of *Rasa* school.

Richards is an amalgam of a multitude of disparate qualities. With his multi-lingual scholarship, he, more than any other critic, contributed to the framework of ideas within which contemporary literary criticism is read and appreciated.

Richards is a systematic thinker and a system-builder. It is difficult to share the views of Schiller that Richards "has not made it easy to determine the precise nature of his theory of literature."¹ Like the critics of the *Rasa* school, Richards is an anti-authoritarian who seldom requires obedience to authority much of which he brands as "the phantom of aesthetic state."² As a theorist, his position is comparable to Aristotle, Bharata and Abhinavagupta in respect of his broad-based programme and the wide influence he has exerted and the admirers he has won by virtue of his sound critical judgment. In no British or American critic do we find such interest in system-building as we find in

¹ Schiller : I.A. Richards' Theory of Literature, p. 141.

² Richards : Principles, p. 11.

Richards and in no critic do we hear such echo of the Indian theory of *Rasa* as we get in him. "His writings are", as Hotopf puts it, "thick with ideas."³ If minutely studied, his literary criticism, in its depth and variety, may seem to approximate the Indian theory of *Rasa*.

"Not a forbidding and arid academic polymath"⁴, As K. Viswanathan prefers to call him, Richards has an armed vision and he examines literary problems with the detachment of a scientist. The impression he leaves is that of an open-minded rather than a circumscribed intelligence.

The main conclusion here arrived at, and now held by many critics, is that Richards' literary criticism has close correspondence with the Indian theory of *Rasa*, though the differences are as much conspicuous as the analogues. The grounds upon which this conclusion rests are unshakable for the similarity between Richards' critical formulations and some diversities and ramifications of *Rasa* doctrine is unquestionable.

From this study, Richards, to use a catchword from Rajasekhara's *Kavya Mimansa*,⁵ emerges as a *Tattvabhinivesi* critic, meaning one who has deep insight into the *Tattva* or essence of literature. Richards conceives of criticism as a specific discipline of thought concerned essentially with the fundamentals of life and literature and much in the manner of the critics of *Rasa* school, tries to tackle such perennial problems of literature as aesthetic experience, communication, poetic language, imagination, stimuli and response and rhythm and metre.

While studying Richards' literary criticism in the light of the *Rasa* theory, what strikes us first is that a large part of his critical theories comes close to those of the critics of the *Rasa* school in one way or the other. To an Indian student whose mind is initially

3 Hotopf : *Language, Thought and Comprehension : A case Study of the Writings of I.A. Richards*, p. 49.

4 Viswanathan : "Dr. Richards and Significs", *Essays in Criticism and Comparative Poetics*, p. 211.

5 Rajasekhara makes four broad divisions of critic, *Arocak* i.e., one who is indifferent to good and bad literature alike, *Satmabhyavahari* i.e., one who is indiscriminate in judgement and is full of praise even for all stuff and nonsense, *Matsari* i.e., one who is actuated by strong prejudices and hence is prone to reject even the masterpieces, and *Tatvabhinivesi* i.e., who is fair and impartial in judgement and has deep insight into the essence or *Tatva* of literature. *Kavya Mimansa*, p. 30.

trained in philosophical thinking, Richards' attempt to reduce literary criticism to science might sound a little unreasonable. But one shall have to make a compromise with his new critical approach keeping in view the recent change in critical climate. But then, the critics of the *Rasa* school also, though they were not born in an age of science, were profound judges of human psychology. The science of *Rasa* gives us sufficient proof that they studied human emotions, impulses, interest, and sentiments in all their subtlety and variety.

The problems which Richards takes up in his critical writings are not quite new. As he himself admits, he puts "novel cards" while playing a "traditional game" and it is his "hand which matters."⁶ His claim to novelty may well be taken seriously by the western readers, where literary criticism began relatively late.⁷ Richards borrowed materials from psychologists like James Ward, William James, C.F. Stout and also from Lipps and the world renowned and Nobel prize winner physiologist Sir Charles Sherrington. He was also influenced by mathematical philosophers like Bertrand Russell and Wittgenstein, linguists like Ferge, and Peirce and critics like Aristotle and Coleridge and wrote on a considerably wider canvas. The critics of *Rasa* school too gave a wide dimension to their critical approaches by borrowing materials from the sciences available to them at their time. They had grammarians and semanticists like Panini, Patanjali, Nagesabhatta, Katyayana and Bharatrhari and the rich treasure of the *Vedas*, *Upanisads* and *Brahmanas* behind them. Thus, in respect of giving a deep, penetrating and extensive treatment to the subject, Richards and the critics of *Rasa* school are without peers.

However, the correspondence between the critical theories of Richards and those of the critics of *Rasa* school does not mean that oriental poetics exercised any influence on Richards, simply because Richards had not read it at all, just as he had studied the semanticists and scientific philosophers and Aristotle and Coleridge. My intention in this study is, therefore, not to show that Richards was influenced by the critics of *Rasa* school, but to

6 Richards : Principles, p. 1

7 Bharata's *Natyasastra*, the earliest extant treatise on dramaturgy was written about 300 A.D. See Kaa : History of Sanskrit Poetics, p. 45.

trace, as far as possible, the similarities and differences between the critical theories of *Rasa* school and those of Richards.

The interpretation of art and literature in terms of *Rasa*, meaning poetic enjoyment through mental palate, has been characteristic of Indian outlook. The difficulty of translating the word *Rasa* into English has all along been felt. As S.K. De urges, "the concept has hardly any analogy in European critical theories."⁸ It is amply clear from the literary criticism of Richards that he approaches literary problems very much in the manner the critics of *Rasa* school do. He brings home the significance of *Bhava*, *Vibhava*, *Sancaribhava* and *Rasa*, though he does not use the particular phrases that are used by Sanskrit critics. His notions of 'stimulus' and 'response' do not basically differ from those of *Vibhava* and *Anubhava* nor are his notions of 'emotion' and 'impulse' quite different from *Bhava*. And when Richards says that the main function of poetry is to create attitude, he, *inter alia*, seems to hint at *Rasa*, the manifestation of which is the primary object of poetry, according to *Rasa* doctrine. Can we then, equate *Bhava* with 'impulse'? Is 'attitude' the same as *Rasa*? can communication be brought under *Sadharanikarana*? No one can either approve of or contradict these equations.

Attitude is, however, not *Rasa*. Richards is grounded in modern psychology which is primarily psycho-physical or sensuous. The "Attitudes", he refers to are determined by motivations in life in relation to others and the satisfaction of these 'Attitudes' in a unique manner is the function of poetry. But Indian aesthetics does not admit either *Bhava* or *Rasa* in any life experience. They are, no doubt, latent in man. But they become aesthetic only when their dross of life-touch is removed by the distancing caused by *Vibhavas* and *Anubhavas* which are technical terms coined to stand for causes and effects of emotions in life. Furthermore, it would appear that Richards' account of 'stimuli', 'emotion', 'interest', 'impulse', 'attitude', etc., is not even half as exhaustive as one given in respect of *Bhava*, *Vibhava*, *Anubhava*, *Sancaribhava*, and *Rasas* by the critics of *Rasa* School.

Richards' definition of impulse as "a process apparently beginning in a stimulus and ending in an act"⁹ readily calls up

⁸ De, S.K. : Some Problems of Sanskrit Poetics, p. 210.

⁹ Richards : Principles, p. 86.

Bhava of Indian *Rasa* theory. But Richards exhibits no interest in classifying impulse into its divisions and subdivisions. The Indian critics, on the contrary, take great pains to point out all the possible divisions of *Bhava*. *Bhava*, according to the Indian theory of *Rasa*, is the raw material of *Rasa*. *Rasa* is not *Bhava*. *Rasa* is the *Asvada* of *Bhava*. *Bhava*, under certain conditions, is transformed into *Rasa*. There are stable states (*sthayi-bhavas*), Transitory states (*sancaribhavas*), Determinants (*vibhava*) and Consequents (*anubhavas*). Several *Sancarins* are pinned up with a *Sthayin*, like ripples of a wave. *Vibhava* is of two kinds : *Alambana* and *Uddipana*. *Alambana* is that object on which *Bhava* hangs. *Uddipana* is the excitant. Richards uses the word 'attitude' for the aesthetic state attained by the interplay of impulses. He defines attitudes as "imaginal and incipient activities or tendencies to action",¹⁰ and states that "it is in terms of attitudes, the reasolution, inter-inanimation, and balancing of impulses ... that all the valuable effects of poetry must be defined."¹¹ His notion of attitude is the nearest approach to the Indian concept of *Rasa*. But while he nowhere show how this attitude is aroused in poetry, the critics of *Rasa* school give an elaborate account of how *Rasa-nispatti* takes place.

Richards observes "As a rule, a statement in poetry arouses attitudes much more wide and general in direction than the references of a statement."¹² The critics of *Rasa* school would say the same thing in a rather different manner. They would say that the primary function of poetry is to provide *Rasa*.

Richards' refutation of the existence of a unique emotion called 'aesthetic emotion' as the differentia¹³, however attractive it might sound, goes directly against traditional Indian thinking. Richards is sceptical as to the existence of aesthetic emotion, while the idea of 'aesthetic emotion' still persists in India. To what extent our quest of beauty remains a permanent impulsive and activity and in what measure our craving for aesthetic experience is satisfied determine the quality of art. Akin to this is the theory of the critics like Oscar Wilde and the painter Whistler who are associated with 'Art for art's sake' school who hold that art

10 Ibid , p. 112.

11 Ibid., p. 113.

12 Richards : Principles, p. 273.

13 Richards : Principles, p. 13.

affords a special kind of pleasure and it has no end save imparting this pleasure. Poetry, which gives this kind of pleasure, is supreme. The Indian *Rasa* doctrine may seem to approximate this pleasure principle of the westerners. The exponents of *Rasa* theory lay down that aesthetic emotion lies dormant in the *Sahridaya* in the form of *Vasana* or *Sanskara* which is prompted and stimulated by *Kavya*. The pleasure which is got from poetry through the process of *Rasa-nispatti* is supermundane (*alaukika*) and incomparable and is on par with *Brahmanada*.¹⁴ Richards shows utmost ingenuity in substantiating that those literary and art critics who believe in 'aesthetic emotion' are in the wrong. He cites the discoveries of modern psychology and neurology in support of his argument. But no amount of argument can uproot the general belief in the special kind of emotion inherent in the reader which enables him to admire and enjoy an artistic creation.

Richards' notion of poetic experience is, however, not as odd as it appears on the surface. He says "if a false theory of the severance and disconnection between aesthetic and ordinary experience has prevented the value of the arts from being understood, it has also preserved their dangers from recognition."¹⁵ And further "the experiences with which criticism is concerned are exceptionally assessable, we have only to open the book, stand before the picture, have the music played, spread out the rug, pour out the wine, and the material upon which the critic works is presently before us."¹⁶ This idea is more strongly put elsewhere. "The world of poetry has in no sense any different reality from the rest of the world and it has no special laws and no other-worldly peculiarities".¹⁷ Richards takes this extreme view because he finds that many aestheticians of established repute, notable among them being Aristotle, Longinus, Plato, Clive Bell, Croce and Bradley-have been clining to the belief that aesthetic experience is something *sui generis* i.e., of its own kind and altogether unique. This impression, according to Richards, is "a legacy from the days of abstract investigation into the Good, the Beautiful and the True."¹⁸ A

¹⁴ Visvanatha : Sahitya Darpana, 3/2.

¹⁵ Richards : Principles, p. 5.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 5.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 78.

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 11-12.



Close scrutiny of Richards' views on the subject will, however, reveal that it would be confusing to take his words literally. To say that the poetic world is just like the rest of the world with no special laws and no other worldly peculiarities is to fall into a serious error because ever since man uttered his emotions in verse, he created a make-believe world the laws of which were entirely different from those of the material world.

While the material world is finite, the poetic world is infinite. The truth of the material world is calculable, whereas that of the poetic world is incalculable. The world of poetry is the world of feeling, emotion and imagination. To some extent, it is a dream world. How far then it is correct to say that the poetic world in essence, does not differ from the rest of the world? The Indian *Rasa* Doctrine gives a clue to solve this problem. It says that poetic experience is fundamentally different from any other experience. It even stretches it to *Brahmananda* to suggest its superior quality. The word *Rasa* stands for that *Alaukika Ananda* which the *Sahrdava* gets from a poetic masterpiece. Impersonality, as a characteristic of aesthetic experience, is emphasised both by Richards and the critics of *Rasa* school. The fallacy involved in the theories, of Richards and the critics of *Rasa* school, is apparent. Richards goes to one extreme by disowning the autonomy of the poetic world, while the Indian critics go to another extreme by disregarding the material for the sake of the spiritual. It is, however, easy to resolve the fallacy. That a great critic and connoisseur of the stature of Richards should deny the independence of poetic world and the absolute supremacy of the poetic truth is inconceivable. The evidence of this is not far to seek. Richards himself admits that "the aesthetic experience may contain no unique constituent, and be of the usual stuff but with a special form."¹⁹ This insistence on 'special form' bridges the chasm between 'usual' and 'unique' and enables us to interpret his theory on poetry on fresh grounds.

Richards considers that the poetic world is made up of usual stuff but with a 'special form'. This means that he is inclined to harmonize the two kindred points of heaven and home. Poetic world is accessible and yet it has certain uncommon features. Richards says that "the bulk of poetry consists of statements which only the very foolish would think of attempting to verify."²⁰

19 Richards : Principles, p. 272.

He believes in "the concrete experiences which are poems."²¹ But, at the same time, he argues: 'The experiences which the arts offer are not obtainable, or but rarely, elsewhere ... They are not incomplete; they might better be described as ordinary experiences completed.'²² This view of poetry has affinity with that of the theorists of *Rasa* school. The critics of *Rasa* school hold that *Rasananda* is on a par with *Brahamanda* and its experience is *Akhandā*, *Svaprasāsa* and *Cinmaya* and is possible only when *Sttva Guna* prevails²³ and, on the other, they state that aesthetic experience is within the reach of the *Sahrdaya*.

The exponents of use words like *Rasana*, *Carvana*, *Asvadana*, etc.,²⁴ to denote the experience of *Rasa* which goes a long way to prove that, according to them, aesthetic experience is concrete and is to be had through the channels of sense organs. The recurrent use of the word *Lokottara* or *Alokaśamānya*²⁵ simply suggests that this experience is 'Universal'. The word usually used for 'poetic excellence' is *carutva*²⁶, and for 'aesthetic experience' is *Ramanīyat*.²⁷ It is also called *Ahlada*²⁸ and *Camatkara*.²⁹ The *Taittiriya Upaniṣad* carries the meaning of *Rasa* to the realm of spiritualism and equate it with divine bliss or beatitude - *Raso Valsah*.³⁰ But it has to be noted that the eyes of the critics of *Rasa* school have always been fixed on the practical application of *Rasa*. Visvanatha tells us frankly that the *avastha* of mind at the time of *Rasa-svada* is both *Yukta* and *Viyukta*.³¹ Bharata, the earliest propounder of *Rasa* doctrine, says that as a meal is made delicious by the assimilation of various spices, so variegated *Bhavas* assemble and mixup to bring home the *Abhinaya* performed on the stage.³²

20 Ibid., p. 272.

21 Ibid., p.79.

22 Ibid., p. 233.

23 Visvanatha : *Sahitya Darpana*, 3/2.

24 Abhinavagupta : *Dhvanyaloka Locana*, p. 40, 164. Abhinava Bharati, p. 290, 292. Mammata : *Kavya Prakasa*, p. 111.

25 Mahimbhatta : *Vyakti-Viveka*, p. 71. Jagannatha : *Rasa Gangadhara* p. 11.

26 Anandavardhana : *Dhvanyaloka*, 1/13 vrtti.

27 Jagannatha : *Rasa Gangadhara*, p. 10.

28 Ibid., p. 11. Also see Kuntaka : *Vakrokti Jivita*, 1/2 vrtti.

29 Visvantha : *Sahitya Darpana*, 3/3 vrtti; Mammata : *Kavya Prakasa*, p. 109; Kuntaka : *Vakrokti-Jivita*, 1/2 vrtti; Abhinavagupta : *Abhinava Bharati*, p. 2/7.

30 Taittiriya Upaniṣad, 2/7.

31 Visvanatha : *Sahitya Darpana*, 3/24-25.

Abhinavagupta tells us that the word *Rasa* implies that it is to be relished through *Rasendriya*.³³ Sanskrit critics, like Indian philosophers, had unflinching faith in the real experiences of life and they wilfully shirked inculcating any moral which might take away man from the real world. Richards' object, like that of Abhinavagupta, is to demonstrate that poetry is a concrete experience and is a medium to give pleasure to the readers.

As regards the nature of poetic experience, Richards says that it is "more than usually organised through his (poet's) more than usual vigilance."³⁴ The difference between an ordinary man and an artist is that while the ordinary man is under the necessity, on most occasions, of suppressing the greater part of the impulses which the situation might arouse because he is incapable of organising them and, therefore, they have to be left out, in the same situation the artist is able to admit far more without confusion.³⁵ The poet is not content only with what he feels or experiences. He likes to communicate his feelings and emotions to the sympathetic and responsive reader. Communication of poetic experience, therefore, has always remained a question of great concern for the critics through the ages both in the West and in the East. Richards has many useful things to say with regard to communication. First, perfection of art and not communication should be the object of the artist. Second, communicative efficacy is inherent in the perfection of art. So even though the artist apparently shifts his attention from communication to perfection of the work undertaken by him, he is unconsciously concerned with communication. For successful communication, the poet as well as the recipient must have certain specific qualities.

Richards says: "The use of past similarities in experience and the control of these elements through the dependence of their effects upon one another, make up the speaker's, the effective communicator's gift."³⁶ And "Discrimination, suggestibility, free and clear resuscitation of elements of past experience disentangled from one another, and control of irrelevant personal details and accidents, make up the recipient's gift."³⁷ While

32 Bharata : *Nāṭyaśāstra*, 6/36.

33 Abhinavagupta : *Abhinava Bharati*, p. 261.

34 Richards : *Principles*, p. 184.

35 *Ibid.*

36 *Ibid.*, p. 180

bringing out some general conditions of communication, Richards gives prerogative to "courage or audacity, enterprise, goodwill, absence of undue pride or conceit, honesty, humaneness, humility in its finest sense, humour, tolerance, good health and the Confucian characteristics of the 'superior man'.³⁸ what necessitates communication is a phenomena of common experience.

The speaker's and the recipient's experience, under certain conditions, may be identical. Where this is lacking, communication is impossible. "Unless A has remarkable gifts of description and B extraordinary sensitive and discriminating receptive ability, their two experiences will tally at best but roughly."³⁹ Richards gives due importance to communicability. It is for this reason that the theory of communication has great importance in considering his critical theory is general since it shows him developing his attitude towards the relationship between the writer and the reader. These ideas of Richards have close resemblance with the theories put forward by the critics of *Rasa* school. In *Rasa* doctrine, we get a thorough account of the poet and the *Sahrdaya* and the process of *Sadharanikarana*. The only word which is nearest in approach to Richards' communication in *Rasa* doctrine is *Sadharanikarana*. The word *Sampresana* or *Presaniyata* so frequently used in contemporary Hindi literary criticism now-a-days is an attempt to translate the English word communication into a workable Indian Language. The word *Sadharankiarana* has the overtone of something philosophical and hence is something more than communication, which suggests a mechanical process. Again, *Sadharanikarana* deals with the emotional distancing of the potential reader or *Sahrdaya* at the time he becomes *Rasardra* whereas communication leans heavily towards the poet and tells everything about the criteria to be adopted by the poet for a good and successful communication.

Since communication is a reciprocal process involving both the poet and the reader or the recipient, Richards and the theorists of *Rasa* school, in spite of their insistence on the one side, could not altogether ignore the other side. That to suppose

37 Richards : Principles, p. 180.

38 Richards : Principles., p. 180.

39 Ibid., p. 178.

that the critics of *Rasa* school whose critical acumen was superb and discerning capacity at its apex, could be unaware of the communicative process of art, would be a gross misrepresentation of fact. They put the something the other way round in their discussion of *Sadharanikarana* and also said something which is not contained in Richards or any other western critic. This commendation of Indian aesthetics will not appear to be an exaggeration of what is contained in it. The *Subhasita*, Kaviḥ Karoti Kavyaṁ, Svadam Jananti Paṇḍitah, *Sundarya Apī Lavanyam Patir Janati no pita*, well reflects upon the equipment of the *Sahrdaya*. Bharata states that the sentiment of the dramatist permeates the heart of the fit spectator in the same manner in which fire inflames a dry piece of wood.⁴⁰

While describing the pre-requisites of *Sadharani Karana* and the merits of a *Sahrdaya*, Abhinavagupta writes that a true *Sahrdaya* is he whose heart has been enlarged due to constant *Kavyanusilana* and whose mirror of mind has been cleansed of all impurities. This entitles him to receive the emotions of the poet and become fully *Tanmaya* in the poet's created world. *Sadharanikarana* is a sort of whispering of two *Hrdayas*, the poet's and the reader's.⁴¹ Anandavardhana lays emphasis on the *Kavyarthatattajna* who alone can understand the meaning of poetry. This privilege cannot be enjoyed by a person who is content with only the literal meaning of poetry.⁴² The word which is used for a cultured reader is *Sahrdaya*.⁴³ *Sahrdaya* is always a *Rasajna*. He is differentiated from an ordinary reader by reason of his superior endowment. There is a *Śloka* written by some anonymous poet which states that the poet is prepared to face all calamities destined to him by Brahma but he would not like that God Brahma should write in his fate that he should recite poem before a *Arasika* (*arasikesu Kavitva nivednam, sirasi ma likha, ma likha, ma likha*). Richards uses word like *fit reader*⁴⁴, *suitable reader*⁴⁵, *competent reader*⁴⁶ and *quick and discerning reader*⁴⁷

40 Bharata : *Natyasastra*, 7/7.

41 Abhinavagupta : *Dhvanyaloka Locana*, p. 40.

42 Anandavardhana : *Dhvanyaloka*, 1/7.

43 Abhinavagupta : *Dhvanyaloka Locana*, p. 1, p. 40.

44 Anandavardhana : *Dhvanyaloka*, 3/47. vrtti.

45 Ibid., p. 31.

46 Richards : *Science and Poetry*, p. 51.

47 Richards : *Practical Criticism*, p. 319.

for *Sahrdaya*. Richards says "those who have naturally a fine imagination and discrimination, who have a developed sensibility to the values of life, do seem to find the password to poetry with great ease".⁴⁸ Leavis used the word 'complete reader' and 'ideal reader'⁴⁹ for *Sahrdaya*. The concept of *Sahdaranikarana* has something which is typically Indian and it is impossible to find its exact parallel in western literary criticism. It is different from and more than Eliot's 'escape from personality' or Keats' 'negative capability' which refer to the reader's 'dispassion' or 'detachment' while reading and appreciating literature. Again, Eliot does not deny the role of personality. He rather assigns to it a heavier task, the task to play a vital role of a catalyst. *Sadharanikarana* meaning transpersonalisation is a psychological process. Bhattanayaka suggests three different stages of *Rasa-nispatti*-*Abhidhavyapara*, *Bhavakatva Vyapara* and *Bhoga* or *Caravna Vyapara*. At the first stage, the reader simply becomes aware of the literal meaning of the expression. This function is applicable to scientific discourse (*sastra*) alone. The matter-of-fact aspect of the meaning is exposed to the reader. At the second stage, he ponders over the meaning and tries to understand its inner content. By this function, the *Vibhavas*, such as *Perdita* or *Rosalind*, are stripped of their individual character traits. At the third stage i.e., *Bhoga*, the reader gets inspired and the intended meaning thrills him and he gets undiluted pleasure, which is universal. Bhattanayaka postulates that it happens because of *Sattvotreka* which is the result of *Bhavakatva Vyapara*. When the two *Gunas* - *Rajas* and *Tamas* are purged of, *Sattvaguna* comes to dominate the heart of the reader where he is in a position to see the reality face-to-face. As applied to poetry, he appreciates the verbal nuance which alone can be amusing and exhilarating. The emergence of *Sattva* helps him in getting fully absorbed in the subject and at this stage the *Bhava* of the poet becomes *Sadharanikrta* or becomes easily accessible. He holds that *Rasa* is neither a matter of inference (*anumana*) nor of manifestation (*abhivyakti*) but of experience (*bhoga*). Visvanatha tells us that *Rasa* is *Lokottara Camatkara Pratiti*.⁵⁰ It is now clear that it is useless to go to Richards' literary criticism for an equivalent of Bhattanayaka's or Visvanatha's concepts of poetry.

48 Ibid.

49 Leavis, F.R. : *The Common Pursuit*, p. 212.

50 Visvanatha : *Sahitya Darpana*, 3/3.

Again, the very argument whether we can find anything like *Rasanispatti* in Richards' literary criticism is misplaced. It is something like demanding 'catharsis' from Indian poetics or *Rasa* from Greek poetics. The problem is not whether we can get western equivalents of Indian critical concepts but whether it is possible to relate any part of Indian critical theory to western critical theory. If this position is accepted, the Indian theory of *Sadharanikarana* has much to do with Richards' theory of communication.

Another ruling conception of our age is the belief that literature can be identified by its language, by the way language is used in literature, as opposed to non-literary discourses. A special sanctity or individuality is attached to the language poets use. A more rational approach to poetic language might be one that is based on semantics. Poet's language is to be distinguished from ordinary language by virtue of its secondary signification. It contains many meanings or levels of meaning - a primary or stated meaning and an unstated or implicit meaning; it contains double entendre, Metaphor, ironic suggestion and ambiguity - "secondary and tertiary co-implication"- in Richards words.

Of all the poetic theories of Richards, one which is reminiscent of the Indian theory of *Dhvani* - is his theory of poetic meaning. A large part of Richards' criticism is devoted to the study of how words behave in poetry. His basic dichotomy of language into scientific and emotive, the former standing for the sake or reference, true or false, in the scientific sense, and the latter for the sake of the attitudes and emotions which ensue,⁵¹ as developed in *Principles*, his distinction between the symbolic use of words and emotive use of words, the former standing for the recording, the support, the organization and the communication of the references and the latter for the expression of excitement of the feeling and attitudes⁵² as made in *Meaning*, his distinction between scientific statement and pseudo-statement, the former indicating verifiable laboratory truth and the latter indicating emotional truth primarily acceptable by some attitude⁵³ as made in *Science and Poetry*, his theory of

51 Richards : *Principles*, p. 267.

52 Richards : *Meaning*, p. 149.

53 Richards : *Science and Poetry*, p. 62.

Interanimation of words⁵⁴ implying that the meaning of word is determined with respect to the other words that come before and after it and his notion of "Ramifications and reverberations of effects due to our simultaneous and successive apprehension"⁵⁵, as developed in *Coleridge on Imagination* may be easily related to the Indian concept of *Dhvani*.

To take concrete examples: "Momentum is the joint effect of mass and velocity" or "mass is convertible into energy" are scientific statements having referential use of language. But "My heart leaps up when I behold a rainbow in the sky" or "My love is like a red red rose" are pseudo-statements having emotive use of language. They are 'pseudo' in the sense that they seem to be but are really not and that their final purpose is not that of reporting how things link up with one another but of suggesting an emotional truth. They are what may be called *Vacaka* and *Vyanjaka* in *Rasa* doctrine - the former to be used in *Sastra* and the latter in *Kavya*.

Richards holds that poetry has nothing to do with belief. In the appendix section of *Principles*, Richards says that one can enjoy Eliot's poetry without believing in what he says or without accepting his ideas. This seems to be a perverse theory since it is difficult to enjoy a piece of literature until one believes in the ideas expressed in it. Once it is established that a piece of literature is enjoyed, it is a logical next step to accept that it also contains ideas that are communicable.

Richards defines poetry much in the manner of the exponents of *Rasa* theory. The credit to apply the theory of *Rasa* to poetic meaning goes to Anandavardhana who worked out a systematic theory of *Dhvani* meaning the suggestion, hint, inkling and adumbration made by the poet through words. The theory of *Dhvani* is, in fact, an extension of the theory of *Rasa*. Earlier in the *Rg Veda*, it was said, "when men of wisdom create by their intellect verse after winnowing words as barley grains are shifted by means of winnowing basket, then men of equal knowledge understand meaning; in their verses blessed glory is enshrined."⁵⁶ A dichotomy is here made between ordinary speech and poetic speech and it is pointed out that the poet's skill lies in the deft selection of words. Anandavardhana tells the

54 Richards : *Rhetoric*, p. 47.

55 Richards : *Coleridge on Imagination*, p. 89.

56 *Rg Veda*, 10/71/2.

same truth in a slightly different manner. His theory of *Dhvani* came to be interpreted and commented upon by Abhinavagupta who distinguished himself in philosophical thinking, literary erudition and critical acumen and thus the theory of *Dhvani* received universal recognition. Critics of this school who came later, like Mammata, Visvanatha and Jagannatha, gave their whole hearted support to this theory of poetic meaning. Even those critics, who broke away from this view acknowledged this important function of language though, in their passion to show originality, replaced the word *Dhvani* by words like *Vakrokti*, *Aucitya* and *Anumana*. The word *Vakrokti* was used by Kuntaka, while the words *Aucitya* and *Anumana* were used by Ksemendra and Mahimabhatta respectively.

Anandavardhana makes three broad divisions of Sabda-sakti i.e., *Abhidha*, *Laksana* and *Vyanjana*. *Abhidha* is the literal sense which well suits scientific truth. *Laksana* is the transferred sense. *Vyanjana* is the suggested sense. "These three types of poetry", as S.K. De says, "are then elaborated and classified with somewhat minute and subtle ingenuity."⁵⁷ 'This is a pen' is an example of *Abhidha* because this statement tells us nothing more than the bare information about the existence of a pen. "He is an ass" is an example of *Laksana* because the word 'ass' is used here not in its literal sense but in its metaphorical sense to denote dullness, laziness and stupidity. 'The sun is set' (*gato smarkeh*) is a stock example of *Vyanjana* because this statement brings forth manifold reactions in different minds according to one's occupations, mental make-up and individual situation. To a school boy, it may mean that the time of final dispersing of the classes is up and he must now prepare to go home. To a roadside shop keeper, it may mean that he should now windup his shop. To a prostitute, it may mean differently and she would think that her business hours are now ripe. To a thief, it may suggest his own opportune time. This is a crude example of *Vyanjana*. Its finer and shbtler forms may be found in poetry where word suggests myriad meanings and the sympathetic reader takes them according to his *Sanskara*. *Siksa* and *Prakarana*. The tone of the speaker, and the physical gesture may help the recipient to understand and appreciate his utterance in its right spirit. This is why in *Rasa* doctrine, much weight has been given to *Kaku* and *Vaktri-bodhavya*.⁵⁸ The Indian critics spare no pains to study the

manifold powers of word as a result of which a bewildering variety of critical concepts attached to poetic meaning has emerged.

As compared with this subtle, deep and careful study of poetic meaning, Richards's theory of poetic meaning might appear quite a pigmy. His concepts of 'emotive meaning', 'symbolic use of words', 'emotive use of words', 'pseudo-statement', 'ambiguity', 'metaphor', 'context', 'interanimation of words', etc., might appear to some extent a reiteration of age-old Indian critical theories.

Richards, in his different critical treatises, ranging from *The Foundation of Aesthetics* to *Speculative Instruments*, preoccupies himself with solving the problem: what are the ingredients of language that make it fit for poetic expression which is primarily concerned with communication of feelings, emotions and attitudes of the poet? In *Practical Criticism*, he mentions four types of meaning i.e., Sense, Feeling, Tone, and Intention. Sense is the plain meaning of the word which has nothing to do with the speaker's emotion. Feeling shows the speaker's special direction, bias or accentuation of interest towards the state of affairs. It cannot be profitably applied in solving mathematical solutions. Tone is the speaker's attitude to his listener. In Richards's words: "many of the secrets of style could... be shown to be matters of tone, of the perfect recognition of the writer's relation to the reader in view of what is being said and their joint feeling about it."⁵⁹ Tone is not independent of the other kinds of meaning.⁶⁰ Schiller points out that 'sense', 'feeling' and 'tone' are nothing more than new names for the strictly 'symbolic use', 'the expression of attitude' toward the audience of the *Meaning of*. The "expression of intention", however, is broadened in *Practical Criticism* to include unconscious as well as conscious aims or efforts.⁶¹ The three functions of words are finally crystallised into Intention which indicates the speaker's purpose.⁶²

It would seem that Richards's concepts of Tone and Intention have amazing similarity with the theory of *Dhvanyartha* or

58 Mammata : *Kavya Prakasa*, 2/20.

59 Richards : *Practical Criticism*, p. 207.

60 Ibid , p. 209.

61 Schiller : I.A. Richards' *Theory of Literature*, p. 51.

62 Richards : *Practical Criticism*, pp. 181-88.

Vyangyārtha as propounded by the critics of *Rasa* School. Richards's four-fold division of meaning gives us a cut and dried theory of meaning which has its obvious limitations. Feeling and Tone overlap and so do Tone and Intention. For example, Tone must involve feeling because Tone defines the inmost feeling of the speaker. Again, feeling may get manifested both in Tone and Intention. Intention, which embodies the speaker's purpose, has its genesis in the speaker's feelings. It is, therefore, fitting not to take them as separate functions of word. Richards urges that "Very much apparent statements turn out on examination to be only these disguised forms, indirect expressions, of Feeling Tone and Intention."⁶³

Richards sets himself to find out the reasons behind all the linguistic tricks which constitute great poetry. He lays emphasis on 'Intention' and says that the "understanding of it is a part of the whole business of apprehending his (poet's) meaning."⁶⁴ It is the 'Intention' of the speaker the understanding of which should be the cherished goal of the reader. In the opinion of Richards, the 'Intention' of the speaker "operates through and satisfies itself in combination of the other functions."⁶⁵ Elsewhere also, Richards says that the superstructure of emotive meaning is laid on the foundation of literal meaning and it is a mistake to look upon these two functions of language as diametrically opposed ones and separate from and independent of each other. In *Meaning*, Richards holds that "the two functions under consideration usually occur together but none the less they are in principle distinct."⁶⁶ or more explicitly the "subtle interweaving of the two functions is the main reason why recognition of their difference is not universal."⁶⁷ While Richards' concepts of 'Feeling', 'Tone' and 'Intention' may seem to remind us of *Dhvani* or *Vyanjana Vrttis* of *Rasa* doctrine,⁶⁸ it is easy to link Richards's notion of the interrelation of literal meaning and emotive meaning with Anandavardhana's views on this point. Anandavardhana says that as a man wishing to get light must

63 Ibid., p. 188.

64 Ibid., p. 182.

65 Ibid.

66 Ogden and Richards : *Meaning*, p. 150.

67 Ibid.

68 Both Keith and De translated *Dhvani* as 'tone'. See Keith's *A History of Sanskrit Literature*, p. 388 and De's *History of Sanskrit Poetics*, p. 143.

cautiously take care of the candle, so a reader ambitious of *Dhvanyartha* must not neglect *Vacyartha* which is its basis.⁶⁹ Visvanatha brands *Vyanjana* as a startling type of *Abhidha* i.e., *Vicitrabhidha*.⁷⁰ Mukulabhatta calls *Abhidha* the basic power i.e., *Prathama Sakti*.⁷¹ Kuntaka too takes *Vakrokti* as a kind of *Vicitra Abhidha*.⁷²

In the Indian theory of *Rasa*, a detailed and minute study of meaning, both from semantic and philosophical standpoints, has been made. There is a surprising unanimity of opinion among the critics of *Rasa* school on the point that it is only the suggested meaning which should be regarded as the essence of poetry. Bharata had already given a hint at this truth when he said : "Without the touch of *Rasa* no meaning can be effective and efficacious."⁷³ When he said so, he definitely aimed at the effect of dramatic performance on the audience. Later, those critics who extended his theory of *Rasa* to poetry and other forms of literature discussed the problem of poetic meaning in detail. Taking a cue from Bharata, Anandavardhana says that the only meaning which touches the secretmost chord of the reader's heart and gives him imaginative pleasure is *Dhvani*. Anandavardhana uses the word *Pratiyamana Artha*⁷⁴ for *Dhvani* which suggests the emotional meaning aimed at by the poet. In a highly elegant language, Anandavardhana says that *Pratiyamana Artha* glows apart from the beauty inherent in the different parts of poetry much in the same manner in which the grace or *Lavanya* of a beautiful damsel is something more than the beauty of her different limbs.⁷⁵ Richards also says: "the form or construction or development of a work may frequently have a significance i.e., not reducible to any combination of our other three functions (i.e., sense, feeling and tone). This significance is then the author's intention."⁷⁶ It brings out the universal truth that the beauty of poetry is something more than and superior to the beauty manifested in its words, figures, sound-effect, rhythm and

69 Anandavardhana : *Dhvanyaloka*, 1/9.

70 Visvanatha : *Sahitya Darpana*, 2/3.

71 Rajanaka Mukul : *Abhidhavyatnamatrkā*, 1/1.

72 Kuntaka : *Vakrokti-Jvita*, 1/10 vrtti.

73 Bharata : *Natyasastra*, 6/31.

74 Anandavardhana : *Dhvanyaloka*, 1/4.

75 Ibid.

76 Richards : *Practical Criticism*, p. 356.

metre, cadence, imagery and symbol. Mammata says that *Rasa* cannot be treated as *Vacya* even in dream.⁷⁷ The critics of *Rasa* school agree on the point that *Rasa* is invariably *Vyangva*. Here, as in Richards criticism, a question has been considered as to who is worthy of appreciating this *Pratiyamana Artha*. Anandavardhana says that such a man must be a *sura*,⁷⁸ an adept in the art of appreciating poetry. *Pratiyamana Artha* is appreciated only by a *Kavyartha Tattvajna*.⁷⁹ For this, profound knowledge of aesthetics is necessary apart from literary sensibility. This is why Anandavardhana dubs the *Vaiyakarnas*, a word used for aestheticians rather than for the dry grammarians, as the first in the row among the scholars.⁸⁰ Mammata says that poetry which is devoid of *Vyangyārtha* is nothing more than word-pictures and may be relegated to the lowest rank (*avara-kavya*).⁸¹ To this *Pratiyamana Artha*, Jagannatha assigns a different name i.e., *Ramānīyārtha*.⁸² In the words of Mammata this *Rmānīyārtha* sparkles like the veiled breasts of a woman.⁸³ Abhinavagupta says that *Dhavanī* is the source of poetic splendour i.e., *Caruta*.⁸⁴ Kuntaka's *Bhangibhaniti*,⁸⁵ or *Bhaniti-vaicitrya*⁸⁶ are simply the other names of *Pratiyamana Artha* treated from different angles. Though Anandavardhana gave the final authoritative shape to the *Dhvanī* theory,⁸⁷ the concept of *Dhvanī* goes far back to the palmy days of India. In the *Rgveda*, it is held that language completely undresses itself before a poet much in the same manner in which a beautiful lady keeps no part of her body concealed from her husband.⁸⁸ The

77 Mammata : *Kavya Prakasa*, 5/47 vrtti.

78 Anandavardhana : *Dhvanyaloka*, 1/1.

79 Ibid., 1/7

80 Ibid.

81 Mammata : *Kavya Prakasa*, 1/5.

82 Jagannatha : *Rasa Gangadhara*, p. 10.

83 Mammata : *Kavya Prakasa*, 5/45-46 vrttis.

84 Abhinavagupta : *Dhvanyaloka Locana*, p. 104

85 Kuntaka : *Vakrokti-Jivita*, 1/10.

86 Ibid.

87 De, S.K. : *History of Sanskrit Poetic*, p. 109.

88 *Rg Veda*, 10/71/4. In the *RgVeda* the simile applied to denote the worth of *Vayakarana*. See patanjali's *Mahabhasya* (Chowkhamba, Varanasi, 1954), p. 27. S. Kuppuswami Sastri extends its application to denote the worth of the poet also. See *Highways and Byways of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit* (Madras, 1945), p. 9.

concept of *Dhvani*, it is some times suggested, is derived from the Grammarian's notion of *Sphota* which in the words of Keith, is a "mysterious entity, a sort of hypostatization of sound, of which action sounds were manifestations, and the same idea of the revelation of something inherent (*vyanjana*) is found in the *Vedanta*, where all is a manifestation of the underlying reality, the *Brahman* or absolute."⁸⁹ This concept of *Sphota* and the attempt to associate *Dhvani* with it lands us on a difficult ground. The process of *Dhvani* can, however, be more conveniently understood by drawing an analogy from physics. When a metal pot is struck, its sound vibration travels farther and farther until it becomes completely inaudible. Silence becomes the climax of sound. Similar is the case with *Dhvanyartha*. *Dhvani* which suggests the purpose (*prayojana*) of the speaker, is not appreciated all on a sudden with the utterance of the word. It first gives us denotative meaning. Then on constant musing, the reader finds that its subtlest meaning unfolds itself petal by petal and with the appraisal of every remote and subtle suggested meaning, the reader gets pleasure. At the final stage, *Dhvani* is transformed into *Rasa*. It is as though the unheard melodies become sweeter than the heard.

Numerous statements are scattered over Richards's literary criticism that go a long way to prove that Richards has firm faith in the suggestive function of language. In *Principles*, he observes : "A single word by itself, let us say 'night', will raise almost as many different thoughts and feelings as there are persons who hear it."⁹⁰ "It is evident that the bulk of poetry consists of statements which only the very foolish would think of attempting to verify."⁹¹ "But even when they are on examination frankly false, this is no defect."⁹² "As a rule, a statement in poetry arouses attitude much more wide and general in direction than the references of the statement."⁹³ In *Practical Criticism*, he states: "Parallel to, and not unconnected with, these difficulties (difficulties of making out plain meaning) of interpreting the meaning, are the difficulties of *sensuous apprehension*."⁹⁴ The

89 Keith : A History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 367.

90 Richards : Principles, pp. 9-10.

91 Ibid., p. 272.

92 Ibid.

93 Ibid., p. 273.

94 Richards : Practical Criticism, p. 14.

speaker has ordinarily an *attitude* to his *listener*."⁹⁵ There "is the speaker's intention, his aim, conscious or unconscious, the effect he is endeavouring to produce."⁹⁶ "It will be enough here to note that the subjugation of statement to emotive purposes has innumerable modes. A poet may distort his statements; he may make statements which have basically nothing to do with the subject under treatment; he may, by metaphor and otherwise, present objects for thought which are logically quite irrelevant; he may perpetrate logical nonsense, be as trivial or as silly, logically, as it is possible to be; all in the interests of the other functions of his language to express feeling or adjust tone or further his other intentions."⁹⁷ A "good poet-to express feeling to adjust tone and to further his aims-may play all manner of tricks with his sense. He may dissolve its coherence altogether, if he sees fit."⁹⁸ "Words are chameleon-like in their feeling, governed in an irregular fashion by their surroundings."⁹⁹ "No word carries a fixed feeling quite irrespective of its context."¹⁰⁰ "Poetry translates into its special sensory language a great deal that is given in the ordinary daily intercourse between minds by gesture, tones of voice, and expression, and a reader who is very quick and discerning in these matters may fail for purely technical reasons to apprehend the very same things when they are given in verse."¹⁰¹ Subtleties of tone are rarely appreciated without some special training.¹⁰² "Doubtless to some degree poetry, like the other arts, is a secret discipline to which some initiation is needed. Some readers are excluded from it simply because they have never discovered and have never been taught how to enter."¹⁰³ "The poet makes a statement about something not in order that the statement may be examined and reflected upon, but in order to evoke certain feelings, and when these are evoked the use of the statement is exhausted. It is idle and irrelevant to consider the statement further."¹⁰⁴ "Where conjecture or the

95 Ibid., p. 182.

96 Ibid.

97 Richards : *Practical Criticism*, pp. 187-88.

98 Richards : *Practical criticism*, p. 190.

99 Ibid., p. 213.

100 Ibid., p. 212.

101 Ibid., p. 319.

102 Ibid., p. 328.

103 Ibid., p. 319.

weight of what is left unsaid, is the writer's weapon, it seems unnatural to bring this under the heading of 'sense' (or statement) ...And we have admitted this, it is no long step to admitting that the form or construction or development of a work may frequently have a significance that is not reducible to any combination of our other three functions. This function is then the author's intention."¹⁰⁵ In *Science and Poetry*, he observes, "It is never what a poem says which matters, but what it is. The experience itself the tide of impulses sweeping through the mind, is the source and the sanction of the words."¹⁰⁶ In *Meaning*, the same idea is reiterated in different words; "Most writers or speakers will agree from their own experience that, on some occasions their speech proceeds slowly, heavily and importantly, because, while they are word-dependent, the necessary words without which nothing whatever would happen occur slowly and have to be waited for, whereas on other occasions the words are emitted in the same fashion because, being word free for the moment, they are choosing the symbolism most suited to the reference and the occasion, with a view to some finality of statement".¹⁰⁷ "Truth or falsity matters not at all to the acceptance."¹⁰⁸ All that these critical pronouncements add upto is that poetry needs to be interpreted in terms of its suggestive meaning to which its fundamental meaning must be subordinated.

Richards derives his critical theory from the framework of a system based on behaviourist psychology. He demands a strict study of cause and effect in human action, and wishes to eliminate the word 'chance' from the critical vocabulary.

His psychological theory of meaning heralded a new approach to the field of semantics. As to the relationship of semantics and poetics, they are interrelated in Richards' scheme. His notion that word is no more than a sign or symbol and that there is no necessary connection between the reference and the referent i.e., the word and the object are thoughts which are sense-provoking. His account of meaning given in *Coleridge*

104 Richards : *Practical Criticism*, p. 354.

105 *Ibid.*, p. 358.

106 Richards : *Science and Poetry*, p. 31.

107 Ogden & Richards : *Meaning*, pp. 217-18.

108 Ogden & Richards : *Meaning*, p.150.

on *Imagination* that "A meaning is what we are talking about, never the signs. What we say about the poem is true (if it is) only about the meaning"¹⁰⁹ is quite in consonance with the ideals of Indian grammarians. Patanjali says: "Yadva sarve sabdah svenarthena bhavanti vatesamarth"¹¹⁰ i.e., the meaning of a word is that which is intended by the user. That the argument that word has no necessary connection with object or signification, except through thought as advanced by Richards in *Meaning* is analogous to the Indian theory of meaning. In Indian semantics, *Buddhi* or *Mana* is considered to mediate between *sabda* and *Padartha*. "It must be admitted", observes Bhupendra Bhattacharya, "that a particular word has some sort of relation with the particular idea signified by it."¹¹¹ Semantics has always helped poetics in India. In *Rhetoric*, Richards observes "It is enough for our purpose that what a word means is the missing parts of the contexts from which it draws its delegated efficacy."¹¹² This 'missing part' is nothing but *Dhvanyartha*. These and numerous such other passages abound Richards' literary criticism which testify that Richards works out a theory of poetic meaning very much on the lines of the critics of *Rasa* school. There are places in Richards' criticism where emotive and multiple meanings of poetic expression and its untranslatability have been emphasised. Paul Valery's concept of poetic language is not basically different from that of Richards. According to Paul Valery, in poetry the synthesis between phonetic and semantic components is finally of a different order from the kind ordinarily accomplished in acts of speech. Language is not simply a system of sounds but a system of signs. But in poetry these signs no longer function simply in a process of signification but rather in a process of formation in which phonetic and semantic components, sound and sense, possess equal value and, so to speak, become mutually symbolic.¹¹³ In Richards view sound and sign are indivisible and hence sound cannot be regarded as

109 Richards : *Coleridge on Imagination*, p. 107.

110 Patanjali : *Mahabhasya*, 5/1/119.

111 Bhattacharya, Bhupendra : *A Study in Language and Meaning : A Critical examination of some aspects of Indian Semantics* (Cal. 1962), p. 40.

112 Richards : *Rhetoric*, p. 35.

113 Browns, Gerald L. : *Modern Poetry and the Idea of Language* (Yale, 1975), p. 80.

different from word. The Indian view is that sound and sense form one complete whole. Sense cannot be appreciated except in relation to its sound.

Let us now consider what the critics of *Rasa* school have to say about the function of poetic language. Mammata says : "As the arrow goes on piercing with its pace-momentum, so the meaning of a word goes on entering the deeper recesses of our mind."¹¹⁴ Visvanatha observes : "only the utterance which is enlivened with *Rasa* can be called poetry."¹¹⁵ Anandavardhana says : "The soul of poetry is *Dhvani*."¹¹⁶ *Dhvani* is the crown and capital of poetry. "Even the familiar meaning, when touched with *Rasa*, glows out with radiance in the same manner in which the plants bud forth new leaves with the advent of spring."¹¹⁷ "Subtle excellence of meaning depends upon the display of *Rasa*."¹¹⁸ Jagannatha says : "The words which give out absorbing and thrilling meaning constitute poetry."¹¹⁹ Abhinavagupta says : "*Dhvani* is the real and all-pervading meaning."¹²⁰ "The *Kavyartha* which appropriately brings out the intended meaning of poetry is *Rasa*."¹²¹ Kuntaka says : "Real poetry affords us pleasure something like that of a song in which words do not count."¹²² In the domain of *Dhvani*, even a 'no' may mean 'yes' as in the case of the utterance of a passionate beloved. The *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* are among the truest epics that have ever been written. Agamemnon, Achilles, Antigone, Othello, Yaksha and Aladdin may be unsubstantial creations. But they are more real than living men. In the realm of poetry, nothing is absurd or false. The more subtle may be revealed only through a complicated process. *Rasa Dhvani* is said to be one of imperceptible process (*asamlakshyakrama*). But in other types of *Dhvani*, the sequence existing between the understanding of the expressed meaning and the comprehension of the unexpressed one is clearly perceptible (*samlakshyakrama*). Anandavardhana divides poetry

114 Mammata : *Kavya Prakasa*, 5/47 vrtti.

115 Visvanatha : *Sahitya Darpana*, 1/2.

116 Anandavardhana : *Dhvanyaloka*, 1/1.

117 Ibid., 4/4.

118 Ibid., 1/5 vrtti.

119 Jagannatha : *Rasa Gangadhara*, p. 10.

120 Abhinavagupta : *Dhvanyaloka Locana*, p. 119.

121 Abhinavagupta : *Abhinava Bharati*, p. 278.

122 Kuntaka : *Vakrokti-Jivita*, 1/37.

into three classes—*Dhvani Kavya*,¹²³ *Gunibhuta Vyangya*¹²⁴ and *Citrakavya*.¹²⁵ Of the three, the first is of the best variety and the last is actually no poetry but only portraits in words. In *Dhvani Kavya* are included all *Alankaras* of word and sense.

Our sense of surprise is enhanced when we come across passages in Richards' criticism which bear clear echoes of certain divisions of *Vyanjana*. In *Practical Criticism* Richards states, "In most poetry the sense is as important as anything else; it is quite as subtle, and as dependent on the syntax, as in prose; it is the poet's chief instrument to other aims when it is not itself his aim."¹²⁶ One can easily trace the correspondence of this view with *Abhidhamula Sabdi Vyanjana*. In this type of *Vyanjana*, the sense of an ambiguous word is fixed in one sense on account of *Sanyoga*, etc., and then the same word gives a different meaning other than *Vacyartha* through a word power called *Abhidhamula Sabdi Vyanjana*. Here we notice three points of importance. First, the literal meaning or sense is fixed and is made to dominate. The sense or *Abhidha* becomes subtle because although its *Vacyartha* is fixed, its use itself suggests some ulteriorly subtle *Vyangyārtha*. And in such a use, sense is not its own aim but it works as the poet's instrument for other purpose, *Vyangvartha*. Obviously, Richards' pronouncement is not very different from this. Richards observes : "Many arrangements of words evoke attitudes without any reference being required enroute. They operate like musical phrases."¹²⁷ Again he says : "A feeling is thus an innocent and unfallacious thing in comparison with thoughts and intentions. It may arise through immediate stimulation without the intervention of either thought or intention."¹²⁸ These observations can be linked up with *Asanlaksyakrama Vyangya* where the process of transition from crude to subtle meaning is not perceived. However, it would be a mistake to go to Richards' criticism for exact equivalents of Indian critical concepts. It is not possible either.

This study reveals that in Richards' account of poetic meaning, ambiguity and complexity of meaning arising out of a

123 Anandavardhana : *Dhvanyaloka*, 2/4.

124 Ibid., 3/35.

125 Ibid., 3/42.

126 Richards : *Practical Criticism*, p. 191.

127 Richards : *Principles*, p. 267.

128 Richards : *Practical Criticism*, p. 331.

word, which in Indian term may be called *Sabdi Vyanjana*, gets a more detailed treatment than the ambiguity arising out of an ambiguous statement i.e., *Arthi-vyanjana*. In comparison with the treatment of *Vyanjana* in *Rasa* doctrine the compass of the treatment of emotive meaning by Richards is relatively short. Again, the earlier theory of meaning developed by Richards (and Ogden) in *Meaning and Principles* was rejected by the critic himself in the fifties. This is done in his later works like *Speculative Instruments*, *Design for Escape*, *So Much Nearer* and in his introduction to the edition of Plato's *Republic*. But the only book in which his early theory of emotive meaning is controverted on a large scale is *Speculative Instruments*. Linguists, however, have never given any credence to Richards' theory of meaning nor they have considered his work serious enough for deliberation, though the philosophers of language have taken note of his at least two works *The Meaning of Meaning* and *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*.

Richards' description of metaphor once again brings him near to the critics of *Rasa* school. In metaphor, the comparison is left implied, 'He fought like a lion' is a simile. But 'He was a lion in the fight' is a metaphor. Similarly 'The news was a dagger to his heart, is a metaphor. Richards gives great importance to metaphor and takes it as "a semi-surreptitious method by which a greater variety of elements can be wrought into the fabric of the experience."¹²⁹ In *Practical Criticism*, he defines metaphor as "a shift, carrying over of a word from its normal use to a new use."¹³⁰ He makes two divisions of metaphor—sense metaphor and emotive metaphor according as "the shift of the word is occasioned and justified by a similarity or analogy between the object it is usually applied to and the new object", or "the shift occurs through some similarity between the feelings the new situation and the normal situation arouse."¹³¹ A good poet must have sufficient "command of original metaphor."¹³² He argues that "a better understanding of metaphor is one of the aims which an improved curriculum of literary studies might well set before itself."¹³³ The poet's task is constantly (though not only) that of

129 Richards : *Principles*, p. 240.

130 Richards : *Practical Criticism*, p. 221.

131 *Ibid.*

132 *Ibid.* p. 223.

finding ways and means of controlling feeling through metaphor. He has to be expert, if not in describing feeling, in presenting it, and presenting and describing are here rather near together."¹³⁴ In *Rhetoric* he bifurcates metaphor into two parts called 'tenor' and 'vehicle' the former suggesting the object to be compared and the latter the object with which the comparison is to be made.¹³⁵ For instance, in "Man is a monster", 'man' is the 'tenor' and 'monster' is the 'vehicle'. These terms correspond to *Upamana* and *Upameya* of Sanskrit rhetorics. The theoretical position of Richards is not very different from that of Anandavardhana who takes *Dhvani* as a removed expression and tells us that only a discriminate person endowed with literary talent can grapple with it.¹³⁶ Still it would be erroneous to take Richards metaphor as a substitute for *Rupaka*, *Laksana* or *Vyanjana*. It is only when metaphor is functional rather than merely decorative that it comes nearer to *Laksana* or *Vyanjana*. In *Rasa* doctrine, it is assumed that *Rasa* may be manifested through *Vastu* or *Alankara*. 'The system', in the words of Keith "does not deny the right to rank as poetry of poetry which contains only a secondary degree of suggestion (*gunibhuta-vyangya*)".¹³⁷ Anandavardhana accepts as good poetry in a mood of compromise even such compositions where this manifested beauty is secondary and not primary. It is the manifestation of beauty that enables the poets to "bring in originality and variety even when the topic and the situation are identical."¹³⁸ Thus, the *Dhvanikara* takes a fairly wide view of *Dhvani* to include even *Alankara*. This is why one comes across such subtle divisions of *Dhvani* in Indian *Rasa* doctrine as *Abhidhamulaka Dhvani* and *Laksanamulaka Dhvani*. But in all cases, it is the *Dhvanyartha* which is prominent and not the *Abhidha* or *Laksana* or any other *Alankara*. *Laksana* or *Vyanjana* are not the substitutes for Richards metaphor. They touch metaphor at certain points and still transcend it. They touch it where metaphor is said to aim at some ulterior meaning and give way to a greater variety of elements by adopting a

133 Ibid.

134 Richards : *Practical Criticism*, p. 223.

135 Richards : *Rhetoric*, pp. 99-100.

136 Anandavardhana : *Dhvanyaloka*, 1/13.

137 Keith : *A History of Sanskrit Literature*, p. 389.

138 Raja, C. Kunhan : *Survey of Sanskrit Literature* (Bhartiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1962), p. 257.

semi-sur-reptitious method. They transcend it where they are said to be based on the speaker's or listener's imagination and evoke pleasure of spectacular kind. Max Eastman says that Richards' "cannot explain metaphor, and his failure to do so grows more and more distressing with each new book that he writes."¹³⁹ Empson, while reviewing Richards' *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, brands Richards' view on metaphor as 'lordly'.¹⁴⁰ The prejudices of these critics are based on the fact that they expect a too sweeping theory of metaphor from him like Aristotle's. Since Richards has extended the concept of metaphor to include a large variety of shades and meanings, it goes beyond general comprehension. The Indian view of *Laksana* or *Vyanjana* is more comprehensive than that of Richards.

An account of Richards' views on poetic ambiguity seems essential. Till recently, clarity of expression was regarded as one of the greatest qualities of poetry. In Sanskrit poetics also, the poets were asked to be on guard against the use of *Gudha Sabda*. Bhamaha forbids the poets from using *Gudha Sabda*.¹⁴¹ *Gudha* means 'obscure' and 'ambiguous'. Richards takes ambiguity as an essential feature of poetic language. While "ambiguities due to erratic reading" may be "troublesome", they may "have great value as a means by which people may severally develop their own reactions."¹⁴² Oblique expression is hinted at in such figures of speech as Innuendo and Metonymy. In Sanskrit, it is hinted at in *Vakrokti* and *Dhvani*. The germs of Richards' theory of ambiguity may be found in his early writings like *Principles*,¹⁴³ *Practical Criticism*¹⁴⁴ and *Science and Poetry*.¹⁴⁵ It is later developed in *Rhetoric* where Richards comes to regard ambiguity as "an inevitable consequence of the powers of language and as the indispensable means of our most important utterances."¹⁴⁶ He supports Empson's view that the skill of the reader lies in finding out relations of meaning for

139 Eastman, Max : *Enjoyment of Poetry*, p. 253.

140 Empson, William : Review, Richards' *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* *The Criterion*, Vol. XVII, No. 66, Oct., 1937, p. 126.

141 Bhamaha : *Kavyalankara*, 1/37.

142 Richards : *Principles*, p. 207.

143 *Ibid.*, p. 291.

144 Richards : *Practical Criticism*, p. 340.

145 Richards : *Science and Poetry*, p. 28.

146 Richards : *Rhetoric*, p. 40.

himself out of statements which seem apparently unconnected.¹⁴⁷ Richards, in the manner of Empson, does not define ambiguity anywhere in categorical terms. But he admits that there is a "peculiar quasi-magical sway of words in the hands of a master". He justly attributes their power and efficacy to "the collections of emotional influences that by their very ambiguity they effect."¹⁴⁸ Ambiguity as used by Richards is not an antonym of clarity. It is not used in a pejorative sense. It simply suggests complexity as well as interaction of meaning. It is a positive term. In Indian terminology, it is analogous to *Artha Bhangima*.

We may now proceed to examine how Richards takes ambiguity as a sure device to embellish poetic expression almost in the same way in which Mammata extends the meaning of Bhamaha's *Gudha* to denote poetic excellence and says that it is *Gudha* which sparkles (*gudham camatkroti*).¹⁴⁹ In Empson's view,¹⁵⁰ ambiguity is not pun particularly where there is no room for puzzling and to be a punster is not to be a good poet. If pun is taken as a substitute for Indian *Slesa*, the difference between the western and the Indian approaches to ambiguity becomes clear. *Slesa* is ordinarily divided into two parts—*Sabdi-Slesa* and *Arthi Slesa*. In *Sabdi Slesa* the plurality of meaning depends upon word or *Sabda*, where as in *Arthi Slesa* it depends upon *Artha*. In the former case, any substitution of word will spoil the meaning, where as in the latter, change in word will not affect the meaning. As Indian poetics incorporates in *Dhvani* even *Dhvani* arising out of *Alankara*, there may be a case where *Slesa* serves some higher purpose. It may be a tool to express *Dhvanýartha* and, in such a case, it has an added charm. Ambiguity is a term used by Richards to convey excellence of meaning. Ambiguity may derive its beauty from various sources. There may be ambiguity by metaphor, by syntax, or by verbal structure. Richards highly appreciates Eliot's "The Waste Land" for its 'music of ideas' which "may not tell us something, but which may combine into a coherent whole of feeling and attitude and produce a particular liberation of the will."¹⁵¹ Richards' notion of ambiguity immediately reminds us of *Vyanjana Vyapara* of *Rasa* doctrine.

147 Ibid., p. 125.

148 Richards . Practical Criticism, p. 364.

149 Mammata : Kavya Prakasa, 45-46 vrtti.

150 Empson : Seven Types of Ambiguity (London, 1947), p.X.

151 Richards : Principles, p. 293.

Vyanjana as used by *Rasa-Vadins* is such a wide term that no part of poetic excellence would seem to fall outside its orbit. Whether it is style ork embellishment, or any other poetic craftsmanship, each is directed to fulfil only one ultimate aim and this is the evocation of *Rasa*. Again, what is called *Bhava Sabalata* meaning mixture or union or various emotions contain much that is referred to by the word ambiguity. *Sabalata*, means many-coloured, spotted or variegated. *Amarakosa* defines *Sabalata* as an assemblage of six colours *Citra*, *Kirmira*, *Kalmasa*, *Sabala*, *Yeta*, and *Karbura*.¹⁵² *Sabala* is constituted of *Sapa Dhatu* with the addition of *Pratyaya Ala* and by the grammatical principle laid down in the *Sutra Saper Vasca*, *Pa* is converted into *Va* i.e., the word formed is not *Sapala* but *Sabala*. The meaning of the *Dhatu Sapa* or *Sapta* is *Vikara* or *Vikrita*. Thus *Sabalata* means many-sided or multicoloured. This meaning has similarity with the French word 'nuance' which is responsible for ambiguity. 'Nuance' derived from the verb. 'nuer' also means the act of colouring or blending colours together.¹⁵³ The trouble with ambiguity theory is that it does not cover all cases of literature.

Further, a basic principle governing verbal meaning is that no sentence may contain two unrelated or indeplent meanings. It can have only one united purport- "*Yekartha Pratipadakam Vakya*". It is semantically unjust to take a word, used in one and the same place, as conveying two difference meanings. Thus, if in a sentence, a word is used in a metaphorical sense, the literal meaning is automatically annulled. If two or three meanings are conveyed at a time, all but one shall be eliminated. Total plurivalence is self stultifying. So a united or a consistant motive is to the assumed of all human utterance. Kumaril Bhatta rightly says that meanings occur only in connected utterances, and that meaning of a sentence is the motive or purpose for which it is uttered- *abhidheyo Padasyarthah vakyarth prayojanam*. The words convey their real significance only when used in sentences. So what we call aimbiguity is a lexicographical feature and not a permanent feature of poetic language. Richards' dictotomy of language into scientific and emotive uses has been challanged by the saw Aristotelians who believe in the continuity

152 *Amarakosa*, 1/5/17.

153 Bulatkin, Eleanor Webster : "The French word Nuance". Publications of the Medren Langrage Association of America, Vol. LXX, NO. 1, March, 1955. p.

of linguistic process.

Richards notion of ambiguity is also reminiscent of Kuntaka's theory of *Vakrokti*. *Vakrokti* as defined by Kuntaka is a generic term for peculiarity of expression and it is taken as a departure from established used (*prasidha prasthana-vyatireka*).¹⁵⁴ Literally, *Vakra*, as opposed to straight, means crooked, bent, figuratively, it means indirect, circuitous and ultimately ambiguous. *Vicitra*, with its primary senses of spotted and variegated, also means strange or surprising. Whatever is strange may even be uncanny or bewildering. Thus ambiguity or *Vakrata* is inherent in poetic language. Many words like subtlety, variety complexity, ambiguity, intensity, etc., which in ordinary communication are among the vaguest in the language have been used by Richards to convey sharp critical perceptions.

For Imagination, the critics of *Rasa* school use the word *Pratibha* though, like many other Sanskrit terms, the word *Pratibha* has a wider implication and it, at one and the same time, touches the periphery of Imagination, intuition, instinct, genius, inspiration, and many other such western concepts as are related to creative writing. The critics of *Rasa* school bring out the importance of *Pratibha* in their description of *Kavya Hetu* or the equipment of the poet. Abhinavagupta takes *Pratibha* as a dynamic power which enables the poet to create novel and startling things (*Pratibha apurva vastu nirmana Ksama prajna*).¹⁵⁵ Bhattatauta states that with the touch of *Pratibha*, even a commonplace object assumes ever refreshing beauty (*Prajna navonmesa salini pratibha mata*).¹⁵⁶ The critics of *Rasa* school hold that among all the *Kavyahetus*, *Pratibha* is the most fundamental. Vamana takes *Pratibha* as the *Beej* of *Kavitva*.¹⁵⁷

Richards lists six senses in which Imagination is used—producing verbal images, figurative language, sympathetic reproduction of another's emotional states, inventiveness, scientific imagination and coleridge's synthetic imagination which reconciles opposites and unites disparate things.¹⁵⁸ Richards, like the Indian rhetoricians, considers imagination as

154 Kuntaka : *Vakrokti-Jivita*, 1/10.

155 Abhinavagupta : *Dhvanyaloka Locana*, p. 93.

156 Bhattatauta : Cited, Ksemendra : *Aucitya Vicara Carica*, p. 218.

157 Vamana : *Kavyalankara Sutra*, 1/3/16.

158 Richards : *Principles*, pp. 239-242.

one of the main springs of poetry. Imagination is constantly kindled by emotion. The poet expresses himself imaginatively under the stress of feelings and emotions. They tend to use figurative language under the stress of emotion. The pictorial power of imagination provides the mind with images. New images and metaphors are coined under the pressure of emotion. Poets and critics being intensively sensitive react even more strongly to emotions. The most imaginative writing abounds in figurative modes of speech in imagery, personification and hyperbol. Richards lays great emphasis on imagination and shows its role in the creative act. According to him, it is the power by which the poet succeeds in bringing order in experience. Impulses which commonly interfere with one another and are conflicting, independent, and mutually destructive, in him combine into a stable poise."¹⁵⁹ He supports Coleridge's view that imagination is a magical and synthetic power by which the poet brings coordination in mutually contradictory and dissimilar images. But from his own side, he adds something more to what Coleridge says. He takes imagination as the highest creative faculty as it provides the key to the enjoyment and appreciation of art. Imaginative experiences arouse a variety of feelings and emotions which an ordinary man with no imaginative gift, is unable to grasp. Richards thinks that imagination does something more than image-creation. It excites feelings. "An ordinary man goes about in blinkers because what he would otherwise see would upset him."¹⁶⁰ Poets being more sensitive than ordinary men are affected in a greater measure by their emotional excitement. They like to give a creative shape to their experiences. The work of art is, thus, born out of the creative urge. So wide experience is of supreme importance for the artist.

The superb role of imagination can be found in tragedies. "Tragedy", Richards maintains, "is perhaps the most general, all-accepting, all-ordering experience known."¹⁶¹ It is a form of literature which best suits the imaginative mind because the tragic playwright can roam about anywhere for his material. "It is invulnerable; there is nothing which does not present to the tragic

¹⁵⁹ Richards Principles, p. 243.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Richards :LPrinciples, p. 247.

attitude when fully developed a fitting aspect and only a fitting aspect."¹⁶² In tragedy pity and terror-the former being an emotion which attracts and the latter which repels or distracts-are presented side by side. He observes, that its success lies in bringing reconciliations in discordant impulses. Though Richards gives due importance to the imagination of the poet, he is not oblivious of the training of the reader which disciplines his critical apparatus. This idea is analogous to Rajasekhara's division of *Pratibha* into two groups-*Karayitri* i.e., creative and *Bhavayitri* i.e., critical.¹⁶³ The former is to be possessed by the poet and the latter by the critic or the reader. Abhinavagupta, however, considers that the poet should also be a *Sahradaya* i.e., he must have critical faculty. This synthesis of creative and critical faculties is one of the singular achievements of the Indian *Rasa* doctrine. This idea came quite late in Elliot. Anandavardhana observes that imaginative description owes its source to *Kavi Praudhokti*¹⁶⁴ i.e., the *Ukti* which he makes in moments of inspiration and exaltation. So, it is *Kavi Praudhoktimatra Siddha*. Mammata while describing *Kavya Hetu* gives prime importance to *Sakti* or *Pratibha*. But he also gives importance to *Siksa* and *Abhyasa*.¹⁶⁵ This is also the opinion of Hemcandra.¹⁶⁶ Jayadeva describes the same point through a striking metaphor. "As the cause of creeper is seed mixed with water and soil, so the cause of poetry is *Pratibha* mixed with *Vyutpatti* and *Abhyasa*."¹⁶⁷ Richards would say the same thing the other way round. "Subtleties of tone are rarely appreciated without some special training."¹⁶⁸ And again, "Doubtless to some degree poetry, like the other arts, is a secret discipline to which some initiation is needed. Some readers are excluded from it simply because they have never discovered, and have never been taught how to enter."¹⁶⁹ Obviously, Richards here refers to *Bhavayitri Pratibha* for which *Kavya Siksa* is essential. But Richards, and most of the

¹⁶² Richards : Principles, p. 247

¹⁶³ Rajasekhara : Kavyamimansa, p. 30.

¹⁶⁴ Anandavardhana : Dhvanyaloka, 2/24

Mammata : Kavya Prakasa, 1/3 vrtti

¹⁶⁵ Hemacandra : Kavyanusasana p. 6.

¹⁶⁷ Jayadeva : Candraloka, 1/6

¹⁶⁸ Richards : Practical Criticism p. 328

¹⁶⁹ Richards : Practical criticism p. 319

western critics, attach undue importance to training or practice of the poet or the reader which feature is wanting in Indian poetics. Anandavardhana, for instance, clearly states that no amount of training can do if the poet is deprived of imaginative faculty. Poetry is not possible without *Sakti*.¹⁷⁰

The core of Richards critical maxims is his theory of balancing of impulses which partially sets him apart from the critics of *Rasa* school. His theory of balancing of impulses can be fruitfully examined in the light of the Indian theory of *Maitri* and *Satru* of *Rasas*. The critics of *Rasa* school provide us with a list of *Satru* and *Mitra Rasas* which works as a formula to ascertain if a particular *Rasa* can stand in perfect amity with a particular *Rasa* or a group of *Rasas*. It needs to be pointed out here that out of the *Mitra Rasas*, only one *Rasa* will be taken as primordial or *Angi* while the rest ones, two or three *Rasas*, will be taken as *anoliary* or *Gauna* to it. There may be a few exceptions to this rule. But its general framework is sound enough to be challenged. Contrary to this, Richards formulates his psychological theory of value keeping in view the growing complexity of modern life. He works out a more convincing poetics than the critics of *Rasa* school who had a different social and cultural background behind them.

Richards makes two divisions of impulses, namely *Appetency* and *Aversion*.¹⁷¹ *Appetency* means an instinctive propensity or natural attraction. *Aversion* means an intense dislike or antipathy. Obviously, these two groups of impulses resemble the *Mitra*, and *Satru Rasas*. But the further stride taken by Richards flings him far off from Indian poetics. Richards begins with the argument that "The most valuable states of mind then are those which involve the widest and most comprehensive coordination of activities and the least curtailment, conflict, starvation and restriction."¹⁷² He suggests that this coordination of impulses should not be only of those impulses which belong to the same group or are homogeneous, but should also be of those impulses which are discordant and heterogeneous. In Richards' words "The equilibrium of opposed impulses, which we suspect to be the ground plan of the most valuable aesthetic responses, brings into play far more of our personality than is possible in

170 Anandavardhana : *Dhvanyaloka*, 13/6 *vrtti*.

171 Richards : *Principles*, p. 47.

172 *Ibid* , p. 59

experiences of a more defined emotion."¹⁷³ In order to give edge to this argument, Richards gives a diagram of the working of mind at the time the balance amongst impulses of various kinds takes place. According to him, the mind is "a system of very delicately poised balances, a system which so long as we are in health is constantly growing. Every situation we come into disturbs some of these balances to some degree. The ways in which they swing back to a new equipoise are the impulses with which we respond to the situation. And the chief balances in the system are our chief interests."¹⁷⁴ The 'chief balances' in the above mentioned description are said to be our 'chief interests'. The 'chief interest', in the Indian terminology, will be called *Angi Rasa* and the 'interest' which will be subordinated to it will be called *Gauna Rasa*. In this description of interest, a hint has been made at the disturbance in the domain of impulses and it is said that the new equipoise is constituted of those impulses "with which we respond to the situation." It is the responding to the situation which matters and not the impulses of a particular category of *Mitra Rasas*. The complex system of mind is illustrated by Richards by drawing an analogy from science. "The needles are our interests, varying in their importance—that is in the degree to which any movement they make involves movement in the other needles. Each new disequilibrium, which a shift of position, a fresh situation, entails, corresponds to a needle; and the waggings which ensue as the system rearranges itself are our responses, the impulses through which we seek to meet the need. Often the new poise is not found until long after the original disturbance. Thus states of strain can arise which last for years."¹⁷⁵ It is clear that human impulses are never uniform and they move to and fro like the needles of a magnetic compass. It is because the outer world is full of conflict. In Richards' opinion there are two ways to overcome this conflict—by conquest or by conciliation. "One or other of the contesting impulses can be suppressed, or they can come to a mutual arrangement they can adjust themselves to one another... Conciliation is always to be preferred to conquest."¹⁷⁶ Richards observes "Finer adjustment, clearer and more delicate accommodation of impulses in any one

¹⁷³ Ibid., p. 252.

¹⁷⁴ Richards : Principle, P. 252

¹⁷⁵ Richards : Science and Poetry, p. 22.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 39.

field tends to prompt it in others."¹⁷⁷ Value results from the abundance and variety of life. It is difficult to appreciate Shelley's "Prometheus Unbound" without having full conviction in the "Perfectibility of man."¹⁷⁸

The Indian rhetoricians, instead of finding reconciliation between divergent *Rasas*, put them in two groups- *Mitra* and *Satru*. But it would be seen that no *Rasa* is a permanent *Mitra* or *Satru* of another *Rasa*. *Vibhatsa* is considered as repugnant to *Srngara*. But Hardy in his novel *Far from the Madding Crowd* describes that Sergeant Troy kisses the forehead of the dead body of his beloved Fanny Robbin. *Karuna* is *Satru* of *Srngara*. But if this position is taken for granted, how can we account for Ravana's erotic gestures at the sight of Sita placed in a pitiable condition beneath the *Asoka* tree? *Hasya* is taken as the *Mitra* of *Srngara*. But it is a matter of common observation that pricking jokes are never desirable. *Bhayanaka* is the *Satru* of *Srngara*. But in Shakespeare's drama *The Taming of the Shrew* Petruchio loves the impetuous and uncontrolled Catherine. In Shaw's *Arms and the man*, Captain Bluntschli takes chocolates while the war is on. How then the fusion of *Bhayanaka* and *Srngara* can be explained? Probably the critics of *Rasa* school were also conscious of the difficulty of taking a particular *Rasa* as *Mitra* or *Satru* rigidly. But they did not take pains to find a clue to the conciliation of *Satru Rasas*. There is one more point to be noted here. The critics of *Rasa* school hold that where several *Mitra Rasas* assemble, one of them become dominant while others are relegated to the secondary status. Richards, on the contrary, conceives of two distinct stages of art creation-when the impulses are in a chaotic and disordered state and when they are fully coordinated and organised. He lays emphasis not on defeating the impulses but on reconciling and balancing them which, according to him, constitute poetic value. It is difficult to agree to Richards' doctrinal position for what is irreconcilable cannot be reconciled. In this respect, the critics of *Rasa* school give us a more satisfactory poetics than Richards.

Richards also expresses some very original and valuable opinion with regard to the external embellishment of poetry like rhythm and metre. Traditional metres have now proved

¹⁷⁷ Richards : Principles, p. 234.

¹⁷⁸ Richards : Principles, p-70

completely ineffective as they often choke the expression of varied and profound feelings of the poets. Latin poetry could not be popular because it was bound by strict and rigorous rules of metre. It is a fact that rhythm is essential for poetry. But bound by accepted metre, it becomes so artificial that it can only please the adolescents. In fact, the existence of rhythm goes much deeper into the depth of poetic feeling. Its form is determined by verbal music and the combination of meaning. It is actually the tension between Rhyme and rhythm, inner and outer structures of the poem that determines its meaning. Richards has it say something very significant with regard to the language of criticism and the attributes of the critic. The language of criticism must be chaste, free from superlatives and linguistic vagaries and must have scientific exactitude. The critic should not be inebriated by a passion to show off his scholarship nor he should be actuated by a sense of bias. He should write with cool and composed mind. He should not be led by frown or favour, affection or ill-will nor he should give way to anger, personal rancour, fastidiousness or idolatry which vitiate the very nature of criticism.

Some points of resemblance may be found between Richards' views on rhythm and metre and those of Ksemendra on the same subjects. A *Rasavadi* critic, Ksemendra mentions certain *Chandas* which are helpful in the evocation of certain kinds of *Rasas*. *Mandakranta*, for instance, is fit for the description of rainy season. *Vansastha* is fit for didactic verse and *Vasantalataka* for *Vira* and *Raudra Rasas*. Richards does not provide us with such a theory. But, like Ksemendra, Richards holds that the beauty of rhythm rests on meaning. In *Coleridge on Imagination*, he says: "The bond, in other words, between metre and poetry-which remains unintelligible so long as we separate words from their meanings and treat them as mere signs fitted into a sensory pattern- becomes an evident necessity if we consider the words as invested with their meanings."¹⁷⁹ With words so invested, their metrical movement is no longer so distant a thing as a *counterpart* to their meaning."¹⁸⁰ Richards believes in the dependence of rhythm on emotion. Rhythm is something more than a combination of sounds. So metre is

179 Richards : *Practical Criticism*, p. 227.

180 Richards : *Coleridge on Imagination*, p. 119.

directly concerned with meaning. While considering metre one must take note of the meaning of words as well. Ksemendra suggests that *Laya* and *Chanda* should be gauged according to *Bhava* and *Rasa*. "The poet should use *Chandas* according to the need of *Rasa*."¹⁸¹ Both Richards and Ksemendra agree to the hypnotic effect of rhythm. Again, they stand on common platform when they argue for the propriety of metre, rhythm and words and pauses.

One of the most obvious tenets of *Rasa Sastra* is the synthesis of literature, religion, philosophy, ethics and spiritualism. Unfortunately, many western critics plead for 'purity' in literary criticism forgetting that literary criticism can hardly exist without philosophy. One is likely to feel appalled at F.R. Leavis' reply to a letter from Rene Wellek about the former's *Revaluation* wherein Leavis exhibits a complete dichotomy between literary criticism and philosophy. Richards also begins with the bias that philosophy can be introduced in literary criticism much to the detriment of its real character. In system-building, Richards is far ahead of *Rasavadi Acaryas*. If we watch the development of Richards as a literary critics we may easily notice in him a gradual distrust in the application of psychological researches to literary criticism. Freud's study of Leonardo da Vinci and Jung's study of Victor Hugo have been most unreliable because of the predilection for the psychological method.

In the words of Marie Hochmuth Nichols " Richards' has attempted to keep abreast of the learning of the last two thousand years and has applied his knowledge to an area of activity in which we as rhetoricians are notoriously weak, the area of methodology - not merely for the analysis of persuasive discourse, but methodology for the ordering of all types of discourse"¹⁸².

We may or may not always agree to what Richards says. But we cannot help catching the spark of his genius. On the other hand, the concept of divine inspiration upheld by the exponents of *Rasa* theory might sound queer to the westerners. But, at least, it for ever solves the problem of how poetry is composed.

181 Ksemendra : *Suvrtatilakam*, 3/7.

182 Nichols, Marie Hochmuth: *Rhetoric and Criticism* (Louisiana Universal press, 1963) p107

Richards, in spite of his scientific leanings, is unable to give a very clear and consistent account of the poetic process which otherwise *remains* a mystery. Science ignores what anything is in itself because it is confined to the extrinsic reality of things. The Indian critics tell us the bare truth when they say that in poetry there is something which transcends ordinary experience and that which transcends experience cannot be proved or known but only felt and believed in. The inspiration which seeks poetic expression has no law to guide it. Richards fails to appreciate the fact that truth is more than what is seen. From the Indian point of view, poetry is so intimate a union between the divine and the human elements that the dogma of divine transcendence is actually cancelled by it.

There are very clear and self-imposed limitations to Richards' critical scope. He denies the possibility of any genuine speculative criticism, and it is this denial-reiterated on several occasions that his deliberate identification of mind with a machine is strongly expressed. Even as a general proposition one regards it with distrust. As T.S. Eliot says, "Poetry is something over and above, and something quite different from a collection of psychological data about the mind of poets."¹⁸³ "Mind", as Sophocles rightly says "is the most wondrous of all the wonders of the world."¹⁸⁴ By denying the intrinsic experience and the dynamism of mind, Richards, in a way, reduces literary criticism to science and it is here that the greatest weakness of his critical formulation is perceived. Richards' attempt to couple poetry in psychology gives us an aesthetics which is at once general and ridiculous.. As Stephen Spender puts it: "The picture which Richards gives of the poet devoted entirely to creating order amongst purely human complexities locks poetry completely within psychology, and bars it out from contact with the spiritual purpose in the universe outside humanity. The poet is put in the position of having to project patterns of experience in which man is outside everything but himself,"¹⁸⁵ Again, Richards reminds us more than once that the function of poetry

¹⁸³ Eliot, T.S. : *The Sacred wood* (London, 1957), p. IX.

¹⁸⁴ Sophocles : *Antigones, Dramas of Sophocles*, ed. George F. Young (Great Britain, 1925), p. 11.

¹⁸⁵ Spender, Stephen : 'Inside the cage',

is to arouse attitudes. But he never satisfactorily explains how these attitudes come about. Against this, the Indian *Rasa* doctrine gives us a clear exposition of the process through which *Rasa* is produced. In literary criticism, one has to deal with small pieces of literature. It is easy to theorize and as Richards himself puts it, every teacher wars when it comes to application.

Richards' method of analysing the intellectual and emotional mechanism of response of the poem may be valuable as a piece of research in psychology, but it has little or insignificant literary value. Literature is made of words and to analyse words in literature, its form and structure is the primary task of the critic. Eliot's eclectic, analytical and comparative method is more helpful in the respect than Richards' psychological method.

Doubtless, Richards establishes his own evaluative method and his own critical stance. He occupies a permanent place in the history of English literature. But his study of poetry is not even half as exhaustive as that of the critics of the *Rasa* school. Richards is now no more. But his fame as a sound judge of literary values will endure.

Appendix

Chapter 10, Conclusion : I. A. Richards as a Tatvabhinivesi Critic

- 5 — “तेन द्विधाऽरोचकिनः, सतृणाप्यवहारिणरच” इति मंगलः ।
“कवयोऽपि भवन्ति इति वामनीयाः ।” चतुर्द्धा हि तयायावरीयः
मत्सरिणास्तत्वाभिमतेशितश्च । तत्र विवेकिनः पूर्वे
लदिद्विपरीतान्तु ततो मन्तराः “इति यायावरीयः
राजेशेखरकाव्यमीमासा, पृ० ३०
- 14, 23 — ब्रह्मास्वाद सहोदरः । विश्वनाथः साहित्यदर्पण, ३/२
- 24 — रस चर्वणात्मनः प्राधान्यं दर्शयाम् रसध्वनेरेव सर्वत्र
मुख्यभूतमात्मत्वमिति दर्शयति ।
अभिनवगुप्तः ध्वन्यालोकलोचन, पृ० ४०
मानविशेषस्येव चर्वणात्मात्वात् इत्यहे बहुना ।
अभिनवगुप्तः ध्वन्यालोकलोचन, पृ० १६४
भुञ्जानां स्वादयन्तीति । रसना व्यापारादोजनार्द्धको यो मनसो
व्यापारः स एवास्वादनमिति दर्शयति ।
अभिनवगुप्तः अभिनवभारती, पृ० २९०
अस्मन्मते सवेदनमेवानन्दधनमास्वाधते ।
अभिनवगुप्तः अभिनवभारती, पृ० २९२
चर्वणानिष्पत्तया तस्य निष्पत्तिरुपचरति तकार्योप्युच्यताम् ।
मम्मटः काव्यप्रकाश, पृ० । । ।
- 25 — लोकोत्तरायाः प्रतीतेरभिन्नोऽपि साकारतया विषयत्वेन स्फुरन्ना स्वाद
स्वभावः
महिमभटः व्यक्तिविवेक, पृ० ७१
- 26 — प्रथमे हि वद्वांसोवैयाकरणः, व्याकरणमूलत्वात् सर्वा विधानाम् ।
आनन्दवर्द्धनः ध्वन्यालोक, १/१३ वृत्ति ।

लोकोत्तरत्वं चाहलादग्रतश्चमत्कारत्वापरपर्यायोऽनुभव
साक्षिको जातिविशेषः । जगन्नाथः रसगंगाधर, पृ० ११ ।

27 119—

रमणीयार्थप्रतिपादकशब्दः काव्यम् ।

जगन्नाथः रसगंगाधर, पृ० १०

28—

लोकोत्तरत्वं चाह दिगतः जगन्नाथः रसगंगाधर, पृ० ११ ।

लोकोत्तरचमत्कारकारिवैचित्र्य-सिद्धये, असामान्याहलाद
विघातिविचित्रभावसम्पत्तये ।

कुन्तकः वक्रोक्ति-जीवित, १/२ वृत्ति ।

29—

चमत्कारश्चतविन्ताररूपो विस्मयापरपर्यायः ।

चिरवनाथः साहित्यदर्पण, ३/३ वृत्ति ।

अलौकिकचमत्कारकारौ श्रेयसगारादिकोरसः ।

मम्मटः काव्यप्रकाश, पृ० १०९

सापि किमर्थमित्याल्लोकोत्तरचमत्कारकारिवैचित्र्य-सिद्धये ।

कुन्तकः वक्रोक्ति-जीवित, १/२ वृत्ति ।

चमत्कारान्तज्जोऽपि कम्पपुलकोकोत्सुक्यहसनादिविकारः ।

अभिनवगुप्तः अभिनवभारती, पृ० २७९

सेनालौकिकचमत्कारात्मा रसास्वादः स्मृत्यनुमानलौकिकसंवेदर
विलक्षण एव ।

अभिनवगुप्तः अभिनवभारती, पृ० २८४

30—

यदैतत्सुवृन्तरसो वैसः । रसहोवाय लब्ध्वा नन्दी भवति ।

तैत्तिरीयउपनिषद्, २/७/१

31—

युक्तिवियुक्तदशायामतिस्थितोयः शमः स एव यतः ।

रसातामेतितदास्मिन् सचायदि स्थितिश्चन विरुद्धः ।

विश्वनाथः साहित्यदर्पण, ३/२५

32—

नानाद्रव्यै बहुविधै व्यजनं भाव्यते यथा ।

एवं भावाभावयन्ति रसान् अभिनयैः सह ।

भैरतः नाट्यशास्त्र, ६/३५

- 33— रसेन्द्रिप्राहयैलिरसशब्दः प्रसिद्धः ।
अभिनवगुप्तः अभिनवभारती, पृ० २६ ।
- 40— योऽर्थो हृदय संवादी तस्य भावो रसोदयः ।
शरीरं व्याप्यते तेन शुष्केकाष्ठमिवाग्निना ।।
भरतः नाट्यशास्त्र, ७/७
- 41 3— रोषां काव्यानुशीलनाभ्यासवसादं विशदीभूते मनोमुबुधे ।
वर्णनीयतन्मयी भवनयोग्यता ते हृदया संवादभाजः सद्वदयाः ।
अभिनवगुप्तः ध्वन्यालोकलोचन, पृ० ४०
- 42— वेद्यन्ते स तु काव्यार्थतत्त्वजैरेव कैयलम् ।
आनन्दवर्द्धनः ध्वन्यालोक, १/७
- 50— लोकोत्तरचमत्कारप्राणः कैश्चित्रमातृभिः ।
विश्वनाथः साहित्यदर्पण, ३/३
- 56— सत्कुमिव तिततउनापुनन्तो यवधीरामनसावाचमुकुल ।
अबासखायः सख्यानिजानते भद्रैर्षालक्ष्मीनिर्हिताधि ।।
ऋग्वेदः १०/७१/२
- 58— वक्तुर्बोद्धयं कावून्नोवाच्यवाच्यान्यसाभिधेः ।
मम्मटः काव्यप्रकाश, २/२०
- 69— आलोकार्थी यथादीपशिखायां यत्नवान् जनः ।
तदुपायतया तद्वदर्थे वाच्ये तदादृतः ।।
आनन्दवर्द्धनः ध्वन्यालोकलोचन, १/९
- 70— त्रसंकेतितार्थस्य बोधनादिप्रमाऽभिधेः ।
विश्वनाथः साहित्यदर्पण, २/३
- 71— शब्दव्यापारतोयन्यप्रतीतिस्तस्तमुख्यता ।
अर्थावसेयस्य पुनर्लक्ष्यमाणतवमुच्यते ।।
रजानकमुकुलः अभिधावृत्तिमातृका, १/१
- 72— का सौ, वक्रोक्तिरेव, वक्रोक्तिः, प्रसिद्धाभिधेयान् व्यातिरोक्ती
विचित्रेवाभिधेः ।
कुन्तकः वक्रोक्तिजीवित, १/१० वृत्ति ।

- 73— नरतादृते हि कश्चिदर्थे प्रवर्तते । भरतः नाट्यशास्त्र, ६/३१
- 74— प्रतीयमानं पुनरन्यदैववस्त्वास्ति वाणीषडमहाकवीनाम् ।
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